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The preparation of this dissertation has been an engaging
and rewarding project. There were difficulties, to be sure, ohief among
them being Tillich's highly individualistic vocabulary and oompressed
style whioh produced a oertain initial apprehension. But this writer,
for one, oan testify to the transition (that is likely to come to anyone
who will study Tillioh,s thought) from bewilderment to profound admirat¬
ion and appreciation. Dawson's thought presented no such initial complies-
tions due to his luoid and arresting style. There were, however, diffi¬
culties to be encountered in attempting to uncover the basic philosophical
and theological presuppositions in his thinking. It is regrettable that
Tillich's second volume of his Systematic Theology is not yet in print.
This hurdle, however, was not insurmountable, for Tillioh has published,
in mimeographed form, an outline of his forthcoming Systematica whioh is
really an abstraot of material to be covered in Volume II. (Quotations
from this source are referred to in footnotes as The Propositions.)
It is hoped that the British reader will over-look the Amerioan
spelling. An attempt has been made, however, to delete all .American
colloquialisms•
I wish to express my thanks to those who have helped in the
preparation of this dissertation, to my advisers: Professors Charles S.
Duthie and James Torranoe, to Robert H. Daubney, Q.I. Watkin, V.A. Demant,
Nels Ferre', Mrs. Lilly PlnouB (who loaned some of Tillioh's German writ¬
ings), Charles Kegley, C.Ray Dobbins, John Balllle, Donald Maokinnon,
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and, above all, to James Luther Adams who loaned a number of un¬
published essays by Dr, Tillioh. I am indebted also to the subjects
of this dissertation themselves for their willingness to answer queries
about their life and work. Regardless of oritioisms expressed herein,
my own thinking has been highly stimulated by the writings of these
men and I wish to record here my deepest gratitude for the privilege
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Our culture# as Paul linear aptly remarks#* has bean subjected
to an "epidemio of philosophers of history" as is witnessed in the work
of such men as Toynbee# Spangler, Latourette, Berdyaev# Butterfield#
Collingwood# and now Tillich and Dawson. Nevertheless (in the view of
this writer) there should be no quarantine on such attempts# for the
interpretation of history is one of the pressing needs of our time •
perhaps the crucial question of the hour#
The world transfonaation in the midst of which we are now
living makes the interpretation of history all the more urgent# Every¬
where men are asking such searching questions as "Why is there such
suffering in history?", "Does God care?"# "What is the meaning of it
all? - or is there a meaning?", "Where is history going?"# "Will there
be an end to history?" These "damned questions# as Dostoevsky oalled
thorn,are haunting men and cannot be answeredwithin the framework of
historical research# They probe deeper to the question of the meaning
of existence itself and thus become philosophical and theological quest¬
ions# The rational structure of man's nature demands that he find some
illuminating clues that will make sense out of history - especially in
2
critical days# By the contingencies of our historical destiny, then#
we are driven to the problem of the interpretation of history#
The authors selected for this study are both keenly aware of
the critioal moment through which civilisation is passing# The titles
^■"Between Two Worlds* Escha to logy and History," in Interpretation#
January# 1951# P* 27
2
Periods of orisis have always stimulated interest in the inter¬
pretation of history as witnessed by the Maccabean revolt (Daniel), the
Domitian persecution (Revelation), and the barbaric invasion of Rome
(De Civitate Dei)•
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of two of their respective books, The Shaking of the Foundations (Tillich),
and The Judgment of the listions (Dawson) reveal a conoern about the present
world transformation. Both thinkers, due to wide eatperience end catholic
outlook, are aware of the disorder in all realms of life (in art, litera¬
ture, politics, education, ethios, philosophy - as well as in the strictly
"religious" realm) and are thus equipped to make pronouncements on the
total human situation as few others in our time are able to do.
Both authors are thoroughly steeped in their own traditions
(one a Protestant and the other a Roman Catholic) and eaoh is attempting,
to a degree, to relate the interpretation of history to his own tradition.
Tillioh asks the question oonoerrdng the relationship of Protestantism to
the present world transformation (indeed, the question of whether Protest¬
antism can even survive as an institutional foroe)j Dawson, on the other
hand, is searching for the relationship of Catholioism to the new world
order. Both adhere to their respective traditions not only out of emotion
or paternal loyalties (Dawson, in faot, was converted from Anglicanism to
Roman Catholioism) but out of reflection and deep conviction.
Tet both, in many instances, transcend the limitations of their
own faith and press toward an even more comprehensive view of history than
either tradition affords. It seems, to this author, that the impartial
reader will find that both Tillich and Dawson have captured insights that
are totally beyond the limited scope of either*s tradition. An attempt
therefore will be made in this dissertation to reach a larger perspective
and to show that the proper interpretation of history demands elements
more characteristically associated with Catholicism (an ontologioal approach
in which reason is seen as the structure of being, a sacramental view of
7
life, a high eeoleaiology centering in authority and tradition, an appreoiat-
of culture and the history of religions, an emphasis upon philosophy in
corr* lation with theology, etc.) as well as those elements more tradition¬
ally associated with Protestantism (prophetic Judgment upon absolute pre¬
tentions, the right of autonomous structures as against heteronomous author¬
ity, a distrust of magical sacramentalism, and an insistence upon the tran¬




Paul Tillich, who was largely unknown to th© English-speaking
world five or ten years ago* is fast coming to the forefront of world-wide
O
theological discussion and is now being widely hailed as one of the most
creative minds of our time#
Since Tillich has already published three autobiographical
5
essays on separate occasions, it will hardly be necessary to go into
detail at this point# Nevertheless, a skeleton outline would seem ap¬
propriate in order to plaoe him in relation to bis intellectual anteced¬
ents and to call attention to some relationships between his life and his
thought#
Paul Johannes Tillich was born at Starsedel in Prussia on
August 20, 1886# The son of a Lutheran pastor, he was reared in a tradi¬
tional and conservative home typical of the bourgeois society which hewas
later to criticise so vehemently# Tillioh had the experience of growing
u£ in some of the old medieval towns of Germany, first at Schbnfliess-
Meumark (from the ages of four to eleven) and later at KSnigsberg-Neumark
(from the ages of twelve to fourteen)# As a result he rather naturally
acquired an historical temperament.
To grow up in towns in which every stone is witness of a period many
centuries past produces a feeling for history, n t as a matter of
knowledge, but as a living reality which the past participates in the
present#^
J
For a considerable period proceeding this, however, Tillioh had a
vdds influence on continental thought as is witnessed in Otto Piper's treat¬
ment of Tillich's views in his Recent Developments in German Protestsnism,
(Londont Student Christian Movemeht Press, 193L), PP» l36-lh3»
^Tillich's writings have been translated recently into Italian, Japanese,
and German#
^The Interpretation of History, pp# 3-735 The Protestant Era, pp»xxlii«
xlvj The Theology of Paul Tiliich, pp, 3"21*
^Paul Tillich, "Autobiogrphioa1 Reflections," in The Theology of Paul
Tillich,(Mew Yorks Maomillan Col, 1952), p# 5*
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These experiences quite naturally led to an appreciation of the Middle
Ages • a fact that -was responsible in part for Tillich's later formulation
of the idea of a theonomous sooiety.^
The medieval environment of his youth was also responsible,
Tillich believes, for certain leanings toward Romanticism as is evidenced in
his love of poets such as Goethe, JJ&lderlin, George, end Rilke. His love
of nature was also closely associated with this phase of his life. He
speaks of frequent communion with nature and of periods of "mystical partio-
2
ipation. This sensitivity to nature no doubt had much to do with his
later ohoice of Sohelling as the subject for his dootoral dissertations.
Communion with nature, he claims, was also responsible for certain charac¬
teristics of his thought such as the Dynamic Mass, the boundary situation,
the unconditional as Ground and Abyss, and his re-statement of the classical
3
view that salvation is cosmic and includes nature as well as man.
Another influence during his formative years was the philosophical
interest of his father, who maintained the classical position that ultimately
there can be no conflict between phil sophical truth and revealed truth,^
Tillioh comments that it was only on the basis of his being permitted to do
some independent philosophical thinking that he was able to break the tight
hold of the Prussian authoritarian tradition, as symbolized in his father.
And through achieving autonomy in the field of philosophy, he could then begin
to experience it in other realms,
—
The Theology of Paul Tillioh, pp. 5£,
2
Ibid,, p. 5«
^The Interpretation of History, pp. 7f•
\'he Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 8.
''idem.
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Tillich received, his formal training at the humanistic gymnasium
in lCBnigsberg and later at a similar institution in Berlin. During his
university days he developed a keen interest in philosophy which led ulti¬
mately to his receiving the Doctorate of Philosophy from the University of
Breslau in 1911 (his dissertation being "Die religionsgeschichtliche Kon-
struktion in Schilling's positiver Philosophic, ihra Voraussetsungen und
Prinzipien") and the Licentiate of Philosophy from the University of Halle
in 1912 (his thesis being "Mystik und Sohuldbewussteein in Schelling's
philosophischer Sntwioklung")• This interest in pure philosoph, hn3 charac¬
terized his work ever since.
In addition to Schelling's influenee on him (especially in relation
to his nature-mysticism, his doctrine of the Unconditional, and the signif¬
icance of guilt), Tillioh admits his indebtedness to philosophers as diverse
as Kant (for his oritioal norms), Bohme^for his awareness of non-being and
g
the abyss), Hegel (for his idealistic and dialectical approaoh), Fiohte
(for his self-world correlation), Nietzsche (for his existential method),
Troeltsch (for his historical relativism), Hurssel (for his phenomenology),
and his own teacher K&hler (for his view of theology as mediation and his
early formulations of the Protestant principle). Thus Tillich's thought,
as Randall puts it, has been "fertilized with many of the insights of a
century [and more] of German thinking." ^
In 1913# Tillich received ordination in the "Evangelical Lutheran
Church and in the following year began a four-year term as a chaplain in the
German Amy during World War I. When he returned from the war, Tillich began
■his academic career as a Prlvatdozent of Theology at the University of Berlin.
•'•The Interpretation of History, p. 160 f.
Especially the young Hegel (See "Estrangement and Reconciliation in
Modern Thought")
3
John Herman Randall, "The Ontology of Paul Tillich," in The Theology of
Paul Tillich, p. 136 f•
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It was in this period immediately following the war and its accompanying
chaos that Tillich became aware of the great gap between the churches and
the masses, between Lutheranism and Socialism.* This painful awareness thrust
him out from the secluded academic world to grapple realistically with the
pressing social problems of the hour. He and his associates (indeed, many
of his generation) felt that they were living in a creative moment in history
when the time was ripe for great social and religious strides. They were,
as Heimaxm puts it, "inspired and transported by the feeling that this was
the crisis that could end only in new creation* ermany defeated, humil¬
iated, punished ... shaken and purged and thereby enabled to bring tha
„2 r
world religious socialism. • • • What was this Religious Socialism? it
was an attempt to bridge the gap between Lutheranism and Sooialism and to show
each side its need for the other; it was an attest to convince the churches
that Socialism had spiritual roots (in its prophetisia) and, on the other
hand, to convince the Socialists that apart from religious infusion their
optimism would end in utopianism. The periodical leue Blatter fur den
Sozialismus" whioh Tillich inaugurated attempted to stimulate thinking at
these points. Under the impact of this movement, Tillich conceived some of
the characteristic motifs of his thought* the doctrine of the kairos (as
the creative turning-point in history), the demonic (as evil structural
foroes sueh as Capitalism), and the Protestant principle (as that norm which
is absolutely opposed to any final stage in either religious or social
3development)•
It might be well here to comment on the Marxism that was implicit
in this movement. Although Religious Socialismwas widely influenced by
%'ho Interpretation of iistory, pp. 19ff; 5k •
Sduard Iieimann,"Tillich's Dootrine of Religious Socialism," The Theology
of Paul Tillich, p. 316
—tt—
The Interpretation of History, pp. 5^5- ff•
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Marxian ideas, Tillieh maintains that the movement never took an undialect-
ioal view of Marxist doctrine and that there was always "no" coupled with
"yes," criticism as well as acceptance. This movement was indebted to
Marx for his penetrating insight into the contradictions of disintegrating
bourgeois society,* for his uncovering of the economically-determined ideol¬
ogy which this society used to mask its real purposes (its will to continue
in power), for his prophetic protest against religious idolatry and his
prophetiS awareness of the historioal struggle between good and evil, for
his doctrine of man (as man in society - in the context of his total behavior),
and for his dialectical materialism (revealing the economic basis of the
social and spiritual structures of society in their relationships and antithe¬
ses), Nevertheless, the Religious Socialists were acutely critical of other
elements in Marx, or better, in Marxism - its metaphysical determinism (the
hardening of the doctrine of dialeetioal materialism into a meohsnism of
calculable processes involving the negation of human freedom), its utopian-
isa (anticipating that history would reach its final stage in the establish¬
ment of the proletariat), its enti-scientifio fanaticism,^ and its tendency
to become just another ideology itself (failing to see that dialectical
materialism may also become a class-determined tool in the preletarian
struggle for power),
"'■"The most magnificent theoretical interpretation and the most effective
practical interpretation of an historical period was the Marxist analysis
of capitalist society" Kingdom of God and History," p, li»l)
2"How Much Truth Is There in Karl Marx?", The Christian Century




This interest in cultural and political activities quite naturally
brought Tillich into conflict with Sarth. Tillich had joined the Barthians,
insaediately following the war, in their protest against the liberal-Protestant
surrender to bourgeois culture (as in the myth of progress). But now as Berth
and his followers were developing a purely kerygmatic theology (giving only
answers apart from any concern with the "situation"), Tillich began to attack
Barthianism as a neo-supernaturalism and joined in a polemic with Barth
almost as heated as the more celebrated one between Barth and Bruaner.* By
putting culture outside the realm of Christian concern, Barth, Tillieh charged,
was rendering it invulnerable to both the critical as well as the forming
2
(and transforming) power of religion.
During this period, especially as a result of his stay at Marburg
(where Heidegger was then located), Tillioh oame under the influence of the
movement known as existentialism. In thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche,
and Sartre, he found a depth of spiritual insight unknown in Christian
circles and great meaning even in their analyses of the meaninglessness of
life. Although Tillich did not accept the existentialist's answers^he did
loam much from their method of thinking. The existentialist's terminology
and vocabulary remain to this day a unique component of Tillich's thought.
In the late 'twenties and early 'thirties, Tillich's interest in
political movements lod him to such an outspoken criticism of National Social¬
ism^ that when Hitler came to power in 1933# Tillich was aaiong the first
fifteen professors to be removed from their positions. That same year he
came to the United States and for a time continued his fight against Nazism
in the form of open letters to his personal friend, Gmmanuel Hirsch, one of
phf haophars of -tee¬
the New Lu the rani am that was aligning itself with the Nazi movement. In those
A
letters Tillich challenged Hirsch's uncritical support of Nazism as an
^Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God (Edinburgh! T.cT.Clark,1936),
pp. 52, 60, 68-70, bk-5, iyj, 156, 2U9, 3567
^The Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 29 ff.
"
*-> « ft » .s i n 1~ _ > 1 £ J.. £ *%. U .nn n mi ww «*#*«* n r±A Ihtr Ma 9 4 *5 -
1h
embodiment of a specific kairos,*
During this period of the 'twenties and early 'thirties, Tillich
held positions at several different universities (Berlins 1919^1^4; Marburg:
1921+-1925J Dresdens 19251 Leiptlgs 1925-19291 Frankfurt: 1929-1933). At
each university he taught in a slightly different department - philosophy,
philosophy of religion, scienoe of religion, or theology. He speaks of his
teaching responsibilities during this period as involving "a constant change
of faculties end yet no change in the subject I As a theologian I tried to
2
rem in a philosopher, end oonversely so," His desire was to stay on the
boundary line between philosophy and theology so that he could relate the
two and thus reveal their deeper interdependence.
This breadth of concern is paralleled in Tillich's eagerness to
partloipate in a wide range of social and intellectual activities, he was
accepted as a congenial member not only by philosophical or theological
groups but as well by .he Bohemian world - the artists, aotors, writers,
and poets? These associations, no doubt, account for his awareness of the
manifold spiritual movements outside the churchesBut above all Tillich
kept in contact with the labor unions and felt the proletarian struggle as
his own. His interest in economics, then, was never purely academic but
always included involvement and participation.
By living on boundary lines between widely-divergent groups,
Tillich consciously sought to hold a mediating position between social
classes, between church end society, between idtalism and realism, between
—Mi i -iimi n—ninn ■■...■ >m,,m Mi— < ii "i"mim ■■■■'■■ !»«'■nun ■■■■ I »■—■■■»—» «i—i ■■ Kill
•'•"Die Theologje des Kairos und die gggenwartige geistige Paget offener
"riaf fin ■ taanuar~iIi'rsoh',,v Tlteologi'sche Blotter, 1934 (Dovemberj ,X111, %
"Um was es Ghet, Antwort an 5ianuel HirscK1' in Theologisohe Blatter (May, 1 >55)
pp, 118-120,
^Ihe Theology of Paul Tillioh, p. 10} The Interpretation of History, p«it0 f,
■7. ™ '
^Tho only movement Tillich has kept in touch with in the United States is
the depth-psychology movement. It is impossible, Tillich believes, "to elabo¬
rate a Christian doctrine of man, • , without using the immense material brought
fourth by depth psychology," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p, 19•
reflects in b is toe*. T^c. SrtuaH-jon .
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Lutheran!sm and socialism, between liberalism and orthodoxy, and between
Catholicism (as "sacramental rerlity") end Protestantism (as "prophetic
protest")* * Tillioh compares this task to that of St. Paul who became
v ♦ ..2all things to all men* In coniperable fashion Tillieh endeavored to become
a realist so as to capture the realists, a Marxian in order to capture the
Marxists, and an existentialist in order to capture the exist"*entialists*
His purpose in doing this was to appreciate the good in each approach and
from there to point out the unavoidable frustrations if taken as a complete
system, thus pointing to Christianity as the ultimate answer to their deepest
guest*
When Tillich arrived in the United States he leotured at various
colleges and universities, and in 193b joined the faculty at the Union
Theological Seminary, Hew *ork City, where he has remained ever since* His
adjustment was a difficult one due to the fact that there had been almost no
3
linguistic preparation* But through the discipline of having to express
himself in another language, Tillich feels that he has developed greater
precision and clarity in the presentation of his ideas* In a manner not
uncommon to German thinkers he was prone to conceal ambiguities under the
cover of German philosophical terminology.^ But this experience of coming
to the new world brought about changes not only in terminology but as well
in content. Tillich speaks of the experience of adjusting to a new environ¬
ment as a creative and invigorating one and is appreciative of what he has
u— - - »■ ~
See "On the Boundary" in The Interpretation of History, pp. 3-73* Demant
has commented that Tillich "shows a"penchant for'dangers of living and thinking
over the chasm. * * whioh makes his altitude highly idiosyncratic and therefore
often, perhaps more interesting than helpful." ("A Theologian on Historical Ex¬
istence," in Christendom (Oxford), (December, 1937)* VII* 285*
%ee Tillioh's sermon "The Theologian" (Part II), The Shaking of the
Foundations,(Student Christian Movement Press, L ndont 19^9)* PP«WTFT
^The adjust ent was difficult for his audiences, too. ".•*"• Hor1»n tells d?
coming away from a lecture bewildered* "It was hours later that I realized*.*
that the word "waykwoom," many times repeated, and the key to the whole lecture
was meant to represent the English word "vacuum*" (Walter M.Iiorton, "Tillici's
Role in Contemporary Theology," The Theology of Paul Tillioh, p* 35 •
TFhe Protestant Era, (London* KisbeT"tT Co,fLtd,1951) P* xxiv*
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learned from the American way of life.^ From his experiences in America,
Tillich believes he has gained a new appreciation of creativity and open-
p
ness to the new as evidenoed in a dynamic civilisation, a new appreciation
of ethics,-* an enhanoed "world perspective," and a renewed hope in the
possibility of a world ohuroh.^4.
Since arriving in the United States, Tillich has continued his
5
political activities and his interest in Religious Socialism. He worked
in cooperation with the New School of Social Research in New York City and
served for a number of years on the Graduate faoulty of its Politioal and
6
Social Science Department. During World War IX,Tillich participated in
broadcasts to Germany in an attempt to interpret the significance of the war
as he saw it. He was active in the "Self-Help for Emigrees from Central Europe"
committee and was also chairman of the "Council for a United Germany" which
worked for the reconstruction of post-war Germany along democratic lines.
But the failure of some of these efforts, especially the latter when the
East-West split within the membership beeame a reality, discouraged him
from suoh extensive participation in politioal movements in the years
since the war. Moreover, the present period, he feels, is radically different
from
See "I Am An American," The Protestant (July, 19l|l)» III* No. 12. In
"Mind and Migration," Social Research (September, 1937) IV* 295-305* Tillioh
calls attention to the importance of "c oss-fertilisation of minds" in the
history of oreative thought. See especially pp. 295
%he Courago to Be (Hew Havenj Yale University Press, 1952)* PP* 108 f.
Beyond Religions Socialism," The Christian Century (June 15* 191+9)*
P. 732.
^Contacts with students from many lands at Union Seminary is the basis
of this observation. (The Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 17 P.)
^See Tillioh^ oontributions to Christianity and Society published by
the Frontier Fellowship for Christian Social Reconstruction, hew York City.
^Tillioh contributed articles to Sooial Research published by this
school ("The Totalitarian State and the Claims of the Church," 193ki "The
Social Funotions of the Churches in Europe and America," 1936; "Mind and
Migration," 1937)•
17
that folio-wing the last -war. Instead of a feeling of hopefulness, creativ¬
ity, and the possible reoeption of a kairos, there is cynicism, despair,
spiritual darkness, and vacuum. Nevertheless, consistent -with hie effort
to maintain a balanced view in every crisis, Tillich feels that the present
mood of despair in the aftermath of World War II is to be condemned just as
much as the mood of unlimited optimism following World War I. The proper
mood for the Christian at either juncture of history would be a "realism of
hope" (realistic, but not pessimistic; hopeful, but not Utopian).
Tillich insists that he still believes in Religious Socialism but
doubts that the adoption of it as a principle is a possibility in any foresee-
2
able future. Hence, Tillioh has tended to turn from politioal aotivism to
the task of systematic theological construction. 1'his, it would seem, is the
most decisive turn of his throught in reoent years.
At present, Tillich is at work on the second series of his Gifford
leotures to be given at Aberdeen, Sootland, in the Fall of 195U« These
lectures will comprise Volume II of his Systematic Theology. Professor
Tillich will retire from his chair of Philosophical Theology^ in 195ht when,
it is hoped, he will have a chance to fill in some of the details of his
elaborate system.
Although it is too early to make any final appraisal of Tillioh's
work, it does not seem inappropriate to recall a few tributes that have been
made to him. Georgia Harkness has compared his work to that of Whitehead in
its comprehensiveness and its appreciation of the depth-dimension of existence.^
The Protestant Bra, p. xlv.
"Beyond Religious Socialism," in The Christian Century,June 15,19^9, P*733»
^Tillichfs desire to bridge the gap between Philosophy and Theology is
evidenoed in the title of his professorship at Union Seminary. See "Philosophy
and Theology" in The Protestant Era, pp. 93 ff•
^"What Whitehead is to American philosophy, Paul Tillich is to American
Theology," Georgia Harkness, "The Abyss and the Given," Christendom (Chicago),
(Autumn, 1938), III, 508.
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T. K. Greene has oalled him the "most enlightened and therapeutic theologian
1 2
of our time." Walter Marshall Horton oleims that Tillich is a "new Aquinas"
and prophesies that his sj&em will provide "a dwelling place for multitudes
of homeless modern minds fven his most able critics cannot help but praise
the depth of his insights and the breadth of his comprehension. To this
....
writer it appears that the architectonic structure of thought that Tillich
is building up may be oorpared to Kinstein's Unified Field Theory in its
attempt to cover the greatest number of facts with the smallest number of
hypotheses^ or, to express it in Tillich's own terms, in its attempt to
embrace the whole of existence and essence in the most meaningful system
of correlations and polarities.
^Theodore M. Greene, "Paul Tillioh and Our Secular Culture," The Theology
of Paul Tillioh, p. 50.
g"
In Arnold Hash's Protestant Thought in the Twentieth Century (New York*
Macmillan Co., 1951)# pp. 120-121. Tillich's"Trotestant synthesis, however,
is organically different from the Thomistic synthesis. It is the difference
between "a correlation of negative and positive (question and answer, philos¬
ophy and theology, reason and revelation) and a correlation of two positives
(natural knowledge and revealed truth)" and even more fundamentally "between
a presoientifio Weltanschauung claiming finality for itself, and one which
is everywhere cognizant of scienee and its implications, and which above all
claims no such finality."(Charles Kegley in the Introduction to The Theolo<;y
of Paul Tillich, p. xiv.)
Sfhe Theology of Paul Tillich, p. Itf
^Lincoln Barnett, The Universe and Dr. iinstein (New York* Mentor Books,1952)
p. 122 f, "
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CHAPTER TWO
THE MEANING AND MAKING OF HISTORY
X* The Definition of History
The term*history1 is a difficult one and is admittedly subject
to ambiguous interpretations. It refers, of course, to an understanding of
the past. This is, perhaps, its fundamental meaning or its "primary defin¬
ition." But in both Tillioh end Dawson, the term 'history1 is much b reader
then thisj it includes an interpretation of existence as a ■whole. Both
authors are oonoerned with history in its cosmic setting - in its relation
to the eternal. Therefore the interpretation of history for them involves
such diverse elements as the doctrine of men, nature, freedom, Christ, time,
sin, salvation, o. action, and esohatology. These remifioations, which are
especially prominent in Tillioh's thought, will be treated in the next
chapter ("History and Existence"). But there are initial questions which
must first be answered, such asi "What makes history what it is - fact, or
interpretations of faots?', "Where does history find its meaning?", "How is
it constituted?" These questions will form the basis for this beginning
chapter and will serve to help define further this ambiguous term 'history.'
According to the "primary definition" mentioned earlier, history,
for Tillioh, is the interpretation of past events. But for Tillioh this
statement is not so simple as it seems. Behind this definition stands an
interesting dialeotio, the understanding of whioh leads to stimulating and
provooative conclusions. The two elements in this definition (past events
and interpretation) convey the double meaning of the worl 'history', for
history, Tillich insists, is at the same time both events and interpretation
in mutual interaction.1 In other words, history is subjective as well as
Propositions (Preliminary Draft for Systemtic Theology),Part V, p. 1|
"The Kingdom of God and History," in The Kingdom oiv God "and1''History (H.G.Wood,
editor), Oxford Conference Series, (Londoni George All'sn &' Urrwin, Ltd, 1933),
pp. 108 ff.
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objective, and both of these elements are necessary and interdependent.
There would be no history apart from events to be reoorded, nor would there
be any history apart from the interpretation of these events. The elaborat¬
ion of the latter half of this affirmation - that there is no history apart
from interpretation - marks the beginning of Tilliohfs creative construction.
Against the common-sense view of history as a collection of past objective
events, Tillich maintains that there is no such thing as objective history
apart from its subjective interpretation. Pure objectivity is, in fact,
2
meaningless. Apart from interpretation, pure objectivity is a denial of
meaning, for meaning is always meaning for someone.
Eistory means firstly the aocount of past events, secondly the
events themselves. The subjective meaning of history precedes
its objective meaning. ... Genuine history is recorded [ in¬
to rpreteTrfl^story.^
2. "Centers" of History and the Rise of Historical Consciousness
Beoaus® history is conceived primarily in terms of interpretation,
Tillich's whole approach hinges on the idea of the meaning of history.
No interpretation is possible (and therefore no history in the full sense
of the word) without a meaningful view of reality based on a decision,
"History," Tillich declares, "is established or destroyed with the decision
for or against its reality as a meaningful process."^ Yet the deoision for
meaning cannot be an abstract one. It must be based on a concrete reality *
a „ - ,, ■
This subjective character distinguishes history from historiography
which strives after pure fact. But even in historiography, according to 1'iliioh,
interpretation is necessarily involved. (Propositions, Part V, p. 6.)
u ■' ■'■■■ 1 —
"If history wore an objaotive process in time and space, then it would
have to possess an objective beginning and and. • • •" (The Interpretation of
History, p. 2I4.9.) And this, says Tillioh, leads to numerous problems,
''Propositions, Part V, p. 1 (italics mine).
^The Interpretation of Plstor; , p. 2l{9,
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an event which a human group sees as an egression of the ultimate
meaning of its existence. The Persians, for instance, found their luminous
even in Zarathustra, the Jews in the dxodus,and the giving of the Law on
Mt. Sinai, the Moslems in the flight of Mohammed to Medina, the Communists
1 ,, «
in the rise of the proletariat. Tillich uses the tern center to describe
2
such a meaning-giving event. When, a group has found meaning, direction,
and purpose through reference to such a "center" it has become historically
conscious. Whenever historical consciousness has arisen, Tillieh declares,
it hrs appeared as a correlary to such a concrete principle (a "center")
whioh has been the basis of its meaning. Since there is no genuine history
apart from such a center to give meaning and direction to the temporal
prooess, the oenter in reality constitutes history - or makes history what
it isi Tillich further maintains that there is no genuine history apart
from a group's self-interpretation. Historical consciousness, for Tillich,
is the achievement of a group and never an individual creation. Only events
which stand related to the life of human groups are historical events. A
group which grasps (or is grasped by) a transcendent purpose or gaal feels
itself responsible for sustaining and upholding the values it has come to
know. Through t he self-interpretation of its existence, such a group creates
r————— —-
The Interpretation of History, p. 258jk "The Kingdom of God and History,"
pp. 10$ flP.
2
The Interpretation of History, pp. 252, 262. The value of the nce iter"
concept is that 'it''gives Tillioh a chance to compare Christ as "oenter" to
other "centers" of history implicitly or eaplici% affirmed by various
oultures or groups. % generalizing the concept, a prinoiple of comparison
is gained whereby other'benters" oan be judged (and appreciated) as hiddm
quests for the Christ, The term "center," than, gives "an abstract and uni¬
versal meaning to the Chistological idea" and helps Christianity to express
the universal olaim of its center. The Interpretation of History, p. 259.
^Tillioh thus believes that in order to understand history one must
participate fully in the life of an historioally-oonsoious group such as the
proletariat or the Church.
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"history," Tlllich oalls a group which fulfills this funotion a "bearer
of history," Paradoxically, such groups often appear at the place of
greatest meaninglessness and suffering,a a with the Israelites in persecution
and the proletariat in the depth of de-huajanization, In such situations,
the ideological cover of acceptable truth wears thin and men are driven to new
and radical truths. In view of this dependence upon a meaning-giving "center"
and a value-bearing group, the fact that historical consciousness is a
relatively rare occurrence is readily understandable. Historical conscious¬
ness has, in faot, appeared only at a comparatively late stage of human
development. Though man as man has always had the capacity for history, this
capacity has seldom been actualized, "We can perhaps rightly assume," says
Tillioh, "that the majority of men lived without history,"^ It is perhaps
true even today that a large section of mankind lives without history (histor¬
ical consciousness), for only as an individual is related to a group striving
for the realization of meaning does he participate in history in its truest
sense, "Only he who can know that he has history, has history in a signif-
g
leant sense of the word,"
If historical consciousness has been rare, what aooounts for thisf
* I . ' 5
There are, according to Tillioh, two predominant non-historioal outlooks,"'
One is the mystical utiawareness of history, as classically expressed in Indian
mysticism and neo-Platonism. Everything temporal is regarded as deoeptivs and
evil; the real and the good lie outside the temporal process. Therefore the
attempt is made to rise above temporality and nature to eternity and super-
nature, Even Roman Catholicism and Neo-Urthodox supernaturalism are in danger
^The Interpretation of History, p. 25I+
^"Man and Society in Religious Socialism," Christianity and Society
(Fall, 19143), VIII, p. 13.
^The Protestant Cra, pp« 38 ff«
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of succumbing to such a non-historical view through negating the value of
the temporal process.)"'' Such views, Tillich believes, are not conducive to
the development of historical consciousness. The other major non-historical
outlook, according to Tillich, is the naturalistic unawareness of history.
This is olassically expressed in the Greek cyclical view and is probably
the most common Y*eltanschauung 6f the ancient and primitive worlds. In this
view, the temporal prooess remains in bondage to the course of nature, and
space predominates against time. All life is interpreted in terms of nature
as the unfolding or developing of what is enveloped. Nothing really new is
expected. What Tillich calls the "myth of origin"^holds swayj the good is
regarded as bel nging to an original Golden Age to which the temporal process
5
shall some day return. This naturalistic outlook is often expressed in a
saoramental view of life. Nature is regarded as an expression of the holyj
the holy is therefore a present reality end not a demand or an expectation,
dmphasis is laid upon nation, blood, and soil. The motherly characteristics
predominate and life is regarded as warm, sustaining, and embracing. Tillich
regards National Socialism as an attempt to return to such a nature-sacrament¬
al view. In an open letter to Emanuel Hirsch, Tillich criticizes Eirach and
the German Christiana for their cannonization ("Eeiligsprechung") of events
given in time and space. "You have ohanged the Kairos doctrine which is
meant to be prophetical and eschatol gical into a priestly and saoiameatal
i 1
AIn contrast to this, Protestantism at its best does not flee into super-
nature but"romains in nature as the sphere of decision." (The Interpretation
of History, p. 13k)
^Die Sozialistjsche hntsoheidung, (Potsdami Protte, 1933). 99• 28 i'f.j
The Interpretation of History, bpJ 236 ff.
—
•"{Such cyclical views, Tillich notes, cannot be disproved by empirical
resoaroh(for who could prove that the span of history as we know it will not
someday be repeated?). Though we may discern forward motion and meaning
within a limited period of time, we cannot prove that time and space as a whole
move irreversibly forward. This is a matter of faith and decision, (•'•he Inter¬
pretation of History, pp. Zk7 ff.)
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afiszssmsrriKSL conseoration (V'aihe) of a present-day event," In contrast
to these views, historical consciousness has appeared only when the cycle of
nature has been broken through and when time has torn itself away from its
2
bondage to space. This occurred first of all in the Judeo-Christian tradit-
ion (although foreshadowed by the Persians), The figure of Abraham represent#
3
Israel's breaking away from the bondage to spaoe. As a nomadic people, the
Israelites were detached from the soil and thus tended to base their self-
interpretation upon a time-ooasciousness rather than a space-oonsoiousness.
They were bound to God by a covenant and not by the ties of blood and soil,
God was to lead them into a new landj but even this land was not to be theirs
by right. They were to remain a ntion without spaoe, as the exile and the
diaspora have shown, because of the work of the prophets, all priestly tradit-
ion was subordinated and judged by unconditional demand. The fatherly elements
of judgraent, decision, and demand predominated over the motherly, enfcraoing,
sacramental qualities. Breaking away from tho "myth of origin" they looked
forward, through the vision of the prophets, to the coming of the Christ and
his Kingdom,^ Through anticipation and expectation, time was given an ir¬
reversible forward movement,'' The "beside" category of spaoe (and its
— v —• ™— — ■
Die Theolo-de dos Kairos und die gegerxwartige geistige Lege," p, 312
2
This separation of nature from history do s net mean, however, the o
Tillioh considers them as two completely separated realms each with its own
metaphysic (The interpretation of history, pp. 1$2 ff,). With Tillich,"nature
i the basis"on wJiich history moves and without which history would have no
re; lity" (Cystomatic Theology, I, 122), Both nature and history are involved
in the tr; gxo separetxon oF existence from its essence, es we shall sea in
the next chapter. Therefore, "the unity of being between men and nature is
mere basic then their difference" (The Proteatant Bra, p. 100)
^"Christianity and -Emigration," The Presbyterian Tribune (October, 1936),
L1I, p. 13.
^tiie Bosialistische dntscheiduug, p. 34 ff.
See "Ahe Kingdom of God and History," p. 111,
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polytheistic ec ompaniments) gave way to the "toward" category of time.
Reslity was now seen in terms of the emergence of ths new, the novel, the
unexpected, and history was born.
This is the view Christianity inherited, and one that gave it its
creative principle. The full historical consciousness of early Christianity,
however, was soon lost in the priestly-ssoraxaental development. Except for
Augustine, the early church lost its tension toward the future, I'he Kingdom
was no longer vividly expected as imminent and approaching, but was regarded
as already having arrived in the Church, which was the visible expression of
the Kingdom and its power on earth. From time to time, seotarisn movements
2
sought to recover the esohatol gic&l dimension, but without permanent success.
All of this serves to underscore Tillioh's observation that historical con*
soiousness is in no sense the normal attitude of man toward his environment.
Historical consciousness (or, history in its genuine sense) is produced only
in reference to a meaning-giving "oenter" * some momentous event serving to
give direction and purpose to the otherwise scattered and dissociated events
of the temporal process.
Once a people has found a "center" a principle is thereby given
through which the beginning and end of the historical prooess are determined .
We are not speaking here of beginning and end in an empirical sense (or of
creation and eschaton in a trans-historical sense) but rather in a "mythical"
The Interpretation of History, p. 263•
p
It ie interesting to note that Tillich regards the Marxian interprotation




(and intra-historioal} sense. In keeping with the primarily subjective
eharaoter of history, the beginning of history for the historioally-conscious
group is the beginning of the expectation of the "center" and the end is
that point which raaries the fulfillment of all the possibilities implied in
the "center," For Christianity, this means that history begins with the
expectation of the Christ and ends with the reign of Christ in his Church,
3# The Absolute "Center" of History
Now if it is true that the oreation of "history" is dependent
upon the centering of a group around a meaning-giving principle, is it
not conceivable that several different groups may be focused at the same
time around different "centers" thus oreating several historical processes,
each claiming finality? It 1b true, Tillich says, that there are and have
been many "centers," But there oan be, theoretically, only one "oenter"
2
for history as a whole. Though eaoh center makes the claim for being the
one due to the totality of meaning, and each culture so centered tends to
think of its history as the absolute, thus forcing surrounding oultures in¬
to a dependent and subordinate role, there can be ultimately only one
"oenter" and one historical process.
What then of the conflicting claims? Which is right? What stand¬
ards can we use for determining the true "oenter"? Tillich suggests the
followingi firstly, the true "center" of history must somehow overcome the
~
^Tillich's distinction between historical (qualitative) and natural
(quantitative) time is helpful here, "Billions of years before and after
man appeared on the earth neither continue nor frustrate the meaningful
direotion of history. Neither the end nor the beginning of history can be
designated on the plane of physical time" ("The Kingdom of God and History,"
p. 111).
o
The Interpretation of History, pp. 250 ff•
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ambiguities of time and existence, including all the destructive, meaning¬
ly
defying powers of life, Eaoh "center implicitly or explicitly makes this
claim, We could consider here not only the world religions, but other
"oenters" of meaning suoh as humanism, soienoe, democracy, and imperial¬
ism,^ But without attempting to discuss these here, it will suffice to
indicate that none of these systems of meaning is able to o«reroome the
ambiguities of finite reality (as a "center" of history), thus failing
to rise above the self-contradictions of time and history. Capitalism,
for Instance, began as a genuine humanitarian movomont against the abuses
of t he feudal order and ended in de-humanization| Nationalism began as a
movement of national re-integration and has ended in world disintegration!
Communism began with the quest for sooial justice and has ended in tyranny.
The tragedy of all conditioned attempts to overcome existence is evident
in each of these movements of social reform. Thus Tillioh affirms that
no finite reality can of itself overcome the tragedy of the historical
process Secondly, the true "cental must be able to become a universal
"center" and embrace the whole of the temporal process and geographical
expanse of the world. But if a finite "center" should make this claim,
history would be delivered into the hands of a heteronomous power/* The
inability of any finite "center" to fulfill this function is immediately
'h'hus if history is affirmed at all, it must be affirmed not only as
a meaningful process, but also as a process in which the ambiguities of
life are finally overcome. The only history possible, therefore, is
"history of salvation,"
i . r i
The Interpretation of Ristory, p. 260.
■^Dawson notes the same tragic process. See especially his analysis
of the French Revolution in Progress and Religion (London* Sheed and Ward ,
191+5), PP. 230 ff, ~ ~ ~
^Systematic Theology, I, 13l+. For 8 discussion of heteronomy, see
Chapter XV.
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apparent. Both criteria can be met only by the appearance of a supra-
1
historical manifestation. History cannot overoome its own ambiguities.
"Only through the appearance of a super-historical unoonditoned meaning can
O
history gain an ultimate foundation." Ho immanent reality will do. This
is the basic error of Utopianism. It depreciates the past in favor of an
ideal future expected within this time process. Such a view not only
fails to see that human nature is perpetually involved in sin. but ex¬
cludes as well all previous generations from a share in the realisation
of the final meaning of their existence.^Hor can an imaginary transformation
of existence, as in the idea of progress toward an ever-receding goal, give
an ultimate meaning to the temporal process. Such a view fails to see
that an "infinite approximation to the final fulfillment would replace
the fulfillment by the way toward itj and this is ultimately self-contradictory!^
Both immanent and imaginary transformations of existence, Tillieh believes,
finally end in non-historicrl stagnation.^ Genuine history can be affirmed,
therefore, only on the basis of ultimate meaning supported by an uncondition¬
al reality appearing in existence with transforming power.
This leads us directly to what may be called the quest for the
"Hew Being." H^oh center is, to a degree, a hidden quest for a "Hew Being*•
a reality that overcomes the ambiguities of life. But the "New Being" in
^i'illich,s comment about final revelation In his Systematic Theology,
(i, 133 ff•) would seem to apply here. It is the idea that the final revel¬
ation is final only if it has the power of negating itself without losing
itself. This criterion is met only by Jesus as the Christ.
2
The Interpretation of History, p. 261
^"The Kingdom of God and History," p. 111.
k
Ibid., p. 112.
^Both views also fail to see what Tillich oalls "the ambiguity of the
good" - the idea that with every forward step and every technical advancement,
good as well as evil are "raised to a higher plane" (The Interpretation of
History, p. 56).
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its fullest content is actualized only in the Christ, In fact, as Tillioh
indicates, "the trends which are immanent in all religions and cultures
move toward the Christian answer."* In Christ as the Hew Being, what roan
essentially is has appeared under the conditions of existence withoutbeing
oorrupted by existence. Christ's victory over existence is, according to
the Gospel, a victory in which we can share. Because Christ makes avail¬
able unconditional power for the transformation of life (thus constituting
history as the "history of salvation") and because this power is valid for
all mankind, Christ, above all others, is the true "center of history."
]+. The Church and World History
The transformation of existenoe by the New Being, however, is
not just an external, objective event. In accordance with the subjective-
objective character of history itself (as also in accordance with the nature
of Jesus Christ as both event and interpretation), the Affect of the New
Being in history is both subjective and objective. The New Being is trans¬
forming power only as he is received by a believing group as its "center."
The Christ is not the Now Being apart from being received as such by faith.
Or, as Tillich puts it, "the uhrist is not the Christ without the church."
This means that the Naw Being must therefore create a cornmunity-
"the community of the New Being" - consisting of those who whare in the
reality of his transformation of existence. This community of the New Being
can become the oreative core of its society. In sooking to actualize within,
itself a theonomous attitude (a direction toward the Unconditional) it my
influence the society as a whole to become, even in its secular foras,
j —
Systematic Theology, I, 15»
^Ibid., I, 137. The reception of the Christ implies the reality of
human freedom. History becomes history only through the deoision for the
"center." There could be no history apart from human freedom.
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transparent to the holy and more of a true community, And it may finally,
through its universal claim and universal appeal, transform the whole of
mankind into one community, thus oreating world history.
points toward hat history may beoomej it is a demand and not something
already given, "Mankind" is a similar terms it suggests a possibility
but does not point to an aotual unity. Technical progress, however, has
brought into existence the conditions for the realization of such a unity.
In our oentury, for the first time, the universal unity of historical action
has beoome a possibility. Technical progress has brought into being a
unity of space for all mankindj thus "world" has become a reality. But,
tragically, the same technicques which can be used to bring the world to-
3
gether can also be used to split it apart, Althought "world" is a reality,
"world history" is still in process of becoming. Technical progress alone
cannot create "world history," "In order to have an interpretation for the
whole of history there must be seme historical group in which the meaning
«k
of the whole of history becomes manifest,"^ In other words, there inist be
a "bearer" of world history - a group in which the unity of mankind is
actualized (or a group which is, so to speak, a miorooosm of the essential
unity of mankind). The quest for such a group is the quest for the Church,
We noted earlier that, according to Tillioh, there is no history
apart from a group which, through its salf-interprotction, realizes meaning
■"•"•r * ' " ■ " -
Systematic Theology, I, 1lj8*
^Tfce Protestant Bra, p, 262,
x
""•What War Aims?" The Protestant (August-September, 19Ul)» IV, 13
The Protestant Bra, p, 262$ "Mind and Migration, p, 301,
At present there is no such thing as "world history," The idea
p
of world history is a metaphysical term, not an empirical reality. It
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and becomes a "bearer" of history.* If world history is ever to be a
reality, then there must be a group which includes the whole of mankind
in its self-interpretation. Further, as we noted earlier, there is no
real history apart from the interpretation by some group of its temporal events
as a "history of salvation." Where can such a group be found? The proletar¬
iat in the Marxist conception of history is one such attempt of a group to
become the "bearer" of u iversal history and is probably the Church's
greatest competitor in the claim for this title. (The proletariat, in
fact, has many characteristics of a Church, with its eschatological hope,
its struggle against the demonic, and its devotion to supra-individual
idealsBut the proletariat can never become a true bearer of wojbld
history* it is not sufficiently universal. The proletariat is, by definit¬
ion, a distinct class and its closest approach to real community is the
"solidarity" of its group. But this "solidarity" is a unified front against
all opponents and immediately keeps this group from being universal enough
k
to be a "bearer" of world history. A similar limitation applies to its
quest for salvation. Salvation, for the Marxist, is the salvation of the
proletariat achieved through the suppression of the bourgeoisie. In con¬
trast to this the Church has maintained its urdversality and is potentially
able to weld the whole of mankind into a true community. The Church alone,
5
"by bearing the course of history in whioh redemption and salvation appeared"
See page 21.
2See page 27, n.l.
^See "Marx and the Prophetic Tradition," Radical Religion (Autumn, 1935)#
I, 21-29.
^"Existential Philosophy," Journal of the History of Ideas(January, 19Wi)#
V, pp. 6U f.
''it should be noted, however, th t calling the church the "bearer of
history" is not so muoh a claim for the Church as it is a demand upon it.
("The Kingdom of Cod and History," p. 125).
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can give meaning to life as a whole.
The bearing of world history by the Church, however, is a
potentiality and not an actuality. The Church is divided and torn into
disputing factions* Further, thoro is tho distinction between what Tillich
calls the Latent Church and the Manifest Church. The Latent Church is the
indefinite historical group within paganism, Judaism, and humanism, in which
there is a quest for ultimate meaning (a hidden quest for the lew Being) and
a partial overcoming of demonio forces and the threat of jaeuninglessnsss.*
The Manifest Church, on the other hand, is the definite historical group which
consciously acknowledges the New Being and seeks to participate directly in
2
His transforming power.
Now the possibility of a world historical consciousness (or
world hiotory) oorrospondo to the possibility of a Manifest Church embracing
all mankind. Just as there is a latont and monifoat Church so there is a
latent and manifest world history. The great challenge to the Church of
our time io, through its missionary activity, to bear witness to the universal
character of Christ as the "center" of history and thus, through the trans¬
formation of the Latent Church into the Manifest Church, to serve as a
medium for the transformation of the latent (potential) world history into
an ootual world history.^ Because of the orucial position which Christian
missions hold in this development, Tillioh deolares that "missions more than
r~ —■— —
Propositions, Part IV, p. 27j Part V, p. 10.
p 1
Tho distinction between Latent and Manifest Church does not correspond
to that between tho Visible and Invisible Church, for both Latent and Manifest
Church have visible and invisible agressions. The Latent Church is not just
those Christians outside of institutional Christianity, but can include in¬
dividuals overtly hostile to the Church, as well as secular and humanistic
movements. The latter, Tillioh believes, are often more of a true Church
than the organized Church because of their prophotio powor combinod with an
absenoe of claim to the possession of final truth.
5"The Kingdom of God and History," p. 121.
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any political or teohnioal force for world unity have the key to world-
historioal consciousness,"^ By realizing the unity of mankind in the
community of the New Being and by making possible a world-historical
consciousness, the Church would fulfill its role as the "bearer of history"
in the ultimate sense. For this reason Tillich believes that
"'ihe history of the Church in its latency and its manifestation
is the central movement of world history because in it history
is world history, or history universal,"2
"History as the Problem of Our Period," Review of Religion, (March,
1939), III, p. 262.
2
Propositions, Part V, p. 11, (13)* (Part V of the Propostjons has
been published in legal size - foolscap - papeifas well as in the regular
size. Page numbers from the foolscap size will be given first, followed




X* History as the Problem of our Period
TilXich has, for several decades, repeatedly oailed attention
to the fact that the problem of the meaning of our historical existence
has become the c-uoial question of our time. In an oft-quoted statement,
he has declared that there has been a momentous shift of interest from
the pre\Tious period's concern with the control of nature to the modern
period's oonoern for the meaning of history. He has made full allowance for
this change of emphasis in his own systematic constructions, notably in
his re-interpretation of Christology in terms of the meaning of history,^*
and in his popularization of such terms as "center of history," "kairos,"
'bearer of history," and "the demonic
Other periods have had their basic questions, too, just as has
ours in its quest for a me* ningful interpretation of history. In a most
o
interesting analysis in ono of hie periodical articles, Tillioh character¬
izes the European development in terms of the basic question of each great
period - the all-embracing fundamental concern which is often asked only
indirectly or unconsciously. The pronouncements given in that article
make possible an outline of the various periods of history as follows»
600-100 B,C* - ©riod of radical questioning, arising from changes in
the sooial, political structure. Basic Question* "What
is the nature of ultimate being?"
IOO -B.C.-IiOO-A.D.-(Religious period of Greek and Chriatian philosophy)
Basic Question* "How can the individual soul of man be
3aved from the demonic?"
^"The old Christological struggle has been transformed into a struggle
about a Christian or a semi-pagan interpretation of history." (The Interpre¬
tation of History, p. 261 n#




ijD0-900 A,P. (Byzantine period) Basic Question! "How can all reality,
nature, history, and man become transparent for the spirit?"
900-lijOO A«D, (High Middle Ages) Basic Question* "How can a human
society, secular as well as religious, be built on a
sacramental basis?"
lijDO-1900 A.D. (Modern Period) Basic Question* "How can we build
society and control nature by human reason?"
1900 on - (Period of Crisis) Basic Question* "What is the meaning of
our historical existence?"
Baoh period's question (or fundamental concern) has been rooted in the
particular needs, demands, embarrassments, frustrations, and hopes of
the times. The roots of our present Interest in the meaning of history
(as the basic question of our period) are not difficult to trace. The
orisis through which we are living could not help but turn men's minds to
the question of the meaning of our historical existence and the cause of
our present tragedy, Tillich analyzes our present orisis in terns of its
foundation in the theory of automatic harmony, whioh was in vogue from the
seventeenth century onward. This presupposition, ho believes, was behind
the whole modern development (democracy, liberalism, individualism,
oapitalism, etc.). (This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five.)
As a result of the oollapse of this foundation, the achievements of t his
period have crumbled, one after another, before our feet. The decline of
Capitalism (especially in the heart of Europe) has been especially influent¬
ial as a force contributing to the rise of historical thinking. Appalling
conditions called for aotion of a drastio sort. But if action was to b e
successful, it must needs be based on a true understanding of historical
forces. Yet, pure interpretation for the sake of theorizing was farf rom
the intention of those concerned. There was a keen awareness that a paper
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interpretation of history must be rooted in historical decision end efotion,*
Religious Socialism, in its desire to bridge t he gap betwss n
the transcendent view of the churches and the immanent view of the social¬
ists, took over this insight and tried to couple a theological interpretat¬
ion with social action, Tillich, as one of the founders of this movement,
was thereby led into the quest for an interpretation of history as one
passionately involved in the political and social struggles of his society.
This philosophy of history, therefore, did not originate in abstraot speculat¬
ion but was wrought out on the anvil of suffering, anxiety, persecution,
and doubt. As Tillioh wrote later.
The new philosophy of history is a child of the World War and of
the subsequent revolutions and oatastrophes* It is not a product of
theoretical considerations in a scientific dotschment from history,
but is the work of men who wrestled with the puzzles of their own
fate as emigrees, driven from country to country, when tljey wrestled
with the puzzles of our period c nd of history generally.
The quest for a meaningful interpretation of history, however,
was soon found to be impossible apart from a new interpretation of man.
The anthropology implied in Marxism was inadequate, even if it did include
realistic elements far in advance of what was found in liberal Christianity,^
The quest for a meaningful interpretation of historical existence, then,
pointed to the need for^bew anthropology.
The doctrine of history drove us • I include myself in this g roup-
to the doctrine of man, Man has historyj therefore the interpretation
of history depends on the interpretation of man,*
iThe interdependence of interpretation and action was devel pad primarily
by Marx in his idea that interpretation apart from action io pure "ideology" -
a mask to camouflage the desire to maintain the status quo,
2"Uicholas Berdyaev," Religion end Life (Summer, 1938), p, i|07*
"*The defects in the socialist doctrine of men jre due primarily, Tillich
believes, to the conceptions taken over from the revolutionary period of early
bourgeois society, especially its Utopian expeotations,
^"Nicholas Berdyaev, " p, liDG,
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2, The Interpretation of Man
Although, as indicated, Tillioh oonsiders history as
(existentially) the problem of our period, he believes that (systematically)
the doctrine of man is "more basic and universal than the problem of
history#' How, then, shall we interpret man?
Sohelling describes man as having In himself both the
highest heaven azd the deepest hell, Berdyaev speaks of man as having
his roots both in heaven above and in the abyss belcw,^ It is this
basic self-contradiction thot Tillieh takes as the starting point for
his doctrine of man - the awareness man has of being both finite and
potentially infinite.
One of the most fundamental things we can say about man is that
he is a creature who is conscious of the fact that he is a creature - consoicus
of his finitude,^ This awareness of finitude points to a relation with
the infinite* "Other oreatures are also finite," says Tillich," but only
man is aware of finitude on the basis of potential infinity," Man c ould not
look at himself as finite if he were not in some way beyond this finitude
and linked with the infinite. But this infinity to which man feels he
belongs is at the some time an infinity from which he knows he is separated,
Man has, aocording to Tillich, the ability "to ask about the infinity to
which he belongs," %t, as he goes on to say, "the feet that he must ask
about it indicates that he is separated from it,""*
^"Hicholas Berdyaev," p. 1&2
5
This constitutes the nature of anxiety as an inescapable ontolqgjioal
structure, "Anxiety is the self-awareness of the finite self as finite"
(Systematic Theology, I, 192f see also The Courage to Be, passim).
Systematic Theology, I, 258,
~*Ibid,p, 61,
"History as the Problem of our Period, " p, 263,
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The infinity from which men is separated may best be described
in terns of the unity and completion, or fulfillment,of life. In other
words it expresses the unity and completion of man - what man feels he
ought to be.
Conscienoe bears witness to another order of tilings. . . We know that
the disrupted and ant agonistic elements of existence belongts a
unity. ... We know that this unity is what we are essentially.
We know that even in the existential distruction of this unity, its
remaining power maintains existenoe. We know this because it appears
to us as law and command, as judgment and tjreat and as promise and
expectation.
This difference between what man is in his self-estrangement and what he
knows he ought to be i3 primarily what Tillich means by his differentiation
betweon man's essential nature and his existential nature
What is the cause of this cleavage? It is, according to
5
Tillich, the actualization of man's finite freedom. It is of the very
nature of freedom to contain dual possibilities. In its best sense,
freedom may be used in self-transcendence and in the realization of meaning
and purpose. Through the ex roise of freedom, man is able to rise above
his eresturely existence, create the new, and make history. Yet, conversely,
"A He-Interpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation," Church
Quarterly Review (January-March, 19^9)# CXLVII, p. lijl*
2
Cssenoe is not a second realm of being in a supernatural sense, but
rather a concept expressing a trans-historical dimension of life. It is
not a realm of being or something existing before existence (as in Platonism)
but rather potentiality. It describes I) that basio quality in which all
things participate, and 2) the basis of value - that from whioh existenoe
feels estranged (or that from which it has fallen").(Systematic Theolo ;y,
I, 202j"Bsistential Philosophy," p. 6). Tillich recognizes that Bsseaoa
arid Sxistenoe are abstractions and says that in reality they appear o nly
in their distorted forms in the dynamic unity of life.
^This is tilllch's description of the basic nature of man. Man is
finite freedom. Finite freedom is not a quality that man has? it is man -
man in his essential structure.("Man and Society in Religious Socialism,"
Christianity and Society (Fall, 19143). VIII,passim)
%his essential freedom separates man from nature. Mature is a unified
process that unfoldswithout question. But man is not one with his environ¬
ment. He rises above it, questions it, and makes demands gpon it. (The Inter¬
pretation of History, p. 2014).
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freedom may be used to negate meaning. Through freedom, man may fall
below his existence and, instead of realizing meaning, fall into non-being
and meaninglessness. Through freedom, man is able to know universal princip¬
les and to act according to them. Yet, at the same time, through freedom
h© is able to contradict these principles and to fall under the sway of self-
destruotive compulsions,*" Freedom may deny itself into servitude.
The actualization of man's fredom (and the self-contradictions
this entails) is, for Tillich, the major presupposition for history.^
This basio, undorivable cleavage in human existence underlies
all human history and makes history what it is,5
Finite freedom, in becoming actual, marks the transition from essenoe
(the structure of finite freedom) to existence (and the contradictions
resulting from the realization of freedom)
This, then, isjnan's predicament as the result of the actualizat¬
ion of his freedomj Man finds himself divided, experiencing a deep cleft
through his very being. He knows that, through his self-transcendence, he
is above history, transcending it in his freedom} yet at the same time he
knows that he is in history, involved in nature and the natural processes.
He is essentially freej yet he is existentially bound and in servitude,
unable to realize the good. Because of his potential infinity, he shares
in the heritage of being and experiences support frem the Ground of all being.
Nevertheless, he also shares in the heritage of non-being, and his life is
insecure, constantly threatened with meaninglessnescatAanxiety. He knows
Nature of Hani An Abstract" Journal of Philosophy (December, 19L&)
XLIII, p. 676f The Courage to Be, p.
^Propositions, Part V, p. 6 (6f.)
^'i'he Protestant Era, p. 2i|2
^Iho doctrine of the Fall symbolizes this transition* Through the
exercize of freedom, man becomes involved in existential 3ervitud . This
i3 both a universal and an individual experience at the same time.
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that because he came from nothing he must ultimately return to nothingness.
He belongs to the ^CrnaX order and shares in its heights of creativity, for¬
giveness, power, and renewal. But he also belongs to the historical order
and shares in its finiteness, sin, vanity, pride and weakness.^" Such is the
2
ambiguous situation in which man finds himself.
Other elements within man's make-up could be added to this des-
ociption such as the tension between the holy and the demonic, thojoreative
the
and the destructive. Insofar as man is transparent toAground of his being,
he participates in the holy. But insofar a s he oonfusea this holiness with
the divine itself and makes the claim of having divine qualities or possessing
unconditional truth, he suoourabs to the demonic. Insofar as man participates
in the forces of growth a nd propagation or does constuotivefw'ork, he partici¬
pates in the oreative structure of life. But insofar as he has a "will to
death" or makes use of another life to serve his own ends, he participates
in the destructive character of existence. Both sides of eaoh tension are
inextrioably mixed in man's being, for his Ufa is never exclusively creative
or destructive, divine or demonic.^ All of tbse analyses serve to fill in
the pioture of man as a creature tragically divided.
Tillich thinks of roan as being a microcosm of the universe. Man
is, as it were, a window through which the whole of life may be understood.
j mm * -
The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 23.
2
The ac&Rlissation of man's freedom is also the clue to the disruption
of other elements of man's nature. In his Systematic Theology, Volume I,
Tillioh gives an analysis of man's being in terms o^ polar structure. Besides
the polarity of freedom of freedom-destiny already implied in the previous
discussion, he discusses other polaritiesi vitality-intentionality, and indi/idu-
ality-universality. Underlying both is the polarity of self-world. Each pole
has a tendency t^ pull away from its oonterpart into separate and tragic actual-
isaions (Freedom, becoming sparated from destiny, becomes arbitrariness, etc.).
Corresponding poles and tensions are found also in the structure of man's reason.
^Propositions, Part IV, pp. 8-10,
la
Or, to change the figure, he is a mirror in which the totality of being
is reflected,
Theetare raicroeosmio qualities in every being, but man alone is
miorooosmos. In him the world is present not only indiraotly and
unconsciously, but directly and in oounsoious encounter,*
This basic correspondence between he human spirit and reality makes it
possible for man to understand the ontologioal sfccucture of the universe
through an awareness of his own structure. The structural elements of
2
man1s being are the same structural elements which appear, in lesser
degree, in animate and inanimate life, On|r in man, howwB&r,is the structure
of being complete and actualized.
Man is the microcosm in whom all cosmic forces are potentially
present, and who participates in all spheres and strata of the
universe.3
Man is the key to the understanding of the universe because the potential
and inc .-mpleted polarities of life are united in him and approaeha le
through him. In other words, man is the door through which the deeper
levels of existence are discernible, "Personal life alcne , • « comprehends
in itself all levels of Being, and represents the Sxistential situation of
all beings. ^
If man reflects in his nature the structure of the whole of life,
the basic oleavages mhave seen in man, then, must to some extent run straight
through the whole of existence. This is what Tillich tries to show, Man,
as we have noted, is that being who, on the basis of his potential infinity.
^Systematic Theology,I, p, 176
See page i*0, n. 2,
^fhe Courage to Be, p. IOI4,
^Propositions, Part III, p. lit.
i|2
is aware of his finitude. And "whoever has penetrated into the nature of
finitude," says Tillioh, "can find traces of finitude in everything that
existsOn this basis Tllich belisves that "the Immediate ecprience of
2
one's ovm finitude reveals something of the nature of existence generally."
Thus from the elaboration of a dootrine of men, we are led direct¬
ly to an intepprstation of existenoe in general, and particularly to a
doctrine of nature.
3. The Interpretation of Nature
If it is true that man's immediate experience is an open door to
the understanding of nature, the concepts dose ibing our immediate experience
must, to some degree, be applicable to the structure of being itself.
We have described man's structure as tht of finite freedom end
have noticed the basio oleft dividing rnani the contradiction between his
existential nature and his essential nature, or what he ought to be. Now
can these same categories bo applied to nature? Certainly not lithout quali-
3
fication. We cannotjascribe human freedom to nature. Nor does it seem to
make sense to speak of nature as estranged from its essence. Quite the
aontrary, nature seems to be a smoothly-functioning organism, always acting
in accordance with its essence and never in contradistinction to it. As far
as wo know, nature never experiences the demand of an "ought" over against
, | ■ ......, ,—_ n *m>
Systematic Theology, I, 62.
2 "
Idea. This method of approaching existenoe&rough man's self-awarmess
explains the predominance of the use of psychological terms to describe ontol¬
ogy. All exisCntial philosophers have used this technique. Cf. Sohopenhaur's
idea of the Wiilaa the ultimate principle of Being, Freud's Unconscious, and
Heidegger's basejn ('Existential Philoephy," pp. 57 ff •)
^Tillich steers clear of panpsychisra. For this reason he speaks of
spontaneity in nature instead of freedom.
h3
what it "is." Yet, says Tillich, it wrong to think of nature as a system
of iron-clad law and order. Modern physics has shown that there are elements
of unpredictability in nature and that, for from being a meehanicslly-
defcmined syste, nature has the quality of indeterminacy and an openness
2
toward the new. This is not freedom in a human sense, but it is analogous
to it and represents in nature, Tillich believes, a potential, undeveloped
freedom. Creatures of nature have a structure of finite freedom similar to
that found in man, though it is considerably undeveloped and is potential, not
3
actual. Nature is unfulfilled spirit•
In nature is l-nperfcotly devel pod what in man is perfectly developed*
finite freedom. What happens in man is representative for what happens
in all beingsi the tragic actualization of their finite freedom, how¬
ever iramerged in necessity this freedom may be.^
1 — ——— — —
The rationalistic view of nature has wrongly viewed nature solely
in bras of physical Law. Modern technology follows this view and seeks to
know nature merely in order to be able to control it. Meanwhile the vital-
istio powurs of nature are breaking loose and turning on personality to
destroy it. A proper view of nature mist take account, therefore, not
only of Law, but of spontaneity as well. Spontaneity implies a -me subjectivi¬
ty, however rudimentary. L'ven things, since they have some subjectivity,
should not bo treated as mere objects. The approach to nature, therefore,
must be through sypathetic, intuitive union. If nature were just static it
could be known by analysis, apart from union end participation. But because
it is dynamic as well, decision is demanded. (The Interpretation of History,
p. 62; seethe discussion of sacraments later in this chapter}.
2
"Redemption in Cosmic and Social History," Journal of Rligioua Thought
(Winter, iy£j6), III, p. 27* Tillioh says elsewhere that the nbn-histori^ai
element in nature (the cycle of genesis and decay) is balanced by an historical
one. Nature, too, participates in the irreversible forward movement of
historicalttme, "The struocure of the oos-nos, of atoms, of stars, of biologi¬




Hature ia not just static as over agrinat history as dynamic.* Tillich
therefore believes that there ia a structure in nature (that of spontaneity
2
end Law) analogous to the structure of freedom and destiny in man*
Although law does appear as one of the polar elements in the
structure of nature, it is not something necessarily hostile to spontaneity.
It is analogous to "destiny" in raa^s struoture "which, as the sum total of
all past decisions, is the basis for the aotualiEation of his freedom.
Similarly in nature Lew is in interdependence with spontaneity and "Law is
•x
law only because it determines spontaneous reactions*" Tillich points out
that the term law as applied to nature is taken from human society. When
applied to nature it does not indicate laws which can be obeyed or disobeyed
in a human way* Hut just as human law does not remove freedom, so natural law
does not osnoel spontaneity* "The law of nature does not remove the reactions
of solf-centered Gostalben, but it determines the limits they oennot trespass*"^
"T ■
• * * nature holds something within itself which is not to be de¬
termined by static and immutable laws*" (Systematic Theology, I, 180)
"Historical dynamics becomes pure imagination if there are no dynamic qualities
in nature, • • •" (The Interpretation of History, p. 165)*
^Systematic Theology, I, 185 .
3Idm.
^Ibid*, p, 186* Closely correlated with this particular cleavage is
what miy~Tj® described as the separation of power and meaning in nature*
Spontaneity is related to the element of "power" - the pure, naked vitality
of nature* But nature is more than mere power. It olso has a spiritual
meaning, as we o»n see in the sacraments (See the discussion later in this
chapter). That all life is not sacramental points to the fact that there
is this additional dnrocnio separation and ambiguity within nature (See The
Shaking of the foundations, p. 86).
If nature does have this polarity between spontaneity and law,
then perhpas this is the basis for the estrangement and separation of
nature from its ground of being and for the tragic finltude which. Tillich
sees expressed in animate and inanimate life. Perhaps this explains why
Tillich, quoting Schilling, says, Mature, also, mourns for a lost good."1
So ranch for the parallel between spontaneity in nature and free¬
dom in man. But what about the cleft between essence and existence as
found in man? Can this also be applied to nature? Tillich does not discuss
this point, but the answer, it would seem, is obvious. If essence is used
to describe the unity (in tension) of the polar elements of man's structure,
and the term existence to describe the disruption and separation of these
poles as actualized in the life process, then there must be an analogy to
this in the realm of nature. The polar elements, of spontaneity and law must
also tend, in existence, to go their separate ways in contradiction to their
essential unity, for Tillich says that there is in nature something analogous
to man's tragic actualization of finite freedom.J Thus it is appropriate,
in terms of the analyses of spontaneity and law, essence and existence, to
speak of a self-contradiction in nature similar to that found in nan.
Looking at nature in this existential fashion through the eyes
of Ms finitu&o and self-estrangement, man finds that it opens its deeper
See Ms sermon with this title in -The Shaking of the Foundations,
p. 76 f. Sis quotation from 3dialling is found on page 32.
^I6i&er the impact of finitude, polarity becomes tension. Tension refers
to the tendency of elements within a unity to draw away from one another, to
attempt to move in opposite directions." (Systematic Thrology-, I, I98).
^ffronositiong. Bart IV, p. k*
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levels of reality to him. In the awareness of the tragic situation of
his own life, man finds a sympathy with nature in its tragedy and the pos¬
sibility of communion with it. This mystical awareness of nature's heart
and soul discloses the fact that "A veil of sadness is spread over all nature,
a deep, unappeasable melancholy over all life" (Schelling). Following the
mythological theories of apocalyptic intuition (and St. Paul, especially
Somans 8), Tillich sees nature held in the bondage of corruption, awaiting
its salvation.-^
Nature is not only glorious; it is also tragic. It is subjected to
the laws^of finltude and destruction. It is stiffering and sighing
with us.
The Genesis account of the divine curse on the land following the fall of
man expresses, in symbolic form, an indispensible truth; nature, because of
man's sin, is subj cted to the same existential situation of tragedy,
5
finitude, and despair. Thus nature, along with man, longs for salvation,
wholeness, and completion.
^"Science is wrong in thinking it can know the secrets of nature through
purely objective, disinterested analyses. Though not discounting the neces¬
sity of objectivity, Tillich believes that only through sympathetic intuition
can nature be approached so as to yeild its rarest treasures. (See page kj,
n.l.) "We cannot accept the word of mathematical science as the last word
about nature, although we do not th reby deny that it is the first word."
(The Protestant %a, p. II3)
gThe Shaking of the Foundations, p. 82- For other references to Tillich's
dependence upon German nature-mysticism and Romanticism, seo Inter-ore tat ion
of History, pp. 6-8.
^Gf. Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time (London; Student Christian Movement
Kress, 1951) PP. 101 ff.
^The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 81.
5
Also involved in the cleft of existence are the "Categories of Appercept¬
ion." The categories have a double relation; on the one hand, to being; on
the other, to non-being. As related to non-being, temporality, without eterni¬
ty, becomes mere transitoriness. Causality, without aseity, becomes total
determinism. Accidentality without losing substance becomes a form of total
self-loss. Spatial existence, without an immovab^ ground, becomes a form
of total uprootedness. These are expressions of aiixiety of non-being as over
against the courage which is rooted in being. (Systematic Theology. I, 192 ff;
Propositions. Part III, pp. 6-8; see also The Courage to Be. passim.)
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The Interpretation of History
If man and nature are deeply cleft and separated from their ground of
being, history must also share In this self-contradiction, for history is
rooted in nature and also rests upon the activities of human groups in their
self-interpretation and quest for the fulfillment of meaning. Ihe fact that
history does share in the cleavages of existence makes it imperative that
history be studied in the light of this relationship. For Tillieh, the
question of the meaning of history is closely related to the question of the
1
interpretation of existence, and is one element in that interpretation.
To what extent can history be said to share in the cleavages with¬
in existence generally? The cleft in history is not, strictly speaking, the
same as that in man, i.e. the disruption of essence and existence. For
history is always existential. History appears only when, through the actu¬
alization of human freedom, there is a transition from essence to existence
(as symbolised by the Fall)- History tares place only in existence; there
is no history in essence.
nevertheless, the historical process expresses, in all of its
manifestations, an abvious ambiguity. 2hrou#t all of man's institutions
there is at the same time both a realisation of meaning and a denial of
meaning. Bach cultural activity, as a quest for meaning, meets with frustrat¬
ion and lack of fulfillment. Nowhere is there complete and pure actualization
of meaning or perfect fulfillment. For this reason, history is constantly
pointing beyond itself toward some final unambiguous fulfillment and unwit¬
tingly witnessing to a supra-hiatorical realm in which the self-contradictions
of history are overcome. So if there is not a cleft between history,s essence
1Fjrppo?j-tiopa> Eart V, p.5-
lis
and its existence, there is at least the separation between what history is
in its frustrations and failures, ambiguities and self-contradictions and
what it is intended to "be in its completion and perfection. Because of this
cleft, Tillich "believes that history points beyond itself to what may be
symbolized as the Kingdom of God.
History, like all other aspects of life, shares in another basic
cleavage within existence - the duality of seriousness and insecurity. On
the one hand, history is supported by the eternal or the unconditional. It
shares in the inexhaustibility of meaning and being; it must be taken serious¬
ly. On the other hand, history, like all being, shares in non-being and is
always threatened by the possibility of plunging into the "abyss of nothing¬
ness."3, It has a basic, underived insecurity. Because of this duality of
seriousness and insecurity, as in the analysis above, history points beyond
in
itself to its transcendent ground, ^which seriousness finds its ultimate support
and in which insecurity is overcome by "courage.
But even more tragically, there is a cleft in history between the
divine and the demonic forces". Eie terra demonic, for Tilllch, is not intended
to express a world of spirits- It is not an ontological category, but rather
refers to tire "blind, chaotic element which is implied in all powerful creating
movements arid drives them toward final dissolution."3 She demonic is ultimately
rooted in the polarity of Abyss and Logos within the divine life, normally
power and form, abyss and logos, are held together in creative unity and tension
within the divine. But in existence, the element of power, which is the creative
Interpretation of History, pp. 273, 2J1.
Courage" is a key concept in Tillich's thought. It is correltaed v/ith
the sustaining power of being as, conversely, anxiety is correlated with the
threat of non-being. (See; Systematic iZheology. I, 193-19S; Courage to 3a .
passim.)
-^The Interpretation of History, p. 85.
and vital basis of life, becomes separated from meaning and drives toward
independent expressions. It must always take on form in order to exist (for
there is no power apart from meaningful form) but it takes on form only to
abuse it - to lead the form out beyond its normal expression into characteristics
it cannot recognize as its own. The demonic, then, is a perversion of the
divine creative power.^ The divine and the demonic within man and existence
meet on the stage of human history as their decisive battleground. But this
doss not mean that any single historical manif station can be described as
wholly divine or wholly demonic. Life is an ambiguous mixture of both elements
in every moment of its being. There is no purely demonic institution, no
purely divine organization. Every individual act and every social manifestat-
2
ion expresses both powers in varying proportions.
The term demonic is used by fillich to convey as well the idea that
evil in history is not just due to individual sin but is rather a matter of
structure.It came vividly to his mind through the struggle for Beligious
Socialism in Germany that there are evil structures of society. In the de-
humanization of the industrialized masses, he sense a supra-individual, even
a supra-institutional, power against which the moral power of good will is
ultimately of no avail. The wars and depr ssiens of this century, he came
to believe, are more than just bad accidents caused by a few wicked men.
Kather, they express inescapable structural trends and are the actualization
*This combination of creativity and destruction is particularly treacher¬
ous in the political realm. Hie really dangerous political pow rs are always
creative as well as destructive, and it is difficult to know idien a political
power has gone beyond its proper claim for sacrifice and obedience in the
creation of what it conceives to be the good. Hitler is a good example of
a ^S&vior" whose creations became demonic.
^The Interpretation of History, p. 116.
-Iks over against the view of the Enlightenment that evil is purely person¬
al and therefore can fee educated away through persuasion.
of demonic power.
Bat the demonic structures do not hold forth without opposition.
Ihey are checked by other structur s which Tillich calls Gestalten of grace.
A "Gestalt of grace" is a form in which the divine is particularly present,
or rather, a form wiich is unusually transparent to its divine ground. 'Bis
Church, in its ideal form, is such a structure, as also is the eucharist.
A great work of art portraying the unity and harmony of life may manifest the
insofar
divine and become a "Gastalt of grace." Individuals, too, as they are trans ¬
parent to the divine may be fame through which grace is revealed in a strik¬
ing manner- Christ himself is the most luminous "Gestalt of grace." Biese
forms, however, do not embody grace in a tangible, objective way. Grace is
perceptible in history only through faith. *
We have noted that Tillich regards history as the battlefield in
which the demonic structures are pitted against the divine structures. But
although the demonic is at work in all realms of existence, it is in history
that its character becomes most visible; in history we see its greatest aggra¬
vations. "History," Tillich says,"is the main place for the manifestations
of the demonic character of existence."^ All the other clefts and tensions
we have noticed in nature and in man also come to their most exaggerated ex¬
pression in history. History is, as it were, the brightly-lighted stage on
which the forces of good and evil give their most dramatic performances. On
term "Gestalt of grace" is an intentional paradox- Grace must
express itself in history as history's unconditional support. Yet grace can
never, according to the Protestant view, be encased in any historical form.
Cf. Tillicli's concept of the "Protestant principle." Protestant!sn must take
on form (i.e., be a "Gestalt" ) in order to have any "ground" on which to ma ds
its protest; yet it must always contest the claim of any conditional reality
to embody the unconditional (or to possess - or dispense- grace in history).
2'""Propositions. Part V, page 6.
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the plane of history, good and evil, creativity and destruction rise to their
greatest intensity.1 .Above all other spheres of life, history, it would seem,
stands in need of salvation.
5» She Universal Quest for Salvation
We have seen how the doctrine of history has led (both logically
and, in the case of Tillleh, autobiographically) to the doctrine of man. In
addition we have seen how the understanding of man and his microcosmic Dualities
led naturally to a doctrine of existence in general (and a doctrine of nature
in particular), finally throwing new light on the character of history itself.
In all three areas (man, nature, and History) wo have noted similar
basic cleavages- The whole of life is separated from itself in tragic self-
destruction and is estranged f on the ground of its being. Further, we saw
how man, nature, and history all have an element of self-transcence and point
beyond themselves to a supra-historical fulfillment. The whole of life, then,
p
longs for salvation in the root meaning of the word ("being made whole").
There is the longing of nature for a Being beyond the self-destructive impli¬
cations of the natural process. There is the longing of man for spiritual
perfection beyond the ambiguities of this life. There is a longing of the
bearers of history for a trans-historical fulfillment beyond the fragmentary
actualization of history. How can these longings be fulfilledHow can
^Propositions, Part V, pp. 6,7 (7,S)
^See "Hed raption in Cosmic and Social History," p. 20.
'fhese questions exemplify the basic format of Tillich's sytsmatic con¬
struction: the correlation of existential questions and th ological answers.
The existential analyses of frustration, ambiguity, and self-contradiction
in all spheres of life lead to basic questions which are finally answerable
only by Christian faith. In reason there i3 th quest for revelation; in being
there is the quest for God; in existence there is the quest for the Christ; in
life there is the quest for the Spirit; in hi stoTg there is th quest for the
Kingdom of God-
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the cleavages in man, nature, and history be overcome? It is a basic element
in Tillich's thought that the salvation of one is dependent upon the salvat¬
ion of all. Life is a unity. Nature, man, and history interpenetrate and
are mutually involved in tragedy and in the quest for salvation.
To begin with there is the mutual dependence of man and nature.
Man is uart of the physical world in his psychic as well as in his bodily
nature. He is ultimately rooted in the 30il and cannot escape the physical
processes of life. Conversely, nature stands in a close relationship to man.
Through the po^ver of reason, man has become nature'3 master and has transformed
the face of the earth in almost every conceivable fashion, from gardens to
earth-scorching obliteration. The myth of the Fall pictures in symbolic
form the mutual reliance of man and nature.
As nature, represented by the •Serpent," leads man into temptation,
so man, by his trespassing of the divine law, leads nature into
tragedy.
Therefore, it is unrealistic to speak of a transformation of man apart from
the transformation of natTire. It is idealistic, Tillioh believoa, to separate
man and nature and to believe that man can come to fulfillment where nature
is excluded. "Man and nature belong together in their created glory, in
p
their tragedy, and in their salvation." If nature is not transformed, how
can man be transfoxraed, for nature reaches into man; and if man is not trans¬
formed, how can nature be redeemed, for man's sin defaces nature? The
•*"The Shaking of the Foundations, p. S3.
%illich points out two insights which strengthen the possibility of a
salvation for nature: 1) the interdependence of self and world given in Kant -
the idea that the world is not the sum of things outside man, but is correlated
to the self whose world it is (Of. Systematic Theology. I, 261, n\1hat happens
in the microcosm happens by mutual participation in the macrocosm, for bjprin?
itself is one."), and 2) the removal of mechanical determinism in physics and
the possibility of openness toward the new ("Redemption in Cosmic and Social
History," p. 27)»
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salvation of the one is interrelated with the salvation of the others.*1*
Secondly, there is the interdependence of nature and history.
Though Tillich, in some ways, makes a sharp separation of nature from history2
and believes that history cannot come into being except as time tears itself
loose from space, and forward direction from the cyclical processes of nature,
he comments, nevertheless, that "The unity of being between man and nature is
more basic than their difference. . . Nature, he believes, is the
basis for history, Just as it is the basis for man's being, and to separate
history from nature and try to develop a separate netaphysic for each would
k
lead to endless absurdities. "Nature is the basis on which history moves
and without which history would have no reality."5 The mutual dependence
of nature and history has always been a subject of apocalyptic vision, as
exemplified in the expected reign of peace in the animal kingdom ("the lion
and the lamb shall lie down together") and in the coming of "a new heaven and
a new earth•" Christian myths and legends also testify to this inter-relationship.
The earth shakes when the Christ dies and quakes again when he is resurrected.
^Nature's participation in salvation, according to Tillich, is an indis¬
pensable element in true sacramental thinking. A sacrament involves the idea
that "natural objects can become bearers of transcendent power and meaning"
(The Protestant -b-a, p. llH). "Nature is not the enemy of salvation. . . as
Calvinistic thinking is inclined to believe; rather, nature is a bearer and
an object of salvation." (idem). See the discussion of sacraments later in
this chapter.
2Piper is wrong in criticizing Tillich on the basis that his "historical
conception of history remains that of an analogy to natural processes" (Secant
Developments in German Protestantism, p. 3M). Tillich declares that history
is much more than just a continuation of natural processes (See: The Protestant
Era., p. 27S).
^The Protestant S^a, o. 100.
k " .
'The Interpretation of History, pp. 162 f.
5
Systematic Theolo^. 1, 122.
5U
Stars and. angels as well as men worship the Christ-child. And the symbol of
the resurrection of the body points to the fact that man's final salvation
involves more than an"immortal soul." His physical basis also shares in
the resurrection. All of these symbols witness to the fact that "Nature. . .
must be understood historically and in the context of the history of salvat¬
ion."^
Thirdly, there is the mutual dependence of history and man. This
is the most obvious of all the in&erdependencies. Man, throughlis freedom
and the quest for meaning, creates history. On the other hand, historical
institutions have a tremendous influence upon the moulding of man's character
and personality (indeed, as Tillich would point out in the case of industrial¬
ism, upon man's very being, whether he is "to be or not to be."). It is not
quite so obvious, however, that the salvation of one is dependent upon the
salvation of the other. Throughout most of its history, Christianity (duo to
the influence of Christian mysticism and Platonism) has concentrated upon the
salvation of the individual, as if man could come to completion apart from the
salvation of society and the fulfillment of history as a whole. We now real¬
ize, says Tillich, the inadequacies of such views. We know that man is rooted
in history and therefore that it is unrealistic to conceive of his salvation
apart from the salvation of history. Today, "historical consciousness forbids
such individualism; for the same reason it forbids a dual predestination. It
2
links our eternal destiny to our historical fate." We feel today that "the
destiny of the individual cannot be separated from the destiny of the whole
^The PTotestant .>a. p. llU-
^"History as the Problem of Q,-,r Period." pp. 260 f. Cf. Augustine's idea
that one of the joys of H aven is the possibility of looking into Hell to see
the torments of the damned. Such a picture for Tillich would be a convincing
argument against Heaven, for there can be no Heaven with the knowledge that
others are suffering.
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in which it participates-"^" Tor this reason, Tillich is suspicious of the
doctrine of personal immortality, especially the idea that, immediately upon
death, one is judged and his eternal destiny decided- Such views, Tillich
believes, wrongly separate the individual from the universal guilt in which
he is inescapably involved- Wq are, says Tillich, mutually involved in the
fall and curse u on all creatures and all mankind- The eternal destiny of
the individual can only be described in correlation with the destiny of all
other individuals and with the destiny of the whole of history.
Hit if the salvation of man is linked with the salvation of history,
the converse is also true: there is no salvation of history apart from the
redemption of raan.^ The prophetic interpretation of history has usually erred
at this point by envisioning a fulfillment of history totally apart from any
fulfillment of the individuals (especially those of previous generations) who
created the historical process. Both Christian mysticism and propheticism
fail to see the interdependence of man and history. Both, at opposite extremes,
"^Systematic Theology. I, 270-
^This would seem to suggest that Tillich is a universalist. Ifcrthologically
speaking, he is; but existsntially speaking (ff such a distinction may be drawn)
he believes that "finite freedom cannot be foread into unity with God" and
that freedom can ultimately resist God's love and bring self-destruction upon
itself (Systematic Theology. I, 2SU) . But the discussion of this issue seems
irrelevant in the context of Tillich's thought, since he entirely dismisses
the idea that there is any real, objective end to the historical process or any
second realm of being where such universal salvation could have any reality.
(See Chapter 71 - "Evaluation and Criticiam").
3Tillich seems here to have modified his view3 since the publication of
The Interpretation of History in 1936.(She German article from which this
section of the book was taken, how ver, was first published in 1929!-) His
view than was that "the question of the individual after death" stands "outside
of genuine eschatology" (p. 2S1). Hit perhaps Tillich really meant in this
statement that individual fulfillment in terms of an immortal soul in a second
realm of being is what lies outside the question of eschatology. If so, it
would explain the reason for the raj ction of this concept in his eschatological
construction. (Hots; since the writing of this footnote, Tillich has personally
confirmed this interpretation just given.)
"Eschatology and Personal Destiny," Uhpublished manuscript, in possession
of Jaaes Lather Adams, Chicago Theological Seminary.
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miss the double truth that "History cannot he fulfilled without the fulfillment
of the "bearers of history," and further that "the hearers of history cannot
reach their ultimate aim as long as history ha3 not readied it."* In eschato-
logical terns this means that the Kingdom of God (salvation in a social sense)
is in correlation with the eternal destiny of the individual (Sternal life,
Immortality, Resurrection - or in whatever symbols it may he expressed).
6. Man and the Haw Being
We have seen how man, nature, and history are each dependent upon
the salvation of the other. If all of them are mutually involved in the qu3st
for salvation and fulfillment, then whatever fulfills the salvation of one
would, so it seems, also bring salvation to the other realms of being.
Concerning the salvation of man and nature, for instance, Tillich
states that although they are mutually interrelated with reference to their
salvation, the turning power and the point at which salvation may be actual¬
ized is in man.-* Bis redemption of history, likewise, seems to focus ultimately
*"3schatolog$r and Personal Destiny," p.l
^Tillich believes that the following symbols best express man's part in
the eternal destiny:
a) Resurrection of the body: because it emphasizes the individual elemsnt-
the participation of the whole, concrete individual in eternal destiny,
b) Metempsychosis (or trans-migration): because it emphasizes the historical
element - development and progress toward the eternal destiny,
c) Spiritual immortality of the soul-: because it emphasizes th8 spiritual
element - the super-individual and universal character of man's destiny,
Ho one symbol is to be taken in isolation from the others. On the other hand,
Tillich rejects the following symbols as being inadequate;
a) Return of the individual to creative life (Naturalism)
b) Eternity of the active mind alone (Averroes, Hegel)
c) Absorption of the individual into the Absolute (Buddhism)
This rather detailed outline is given here because the article fron which it is
taken ("Eschatology and Personal Destiny" )is not readily available; Cf. also
Propositions, £hrt ?, p. 15 (17£')
3"Redemption in Cosmic and Social History," p. 22; Shaking of the Foundations,
p. S3. (Cf. Romans S;ig, "Even the creation waits with eager longing for the
30ns of man to be revealed," cited in Shaking of the Foundations. p. SI)
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upon the redemption of man. Through man, th n, the -universe as a whole is
to gain salvation.
At this point Tillich utilizes again the concept of man as the
microcoms who 3tands at the meeting point of the cosmic forces and "is called
to unite them in the whole of nature by knowledge and control. . . But
although the salvation of the universe hinges on man, this docs not mean that
man is the cosmic hero who rescues the world from darkness. Quite the con¬
trary. Man is not able to save himself, let alone to save nature and history.
Nature and history are in their tragic predicament precisely because of the
sin of man, as the ancient myths declare. Universal salvation centers on man;
but since man is unable to effect it, it is possible only through the "man
from above.Nature, man, and history long for the "Hew Being" who alone
is able to save and to make all things new and vihole.^
The salvation of the universe, then, hinges on man only because
the New Being appears as man and because man alone among all creatures is able
^''Redemption in Cosmic and Social History," p. 22f.
2Man*s inability to save himself is expressed in the following set of
propositions;
a) "Since Existence is not only freedom but also fate, no act of freedom can
liberate from its contradictions and its self-dsstr&etive consequences. .
b) "Since Existence is the result of a transition from Egsonco by actualized
freedom, no return to Essence by elevation above Existence is possible."
c) "Existence can be overcome only by the manifestation and actualization
of Essential Being under the conditions of Existence."
(Pro-positions. Bart III, p. 9).
3She concept of Christ as the New Being places Tillich's Christology
squarely in a soteriological framework. Tillich objects to approaching
Christology as a metamhjtsical problem, as in the relationship between the
finite and the infinite (in terras of a "higher chemistry"). Instead, it should
be approached as a soteriological problem, i .e., as to how essential Godmahhood
can appear in existence with transforming power. ("A Eg-Interpretatlon of the




fully to respond to the Hew Being and to participate directly and consciously
in his transforming power- Because man is a microcosm comprehending in him¬
self the existential situation and estrangement of all beings, the Hew Being
appears as personal life^in ord r, through man, to 3ave the whole of existence.
But the fact that universal salvaicn centers around man does not
mean that we are back to the former views of individual salvation that Tillich
criticizes. Bather, the salvation of man is seen as the center of a tuiiversa!
salvation. "The and of redemption is the 'Hew Being,' cosnically. in nature,
man, and history."2 Tillich's emphasis is upon salvation as an objective,
xuiiversa! event in which man participates along with nature, history, and the
totality of being.
Salvation is primarily a cosmic event and. . • the individual is an
object of salvation only insofar as he is called upon to participate
subjectively in the objective and universally valid salvation.3
Because the salvation of the universe centers around man, this does not mean
that God thereby depreciates the universe. On the contrary, "He deals with
man because He has His purpose with the universe, of which nan is a part."^
Indeed, says Tillich, the Hew Being could appear only in a human life,
for only in personal life is the structure of being complete, the self and
the world in correlation (Propositions. Bart III, p. lH). Th re is, then,
an essentially humanistic element in the doctrine of the Incarnation ("A Re-
Interpretation of the .Doctrine of the Incarnation," p. IH3 f.).
The value of the term "Hew Being" is that it calls attention to the
transforming of existence generally as well as to the transformation of man.
She "old" being (existence) is transformed by Him *vho makes all things "new."
("A Re-Interpretation of the Doctrine of the incaroation," p. I33). Other
values in this concept are 1) it Implies that Jesus is the Christ in the
totality of his being, and not just in his words and deeds, 2) it indicates
a real transformation of existence, and 3) it connotes the possible participat¬
ion of individuals and history in this transformation, and U) it has eschatolog¬
ical implications ("A Reinterpretat ion of the Doctrine of the Incarnation,"
pp. 1^6-lHS).
^'•Redemption in Cosmic and Social History," p. 26 (italics mine).
^IbM, P- 17.
A paraphrase of Tillich's thought by Otto Riper in Recent Developments
in German Protestantism, p. I3S f.
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7. The Universal Transformation Through the New Being
If salvation, then, is a universal, objective event involving the
transformation of the whole of existence, and if the New Being really makes
all things new, what specifid transformations can we point to in man, in nature
and in history?
Man, as we noted in a previous section, is a finite creature conscious
of being separated from the infinite. Deep in his nature is a cleft between
what he is, existentially, and what he ought, essentially, to be. His essent¬
ial freedom constantly betrays itself int# existential servitude; his creativi¬
ty is poured into destructive channels; and his divine ground is used to sup¬
port demonic manifestations. Man is infinitely estranged and tragically divided.
He is separated from himself, from his fellows, from nature and from God.
In what way does the New Being bridge this tragic separation and make men
whole?
Christ as the New Being represents a human person in whom all of
the cleavages of life are overcome. As the Mediator, he overcomes the separat¬
ion between finitude and infinity, God and man. The concept of the Mediator,
however, is not intended to mean a third reality between God and man, but
1
rather the egression of their essentual unity and interdependence. As
essential Godmanhood, Christ appears as man und r the conditions of existnece
revealing the fact that God and man, in their essential relationship, belong
2
together.
It is not Just the estrangement between God and man that Christ
bridges, but as well the separation between the various poles of man's nature
idiich, in existence, become antagonistic and mutually destructive."^ Christ
*
Propositions. Part III, p. 20.
^"A Heffiterpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation," p. IH3.
-*See page Ho, n.2.
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overcomes the estrangement between self and world, and between freedom and
destiny, individuality and community, intentionality and vitality.* Further,
all the threats of time and space, causality and substance, the hazard of non-
being, and the menace of ineaninglessness fail to disrupt his essential structure
of being or his comniate unity with the Father. She necessary seclusion of
individuality never becomes distorted into isolation; the essential self-
relatedness of being never yields to salf-centeredness; the loneliness of life
never gives way to the horror of death; inescapable human error refuses to
become deliberate lie; unfulfilled want never beconos sclf-divinding frustration;
2
doubt, counteracted by faith, never becomes meaninglessness. As essential
being, appearing without distortion under the conditions of existence, Christ
is "the paradoxical anticipation of the ultimate perfection.
To what extent may Christ's victory over existence become ours?
Christ's benefits for mankind can best be expressed through reference to the
cross. The cross of Christ symbolizes a necessary dual movement between God
and man which Tilllch describes as l) the self-surrender of the infinite to
the finite (God to man), and 2) the self-surrender of the finite to the in¬
finite (man to God). Through the cross, Christ makes a representative sacri¬
fice (of the finite to the infinite) for the whole of mankind- As all were
involved in Adam's fall, so, through the cross and resurrection, all share
in his victory and in his perfect union with the Father. The cross is man¬
kind's representative response to God. Mankind thus participates in Christ'3
redemptive work - but not in an automatic or mechanical way* Christ's self-
suriender is not a substitute for our own self-surrender. "Genuine representation
*"A ^interpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation," p. lUU
2Propositions. Part III, pp. 6-8.
^The Interpretation of History, p. 262.
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implies the participation of those who are represented in the reality that
represents them."''" therefore, althou^i the redemption of life is a cosmic
and objective event, there is no real transformation of man apart from his
response to the Hew Being. This, however, does not mean that Christ is just
a moral example whom we are to emulate. Christ, for Tillich, is always
much more than just a human possibility.^ Though, as man, he courageously
sacrifices himself to God, at the same time, God is uniquely present in him.
Christ is always an incursion from the divine and never solely an eruption
from within history. Christ's perfection, then, is not something that we
can attain, but is through, and throu^i a paradoxical manifestation.
We are transformed, therefore, not through our own moral endeavor,
but only as we participate in the reality of this Hew Being and in the Community
of the Hew Being which he establishes. But we may share in the power of his
victory not only through the reality (gestalt) of the Church, but as well
through his real presence with us, for Christ is our contemporary as much as
he was the contemporary of the disciples.
The Christian way is to have a continuous connection with the reality
which has happened. . • • We are contemporaries with Christ. . . . The
first disciplos had no advantage before all others in this respect- If
they had, the universality of the Christian faith would be destroyed.3
The transformation of man through union with Christ, however, is
always incomplete and imperfect. It is, in fact, more in terms of anticipation
and expectation than in terms of visible, tangible results. It shares in the
duality constantly referred to by Tillich of "already" and "not yet," or of
"reality" as over against "expectation." The Hew Being is a reality in history -
1
Propositions. Part III, p. 21.
%he Interpretation of History.p. 261.
3"The Significance of the Historical Jesus for the Christian Faith".Monday
Forum Talk, February 2S, I93S, given at Uhion Theological Seminary. (Unpublished
manuscript in possession of James Luther Adams.), p. 9.
^The Protestant Bra, p. 2U8.
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1
even a sacramental reality- yet, like Grace, it always remains transcendent
and can never be confined or localized. On the other hand, the New Being is
expectation. Bat this is not just the bare anticipation of something entirely
future. Hie faith that he is to come again is based on the fact that he
already has cane. True expectation, says Tillich, is possible only on the
2
basis of partial possession.
Hie New .Being, then, is both "here" and "not here." Hie duality
remains: we both possess and do not possess Him. Therefore all transformation
is fragiientary and incomplete, making us look ever forward and upward to the
complete fulfillment of the eschaton. Perhaps the best expression of this
paradox of "having" and "not having" is the doctrine of Justification. Though
we are conscious of being accepted, it is an acceptance in smite of what we
are; our guilt and sin continue. We are transformed, but more in terms of
anticipation than in terms of tangible results.
Another concept expressing the transformation of human existence
by Christ is that of "Sternal Life." Tillich prefers this doctrine of Sternal
Life (or Resurrection^) to that of Immortality, which is usually thought of
as exclusively future and grounded in a supposed substantial quality of the
soulSternal Life, Tillich affirms, does not mean something to come at the
end of time, fo. such an idea is self-contradictory.^ The eternal is equally
^"See page 50, n.l.
2
"Anticipation without posoesoion is religiously as impossible as noarnoss
without presence; for nohouy can anticipate the ultimate without being touched
by it" (Hie Protestant Sra, p. 2hS).
3Ibid.. pp. 2k7 ff.
k
Resurrection, says Tillich, has nothing to do with the idea of dead bodies
leaving their graves. "Resurrection happens now, or it does not happen at all.
It happens in us and around us" ("Hie New Being," Religion in Life, (Autumn, 195-1)
xix, 517).
^Systematic Theology. I, 1SS, 2jS.
^The end of time is itself a time-determined thought. One would have to
stand in some sort of time to conceive that time had "ended." Such an end would
be only a discontinuance and not a real end (The Interpretation of History.n.280).
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near to (and distant from) all moments of time. Further, says Tillich,
Sternal Life does not mean an existence in some second realm of bein^ above
this one. "Our empirical world is the only existing world."1 Sternal life,
therefore, is a quality of life in the here and now - a new dimension in
relation to the ultimate. It expresses "the eternal participation of the
individual in the ultimate fulfillment."2 Bit though Tillich is primarily
interested in Sternal Life as a present possession, he does indicate that it
also has a future referenceIt, too, shares in the duality of "already"
i+
and "not yet."
The fact that man can participate now in the ultimate fulfillment
gives his life new meaning.^ Sternal Life as a present reality means that
there is infinity of meaning for each of his finite acts. Although every¬
thing we do participates in non-being and has a tranaitory character, although
the exercise of finite freedom leads inevitably to tragedy and frustration,
Ly means of this new dimension, man is enabled to rise above the incompleteness
of existence and realize that each of his creative acts has infinite signifi¬
cance. The transitory character of whatever we achieve does net prevent it
from being a vehicle of infinite meaning.
All of these areas we have been discussing are facets of man's
transformation through the power of the Hew Being. Tillich's existential
analysis of man as a microcosm, it will be remembered, enabled us to see
"But," he goes on to say,"it is precisely this empirical world which in¬
cludes within itself the strange contradiction between what it is actually and
what it is existentially." <A Beinteroretation."etc.. p. lk2). This experience
accounts for the fact that Tillich can conceive of the supra-historical or the
transcendent (as wholeness, completion, perfection of meaning, etc.) without
positing a second realm of being. The contents of Christianity, Tillich says,
are symbols for the transcendent meaning of the one world of experience." (The
Attack of Dialectical Materialism on Christianity," The Student World.XXXI.122).
2"Sschatology and Personal Destiny,"
3lbid.
^For a critique of this future reference, see Chapter VI.
^"The transcendent cannot be expressed in terms of being but only in
terms of meaning" ("llie Kingdom of God and History," p. II3).
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new dimensions in nature and history (in terms of estrangement and the long¬
ing for salvation). Similarly, his una rstanding of the transformation of
the microcosm should shed light on the transformation of nature and history
through the New Being.
V,hat is nature's sh re in the transforming power of the New Being?
In what way does Christ overcome the estrangement of nature from itself and
from the ground of its being?
Tillich has not gone specifically into the question of how the
essential unity between spontaneity and freedom can be restored (paralleling
the unification through Christ of the various polarities in man's nature \
Although he comments that nature, through the New Being, is liberated from
its ambiguities and from its bondage to the demonic forces, he does not give
1
any details. He has, however, in a more general way, a great deal to say
about how nature, through the sacraments, participates in the power of the
2
New Being. If the whole of reality is touched by the Nsw Being, then nature,
too, is included in the "History of Salvation" and must, in however limited
a 'way, be able to witness to its Savior. Sacraments, Tillich believes, are
the way in which nature is enabled to became transparent to its ground of being.
A genuine sacrament, however, reveals not only something about God or Christ,
but also something about the "power of being" of the natural object which is
its bearer.
Sverything in nature, Tillich believes, has an inherent "power of
being" (Selnsmachtigkeit) which makes it what it is and without which it could
not exist ? ©lis "power of being" in things has been tragically neglected ia
^The Protestant Era, pp. llH, 125-
2Tillich's sacramentalism is greatly influenced by the Berneuchener movement
in which he participated.
•^The Protestant Bra. p« 122. Not only everything in nature but as well
every individual and community has its "power of being" which is its unique form
(The Protestant Zra, p. 129)- God Himself is the ultimate "Power of being."
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recent centuries through the application of science and technology. Things,
losing thier "power of being" have become objects to be mastered and con¬
trolled. (Tillich calls this process "thingification.") Industrial technolo¬
gy forces forms on things from the outside, contrary to their original "power
of being" so that they no longer reveal any sign of their ultimate origin or
transcendent ground."** There has been a wide-scale violation of things in our
p
modern technical civilization. The loss of a mystical (eros) attitude
tosard nature has been accompanied by a marked decline in sacramental think¬
ing.-^ But through a sacramental approach this "rsower of being" is regained
and the "power of being" in things is allowed to point beyond itself to the
ultimate Po.;er of Being.
The elements of the sacraments, then are not just arbitrary symbols
which could be replaced or dispensed with. The water of baptism has a "special
character or quality, a power of its own."1* virtue of this natural nower,
5
water is suited to become the bearer of a sacral power. . . ." There is,
then, an intrinsic relation between water and the sacrament of baptism. The
same is true of the bread and wine of the euchar&st. Both bread, and wine have
^Die Sozialistische Bntscheidung. p.
p
"The lines and colors of most things used for commercial manufacture
do not express the true nature of the material of which they are made, nor do
they express the purpose for which they axe produced." But Tillich goes on
to say that this situation is being recognized and that many are now "trying
to rediscover the inherent power and beauty of the materials they use and of
the products they create." (The Protestant Bra. t>. 137)
^This in turn has been responsible for the loss of the masses, especially
by the Protestant Church. Protestantism has over-emphasized the conscious
appeal of the V/ord. Sacraments are needed to appeal to the unconscious. (The
Protestant Era, p• 228)
U
The Protestant Hra, p. ±oJ .
5
Ibid. Tillich is probably indebted here to Paracelsus. (See "The Re¬
lation of Religion and Health: Historical Considerations and Theoretical
Questions," TUview of Religion (May, 1$)U6), X.358.
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inherent natural powers which are recognized in the "realistic" sacrament.
They point beyond themselves to the symbolic meaning of the eucharist; this
is their primary purpose. But they also point to the natural powers which
nourish man and provide the support for the highest achievements of the spirit.1
If this latter aspect alone were recognized, it might be thought that the
powers of nature by themselves would make sacraments possible. Actually
sacraments are possible only when the powers of nature are brought into the
2
context of the history of salvation. Through sacraments, natural power
becomes united with spiritual power. Nature, apart from the New Being, is
pure power and vitality. But throu^a the New Being this natural power is
3
reunited with its inherent spiritual power. Nature is made whole and becomes
a bearer of the holy; it becomes transparent to its ground of being.
It is to be noted, howev.r, that transparency to the holy is not
to be misunderstood as transmutation into the holy. Over against the Roman
Catholic tradition in which Grace is interpreted as tangible reality, Tillich
li
holds that Grace appears only through a sacrament but not in it. To transub¬
stantiate a substance into a holy object would be to elevate a conditioned
reality to Unconditional power, ^his, for Tillich, is blasphemy and damonizat-
ion. Protestant sacramental thinking must insist that the forms through which
Grace appears never theselves become unconditional, but continue to point
beyond themselves. Grace, as we have noted in other connections, is never
alloived to become "capsuled" or encased in history. It is both "here" and
"not here."
3-The Protestant i&ra. p. 109.
aIbid.. pp. 11U, 125-
3The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 66.
^The Protestant Bra. p« 211.
5«©ie Protestant Vision," Chicago Theological Seminary Register. (March,195),
XL, 11.
Hie transformation of nature, then, like the transformation of man,
is both present and future, "already" and "not yet." The salvation and whole¬
ness of nature (the unity of natural power and spiritual meaning) expressed in
sacraments is limited to specific forms and moments. Grace in nature is far
from being a permanent reality. Nature, along with man, awaits the final
transformation -"a new heaven and a new earth" which, it is to be repeated,
is not to be expected as a future event but is instead a symbol pointing to
the mysterious depths of our present world.*
Finally, what is history's share in the universal salvation? How
is the historical process transformed by the New Being? It will be remembered
that the most exaggerated expressions of the demonic cleavages in existence
were noted as most visible in their historical manifestations. Conversely,
Tillich believes that it is in the sphere of history that the transforming
effects of the New Being are most visible.
Ihe most apparent expression of salvation in history is what Tillich
calls the "theonomous society" - a soci ty that is transparent to the eternal
in all of its major expressions. In Buropean history the best expression of
such a period is found in the early and high Middle Ages. In this period
there was a spontaneous acknowledgment of a spiritual center for the whole
of life and a real s9nss of spiritual community. Such a society is made pos¬
sible by the New Being in history and especially through the Community of the
New Being, or the Church. This Community, however, does not "lord it over"
secular culture or dictate its forms of expression. (This would be "heteronomy"
and not "theonomy"?) Instead, the Church serves as a standard for society as
a whole and demonstrates how the society's own autonomous forms and daily
activities may express the holy which is the ultimate power behind these forms.
■
=j —xThe Shaking of the Foundations, p. 85.
^See Chapter IV for a discussion of these forms of society.
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Another concept dealing with the transformation of history "by the
Hew Being is that of the kairos (the "fulness of time," or "the right time").
Shis concept is closely correlated with the idea of a theonomous society, for
in the acceptance of its kairos. a society may take an important step toward
2
the actualization of theonomy. Christ as the New Being is the unique kairos
and thus sets the standard for other such realizations. Other kairoi occur
whenever special demands are felt in a special moment, calling for specific
decisions for the Unconditional. Not everything is possible, true, or demanded
at every moment of time, but each time has its own vocations and its own specific
3 ...
demonic powers which may be overcome.^ ^very kairos marks a turning point in
history. Christ as the unique kairos split history in B.C. and A.P.- into a
period of preparation and a period of reception. So, too, every derivative
kairos becomes the center for a similar division. On the basis of the kairos
U
concept, the periodieation of history becomes possible. For instance, the
Reformation marks the unique turning point in modern history. Specific demonic
forces were challenged .aid overcome; consequently prsceeding events could be
seen as preparation for the Reformation and subsequent events as reception
5
of the message of this particular lcairos. Other examples In recent history
are the Enlightenment and the Counter Reformation.
*Cf. Kiekegaard's doctrine of the Aaaenbliclc - the moment in vMch eternity
touches time and demands a personal decision. ("Existential Hiilosophy," p. 6l)
Tillich, however, stresses the social aspects of the tension-laden moment.
2
kairo3 doctrine expresses a duality between Judgnent and Creation
(Kritik und Gestaltun-); it is a turning-point in which the eternal both shatters
and transforms history. The kairos idea represent's Tillich's synthesis of
Lutheranisa and Socialism (the "critical" - that all action is sin, plus the
"constructive" - the prophetic demand for social action).
■z
•uEhe Protestant Bra, p. Jo. There is nothing automatic about the kairos.
It is a pregnant moment which may either be seized or neglected, if proper
decisions and choices are made, creative forces may be loosed; if the wrong choice
or no decision is made, then the kairos is lost and destructive forces reign,
k
The Rrotestant Sra. p. xxxiv.
5«The Kingdom of God and History," p. 123.
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Although both concepts (theonomy and Scairos) connote the transformat¬
ion of history by the New Being, both also express the incompleteness of any
historic transformation. Even the most perfect theoncmous society, Tillich
believes, is far from the Kingdom of God. Theonomy, of necessity, moves in the
direction of heteronomy (the domination of the spiritual or political elements
of society over the others) for there is an inevitable tendency to try to
preserve the achievements of a theoncmous age. Thus the good that is reached
becomes legalized? the artistic forms become an absolute, domineering standard;
free expression and the impulse for creativity in new channels is thwarted.
The society becomes static and immobile, provoking, in turn, autonomous react¬
ions. As Tillich sees it, autonomy and heteronomy are always in dialectical
tension, with theonoray as the synthesis of the two. Bat, contrary to Hegel's
dialectic, the synthesis always breaks, and the dialectical process moves on
to new manifestations. Th re is no final stage in which the dialectical
tension ceases."'"
'The concept of the kairos also expresses, in a similar way, the
fact that historical transformations remain incomplete. For the kairos
2
always represents an ecstatic moment in time, never a prolonged period. The
kairos, like Grace, cannot be confined to history. Although particular ex¬
pressions of the demonic may be met and conquered as the particular vocation
°f t'ne kairos, the demonic kingdom as a whole still stands. "The demonic is
subdued In actual victories from time to time, but it is never extirpated."3
Further, every manifestation of the power of God in history stimulates the
•'■James Luther Adams, "Tillich's Concept of the Protestant Era," The Protest¬
ant Era (U.S. edition), pp. 3C& f.; See also James Iuth r Adams, "Tillich's
Interpr tation of History," The Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 296-302.
gThe Protestant E^a. pp. S7 f.
Kingdom of God and History," p. 126.
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demonic forces at the same time that it overcomes partiular evils. Therefore
salvation in history is always fragnentary, and history, like man and nature,
must look beyond itself for the complete and perfect fulfillment* its ambiguities
and failures to achieve completed and permanent meaning point history beyond
itself toward the Kingdom of God.
The Kingdom of God is, in a sens , an all-embracing concept includ¬
ing the fulfillment of man and nature as well as that of history. Man's ful¬
fillment is included in it, for men are the subjects of the kingdom; nature,
too,is included as symbolized in the "new heaven and a new earth" associated
with its advent. As with the other eschatological symbols, however, the King¬
dom of God is not to be expected as a future event in time and suace or at
p
the end of time. Bather, the Kingdom of God symbolizes the purification of
history's distorted meanings, the fulfillment of history's ambiguous quests,
and the unification of all the dispersed embodiments of meaning which take
place in historical acts and institutions.^ The Kingdom, Tillich believes,
represents the prolongation into the absolute of realities already appearing
in history in a fragmentary and ambiguous way. This is the meaning of Tillich's
puzzling statement that "There is nothing in the ultimate that is not in
k
history." In other words, there is nothing in the eschaton that is not
%or this reason Tillich outs little trust in the doctrine of progress.
There may be progress in technical and political spheres, even in the humanizat-
ion of relationships. But there is no progress in the moral realm or in resuect
to the creative works of culture ("The Kingdom of God and History," p. 112; The
Interpretation of History, p. Cf. Tillich's concept of the "ambiguity of the
good," mentioned earlier).
?
Continental eschatology, by taking the "end" in a literal and temporal way,
is in danger of returning to a "pre-Iienaissance geocentrism, though not in
astronomical terms" ("The Present Theological Situation in the Light of the
Continental .European Development," Theology Today (October, I9U9), VI, 309.)
3"The Kingdom of God and History," p. II3; Propositions. Part V, pp. 7ff.
^The Interpretation of History p. 279*
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already in history in a partial and incomplete sense and that there is no
fulfillment in the Kingdom that is not intended to "be actualized in the historic¬
al process. "The Kingdom of God therefore embraces everything in the course
-1
of history as its transcendent meaning."
The fact that the ambiguities and distortions of history belong to
a supra-historical unity and fulfillment means that they already have a share
in the Kingdom of God and thus that the Kingdom has a present as well as a
future reference. The Kingdom of God symbol, therefore, shares the duality
already mentioned in relation to other eschatological concepts of "already"
and "not yet," for it is both in history and beyond it. The Kingdom reaches
into history and is stablished through history, but it is never completely
actualized and always remains transcendent In setting his own views over
against those of Barth, Tillich comments:
"At hand" means that it is here and not here, it is "in your midst,"
but it cannot be seen and handled. It is qualitatively different from
everything that is known to us. But with this distinctively qualitative
difference: it breaks into our world.3
Further, the fact that every ambiguous and frustrated meaning participates
in the perfect fulfillment serves to give infinite meaning to every historical
actualization of the good, no matter how incomplete or limited it may be.
Paralleling the earlier discussion in which it was seen that every individual
achievement (in spite of its transitoriness "'has a share in the ultimate mean¬
ing, Tillich comments that the same t ing applies in the wider, historical scene.
In every historical event in past and future there is a relationship to
an ultimate fulfillment, which lends meaning to relative and conditioned
fulfillment•
^The Interpretation of History, p. 280.
2,1The Church and Communism," Religion in Life (Summer, 1937), VI, 355*.
Systematic Theology. I, 268; "The Kingdom of God and History" p. 115*
^"What is Wrong with Dialectical Theology?" Journal of R lialon (April,
1935), xv, 1U3.
^The Interpretation of History, p. 278.
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Or, as Tillich says elsewhere, "history in each of its mom nts, in eras of
progress and eras of catastrophe, contributes to the ultimate fulfillment of
creatuxely existence. . . ." This insight serves to give an absolute meaning
and final validity to the historical process in contradistinction to all
p
suoernaturalism in which the historical process is depfceciated or disregarded.
Nevertheless, there is no completeness of meaning within this temporal process.
The partial fulfillments, frustrations, and ambiguities of history noint
(for faith) beyond themselves to their unity and completion in the Kingdom
of God. History, along with man and nature looks toward the ultimate "restorat¬
ion of all things."
S. The Restoration of All Things
The phrase the "restoration of all things" can be used to summarize
the ultimate transformation of man, nature, and history.
Th- Kingdom of God in its transcendent reference is described by
Tillich as the universal unity and perfection of all being.^ (This includes
the unity of man with man, social group with social group, man with nature,
and nature with itself; the term •berfectioxf includes perfect justice and
community, the fulfillment of individuals according to their uniqueness, and
even the salvation of time and space .^) At other times he speaks of the
renovation or restitution of the world and of regeneration iB a cosmic sense
as universal transformation (prior to its meaning in a personal or moral sense).
But the symbol "restoration of all things" can be used to cover most of these
meanings.
______g— —
larthianism, according to Tillich, holds that the meaning of existence
is fulfilled entirely beyond history and independently of human activity ("What
is Wrong With Dialectical Theology?" p. lb-2 ff. Tillich's views on Barth himself,
however, have changed since the publication of this article. For this rsason
Tillich did not vrant this essay published in The Prot stant 2ra.)
•^Propositions. Part V, p. lH ff. (15)•
^Time, according to Tillich, is also involved in the ambiguities of exist¬
ence. In the ultimate fulfillment, time is elevated to eternity and its disrupted
moments are brought into a supra-historical unity (Propositions. Part ¥,p.l5).
"^Systematic Th ology. I, 267*
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The idea of a "restoration of all things" needs to be protected
against misrepresentation and distortion. Restoration might be misconstrued
as meaning a return to some previous stage of existence. Tillich's use of
the concept "Essence" does at times seem to suggest something of this sort.
He cautions frequently, however, that essence is not to be conceived as some
previous state of existence. It is not something existent at all; it is to be
thought of primarily in terms of potentiality or in terms of the "ought" as
over against what "is." The idea of a return to the state of essence or
original perfection is also a falsification of the picture. Tillich's ultimate
fulfillment has nothing to do with a Golden Age or with anything static taken
as a norm. The "restoration of all things" is more a dynamic fulfillment in
which the potentialities of essence become actualized and, in the process,
produce the absolutely new and novel (beyond even the potentialities of essence).
Original perfection (as implied in the concept of Essence) is an uncontested,
undecided perfection and innocency. The perfection of the eachaton. however,
is of a much higher sort. It transcends both existence and essence. Its
superiority over existence(and its self-destructive clefts) is obvious. Rut
what is meant by a state higher than essence? As we said, essence is to be
thought of as potentiality. In terms of a personal quality, goodness, for
instance, this would mean an original, uncontested goodness. But the goodness
of the eschaton is not undecided or uncontested; it is goodness which has
withstood the temptations of life and risen above them. In terms of history,
a similar dynamic fulfillment is expressed in the symbol of the Kingdom of Go 1.
The Kingdom of God is not just the restoration of some original order - a timeless
and tensionless bliss. Such an idea, Tillich says, "is an abstraction whose
roots lie in a static conception of transcendence."* The Kingdom of God,
^The Kingdom of God and History," p. 117.
7U
he goes on to say-
is . . . not a system of eternal essentialities whose realization
was given in the Creation, was lost in the Fall» and. was regained in
Redemption. The Kingdom of God is the dynamic fulfillment of the ultim¬
ate meaning of existence against the contradictions of existence.*
The final fulfillment (in both personal and social life^ is a fulfillment of
the ultimate and not of the origin.
The figure of Christ as the Hew Being expresses a similar fulfillment
and helps to fill out the picture. The Hew Being also is a creation beyond
p
both existence and essence. Christ is essential man appearing under the condit¬
ions of existence (including all that this means in the way of temptation,
suffering, anxiety, etc.) without any transformation of his essential unity
with the Father. His goodness and perfection represent, therefore, not an
undecided and uncontested innocence, but a purity and unity of life which has
triumphantly witstood every finite existential condition without succumbing
to distortion. In this way he overcomes existence and is able to be the New
Being.
Another possible misinterpretation of the phrase "restoration of all
things" weald be to take it as meaning a universal salvation in the sense that
God will finally, throu^i persuasion or power, overcome every finite will. Such
a view, Tillich believes, means a weakening of ultiraate responsibility and is
u
an underestimation of the absolute seriousness of human freedom. God took a
risk in giving men finite freedom - the possibility that this freedom could
ultimately be turned against Him in final rej cticn of His love. Man, then, is
*"The Kingdom of God and History,"p. 117-
p
"A Rginterpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation," p. lU2.
3
See the discussion of universalisn, p. 55» n.2. Fulfillment, according
to Tillich, is impossible apart from freedom. "In eternity fulfillment cannot be
enforced." (The Interpretation of History, p. 2S3).
u
"Redemption in Cosmic and Social History," p. 2U.
^Systematic Theolo,-py.1. 269.
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not irresistably saved; he can cut himself off from the ground of his being
1
and be left to the non-being which he chooses.
One final distortion to be guarded against has already been repeat¬
edly recognized - that of conceiving the final "restoration of all things" as
a future event. Ths supra-historical, Tillich affirms, cannot be understood
O
in terms of any future state of being, out only in terms of meaning. To try
to express it in terms of time and history "makes the ultimate meaning a section
in the totality of meanings, a history after history, a time after time,"3 thus
negating its ultimacy. Supra-historical concepts (such as Eternal Life, the
Kingdom of God, the "restoration of all things") really symbolise a hidden
dimension within our present existence (which is the only existence); they
express life's deepest meaning: its relation to the Unconditional as the
1$,
ground, source, and aim of life.
On the other hand, Tillich rejects the concept of "eternal condemnation"
which he believes to be a contradiction in terms. "It establishes an eternal
split within being itself." (Systematic Th~olo y. I, 2S5). We may separate
ourselves from God, but "eternity " cannot be attributed to this state.
Eternity is applicable only in the realm of being. "Where the divine love
ends, being ends." (Systematic Theology, p. 2SU) When a man finally rejects
God, he falls into non-being, where temporal qualities no longer apply.
^"The Kingdom of God and History," p. II3.
3lbid.. p. 127.
U




1. A Definition of Terms
Just what does Tillich m an by "religion" and by "culture"? What
are their similarities, differences, and interrelationships?
Contrary to the general assumption in which religion is Identified
with the holy and culture relegated to the realm of the secular, Tillich
affirms that both religion and culture are rooted in a common "spiritual
substance" and that they differ only in the way in which they express that
substance. An understanding of Tillich's conception of "spiritual substance"
is therefore basic to our discussion.
According to Tillich, culture, along with the ^ole of existence,
is supported by the Unconditional which is the Ground of all being and mean¬
ing. In relation to the sphere of culture, Tillich calls this unconditional
support "religious [or spiritual] substance" and claims that it is this alone
that gives content, meaning, and import to life.1 Now this spiritual substance
may be expressed in two ways: religion expresses it directly and intentionally;
2
culture expresses it indirectly and unintentionally. It is the vocation of
religion, so to speak, to proclaim this unseen support which, as the ground of
all being, i3 hidden as an assumption in all cultural activity. Religion :alls
attention to this "spiritual substance," symbolizes it, and seeks to relate life
directly to it through worship. Religious forms express in symbolic form "the
religious substance that bears our entire existence."3 Religion, in other words,
^•Die Idee Eine Theologie der Hultur," Reljgionaphilosophie der Kultur ,
(Berlin: Heather and Riichard, 1921) , Hhdlosophische Vortrage, j^frgegellsphafj;
No. 2^., passim.
^Religiose VerwirklichungTtod . 255 ** •
^The Interpretation of History, p. 53-
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is the depth-dimension of culture; it accepts as its vocation the task of
making the source of this depth-dimension known, loved, and obeyed*
In culture, on the other hand, the spiritual substance is only
indirectly and unintentionally apprehended, Cultural activities are concerned
with conditional forms, immanent ends, and preliminary concers which express
the finite structure of reality. In culture the dependency of finite forms
upon the infinite is only indirectly and unwittingly expressed. Religion and
culture differ, then, primarily in the degree of intentionality and conscious¬
ness with which they express the spiritual substance and Unconditional ground
that sustains them both.
2. The Relationship between Religion and Culture
Because of the spiritual 3ubstance that undergirds them both,
religion and culture are, according to Tillich, closely related. They are,
in fact, "mutually immanent."1 and are as 1 nterdenendent as form and content.
Tillich frequently expresses this relationship in the following formula:
"Religion is the sustance of culture; culture is the form of religion."
The first half of this statement should be clear from the foregoing discussion.
Tillich is simply saying that all culture is ultimately dependent ron a spirit¬
ual substance that gives it a canter of meaning. The second half of the
affirmation- that "culture is the form of religion" - means simply that religion
must express itself in and through cultural forms in order to have any reality.
TMs formula is meant, however, to describe the essential relation¬
ship between religion and culture and not necessarily their exigential relation¬
ship. Ideally, as in a theonoraous culture, religion is the reco^iized substance
*The Protestant ag-a. p. b2
2cf. this to the double truth expr ssed in much of Dawson's thought, that
1) no religious faith is robust unless it produces its proper culture, and that
2) no culture can surive unless it becomes the embodiment of a living religion.
3Tlie Interoret.?.tion of History, pp. 225, 227, 23S.
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of culttire and culture provides the forms through which religion is expressed.
But xmder the conditions of existence this is not often the case. The substance
of culture is not usually religious; preliminary concerns intrude and put them¬
selves at the center. On the other hand, the forms for religious expression
are not often drawn from contemporary culture but instead from an archaic one
and are therefore not particularly meaningful or vital.1 Existentially, then,
there is a separation between religion and culture contrary to their essential
relationship of interdependence.
Culture as the totality of man's spiritual creativity is Essentially
the expression of man's ultimate concern. But Existentially it has the
tendency to isolate itself from the connection with the holy and to
become secular. Religion, conversely, has the Existential tendency to
isolate itself from culture and to produce a special religious realm
in which the theoretical fuiftion produces special objects of intuition
. . . special forms of action. . . and special kinds of feeling
Under the conditions of existence, religion and culture usually move against
one another. A conflict thus ensues between autonomous culture and heteronomous
religion in which neither is able to transcend its limitations toward the
achievement of a theonomcus unity.
Asked what the proof is for the fall of the world, I like to answer,
religion itself, namely, a religious culture beside a secular culture,
a temple beside a town hall, a Lord's supper beside a daily supper,
prayer beside work, meditation beside research, caritas beside eros. ^
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that religion and culture can be
entirely separated. Culture cannot avoid ultimate concerns; it cannot permanent¬
ly hide Its spiritual substance. Every culture, whether it recognises it or not,
is undergirded by a spiritual substance which gives it, according to Tillich,
1+
a "substantially religious character." Underneath every society, Tillich
^Religion in such cases becomes "heteronomous" if it s-;eks to force theso
archaic forms u on a society as if they were the only proper expression of tho
unconditional.
"Proioositions. Part IV, p. J.
^Tha Protestant Era, p. 66.
\he Interpretation of Historv, p. k9.
79
insists, is "an unccncsious faith wich is not assailed because it is the pre¬
supposition of life and is lived rather than thought of. . . . This all-
determining, final source of meaning constitutes the actual religious situation
of a period."^ Because culture, along with the whole of reality, is rooted
in the Unconditional, it is possible to find traces of the ultimate in even
the most avowedly autonomous or secular cultur s • Even whan a culture apnears
materialistic, humanistic, or even atheistic, it still reflects same ultimate
concerns - seme unconditional faith and meaning- which reveal its basic
religious character. Secular culture is thus as impossible as atheism, for
even atheistic negation is grounded in being itself and can make its protest
O
only on the basis of the power and support that comes from the ground of being.
defining religion as "ultimate concern" Tillich thus avoids restricting it
to its institutional expressions. Ultimate concerns are reflected in politics,
economics, the arts, and in all realms of life.
Whenever human existence in thought or action becomes a subject of doubts
and questions, whenever unconditioned meaning becomes visible in works
which only have conditioned meaning in themselves, there culture is
religious.-^
5y means of what he calls a "theonomous analysis," Tillich seeks to uncover the
latent religious character of secular movements and to show how secular pur¬
suits embody ultimate concerns and are therefore basically religious Culture
then, according to Tillieh, cannot entirely avoid expressing its spiritual sub¬
stance; it can never become completely separated from its religious foundations.
•*"The Keligious Situation, p. 12
2"Two Types of Philosophy of Heligion," Union Smlnary Quarterly Bevlew
(May, 1936), 1,12} Cf. also his statement "There is no place beside the divine ,
there is no possible atheism, there is no wall between the religious and the
secular. The holy embraces both itself and the secular." (Prot. Spa, p. xxix"*
3fhe Interpretation of History, p. 49
^Uber die Idee Eine Theolgie der Kultur", nassim; Systematic Theolorer.I. 40
The Protestant . pp. 62 ff.
so
But neither can. religion, on the other hand, cut itself off from
culture. Religion cannot avoid expressing itself through cultural forms such
as those provided in art, music, literature, philosophy, and poetry. ?.hat
would institutional religion he apart from the techniques of building and
construction? And what religion could get along without utilizing the languague
of a culture? Apart from these cultural forms, religion could not even exist,
let alone express itself; it is in and through cultural forms that religion
1
becomes a reality. Even an other-worldly faith has to have some form of
social embodiment in order to exist; even a religion which renounces the world
has to express its renunciation in worldly forms. A heteronoxaous religion is
thus not as absolute as it thinks it is, for it is dependent unon the culture
that surrounds it for the forms of its expression, .dven if it chooses to use
archaic forms, these forms must have some contact with contemporary life and
express some cultural meaning, however remote. Otherwise that religion would
have no "power of being." Thus religion and culture, even under the tragic
conditions of existence, cannot be completely hostile or "strange" to one
another, but only "estranged."
Tillich's ideal society ?/ould be one in which this estrangement
Is overcome and in which religion and culture realize their essential relation-
2
ship of mutual immanence. In such a society, culture would penetrate to its
depths and find that its autonomous forms transcend themselves. Its forms would
become transparent to the divine ground and would evidence the spiritual
*This insight has reievance for Tillich's concept of revelation. Revelation
for Tillich is not something that breaks through and is foreign to life, but
rather something that must be received in and through the forms of secular
culture. There is thus a preparation for revelation in the history of religions
and in the history of cultures. ("What is Wrong with Dialectical Theology?", p. lUo)»
p
Tillich calls such a culture a "theonomcrus" one. A full discussion of
this will be given later in this chapter.
SI
substance that supports them. Beligion, on the other hand, would find expression
in and through, the forms of the daily life. The autonomous forms would be
filled with ultimate meaning and significance. Through such a two-fold process,
the essential relation between religion and culture would be actualized; the
secular would become religious and the religious would become secular (in the
way it expresses itself).
This quest for the mutual immanence of religion and culture, however,
should not be taken as an indication that Tillich believes that religion
and culture should become fused or incorporated into one another. There is
no thought that religion ought to absorb the secular realm (as, for instance,
the church exercizing control over the State).^ Although Tillich wants to
overcome the false antithesis of religion and culture, he is caxef .1 to
caution against the dangers of fusing or synthesizing the two. His view of
the ideal relationship of religion and culture is that of correlation (rather
2
than either separation or synthesis). He favors a dialectical approach in
which religion and culture are seen as two poles of one reality. The poles
are mutually dependent u~nn one another, yet are in significant contrast to
one another. Bach pole needs the other for its fulfillment and completion.
Culture needs a religious (prophetic ) protest in order to keep its forms from
becoming empty* religion needs cultural criticism in order to keep it from
becoming arrogant and heteronomous.
3. Autonomy, Heteronomy, and Theoaomy
It has been impossible to discuss the relationship of religion and
culture without introducing the terms autonomy, heteronomy, and theonoay.
Tillich believes that it is possible to classify all varieties of societies
^•The Profr fstent p. 50.
2See especially the article "The Present Theolggical Situation in the Light
of the Continental Byxopean Development," passim.
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and all possible periods of history according to these three types. Our
analysis, then, would not be complete without a discussion of these terms
and their relevance for Tillich's typology of culture.
Autonomy means, of course, "self-law" and refers to the law of
reason (the logos structure) which is immanent in reality and in the mind.
It does not m ;an lawlessness, but rather the acceptance of and obedience to
1
the objective demands involved in the nature of our world. As an attitude
assumed by a society, autonomy refers to the attempt of a group to live accord-
irgto the rational structure of reality as it is p rceived by the human mind
without any particular recognition of the dependency of these rational struct¬
ures upon the unconditional ground and abyss. An autonomous society is not
necessarily irreleigious (although it tends in this direction); it often begins,
in fact, as a religious (prophetic) protest against the abuses of a heteronomous
society in which finite realities have set themselves up as absolutes. In the
name of universal reason and the dignity of man it registers its protest, as
2
it did in the age of the Enlightenment. Its real power, however .usually comes
from the spiritual substance of a previous theoncmous age. As long as this
inherited spiritual character lasts, the autonomous society remains creative,
but when this inherited foundation begins to crumble, the autonomous culture
becomes empty. As Tillieh puts it,
Autonomy is able to live as long as it can draw from the religious
tradition of the past, from the remnants of a lost theonomy. Bat more
and more it loses this spiritual foundation. It becomes emptier, more
formalistic, or more factual and is driven toward scepticism and cyncicism.3
1ffhe Protestant Era, p. 50.
P
A more detailed account of the Enlightenment is given in the next chanter.
Protestant, %a, p. 53.
*3
When a society loses its contact with the eternal, science is no longer con¬
cerned with truth, politics with justice, or art with eternal meanings. The
greatest danger, however, is not merely that the forms of life become enroty
but rather that the religious vacuum thus created cannot remain a vacuum and
is invaded by demonic forces. There is, in other words, no such thing as a
"matter of fact" culture. "An autonomous culture without religious foundat¬
ion necessarily falls into anti-divine heteronoray
Hateroncmy means, of course, "other-law" or "alien-law" and refers
to the imposition of a religious or secular power in disregard of the logos
structure of mind and world. Heteronoray, according to Tillich, can originate
in two ways. Firstly, as indicated above, it can arise from an autonomy which
has become impoverished. To avoid meaninglessness and chaos following the
failure to live according to the demands of reason, a society may submit
itself to super or and oppressive forces (such as an arrogant church or
political power). An example of this process at work is seen, Tillich believes,
in the great transition of our time from an individualistic society (based on
the presupposition of "automatic harmony") to a collectivist society centered
around the omnicompetent State.2 Secondly, heteroncmy may arise from a dis¬
integrating theonomy. It occurs for instance when a Church has once been the
center of cultural creativity finds its indirect power weakening and begins to
wield direct power in order to preserve the forms which were once an adequate
expression of meaning (but have since become empty) and to force them upon the
society as absolutes- Jhe classical example of this for Tillich is the breaking
up of the medieval society and especially the use of the inquisition. In both
cases the heteronomous power assumes control of the social situation, stif^lss
■'■"Our Protestant Principles", The Prot - stant. (September. I9U2) IV, I3.
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The next chapter will deal with this transition in detail.
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all rational criticism, and subjects all things unto itself. In either case
heteronoray represents a type of demonry, in that a finite reality claims for
itself unconditional validity.* When religion acts heteronoraously, says
Tillich, it "has ceased to be the substance and life-blood of a culture and has
itself become a section of it, which, forgetting its theonomous greatness,
betrays a mixture of arrogance and defeatism."2 Autonomous forces, of course,
react to this heteronomous subjection. The ensuing struggle between autonomy
and heteronomy may issue in theonomy. There is, however, nothing automatic
about this; there is no necessary synthesis (theonomJF) as a result of the
interaction between thesis (autonomy) and antithesis (h teronoroy).^
Theonomy means, of course, submission to the divine law or, better,
an openness toward the divine. This openness toward the unconditional, while
expressing itself in a wide variety of cultural manifestations, does not
necessarily indicate an age in which the majority of people are actively
ll
religious. It is rather an age in which
the consciousness of the presence of the unconditional permeates and guides
all cultural functions and forms. . . . This situation finds expression,
first of all, in the dominating von r of the religious sphere, but not
in such a way as to make religion a special form of life ruling over the
other forms. Rather, religion is the life-blood, the inner mower, the
ultimate meaning of all life.5
In a theonomous society, all forms of cultural life are mlsated by the
consciousness of the unconditionally real. Theonomy thsrefo e differs radical¬
ly from heteronomy. In a heteronomous society, autonomous creativity is
stifled in the interest of conformity; in a theonomous society, autonomous
3-She Irfterureation of History, p. 26.
^The Protestant .Bra, p. 52*
^The Interpretation of History, p. 235. Religious Socialism in Germany,
for instance, failed in its attempt to overcome the gap between a heteronomous
church (rejected by secular revolutionists) and an autonomous culture (rejected
by the churches). See The Rfrotestant Era, p. 62-.
^Systematic Theology, p. lb-S; The Prot stant Ira, p. U9-
^The Protestant Era, p.
S5
creativity is saved f am self-destruction, directed (i .e. given an ultimate
meaning and purpose), and fulfilled- Autonomous forms are not dominated by
religion or subjected to its control, but rather become transparent to their
ground and aim as bearers of ultimate meaning. In a theonomous situation,
religion does not press its forms upon life but rather the forms of life
become filled with religious meaning. Tillich thus speaks of theonoiry as an
"autonomy filled with religion"*' or as a "self-transcending autonomy"^ for in
a theonomous age, the autonomous forms are recognized as having a definite
contribution to make. "Protestant secularism" is another synonym Tillich uses
for theonomy in order to indicate the necessary autonomous elements in it."^
Protestantism as opposed to both Judaism and Roman Catholicism is able to
recognize the inherent values of secular culture and to give full value to its
autonomous forms so that
the secular forms in thought and action approach the specificially
religious ones without becoming religious themselves, ©ley remain
secular, but they show the spiritual influence that permanently ema¬
nates from a Gestalt of tracer - -> • • • •
Although a theonomous age has an awareness of an unconditional "otherness"
this transcendnet element is not alien or strange, as in heteronoray, but is
rather a transcendence that is within. The divine law is net subjected upon
man "from above" but is seen as a law known to man as he becomes aware of the
transcendent depth within himself and within his society.
Theonomy asserts that fee superior law is, at the same time, the inner¬
most law of man himself, rooted in the divine ground which is man's
own ground: the law of life transcends man, although it is, at the
same time, his own.5
*The Interpretation of History, p. 2l.
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Thus, in a theonomous age, the inner transcendency of existence itself is
made visible.
Transparency to the unconditional, however, should not be taken to
mean transmutation. Autonomous forms which become windows toward the eternal
do not thereby become segnents of the eternal. That is the error of Eoman
Catholic sacramentalisra. For Tillich, the sacraments are only symbols of the
unconditional and, as we saw in the previous chapter, do not possess uncondit¬
ional power or validity in and of themselves. The same thing applies to
aspects of society (including the Church) which, in a theonoraous age, are
recognized as gestalten of grace. The Protestant principle demands that no
finite reality be given an unconditional significance. Thus even a theonomous
age itself cannot be identified with the Kingdom of God, for the achievements
of a theonomous age are only partially filled with unconditional meaning and
1
are therefore transitory.
Tillich believes that these three classificiations we have been
discussing are applicable to the whole of history and that in every period one
or the other attitude predominates. The transitions from one period to another
and the structural changes involved become, for Tillich, luminous clues to the
understanding of the historical process.
Seen in a world historical perspective, the conflict between autonomy
and heteronomy is the key to any theological understanding of the Greek
as well as of the mod rn development and of many other problems of the
spiritual history of mankind.**
The next chapter will deal with Tillich's analysis of the source and solution
of the present world crisis in the light of these principles.
"^The Interpretation of History, p. 23U.
^Systematic Theology, p. S5.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE SOURCE AND SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT WORLD CRISIS
Although Tillich is not primarily an historian or sociologist, he
is keenly interested in the present world crisis and has made some important
contributions to the understanding of the historical roots of our present
situation. He believes that it is impossible properly to diagnose the present
situation and prescribe remedies apart from a thorough knowledge of its histor¬
ical antecedents.* His Marxian view of structural trends operating in the
historical process causes him to look upon the events of recent years as the
result not of a series of bad accidents but rather as the manifestations of
profound structural changes which have been shaking our society for centuries.2
Tillich describes this world-revolution largely in terms of the transition
from the autonomous age of the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenement,
throui^x the intermediate period of the Victorious Bourgeoisie to the heterono-
mous age of modern industrial society. In this chapter we shall attempt to
see this process in detail.
fillich outlines thi3 development in several essays^ but touches
upon its widespread manifestations time and again in his various writings.
An attempt is made to incorporate a variety of sources in order to give as
complete a picture as possible of Tilllch's total historical analysis of the
source and solution of the present world crisis-
^"The Meaning of the German Church Struggle," etc, p. I3O; The Protestant
Era, pp. 26, 29, 286, 291*
2,,0ar Disintegrating World," p. 1U5; The Protestant Era, pp. 261, 291
3"The World Situation" She Christian Answer (Charles Scribner's, I9H6H 'Our
Disintegrating World," Anglican Theological Review (Auril. I9LI) XXIII, pp. I3I4-
1U5; "The Disintegration of Society in Christian Countries" The Church's Witn?ss
To God's Design (London: Student Christian Movement Fress, I9HS); "Trends in
Religious Thought that Affect Social Outlook" .Religion and the World Order (F.
Ernest Johnson, ed.) (New York: Harper and Brothers, I9I&), up. 17-28.
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1. The Theonoray and Heteroncray of the Middle Ages
Oar analysis may begin with Tilllch's view of the theonomous period of
the Middle Ages. Although Tillich cautions that no one period can be considered
as a norm - not even the Sew Testament period - he does indicate that the
high Middle Ages may be considered "a symbol for our future work."'" ®iis
high estimation is based u on the spontaneous acknowledgement of a common
spiritual center by individuals and socieity alike during this age. Every
person, regardless of education and status, participated in a common spiritual
reality which transcended him and yet at the same time gave hiia a personal
center. There was thus a high degree of real community spirit and a genuine
harmony of interest between individuals and society guaranteed by the identi-
2
cal foundations of both.
The Middle Ages, of course, had its defects. Individual autonomous
creativity was often surpr ssed in favor of group creativity; the development
of individual personality was consequently thwarted- The over-enrphasis upon
sacramental grace obstructed the free flow of prophetic criticism, and the
loss of prophetic criticism led in turn to a definite trend toward heteronoray
during the late Middle Ages .3 The adoption of an official Roman Catholic
philosophy tended to kill the philosophical eros and discourage autonomous
k
thought. The pride of achievement and the belief that society was attaining
a final and ultimate form led to the subordination of "the Logos to the great
Kairos on which their culture was built,and the imprisonment of eternal
^The Interpretation of History, p. 236.
^T:ie Protestant Era, p. 2$0.
^The Interpretation of History, pp. 233 ff.
'Systematic Theology, p. 28
-^ghe ffrotestant J) • 17.
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truth in finite forms. It was against this growing tendency toward authori¬
tarianism and oppressive heteronomy that the Renaissance and the Reformation
revolted.
2. She Autonomy of the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, and "Rise of
The Bourgeoisie" Periods
The great autonomous period of modern culture Tillieh considers as
beginning with the Renaissance. Although there was a definite tendency in
the direction of autonomous creativity in all cultural pursuits, not all
aspects of the Renaissance were by any means "autonomous," according to Tillich's
definition. "The Renaissance was a step toward autonomy, but still in the
spiritual ower of an unwasted medieval heritage.""'' Although the Renaissance
scholars w re enchanted by the discovery of Greek culture, their achievements
remained largely dependent upon the inescapable Christian foundation which
gave its color to every major thought and act of this period.
Everything Greek came back awain: yet nothing was in reality Greek.
for the religious foundation was no longer the same.2
Nevertheless, the break with the Christian tradition and the medieval culture
had begun. The rupture was accentuated by the preeminence given to Reason as
the principle of humanity - that which had power to liberate man from religious
and political absolutism and tyranny. In the great battle against the petri¬
faction of medieval culture, the rational elements gradually became independent
and unleashed forces that were to usher in a new age.
Ighe Protestant Bra, p. 6^.
gIbid. p. 9; See: Courage to Be. pp. IS f.; The Renaissance, then, was not
a simple recovery of the Greek tradition but a basic transformation of it. Neo-
Flatonic negative asceticism became a positive, enthusiaetio affirmation of the
world, Greek individualism became transformed in its application to the new
theories of the State and Society; Hellenic intuitive science became an in¬
strument of technical control, etc.
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The Reformation in some ways carried on the autonomous spirit of the
Renaissance and, in its attack on Soman Catholicism, helped prepare the soil
for the growth of autonomy. Bat although the Reformation began as a protest
against heteronomy, it swiftly hardened into a new heteroaomy. The emphasis
uuon correct doctrine, the legalistic Bibliolatry, the arbitrary demand for
the repetition of Luther's experience of justification by faith, all issixed,
according to Tillich, n an authrcitarianism and obscurantism oftentimes worse
than anything the Middle Ages had seen. ^
Bat the period in which the autonomous attitude is most clearly
expressed is, as Tillich calls it, the period of the Rise of the Bourgeoisie.
Behind the ascendancy of this new class of merchants, entrepreneurs,and
capitalists was the n w conception of man coming out of the Renaissance
and blossoming into full force in the Enlightenment - an anthropology based
on a faith in the essential goodness of man and the basic integrity of human
reason.
The transcendent foundation for personal and social life provided
by the common faith of the Middle Ages was, as would be expected, undermined
in the period of reformation and religious wars. Tillich agrees with Dawson
in seeing the battle between Protestant and Catholic fo ces as providing an
opening wedge for the growth of secularism.3 iy the time of the Enlightenment
the transcendent foundations were replaced by immanent ones provided by reason
k
and its metaphysical and ethical creations.
The Enlightenment brou^it into play what Tillich calls "revolutionary
reason" directed toward the formation of a n w humanity and a new society by
"*The Prot stant E-ra. u. lUS.
^Systematic Theology. p. S5.
^The Interpretation of History, p. 233.
**3he Protestant Era. p. 290.
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liberating man from the medieval authoritarian Leviathan and giving him a
new dignity. Now this attempt to overcome the demonic distortions of the petri¬
fying medieval society was indirectly a religious attack ishich had behind it
the definitely religious motiviation of prophetic criticism. The religious
demonry that violates human nature through divine decree and destroys human
reason and psychic poweijthrough heteronomous subjectiorfeieeds to be attacked and
overcome. So in spite of its critical attitude toward religion, Tillich
sees in the humanism of the Enlightenement a warfare carried on for the sake
of the image of God in man. Yet its criticism, based as it was on an optimistic
faith in human reason, was oftentim s shallow; through its emphasis upon the
divine clarity tended to obscure the divine depth.^ Although it began as a
religious (prophetic) protest, it soon lost contact with the spiritual depths
from which it had sprung and became two-dimensional, failing to grasp either
O
the depths or the hieghts of classical Christianity. through an emphasis
upon the power of human reason to cut through all levels of life and discern
truth about our universe, the philosophers of the Enlightenement succeeded in
banishing all fear of demons (and the taboo formerly associated with nature)
and in constructing a view of the universe as a closed, rational system. Con¬
sequently it was thought that there were no longer any hindrances to the
"will for knowledge" and no limits tG the possibilities of forming and sharing
matter. The only elements remaining to be overcome were immanent realities;
ignorance, finiteness, and indolence.^ With nature shorn of its numinous
qualities and deprived of its basic resistance to man, it became possible to
perceive it, analyze it, and rule it.
*fhe Interpretation of History, p. 107.
freeing itself from the transcendent "threat" it also cut itself off from
the transcendent "support".
3The Interpretation of History, p. 109«
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The loss of the demonic depths and contradictions in nature paved
the way for what Tillich calls the philosophy of harmonism which became the
force of integration during the whole period of the rise and victory of the
bourgeoisie. According to this view, the whole universe comprises one great
harmonious system wherein "all things work together for good." Although not
assuming that everything is "sweetness and light," there was the basic pre¬
supposition that, behind the back, so to speak, of the historical process
was a "pre-established harmony"* which would over-rule the separate, self-willed,
2
egoistic acts of man. Season in one individual was thought to be essentially
in harmony with reason in every other individual. Therefore every man could
pursue his egoistic desires without hindering the basic harmony of life."'
Individualism, self-affirmation, and initiative far from upsetting the social
balance were thought to contribute to the forward march of progress. For if
there was a providential harmony, as believed, between the free will of man and
the organic structure of society, the pursuit of individual interest could not
help but result in the general welfare of the community. Although not a verbal¬
ized belief for the average man, this view, according to Tillich, was such a
basic presupposition that it gave color to nearly every social manifestation
of the period.
It was expressed in economics, for instance, in the doctrine of
laissez-faire.^ Since natural harmony was thought to exist among the competing
interests of men, the economic process functioning according to its own stroctural
laws (without government interference) would automatically produce the best
*Cf. Leibnitz's monadclogy and Pope's "Essay on J*ian" ("Whatever is, is right")
^Systematic Theology, I, 265.
3«Trends in Beligious Thought that Affect Social Outlook," p. lgff; The
Protestant Era, p. 290.
"The World Situation," p. 21 f.
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possible distribution of w alth. Underneath the competitive struggle for profits,
in other words, lay an essential harmony by means of which all aspects of
economic life could work together for the common economic good of all.
In politics, harmonism was expressed in the doctrine of liberal
democracy, especially in the idea that individual political judgments and the
rule of the majority would lead to the rational and just shaping of society.
The great development of this period, parliamentary democracy, Tillich believes
rests upon the harmonistic view of life and presupposes a basic conformity and
common interest among the members of a society.^" As long as th re was an
agreement to differ and a willingness to accept compromise for the sake of
society as a whole, democracy could function successfully, as it did during
this period. There was further, according to Tillich, an interdependence
between liberal democracy and the economic power of the rising bourgeoisie.
Tillich even goes so far as to call democracy an expression of middle class
2
economics. although under the theory of harmonism no absolute rulers were
needed or tolerated, there were hidden rulers who kept control of the democratic
process and were the real "bearers" of democratic society.^ These were the
bourgeois capitalists. Their dominance, soys Tillich, was comperable to that
of the ruling classes under feudalism, except that in feudalism the control
of society was in the hands of those whose office had a general social sanction
' J- ■ ■ ■' ■ 11 ' ' 1 ' - ir l i 1 » ---r """ ' i. ■■■■■ ■■■■■«
The Protestant kra. p. 266 f. Dawson similarly speaks of liberal confjxm-
ism as the basis of parliamentary democracy and sees Capitalism and parliament¬
ary democracy (along with the idea of progress) as parallel aspects of the
liberal movement (.Religion and the Modern State .trn. 1,14,25 Snauiries.
pp. 9,10,11.)
O
"The power which supports democracy is made up of the forces which can make
use of it in establishing their own dominion in place of the sacred old aristoc¬
racies. Hie pillar of democracy is the middle class and particularly that part
of the middle class which exercises economic leadership, in whose hands lies
the control of capital. . . . Capital creates majorities and with majorities
it creates political power." (The Religious Situation, -p. 94 f.)
3Idem.
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and consecration. Democratic leadership, on the other hand, was usually more
a matter of personal will to power and lacked the numinous quality of the conse¬
crated feudal offices.1 Bourgeois lead rship was thus devoid of any real sense
of social responsibility•
In international relations. the doctrine of natural harmony pro~
p
duced the "balance of power" structure. The religious cohesions of the Middle
Ages had besn replaced by the supposedly automatic harmony existing between
soverign states. The development of one State, even through the competitive
struggle for markefe?, was thought to be in harmony with the development of
all nations.
education the presupposition of automatic harmony led to an
emphasis upon individual personality and human potentiality. The undermining
of the old sacred degrees of power (kingship, knighthood, nobility, etc.) and
the making of person equal to person created an atmosph-re in which the develop¬
ment of the individual personality took precedence ever group life. Spiritual
production became individual and personal rather than communal. There was no
fear th t this would lead to anti-social conduct for again, according to the
presupposition of natural harmony, the development of each was thought to
promote the development of all. The humanistic ideal in education was to
actualize the greatest possible human potentiality in each individual and, thiuueh
a maximum of self-expression, to produce a harmonious community.3 The humanist
ideal also emphasized reason as the principle of truth and, since everyone
had reason, an impetus was given to universal education.
1The Protestant -Sra, p. lU2.
^"The World Situation," p. 22.
P- 35-
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religion. Protestantism was the chief expression of the harmonistic
view of life. Free reign, for instance, was given to individual interpretation
of Scripture since it was believed t iat one man's interpretation would not
differ radically from another's- Protestantism stressed freedom and personal-
ism as against authoritarianism and symbolism; it emphasized autonomy and indi¬
vidualism as against certainty and collectivism.* The stress on Biblical
education in Protestantism produced a rationalized, intellectual!zed faith as
2
over against Catholic sacramental!sm. It was thought that a mere hearing or
reading of the Word would create religious common sense and that preaching
alone was sufficient for maintaining the church and creating a community of
believers.
As a whole, this period that Tillich labels the "Rise of the Bourgeoisie"
was an autonomous age in which there was a breaking free of the human spirit
from the sh8cW.es of feudal oppression. Unrestricted optimism and confidence
prevailed along with faith in the goodness of man, the integrity of human
reason, and the straight march of history toward perfection. The presupposition
of automatic harmony undergirded the entire social structure and gave it an
apparent security and balance.
Row the amazing thing is, as Tillich points out, that most of the
political and social actualizations of this philosophy did work relatively
well for a considerable period. It is easy to see why men thou^it they had
tapped universal principles- Ae long as the accumulated spiritual power of the
Middle Ages lasted, religious individualism could flourish Trithcut ham to
society as a whole; as long as cultural conformity continued, liberal democracy
could hold its own; as long as Great Britain could maintain the balance of power,
*The Protestant U„a. p. 267. Tillich calls attention to the fact that
today the trends are in the opposite direction. Protestantism therefore faces
the possible end of its "era." The implications of this will be discussed later
in this chapter.
2Dawson's analysis at this point is very similar.
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relations between States could function relatively harmoniously; as long as
markets were expanding without limit, free trade could be allowed to continue
without restriction and many benefits were extended to society as a whole.*
Nevertheless, as Tillich points out, these were results of a particu¬
larly favorable constellation of social-economic-religious forces. In reality,
then, this period was living from the accumulated spiritual substance of the
past- the social harmony of the previous age which had been based on common
religious and social foundations. Such harmony as was produced during the
bourgeois period was due not to a smoothly-working natural law as was supposed
but to the basic conformity of interest and ideology of the rising bourgeoisie-
their mutual interest, for examole, in the accumulation of wealth and in the
2
restriction of government to keep it from interfering in the economic realm.
The believe in a harmonious universe, then, was more a matter of faith than
of fact - a faith in the goodness of man and the world and in the spiritual
unity between man and nature. Tillich therefore calls the belief in harmonism
a rationalized trust in Providence.
As this particular constellation of forces changed with the years,
significant transitions were to come. The succeeding period unwittingly
brought into play new forces which were to underm ne the very foundations for
the doctrine of automatic harmony.
3. The "Hidden Heteronomy" of the "Victorious Bourgeoisie" Period
The next period - the period of the "Victorious Bourgeoisie" as
Tillich calls it - was characterized primarily by an expansion of creative
vitality and new conquests of reason over nature and society. Although outwardly
^■See ^ames Luther Adams, "Tillich's Concept of the Protestant Era,"p. 2S5;
The Prot stant Era, up. 265, 268, 271*
2
The Protestant E„a. p. 290.
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this age might he classified as the apex of achievement for the autonomous
spirit, it represents in reality the beginning of the decline of autonomy
and the gradual subjection to a new heteronomy. Tilllch does not classify
this period in terms of autonomy or heterononjy; nevertheless it seems appropri¬
ate to specie of it as an age of hidden heteronomy (as contrasted to the open
heteronomy of our century and the conscious submission to new dictators and
collectivist States). Life was beginning to come under the grips of a huge
impersonal machine - the all-embracing capitalistic soci ty and the world
mechanism of production and exchange.
The period begins with a significant transformation in the concept
of reason. "Revolutionary reason" of the previous period, which was concerned
with ends, was gradually transformed into "technical reason" concerned with
means. Reason, now less revolutionary, was becoming more sober, scientific,
and technical. Fighting reason was replaced by calculating reason.* Bart of
this decline suffered by "revolutionary reason" was due to the fact that
reason (the "pure reason" of the Enlightenment) had been mistakenly deified.
Pure reason had failed to bring in the millenium and now, through Kantian
p
criticism, it was dethroned. The loss of the universality and depth of this
tyoe of reason (akin to "ontological reason" as used in the gystematics) paved
the way for the advent of technical (or "controlling" ) reason - with its
methods of detachment, analysis, and objectivation - which ushered in an era
characterized by the trituaph of science and technique.
^"Trends in Religious Thought that Affect Social Outlook," p. 21.
^Systematic Theology, 1, S3.
^Tillich here follows the thought of Max Scheler, according to J.H. Randall
(The Iheoloey of Paul Tillich. p.1^5.)
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The basic qu. stion^ which Tillich lists for the entire period from
A.D. lUOO to 1900 - "How can nature and socie^ty be controlled by human
reason?" - here in this particular span of time (the eighteenth and nine¬
teenth centuries) finds its most pointed relevance. Everywhere in Western
society man was inspired by the desire to dominate nature and make it serve
his purposes. Animals became so much horse-power; rocks were turned into
highways and water into thoroughfares; iron was transformed into steam engines
and soil into dams.
These achievements, of course, had great value for civilization.
Man, released from Ms bondage to nature and to finite things, was swiftly
becoming the rightful master of the material world. Finite things were no
longer considered holy in themselves and personality could thus be exalted
2
above all things. Notwithstanding all of these gains, Tillich is keenly
cfitical of this development. He is unusually sensitive to the estrangement
between man and nature that is produced by modern technical civilization.
The domineering attitude toward nature characteristic of the victorious
bourgeoisie led to what Tillich calls "thingification" (Verdinglichung) -
the reduction of all reality to things that can be measured, classified, analyzed,
and controlled. Things as such were no longer valuable as objects of know¬
ledge but only as elements of reality to be calculated and used for utilitar¬
ian purposes. Such exploitation deprived things of their original meaning
and organic purnose (or "power of being" as Tillich calls it) and made the
world seem a huge machine. Nature, as a result, lost its inherent pow8r and
its element of uncondittonality. Traces of the ultimate were no longer found
in all things and being lost its ability to point beyond itself toward its
1~~
See page 35 f.
2The Roligious Situation, p. 72.
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transcendent ground- $hen being ceased to bs considered divine, God ceased
to be thought of in terms of ultimate being and became just another object
alongside other objects. As Tillich puts it
Complete thingification is the complete elimination of the relation of
existence to it3 origin, its complete profanization. The spirit of
bourgeois society is the spirit of a group of men who, after having
cut theBugh every original tie, subjected a materialized world entirely
to its purposes.
But Tillich is concerned not only with what happened to nature through this
exploitive attitude of bourgeois man but also with what happened to man and
to human personality. VShat 'Tillich laments is not just that a domineering
personality was produced contemptuous of nature and things, unlovely as that
may be, but that the exploitation of nature led to the subjection of man as
well as nature to technical and economic purposes. Man became a part of the
huge impersonal machine he had created. The domination of personality over
things issued in the domination of things over personality t What man took
away from things (their "power of being") he lost for himself so that he
p
became just another "thing" in the process of unremitting industry.
Man who transforms the world into a universal machine serving his
purposes has to adapt himself to the laws of the machine.3
As a result, the Victorious Bourgeoisie saw the power of money gradually
transform all human relations into commodity relations. A large class of
workers became totally dependent upon the "free sale" of their work with their
^Die Sozialistische Hntscheidling (19^S edition), p. H9 f. Dawson on
the other hand, though also talcing somewhat of a mystical attitude toward
nature, looks uuon scientific and technical development in a more favorable
light - He sees the rationalization of the world by science as an essential
part in the eventual spiritualization of the world.
2
"Basic .Features of Beligious Socialism," p. 15. In his latest book, The
Courage to Be. Tillich takes a slightly different attitude toward technological
production and "unremitting industry." He sees in the ceaseless productive
impulse in .America (usually criticized by foreign observers as concentration
upon means apart from worthy ends) a definite spiritual value. In .America, he
says, it is not the means that are important (as the telos) but the production
itself as a creative participation in Being-itsolf which is essentially product¬
ive and creative.
^The Prot9stant Srft. P* 13s-
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destinies entirely dependent upon the turn of the market. One day they could
be thrown into the factory, the next day into the streets, and the next into
the front lines of a battlefield.
This isjwhere the designation "hidden heterononiy" that we noted
earlier gains meaning. The mechanization of life during this period created
what Tillich calls a "second Nature" - the impersonal machine of capitalistic
finance and production which subjected man. This "second nature" was a new,
man-made nature above ph sical nature that man was not able to control. It
was, in other words, a Frankenstein creation that turned on its maker so
that man was swallowed by his own creation
The history of art bears striking testimony to the effects this
great transition has had upon human personality. Tillich sees significant
2
changes in types and expression from the works of Giotto to Titian and Rembrandt.
In Giotto he sees expressed the spirit of the Middle Ages when man was caught
up in a transcendent community - when the forms of his personal and social
life bore witness to something greater than he and his life was thereby giving
meaning and significance. Titian, on the other hand, represents an entirely
different spirit- the spirit of the Rising Bourgeoisie# His paintings express
the greatness and the power of man and the triumph of revolutionary reason
in liberating man from authoritarian abuse. Later, in Rembrandt, the Victori¬
ous Bourgeoisie are strikingly pictured. The self-sufficient capitalistic
spirit has triumphed. Man has entirely broken with the spiritual substance
of the past and has lost all supra-individual symbols and institutions. He
now lives in a 3elf-enclosed, lonely world. Man's conquest of nature provides,
•'•"The World Situation," p. 23. Berdyaev similarly analyses the trend
through which the machine has conquered not only natural elements, but man




in Rembrandt, a foretast of the self-willed Fascist type of personality vdiich
we see in modern art.
The disintegration of personality which we have seen thus revealed
has its counterpart in the disintegration of community, for as Tillich puts
it, "Only personalities can have community. Depersonalized beings have social
interrelationships."^ Communal disintegration of this period parallels the
personality disintegration we saw portrayed in the history of art. In the
Middle Ages society was dedicated to a transcendent ideal, and there was a
real unity of purpose and meaning in community life. The period of the
Rising .Bourgeoisie saw the disappearance of that oommon foundation and spirit¬
ual purpose and the disintegration of families into individuals.2 flhen the
old social groups with their secured character collapsed there was little to
take their place. The individual was cut off from his existential roots in
the social grouu and from its traditions and symbols.^ Consequently the
period of the Victorious Bourgeoisie saw communities disintegrate into masses,
especially in the crowded industrial cities - masses determined by the same
economic fate, threatened by fear of unemployment, and ruled by the manipu¬
ll
lators of mass psychology.
In economics, the transition during this period was from laissez-
faire to monopolistic capitalism. Economic power, through its growth in
strength and concentration, was beginning to encroach upon the political
realm and dominate it wherever possible. The State was no longer considered
just a legal framework intended to give ndustry free scope to develop accord¬
ing to its own laws, but a power to be bent to indsutry's pumosea (as with
the tariff). Political control by industry, how ver, was not often direct.
Industry brought its influence to bear in a more indirect way through its
control of the channels of public communication. As a result, the "cap!tali3t-
ic suirit" came to dominate most of life. For Tillich this means not just a
^The Protestant Era, p. 28$ 3The Protestant Era, p. II4.5.
2"The World Situation," p. 32 f. ^Ibid.. p. 222
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view regarding production and distribution but rather a whole attitude toward
•I
life - an attitude which he characterizes as "self-sufficient finitude."
The success of human techniques had given confidence to the attempt to fulfill
the meaning of the finite ju the finite without looking beyond toward the
eternal and the unconditional. There was, as a result, no hallowing of exist¬
ence, no self-transcending faith but only a "ceaseless unrest. . . not oriented
p
to soma higher sort of calm.
The political expression characteristic of this age was not democracy,
as in the previous period, but nationalism, nationalism, according to Tillich,
was closely associated with capitalism and, at least in the West, was largely
x
the by-product of capitalistic disintegrations The relationship is, as
Tillich sees it, simple enough - The diminishing latitude for exploitation
in the late colonial world forced each national group to intensify its own
political and economic aspirations and thus lead to national self-consciousness
I*
and fanaticism. Thus nationalism and capitalism are twin disintegrating
forces - demonic powers, as Tillich calls them. Their good qualities do not
keep them f_om being demonic, for the demonic, as we saw earlier, includes
5
creative as well as destructive power.
In the realm of education, this period shows an emphasis similar to
that of the former period upon the development of individual personality. Hie
need for adjustment to the conditions of the new industrial society, however,
brought with it a demand for vocational education in addition to the humanistic
curriculum. Education thus became centered in adjustment to the existing
,
This is the theme of Tillich's book The Religious Situation.
O H
^Relialose Verwirklichung. p. I35.
3"The Kingdom of God and History," p. 135.
^"Totalitarian State and the Claims of the Church", Social Research. (Novem¬
ber, 193^)• I,^07; See also The Bellgjous Situation, p. S3 f.
5The demonic gains power precisely because it can appeal on the baiis of its
constructiveness, as in the case of Hitler overcoming unemployment by resort to
conquest.
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society so as to prevent any serious disturbances of that order. Although
education continued to rest upon humanistic foundations and stressed the
role of reason, the nineteenth century Leviathan of capitalistic production
and techniques was the real master."'' Further, the loss of an eternal reference
caused everything to be regarded from an intellectualistlc and formalistic
viewpoint with corresponding concentration upon finite and phenomenal forms.
Even religious education, in protest against this trend, tended to become a
separate body of knowledge about religion (as a theoretical concern) rather
2
than an expression itself of the ultimate concern.
In religion, there was doubtful gain in the fact that the Victorious
Bourgeoisie came to adopt a less hostile attitude toward religion than their
predecessors of the revolutionary period. Since the botrrgeois group now
feared the revolutionary impetus of its own fighting period, religious symbols
were found to be helpful as a means of keeping the masses content. The
churches thus became little more than agencies for safeguarding the accepted
moral standards of society.^ In Protestantism in particular, the loss of
sacramental grace and the confessional was beginning to show itself. Although
Protestantism in its earlier period was able to live on the accumulated spirit¬
ual substance of the past, its individualism was new becoming arid and moral¬
istic. The stress upon conscious decision (as against sacramental communion
and incorporation into a mystical fellowship) was leaving the subconscious un¬
touched and personality was being cut off from the vital basis of its exist¬
ence. Protestantism, as Tillich sees it, had developed a "theology of conscious
ness" and the conscious was being separated from the unconscious in analogy to
Cartesian philosophy. In its insistence unon doctrinal conformity, Protestant¬
ism was becoming hardened, encrusted, and oppressive. The movement that begin
*"The World Situation," p. 35 ff.
2"f?eligion and Education," THE Protestant Digest (April-May, 19U1),111, 5S ff.
3"The World Situation,", pp 59. 62.
The Protestant Era, p. 256.
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in individualism and autonomy was now ending in legalism and heteranGmy.
Tillich finds the spirit of the age summarized again in art, which
ha regards as the most sensitive "barometer to the changing social styles and
temperaments of a culture. Hie art of the period portrays some of the
characteristics we have "been considering! the moral and intellectual tyranny
of consciousness, the supremacy of reason, and ths triumph of man over nature.
In Bourgeois naturalism and realism, reality was deprived of its self-transcendence
and symbolic power; art had become entirely two-dimenftional. On the whole,
artists seemed to be satisfied with painting only the surface of reality
without penetrating to universal or eternal meanings. There was, however,
another strata that foreshadowed the crisis to come. Sensitive artists were
beginning to refl ct the inner rebellion of man's spirit (the vital, un¬
conscious side of his personality) against the moral and intellectual tyranny
of the time. In expressionism and surrealism they shattered the two-dimensional
surface of reality in an effort to expose deeper levels of being. The surface
world was no longer all important. Fragments of it (limbs, furniture, color)
grotesquely thrown togeth r on the canvas conveyed to the discerning eye the
fact that artists were no longer satisfied with objective reality as it can
be weighed, measured, and analyzed, and were pressing toward a oelf-transcending
realism.^"
Hie age of the Victorious Bourgeoisie, then, was not as great a
triumph of the human spirit as its contemporaries had expected. Although the
network of finance, investment, and capital had spread from city to city tying
nations together in a great mechanized and industrialized civilization, and
although science and techniques reigned supreme, the mostrous meehanism that
resulted was beginning to swallow personality and community. Late in the period
•*"The Protestant iira. m. 53, 65.; "The World Situation," p. 53.
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there were signs of an undercurrent of protest in realms other than art.
In the midst of the spirit of human domination over things and the rational
control and exploitation of nature, doubt was being cast on the supremacy
given to science and techniques, and movements against the tyranny of
"controlling knowledge" were gaining momentum, There was the Romantic
movement with its nostalgia for the past,^ "philosophy of life" with its
longing for true human creativity, and Existentialism with its desire to
transcend the cleavage between subject and object and to bridge the Cartesian
2
dichotomy. -All of these movements were protests against scientific detach¬
ment, against "objectivation" and "thingification."
Perhaps most significanct was the rebellion against the haxmonlstie
presupposition of the preceding periods. The glaring contradictions in
late bourgeois society produced radical questioning on the part of the great
thinkers of the day. The optimistic notion that there was a pre-established
harmony between nature and reason and the corresponding high estimation of
man's rationality was attacked from two sides: by pessimistic naturalism and
pesaimitic 3upranaturalism,3 $he first school (Schopenhaur, Nietzsche, and
followers) saw the irrational depths of human nature expressed in anxiety,
despair, the will to death, and the will to power and could no longer believe
in any rational structure of society. The second group, the pessimistic
supraaaturalists (following Kierkegaard) saw the tragedy of the historical
process and could no longer believe in the essential goodness of human nature.
They did believe, however, that man's goodness could be restored through
b-
Christ and the Church and that history had a transcendent fulfillment.
*The rise of Capitalism was connected with an anti-metaphysical movement in
opposition to medieval sacramental!sra. Therefore it is natural that the reaction
to Capitalism was accompanied by the recovery of a mystical approach to life.
(The Religious Situation, p. 125)•
2"Existential Hiilosophy," p. 56 £*"•
3"Trends in Religious Thought,etc•", p. 22.
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She nineteenth century witnessed, an i. pressive array of men who were aware
of the approaching earthquake. Marx challenged the de-humanization of the
economic order and the making of man into a mere "commodity"; Burckhardt
prophesied the catastrophe of mass culture; Dostoevski revealed the demonic
forces beneath man's rationality; Freud uncovered the depth of the human
subeoncsious and brought to light the mechanism of repression used by the
bourgeois Protestant personality; Nietzsche saw humanity reaching the stage
of the "last man" who is a completely rationalized cog in a machine devoid
of creative vitality.•*" In all of these thinkers there was an eschatological
consciousness - an awareness that the foundations were being shaken. They
sensed the social and spiritual disintegration of the times and saw,instead
2
of harmony, discontinuity and conflict. This sensitivity was especially
keen in Marx and Nietzsche who, according to Tillich, spear-headed the transit¬
ion into the modern age.^ Both took for granted the collapse of the transcend¬
ent foundation of the previous periods. From there they proceeded to attack
and to shatter the immanent foundation of society based on natural harmony
1+
and faith in human goodness and social progress. These various prophecies of
approaching doom and judgment proved only too true, .and in exposing the
clefts in late bourgeois society, the pronouncements of Marx and Nietzsche
served only to widen the breach and thus to precipitate the crisis.
^""Nietzsche and the Bourgeois Spirit," Journal of the History of Ideas,
(June, I9U5), p. 307 ff.
2Tillich points out that the most inportant analysts have lived outsida
the Christian sphere. ("Our Disintegrating World," p. IU3)
•^Their atheism, Tillich contends, is not an argument against their analyses
of the disintegration of the bourgeois world ("Our Disintegrating World," p. IU3).
Tillich even doubts that thy may be classified as atheists. "If this struggle -
one for justiceLMarxj and the other for creative life [Nietzsche] was in both
cases fought against God, then it was against a god who was bound to a stand¬
point, the standpoint ojpourgeois society."
"History as the Problem of O^r Period," p. 257.
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H. She "Open Heteronomy" of the "Period of Crisis"
This analysis brings us to the present period idiich Tillich calls
the "Crisis of Bourgeois Society" - the age that began with the early years
of World War I.
The anti-rational forces unleashed in the previous period have now
corae into promittance. Season no longer reigns supreme on the heights; indeed,
since World War I there has been a growing feeling of the loss of control of
reason over man's historical existence. Life has increasingly come under the
control of supra-individual forces such as the omnipotent state and the
"second nature" of mechanized society, and man has been made either a slave in
a totalitarian state or a cog in a vast industrial machine. The "1-determined"
world of the nineteenth century, as Tillich puts it, has become the "it-determined"
world of the twentieth century.1 Everywhere the "basic question" of our
period is being asked with growing intensity; "What is the meaning of our
historical existence?"
The crisis of our time in regard to human personality is evidenced
by the rising tide of personal insanity. Tillich lays much of the blame for
this situation directly at the feet of Protestantism. The Protestant stress
upon conscious personality, rationalized faith, and rigorous moralism has
consistently denied the vital and mystical impulses and could not help but
lead to deep cleavages within personality. The soul (i.e. the vital forces)
deprived of its "ower and subjected to the rationalized intellectual!zed con3cious-
2
ness was driven into repression. It has finally, however, wreaked its revengs
in the volcanic eruption of insanity and irrationalisa in our period.
^'Martin Buber and Christian Thought," Commentary. (Jane 19h-8), V, 519.
2The Protestant Erg.. pp. lUS f, 228 f., xxxix.
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More and more individuals became unable to endure the tremendous
responsibility of permanently having to decide in intellectual and
moral issues without help of sacramental grace or the confessional'
The weight of this responsibility became so heavy that th y could not
endure it; and mental diseases have become an epidemic in the United
States as well as in Surope.
The individualism of the Protestant-humanist tradition must also shoulder
some of the responsibility for the modem disintegration of personality.
Although producing some impressive personalities, it finally led to dangerous
consequences.
The humanist ideal of personality tends to cut the individual off from
his existential roots. . . It tends to make him abstract-universal and
detached from any concrete concern; everything interests, nothing
affects. There is no ultimate meaning, no spiritual center.
The mesninglessness, loss of a personal center, and nomadic loneliness
connected with Protestant Individualism were no doubt factors contributing
to the rise of insanity noted above.
The disintegration of personality was paralleled by the disintegrat¬
ion of community life. Both were accompanied by the loss of a meaningful
•in
"center" -.the one case a personal center and in the other case a social and
historical center. With the disappearance of ideological haraony through
the contradictions and conflicts within capitalistic society, the bourgeoisie
had lost all traces of a common world. Without something in common more than
the quest for material -ossession there can be no real community, Tillich
affirms. The social atomisation, loneliness, and solitude of the late bourgeois
era led to an indirect qu st for community and for a new spiritual center for
society. This explains the popularity of the youth movements and of romantic
nationalism. Through the irony of the dialectical process, the rise of
personality above coraaunity (in the hnlightenement) had led to the fall of
personality below community.^ In other words, the subjection of social relations
j ■
%fee %ptejafrant p. 228 f.
gIbid.. p. 1M-5.
•^Ibid., pp. lUo f., 146•
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to the individual's purposes (characteristic of the previous age) led in our
time to the subjection of personality to the new totalitarian community. In
the Nazi state, for instance, there was a desire to return to a primitive
tribal state of existence in which the individual personality was negated.
Pear, anxiety, the longing for security, uncertainty, the dread of making
decisions, loneliness, solitude, despair, meaninglessness, and the urge for
commanding loyalties and symbols all served to strengthen the collectivist
trend.^ Cynicism and pessimism captured by the State-cult were easily trans¬
formed into fanaticism. In totalitarianism, non found answer/a to their quest
for myth, hope, and a fighting community. In the "commanded" community of
the new omnicompetent state the individual could become a self-dedicated
instrument of an absolute, controlling will. She vacuum of disintegration
produced by bourgeois culture was thus filled by demonic constellations.
This is the path which has led to
an extinction of the individual as individual and therefore to a demonic,
sub-personal struetu e of life. Shis is a tragic consequence of the
loss of Christianity as the spiritual center of the "Christian" nations.
She reaction against an empty individualism leads to a demonic collectiv¬
ism.
She crisis of our time in the area of economics has boon expressed in techno¬
logical unemployment and world wars. Both, according to Tillich, are results
of the inherent structural trends of capitalistic society. She closing of
world markets and the fierce national competition of late monopolistic capital¬
ism resulted in structural reemployment and the inability of a nation to use
its full resources except in a war economy. Tillich blames the first World
^"In She Courage to Be, p. 57ff., Tillich classifies the emptiness and
meaninglessness of our times as "spiritual anxiety" in contrast to the "ontic
anxiety" of ancient civilisations and the "moral anxiety" of the Middle Ages.
Spiritual anxiety is especially prominent, Tillich believes, at the end of an
era when "accustomed structures of meaning, power, belief, and ord r disinte¬
grate," and when the individual can no longer gain courage by faVIling back upon
meaningful participation in established institutions^. 62.)
^H^he Disintegration of Society,etc, p. 6l
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ffer on "imperialistic competition." The nations entered the war as capital¬
istic groups of power and the will to war, he holds, came from the capitalist
1
groups within each nation. The economic crisis is further evidenced in the
increasing State control of the means of production and distribution. World¬
wide depression and unemployment made it necessary for States to sfcep in to
support the economic structure - first to "subsidize the losses" and finally
2
to control. In reaction to this, fear of state interference in economics
led monopolistic groups in some countries to seize control of the State
inttelf> as in Fascism.^ There is thus, according to Tillich, a definite
structural trend from capitalism to totalitarianism which parallels the
trend we have noted from capitalism to nationalism. In addition to the
impetus capitalism gave to the rise of national spirit (through international
competition), it also produced forces of disintegration such as class struggle
and party conflict that demanded a stronger national state as nn integrating
force. In seta© areas, the threat of communism also drove many classes within
a nation together in a mutual desire to strengthen the State against communist
infiltration. These factors, along with the general disintegration of
bourgeois morals and customs pointed to the need for political, spiritual,
and economic ra~integration through the agency of some kind of a totalitarian
state
-- • - ~ r " — ~
The Protestant lira, p. 265. Tillich recognizes other factors in the
situation - especially the political crisis in Eastern and Central uroue and
the establishment of new nation-states on the basis of a more authoritarian
tradition ("The Totalitarian State," etc, p. HlO). Dawson similarly points
out the importance of the breaking up of the fcror military empires of Eastern
and Central Europe and the organisation of new totalitarian states as a cause
for the wax, but thinks that this situation was far more important than any
dynamics of capitalism.
2The Interpretation of History, p. 121,
^The Protestant ik»a. p. 2&±.
^"The Totalitarian State,Etc, pp. U07-HI2
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In the realm of politics, the crisis of our era is evidenced in
the decline of liberal democracy. This, too, according to Tillich, is largely
the result of a structural trend in the development of late capitalism.
Capitalism had given rise to self-conscious industrial masses who revolted
against their oppression and thus destroyed all semblance of political con¬
formity which provided the sociological basis for democracy. With the advent
of bitter class-consciousness and the collapse of conformism, democracy became
increasingly difficult to sustain, for liberal democracy, as we saw, was based
on the agreement to differ and the willingness of minorities to abide by the
1
decision of the majority. With the rise of the workers and their organisation
into political parties, the foundations for democracy were greatly weakened
In education the disintegration of our time is reflected in the
fact that the State has increasingly become the schoolmaster. With the lack
of any other powerful center of meaning (such as a religious or cultural one',
the Nation-State i9 appreciably setting itself up as the center of all educat¬
ion. In th8 growing tendency toward the heteronomcus State, all autonomous
elements are being brou^it und r subjection. This is, of course, especially
true under dictatorships, where rational criticism is almost entirely cur¬
tailed.
Miat has happened in the realm of religion? The period of crisis
found the churches in a position of diminshed prestige - at a lower oeak,
Tillich believes, than at any time since the beginning of Christianity. Protes¬
tantism, especially, had entered a "Babylonian captivity" to humanist bourgeois
*"The World Situation," p. ^5: The Protestant Era, v. 266.
O
Dawson notes the same foundation (confcrmism) for democracy and fears
the current undermining of it. (See -ncuiries. pp. 9 f»: Religion and the
Modern State, up. lU, 26).
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society. Because of its support of the status quo it was becoming, at least
in Surop©, widely suspect by the masses of industrial workers. Without syrabol-
1
ism and sacred power, it load no appeal to the disinherited. But under the
leadership of Karl Barth the church began to awaken from its slumber and to
challenge the shallow optimism of bourgeois culture. Ms powerful critical
.movement, however, offered little in the way of creative or constructive
impulse. It had no program for relating the message of the church to the
crying needs of contemporary scci ty. She "crisis theology" was aware of the
crisis, but net of the way cut-
in all of these areas, then, there was an awareness that the
foundations of society were crumbling. Automatic harmony lias been thoroughly
discredited and in its place is a quest for mass re-integration. Hie only
remaining institution having the power to effect such a reintegration of
life is the State. Tillich therefore believes that the great structural change
through which we are now living is the transition from automatic harmony
to planned unity under State auspices.
Following the breakdovjn of the natural or automatic harmony on which
the whole system of life and thought during the eighteenth and nine¬
teenth centuries was based, the attearrt is now being made to -oreduce
a system of life and thought which is based on an intentional and
planned unity.
CFhis transition, at least to a degree, is destined to take place universally.
Although this is not for Tillich a matter of inexorable law or "mechanical
necessity" it is an inescapable structural trend.It is not to be expected
that all parts of our globe will experience the f.'nal stage (planned unity)
simultaneously • Shere have been and will continue to be vast differences in
tanpo. Many areas, such as the ttoited States, are still largely in the stage
of the Victorious Bourgeoisie^' and have not yet witnessed the deaths of
*"Ehe Present Eheological Situation," p. 302.
SatSai&aal lsa» p* 262.
^"Our Disintegrating World," p. I36 f.
ii
"American lives still in a happy backwardness" (Protestant Eva.-n. 272).
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bourgeois-capitalistic disintegration such, as was experienced in the heart
of Europe. Y/hile on the other hand Russia, largely in reaction to the
emptiness of the bourgeois world it saw reflected in its Buropeanised intel¬
ligentsia, jumped directly from the feudal stage to the collectivist stage
without mediation of the other stages of western culture (such as the Renais¬
sance and the Reformation).1 Bat regardless of national differences there is,
Tillich believes, a world-wide trend toward collectivism and a greater degree
of heteronomy.
This trend has given stimulus to three great systems of mass inte-
2
gration: Communism» Fascism, and Roman Catholicism. One of Tillich's major
concerns is that in this situation Protestantism is no longer a live alterna¬
tive, for by its very nature Protestantism is opposed to the whole modern
trend toward collectivism. The modd of the houriis definitely a willingness to
sacrifice freedom to security, autoncmy to certainty, and individualism to
community. Growing numbers of people want their decisions made for them and
are longing for mass organization and mass ideas. All of these tendencies are
the very antithesis of pristine Protestantism which stresses moral decision
and personal responsibility.^ Moreover, modern totalitarian movements have
assumed quasi-religious qualities and have utilized religious symbols such as
fire, blood, soil, charismatic leadership, etc. - absolute symbols beyond all
criticism. The Protestant principle stands ever-lastingly opposed to the
absolutiaing of any conditioned reality. It proclaims the finite character
"The Christian Churches and Europe." Religion and Life (Summer, 19^5).
XIV, p. 333 f.; "The Totalitarian State,etc, pp. hzh f.; Tillich's Review of
"The Russian Soul and Revolution" by P. Stepun, Christendom (Chicago) Winter,1936^
^The Protestant Era, p.230. 3lbid. p. 226 '
H
Totalitarian systems thus prove that a center of integration imi3t be spirit¬
ual. This is borne out even by Communism with its trust in Marxist "science," its
ffcith in scientific myth, its obedience to the political party as a religious
community, and its Utopian, eschatological expectations (See "The Class Struggle
and Religioxis Socialism" in P.eljgiBse Yerwirkllchong. esp. page 207).
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of every human achievement and brings the judgment of the eternal to bear
upon every claim to usurp the divinity of the divine. In the midst, then,
of so powerful a collectivist trend, can Protestantism survive? As a principle.
Protestantism has unconditional validity. But even an eternally relevant
principle has little practical value apart from embodiment in an institution.
If institutional Protestantism is to be a formative influence in this period of
v/orid revolution, what changes must it undergo? The discussion of this
question must await an analysis of the characteristics of the new age that
Tillich feels is approaching.
5. The Hew Theonomy of the Future Age
We have noted that Tillich's view of history involves a dialectical
approach in which the various alternations between autonomy and heteronomy
have the possibility of resolving themselves in a new/ theonomy. Th re is some
evidence, Tillich believes, that through, the self-destruction of the bourgeois
world we are being brought to the threshold of a potentially new and creative
era of human history - another theonomous age comparable to that of the Middle
Ages.
The present period of the decay of liberalism and secularism may be
called a period of expectation which perhaps may be followed by a ,
period of reception after the turning-point, the kairoa. has occurred.
If such a period should come, what would be its characteristics? Tillich
nowhere attempts to give a blueprint of what may be expected but he does give
a number of hints (largely through his criticism of bourgeois secularism) of
what a theonomous age would be like.
First, a theonomous age would include the supremacy of what Tillich calls
"theonomous reason" as over against "revolutionary," "technical1! or "planning"
reason. Theonomous reason would unite theory and practice, union and detachment,
■*-"The Kingdom of God and History," p. I23.
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and receiving and shaping knowledge.'*" Hie best elements of autonomous reason,
however, would be included. The gains of the bourgeois period, especially
the elevation of reason above authoritarianism and obscurantism, would not
be lost.
In a thaonomous age there would be a new attitude toward nature
and things. The "inherent power of being" in all things would gain new ap¬
preciation; man's relationship to things would not be that of technical
manipulation but rather one of "immediate spiritual communion." An attitude
akin to "new realism" in crafts and applied arts would prevail - an attitude
in which the creative artist allows the nature of the material itself (color,
texture, fora, etc.) to express itself according to its own structures and
laws. There would be a desire to rediscover the inherent power and beauty
of materials and to unite oneself with things not in order to exploit them
but in an attitude of devotion and in the spirit of eros.^ There would be
a realisation that "everything has levels that transcend scientific calcula-
bility and technical usefulness. . •" and that "Everything has the power to
become a symbol for the 'ground of being* which it expresses in its special
way."'"5" This applies even to tools and machines which, according to Tillich,
are gestalten with individual gestalt qualities (including subjectivity).^
As gestalten. they demand a productive empathy and a vital eros relationship.
Tillich believes that in a truly theonoracus society there would be a tnythos
of technology and a cultic consecration of technical production which would
lead to a mutual fulfillment of persons and things.
1Systematic Theolc-.-y. I, $k, I55, 177.
2The Protestant Era, p. k9
137 f-
^Ibid., p. 138.
^Systematic Theology. I, 173.
^"Basic Features of Beligious Socialism," pp. 21 f.
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The fulfillment of personality in a theonomous society would be
largely dependent upon the recovery of a spiritual center of personal life
/,
giving it transcendent meaning, direction, and purpose. The reintegration of
communal life likewise hinges on the recovery of a spiritual center. A
truly theonomous society thus "centered" would overcome individualism and
loneliness. To do this, some form of collective life would be required.
Tillich believes, then, that the trend toward collectivism is not entirely evil
dnd that planning is necessary in order to save "the democratic way of life."
It is impossible, he believes, to return to the era of automatic harmony and
laissez-fair. The attempt to refashion the old structure for use today would
only serve to postpone and aggravate an eventual crisis.1 "We must go for¬
ward under the direction of planning reason toward roi organization of society
which avoids. • . liberal individualism."2 But Tillich is also keenly aware,
as we have seen, of the dangers of collectivism and cautions that totalitarian
absolutism must also be avoided. Tillich's ideal, therefore, is a planned
economy in which enough liberal elements are included so as to prevent totali¬
tarian tyranny. Collectivism in one form or another, he believes, is inevi¬
table.
The exanrls, laid down by the Fascist, and - on the basis of the opposite
principle- by the Soviets, will be followed (although with important
modifications) by the democracies. The tremendous task of a fundamentil
transformation of the world will permit no other way.
If collectivism of one form or another is unavoidalbie, then
The Protestant principle is more necessary today than at any time since
the period of the Reformation as the protest against the demonic abuse
of those centralized authorities and rsowers which are developing under
the urg& of the new collectivism.'*'
l!Ihe Protestant dra, p. 273*
2"The ...«xld Situation," p. 2~J.
"^Freedom in the Period of Transformation," Freedom; Its M aning (R.N. Anshen,
ed.) (Hew York: Hareourt Brace & Co., 1'iUO) p. I3S.
kjghe Protestant lira, p-231
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In favoring a centralized State power with democratic correctives, Tillich
thus opposes the Marxist vi -w of the eventual "withering away" of the State.
Tillich believ s that the State is a necessary power structure; it exists to
preserve justice which, according to Tillich, is bettrer than chaos."*■ "History,"
he says, "seems to show that without the shell of a state, a community cannot
exist."2 Bat beyond this restrictive function, the State, according to Tillich
(who here goes beyond even Martin Buber himself), has potentialities for an
I-Thou relationship. These potentialities, it is to be assumed, would be
realized in a theonomou3 age.
Other than some form of collectivism, what else can be said afooxit
the economic situation in a future theonomcus age? For one thing, Tillich
does not believe in absolute economic equality. This theory denies, he
believes, the element of finitude (and contingency) in human nature expressed
in the accidental character of one's existence.
A social form built on community and love has nothing to do with the
egalitarian ideal, but rather recognizes a ranking of ability. . . .
For it lies in the essence of love to affirm the individual precisely
in his particularity.3
There is only one basic equality, according to Tillich, and that is the
equal claim to be acknowledged as a person and this includes the right to
actualize one's creativity ?dthin the limits of his finitude^ It is hardly
necessary to add that Tillich does, however, believe in economic justice which
involves the principle that the infinite productive capaoity of modern industrial¬
ism be used for the advantage of all rather than for the few.
1,1 The Gospel and the State," Orozer Quarter!*1 (°ctober, I93S), XV, 25U.
2"Martin Buber and Christian Thought," Commentary (June, 19US), V, 520.
^"Der Sozialisnus als Kirchenfrage,"
Ij.
'"Man and Society in Peligious Socialism," Christianity and Society (Fall.
19H3), VIII, 7.
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What does Tillich affirm about man*s freedom in such a society?
What fate may we expect for constitutional democracy in the coming age?
Tillich believes that it is necessary to distinguish between "political
freedom" (dependent upon a particular set of constitutional procedures)
and "historical freedom" (the right to historical self-determination).
In a theonomous age everyone must be given the latter (for this involves
ghe very basis of his claim to be acknowledged as a person). Tillich does
not think, however, that "political freedom" is absolutely necessary and points
out that "political freedom" in itself is no guarantee that men will really
be free or that they will, in other words, have "historical freedom." for
"political freedom" through, a manipulation of political bosses, party machines,
bureau&cracies, and the control of economic groups can easily become nothing
more than a shell. Even such a framework as liberal democracy (the best theo¬
retical system for safeguarding freedom) can become a tool for suppressing
free creativity.1 Tillich therefore believes in democracy as a way of life
(as that system which best do s justice to the dignity of every man) but not
necessarily in democracy as a constitutional procedure. The latter is a
means to an end and should not be regarded as an end in itself; it is to be
2
einrvlcyed only so long as it works. Constitutional procedure may, in fact,
need to be revised or limited, Tillich believes, in order to further the
development of real democracy as a way of life. In a theonomous age, thap, the
rights of man (and especially the right of historical self-determination) would
be protected, bxit the special political form providing for this would not
necessarily be a constitutional one.^
^•"Freedom in the Period of" Transition," p. 13k.
-"The World Situation," p. 46.
3"The Church and Communism," Religion and IAfe (Summer, I937) VI, 353;
"Man and Society in Beligious Socialism," Christianity end Society (Fall, 194^),
VIII, 6 f. J
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What can we say about the international structure in a cosing
theonoaous age? Million looks forward to either a Federation of Nations
1
or to a system of federations•
She freedom of the nations is dependant upon a supernational
unity in which each nation activly participates and which has the
power to protect it against insecurity and conquest.2
Nevertheless Tillich believes that such a federation is unrealistic apart
from a common spirit within each federation of nations ? For this reason
he agrees with Dawson that a European Federation is at present a more realistic
k
solution than that of a World State. It is also unrealistic, Tillieh believes,
to think in terms of world cooperation apart from dependency upon same all-
embracing structure of powerIf such a world federation is ever to come
into being, some group must become the bearer of this supemational stricture
of newer. The churches, the intellectuals, and the proletariat are all potent-
B,
ially bearers of such power structure which could transcend national boundar-
ies, but at present none of these possesses sufficient moral or spiritual
6
power to do so.
In the area of education, Tillich envisions "a new, non-denominational
religious foundation of the whole secular life, including teaching and educat¬
ion.There would be no separation between education and religious education
but rather an awareness of the "tangible, wholly obligatory, basic, and holy
9
meaning of the educational ideal and method" itself. Children would be taught
*"What War .Aims?", p. lH f.
2Ibid«, p. 13 f* Tillich notes that the correlate to this is the proposit¬
ion that "The freedom of the individual is dependent upon a social and econonic
organization in which each individual actually participates and which has the
power to protect him against insecurity and exploitation."
3"The World Situation," p. h-9; Systamatic Theology. I, 92.
^"V.hat bar Aims," p. 16. 7The Interpretation of History. 1Q6
^Ihe Iptejpret..tion.of Histgry.p. 195 ff • 8"B ligion and Education," p. 6l
6"The Gospel and the State," p. 255 9The Religious Situations. 113
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to see the deeply religious ra-aning of daily tasks and communal enterprises.
In such a society there would he "a common relationship of both teacher and
taught to something ultimate, to the eternalSuch education would embrace
humanistic, scientific, and technical elements but would be inspired primarily
2
by religious motives and theoncmous ideals.
tod finally, a theonotaous age would involve structural changes in
the realm of institutional religion. Tillich's ideal in terms of mure
religion is a combination cf the Protestant principle and Catholic substance.
Ihe former has already been dealt with and the latter will be treated more
completely in the concluding chapter. Briefly, however, Tillich uses the
term Catholic substance to indicate those elements in Catholicism such as
the emphalsis upon symbols, authority, and sacramental reality which he
believes Protestantism must recover if it is to surivive in an age of collectiv¬
ism and mass consciousness.^ In conjunction with this, the Protestant principle
would retain its function in a theonomous age as a guardian against all demonic
claims on the part of finite realities (especially authoritarian institutions)
to unconditional significance.
In general, a theonomous age would involve a hallowing of the
"profane" so that large sections of society would become transparent to the
eternal. Human existence would point to a spiritual center outside itself
and would be characterized by a "Thoti-determined" attitude rather than an
"I-determined" or "it-determined" one. 2he achievement of a new spiritual
center transcending all the old patterns of Western culture would result in
"a new integration of life. . . by replacing the principle of immanence with d
^•The Religious Situation. 110 f.
^"The World Situation," p. 39
^"The Permanent Significance of the Catholic Church for Protestantism,"
Protestant Digest (February-March, 19^1), III, pp. 28 f.
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principle which reunites all finite concerns - political, communal, and
personal - with their ultimate ground."'*'
6. Steps Toward a Hew Theonomy
What, according to Tillich, may he dona to help usher in this new
theonoraous age? C^e necessary prerequisite is that the church must l) free
itself from entanglements with the present disintegrating society and 2) pre-
1
pare for a new embodiment of Protestantism. The first part of this state¬
ment implies certain dissociations. The church must learn to differentiate
its message from the shattered assumptions and illusions of Western culture
and must proclaim the spiritual center necessary for the reintegration of
life. The church must transcend the limitations of bourgeois society, conquer
within itself the principles of immanence and individualism, and assert once
more the transcendence of the spiritual principle. (These steps- the steps of
'dissociation^ have been taken by larth and the Neo-Hefcrmationists.) The
second part of Tillich's proposition implies a certain "association" with the
disintegrating culture. The church oust not merely stand apart from society
and make its pronouncements of judgment but must lovingly show how the profane
forms of society can become transparent to the eternal. (This the Barthians
have failed to do.) The church, Tillich believes, must refrain from becoming
authoritarian or heteronymous in an oppressive and arbitrary way; it must
spiritualize some of the present forms of society and thus prepare for a new
historical existence. This, Tillieh realizes, cannot be accomplished through
institutional changes or the action of ecclesiastical hierarchies alone but
must involve a large-scale transformation cf individuals. For , as Tillich
'''"The Disintegration of Society," pp. 62 ff.
?Tha Kingdom of God and History," pp. I38 ff.
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says,
the corrupt human situation has deeper roots than mere historical and
sociological structure. It is rooted in the depth of the human heart.
Olhui . • • the regeneration of mankind is not possible through in¬
stitutional and political changes alona, hut requires changes in the
personal attitude of many people toward life.
Tillich therefore attempts to transcend the antithesis between a "social
gospel" and a "personal gospel" by stressing what he calls "historical grace"
which is a power received vertically (God to man) that operates horizontally
(man to man).
rIhs problem of religion and social reform lies on a deeper level than
the problem of personal life and institution. It is the question of
"historical grace" which forms personalities and through them institut¬
ions. . . . She religion of the future will not be based on the conversion
of more individuals, but on the readiness of the coming generation to
receive the historical grace which is needed for the continuation of
human history.2
On the whole, however, Tillich seems to place more faith in the
power of a small, esoteric^ group to effect a transformation toward a more
theonoaous type of society.
nijy idea for the spiritual reconstruction of Sorope envisions a large
number of anonymous and esoteric groups consisting of religious, humanist,
and socialist people who have seen the trends of our period and who were
able to resist them, who have contended for personality and community
(many of them under persecution), and rho know about an ultimate mean¬
ing of life, even if they are not yet able to e:-r>ress it
Some of these groups Tillich calls "cultural vanguards" and others "religious
vanguards." %'bultural vanguards" Tillich means those groups (including non-
Ghristians) who are "ultimately concerned" about the necessity of realizing
^The Protestant Kra. p. 2S2.
2"Vertical and Horizontal Thinking," American Scholar (Winter,I9U5) XV,112.
3Although esoteric, their purpose is not to remain so but rather to become
esoteric (to establish a democratic exoterisn) and thus to lay the foundations
for a now social conformity ("ifreedom in the Period of Transformation," p. lb-1).
The Protestant Era, p. 295* *',s* Morris comments that this smacks of
Plato's RevidLiua and asks: "Ifost the wise shelter behind the wall until the
op-x>rtunity Is given than to become philosopher-kings?" (Review of the Protestant
Era. Hibbert Journal (July, 1950) XLVIII, U19.
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the autonomous spirit in spit® of the inc-oasingly heteronomous character
of our age. Those groups ere for people with "courage end patience* vision
end rationality** who have boon willing to risk persecution for the sake
of preserving human freedom end dignity. These groups (which presumably
include whet Tillieh cells elsewhere the "political vanguard") are inspired
with » "faith and heroism with respect to truth in whatever terms truth
p
may be expressed• Such groups, Tillieh believes, "will be the win
bearers of freedom end autonomous creativity In the period of transfor¬
mation."* The special role at the "religious vanguards" on the other toad
is to press for radical Christion action in the socle 1 sphere and further
to realise in itself the transformation of Protestantism which is required
for its survival.
This cannot be done by the churches officially* it is an adven¬
turous task and the dutyt of e Christian vanguard of e volutary and
half-esoteric oto rooter.'*
Although the Church as a whole is too greatly bound to tradition to aaoept
auoh a program for itself, it should give support and protection to this
spiritual vanguard.
Roth the "cultural vanguard'' and the "religious vanguard" are,
Tillieh believes, ineffective in and of themselves, and need on© another.
The "cultural vangaurd" lacks the institutional means of making its protest
effective and the "religious vanguard" needs a greater degree of secular ex¬
pression^ "Without the participation of the secular spirit in the work cf
spiritual reconstruction, nothing can be done,"^ Both groups, on the other
*"Freedom in the Period of Transformation," p. II4I.
£ldm. See also ?he Interpretation of History, p. 67#
^"Freedom in the Period of Transformation," p. litl




hand, need to participate in established social movements. The goal of a
combined Christian-humanist-socialist group was most effectively realized,
Tillich believes, among the "geligious Socialists" of Germany with whom he
was associated from the beginning. Regardless of the political defeat of this
movement and many of its associated movements in other lands, Tillich still
maintains that this approach needs to be made.
It is my conviction that neither the Catholic Church nor Ecumenical
Protestantism but the spirit of these small groups will determine the
future of mankind.
nevertheless, in the last analysis, Tillich does net place much confidence
in any human means for achieving a theonomous age. Ke maintains that a new
theonomy cannot be created by intention or religious romanticism but is
rather a matter of historical destiny (i.e..the approach of a new kairos)
and historical grace (l .e.. the intrusion of final revelation). A kairos
is not something that can be created but rather is something grasped; revelat¬
ion cannot be produced but rather is only received. Thus in spite of his
concern fox- Christian social action, Tillich maintains that the will for a
new theonomy is itself irreligious and unspiritual.3 The only thing we can
do, he feels, is to realize our spiritual poverty, emptiness and nakedness-
II
and then to wait. When waiting and acting have become profound enough then
k
our culture may be able to rective a new kairos.
That we no longer believe we can redeem cult-are through the Church or
the Church through^culture - this is the first and most Important
sign of salvation.
1
"Trends in Religious Thought,etc, p. 28; See also "An Historical
Diagnosis," Radical Religion (.'inter, 1936), II, 17*
^Systematic Theology, I, 1^9 f.
Interrelation cf Hi?toj^, p. 239.
**Tn regard to Tillich*s doctrine of the "sacred void" Heimann comments that
"The only qu stion one may raise i3 whether, thus waiting for the distant and
unknown kairos. . . we may not possibly miss minor assignments of a makeshift
nature, which, however uninspiring and preliminary in themselves, could be the
earnest and symbol of the coming light. . . ." (Theology of Paul Tillich.nn.^gUf.)
pThe Rirotestant Era, p. 67
The Interpretation of History, p. 239•
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Vihether or not a new kairos is now in the making or whether our culture
will be able to receive it if it should, come, Tillioh is not prepared to
say. His only comment is that
it is not possible to assert that Western society can be saved.
Still less is it possible to assert that God's plan for the world
depends upon its salvation and that of the Viestern church s which
have been associated with it. . . • [it is my conviction} that
Western civilization has in the past incorporated great spiritual
values, that it is worth saving if it can be saved, and that the only
means by which it can be saved is the fecovery of the Gospel of Christ
as the power which can heal the sickness of society from within, from
the ground of its own being. Even if all this were destroyed, the Gospel
would still he the Gospel, and God's purpose would go forward throu^i
other men and in other ways.





TILLICH'S INTERPRETATION OP HISTORY
Tine importance of Tillich's contribution to contemporary theology
can hardly be overestimated- His emphasis upon the importance of an under¬
standing of history as the problem of our period and his linking of Christol-
ogy to the interpretation of history has rescued Christ from a narrow interpre¬
tation as Savior of individual souls and elevated him to his rightful position
as the Savior of history and cosmos as well. He has widened our horizons
through his recovered snphassi upon eschatology and has helped to give many
1
cf the old myths a new relevance. Again, Tillieh has done our generation
a great servioe in his development of a method of correlation between theology
and philosophy and in his construction of a new terminology which, once
grasped, is a goldmine of insights for a fresh reinterpretation of tradit¬
ional doctrines. let, underneath much of this lies a basic ambiguity. In
spite of his existential approach and his realistic grappling with political
and social problems, his system has an air of unreality. This can perhaps
best be explained in reference to his eschatological concepts.
1. Eschatological concepts
Tiliich has called our attention to the need for a transcendent
reference if life or history is to have any real meaning. He has demonstrated
how every area of life, torn by its self-contradictions and ambiguities,
joints beyond itself in a quest for the Christ and the Kingdom of God.
^Reinhold Niebufer, who has popularized this mythological-historical
approach,probably borrowed many of his insights from Tiliich.
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Tillich's ability, by means of his training as a philosopher, to demonstrate
how the deepest philosophical questions are answerable only on the basis of
Christian doctrine meets a great need. We may, however, have some serious
misgivings about the type of Christian answers Tillich gives, insofar as he
interprets these answers in a mythological way. We need to ask what reality
his eschatological concepts have ('Sternal Life," Kingdom of God,M "restoration,"
etc.) if the eschaton, after all, is Just spiritualized away into a trans¬
cendent ultimate. We need to ask to what extent his Christian answers come
down from the realm of myth and concert and involve an actual transformation
of existence, a real overcoming of the tensions and tragedies of life, and a
genuine victory over the demonic forces he so adequately portrays.
Tillich do-S speak of a partial transformation of existence. The
Kingdom of God is in history as well as beyond it; the Hew Being is a sacra¬
mental reality as well as "demand" and "expectation"; society may become
theonomous for a period of time, and the demonic may be overcome in specific
manifestations during a special kairos . But every present actualization,
every "already" is, as we saw, strongly qualified by a "not yet." History
as a whole can never be the scene of the perfect or the complete. History,
taking place as it does in exi t nee, must continue to share the ambiguities
of existence; it must always remain the scene of contending powers.
We can, no doubt, agree with Tillich that to expect anything more
in history would be Utopian. Where we must part ways, however, is in his
view that there is no ultimate solution beyond history. (This, of course,
Tillich would deny; yet it seems to be the end result of his de~nythologizin;
tendency.) It is true that Tillich does speak about ultimate fulfillment heymd
history and that he has a great deal to say about supra-historical solutions.
Tet they seem entirely lacking in content. Two specific facts lead to this
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judgnent: l) Tillich's criticism of a second realm of being, and 2) Tillich's
disavowal of the end of history as an empirical event.
1) Tillich tell3 us plainly that he does not believe there is a
second realm of being beyond this existence and affirms that this world of
experience is the only realm of being, The ultimate or transcendent, he
believes, cannot be conceived in terms of a supernatural "second story" above
this world but only in terns of meaning. The ultimate is history's trans-
temporal meaning - the realm meaning underlying all those roolitios appearing
in the historical process in a fragmentary, anticipatory way. There is, in
fact, nothing in the ultimate (eachaton) that i3 not already in history
in an incomplete, imperfedt way,1 and there is nothing in history that is not
in the ultimate in a perfect, completed way. The ultimate, it would seem, is
the theoretical perfection of history's ambiguities. We are to expect, then,
no other realm of being in which persons after death - or history at its
close- may be renovated or completed.
2) Secondly, Tillich holds, as we have noted earlier, that the
eschaton should not be conceived as appearing in any future moment of history.
The end of history is not a temporal one in an empirical sense, but rather
a quality of life in which the eternal and tranocendnet meaning may be known
XThe interpretation of History, p. 279. V.A. Demsnt quetes this idea as
Tillich*s 'arch-Srorrarients that no interpretation of history can be
given without reference to a trans-historical absolute or a real supernatural
realm through which man can gain truth coming from outside of history. ("A Theo¬
logian on Historical Existence," pp. 287 f-)
^In terms of telos (inner aim) rather than finis (absolute end). Part of
the difficulty in reference to Tillich's interpretation of the Christian myths
lies in his idea that all religious knowledge is necessarily symbolical. The
Lnconditional is beyond essence and existence; therefore all that we oan say
about ultimate reality must take the form of finite symbols. Eschatological
symbols are limited human attempts to describe what cannot finally be described
or defined. This does not mean, however, that the referents of symbols have
no reality I Although we oannot say they have objeotive reality (religious
symbols, according to Tillioh, do not refer to a world of objects), they do
express express-what is ultimately and really real, Tillich criticises the
notion that religious symbols are only "ideology1* (Marx) or "sublimation"
(Freud) and insists that they are not just subjeotive, (Seej "The Religious
Symbol," pp. 16 ff.)
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as a present reality.
Now if there is no final fulfillment within history, no empirical
ending of the historical process, and no second realm beyond history where
ultimate fulfillment may take place, what is the rurpose of the term ultimate
filfillment? Does it have any reality or significance?
Shis dilemma becomes even more visible in the case of the inter¬
relationship between individuals and history. There is no personal fulfill-
rnent, Tillich believes, apart from historical fulfillment. Yet, according
to Tillich, neither personal nor historical fulfillment is to be expected
within history. Farther, as we noted, there is no realm beyond, above, or
at the close of history in which personal and historical fulfillment may have
any "being" or reality. If this is so, why speak then of personal and
historical fulfillment at all? If "fulfillment" is just a possible dimension
within our present existence - the idea that we, in our incompleteness may
somehow feel related to a theoretical completeness and perfection of things
which shall never really be ours - then is it not just an idle dream? On this
basis is there any real ground for Christian hope?
Can we really make sense of the historical process apart from a real,
objective ending of history (however impossible or illogical such an idea
may be) in which completion and perfection become actual? If there is nothing
beyond the imperfection, frustration, defeat, and tragedy of life, have we not
lost one of the most important elements in Christianity - the note of final
victory and the hope that this gives? Now it may be very acceptable and
meaningful to speak of a fulfillment of history at each of its moments as it
participates in the transcendent - to speak of the realization of infinite
meaning in every historical event. But still, this is intra-historical fulfill¬
ment and, in so far as it is confined to history, is partial, incomplete and
ambiguous. Is nothing more than this to be expected9
"""' " 1 —. ■ ■ -
See pa>ge Sf-f.
130
The same difficulty arises in relation to the ultimate destiny of
individuals. Hers again Tillich speaks of hope and victory, through Eternal
Life. But Eternal Life for him is primarily here and now, within the ambi¬
guities of existence and not beyond them. This, too, is acceptable as far as
it goes, especially the idea that we can realize infinite meaning in each of
our creative acts. But is there nothing beyond this? Though Tillich does
speak of Eternal Life as future as well as present, the future reference is
vague and meaningless, for all futurisms in his thinking are symbols and do
not mean what is normally meant in Christian eschatological expectation.
Can we so lightly dispense with the idea of an actual perfection
of individuals and history beyond, above, or at the close of history? If
there is no real perfection to come, what can we make of all the torments
and sufferings of this life where no realization of infinite meaning within
the present seems at all possible or likely? Can Christianity make sense
^Tillieh attempts to answer the question of how a Christian view of life
is possible in view of the fact that so many seem to be excluded from any
possible intra-histerical fulfillment. All theological statements, he says,
are existential and necessarily bound to the person maiding the statements.
"This existential correlation is abandoned if the question of theodicy is
raised with respect to persons other than the questioner. ... If we wish to
answer the question of the fulfillment of other persons. . . we must seek
the point at which the destiny of others becomes ur own destiny. And this
point is not hard to find. It is the participation of their being in our
being, 3xe principle of participation implies that every guosticn concerning
individual fulfillment must at the same time be a question concerning univer¬
sal fulfillment. The destiny of the individual cannot be separated from the
destiny of the whole in which it participates" (Systematic Theology I, 269 ff.)
This is an excellent answer and sheds much li^it on the problems of providence
and predestination. Yet, as in the other eschatological answers that Tillich
gives, the substance is lost through a E^ytholtgical interpretation. When we
consider what Tillich means by "universal fulfillment" we discover that it
is no answer at all and we return to the sane ambiguity: the solution of a
final fulfillment ishich he never expects really to happen'.
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of life and. history apart from an ultimate fulfillment which has more
substance to it than anything to be found in Tillich's eschatology? Most
we not agree with HeIs Ferr^ when he says that "No full claim for a Christ¬
ian God can ever be made legitimately from within a history like curs except
in the light of a perfect ending"?"1"
2. The "Historical Jesus"
The question of the historical Jesus parallels, in a sense, the
question about the reality of the eschatological symbols. It is the question
as to whether Christ himself, in Tillich's sytem, is not just a symbol or
myth ultimately lacking in historical reality. If the beginning and the end
of history are to be understood mythologically and not as empirical happen¬
ings, is not the "center" of history arawn into the same mythological inter¬
pretation? Tillich has been widely criticized for over-symholizing the
Christ concept.2 D.M. Baillie, for instance, believes that Tillich neglects
the historical Jesus to such, an extent that his Christology is "quite indepen¬
dent of the question whether Jesus ever existed as an historical personality
at all.""5
It is true that Tillich do as speak often of the "New Being," the
"center of history," and the "picture" of the Christ and seldom of Jesus as
a real historical person. Because of his philosophical approach and his
concern for the deveopment of a new terminology, Tillich does seem at times
to speak of Jesus in a dccetic or gnostic fashion. Further, Tillieh's desire
^"Present Responsibility and Future Hope," Theology Today (January, 1952)
p. US3.
%eej Otto Piper, Present Develorxaents, etc., p. IU3 f.; Harkness, "The
Abyss and the Given," Christendom (Chicago) .(Autumn, 1^38).III, 519; Lehman's
review of Hie Protestant -^a and The Shaking the -'-Validations in Interpretat¬
ion (January, 191+9)»III)115 *"•; D.M. Baillie, God Was in Christ (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 19U8),T>p. 72-79*
3d.M. Baillie, oo.clt% p. fS.
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to generalize the Christ concept so as to afford a basis for comparing the
Christian claim with other "centers" of meaning in other faiths and cultures
opens him again to the charge of vagueness or even gnosticism.^" But although
there are grounds for being suspicious of Tillich's Christology, I should
like h9re to defend Tillich against many of his adversaries
First, let us consider the reasons for the criticisms. It is to
be admitted at cnee that Tillich leaves himself open to attack at many points.
He has made such radical statements as this: "The foundation of the Christian
belief is not the historical Jesus, but the biblical picture of Christ."^
iiarlisr in the same paragraph he tells of how, since 1911, he has attempted
to answer the question as to "how the Christian doctrine might be understood,
if the non-existence of the historical Jesus should become historically probable.^
Far from being a gnostic or a docetist, Tillich has specifically argued
against such heresies. Speaking of the Sirgin Birth he says, "But this symbol
(though it has its values) in its supra-naturalmairaculous form it is not in
conformity with the anti-docetic era-has is on the perfect humanity of Jesus as
the Christ." (Propositions. Part III, p. 19) Again, Tillich criticizes the
attempt of the "German Christians" to try to make Jesus a hjro demigod and
thus transform Christianity into a pagan-gnostic movement. ("The Totalitar¬
ian State, etc.", p. hl9)«
p
The criticism in the previous section would seem to make the defense of
Tillich at this point inconsistent. Still, the evidence in favor cf Tillich's
belief in a real Incarnation based on factual events is overwhelming. Further
the criticism of Tillich's eschatological concepts is not crucial to his
system as a whole, which can still be aa reciated in spite of this defect.
If it could be shown, however, that Tillich's Christology is gnostic, his
whole system would crumble. For the focal point in Tillich's system is the
Incarnation - the overcoming of estranged existence by the Christ. If there
is no fact upon which this is based, there could be no real victory over
existence and Tillich's system would be nonsense. (It should also be said
that this defend© of Tillich was written prior to the publication of The
Theology of Paul Tillich which contains an essay by A.T. Mollegen, whose
approach is much the same as that given here. The interpretation of Tillich's
Christology given here was personally confirmed by a latter from Br- Tillich,
March 31, 1952.)
-''The Interpretation of History, p. 3b.
P- 33
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A great deal of the misunderstanding of Tillich's position has
to do with the ambiguity of the term "historical Jesus." Tillich himself
distinguishes three different meanings of the term:
1) (The objective event itself (Jesus of Hasarfcth) and the occurrences
happening around this man. (This fillich recognises as the absolutely
indisponsible foundation of the Gospel. The event is ths foundaticn
upon which the "picture" of Christ is based.)
2) The religious picture of the Christ- the story of the events as
reported in a "beliaf-full" interpretation. (This, Tillich says, is
the only Christ we can really know, for all of our sources are inter¬
pretations and it is impossible to get behind them to "pure facts" about
Jesus.)
3) The scientific reconstruction of the life or personality of Jesus-
a critical restatement of the above two concepts in an attempt to get
behind them in order to discover the facts about Jesus, his inner life,
etc. (This is the "historical Jesus" that Tillich rejects^ ahd especially
the attempt of scholars to make this type of "historical Jesus" the
foundation of the Christian faith. )3
*The hyphenated noun Jems-Christ should convey the double meaning of
1) and 2) above - Jesus as the historical, fact interpreted through faith as
the Christ. Neither emphasis, Tillich believes, should be lost. To negate
the fact of Jesus is to ldse the gospel of God's coming to man and manifest¬
ing Himself under the limited conditions of existence. To negate the inter
pretation of that fact is to destroy the significance that the fact has more
- much more - than a plain historical value (Propositions. Part III, p. 1)
Thus the same duality that we noted in Tillich's definition of history (as
both subjective and objective, fact and interpretation> also applies to
Jesus as the Christ (Propositions. Part V, p.3).
^When the term is used in this third sense it will be set in quotation
marks to indicate that what Tillich is rejecting is not the factual Incarnation
but rather what he calls "the artificial prodtict of historical research."
3"The Significance of the Historical Jesus," pp. I-3. Other reasons for
Tillieh's rejection of the "historical Jesus" are: l) if taken as the foundat¬
ion of the Christian faith, it makes Christianity rest on historical probabil¬
ity. "If the Christian faith is based even on a 100,OX) to 1 probability that
Jesus has said or done or suffered this or that. . . then it has lost its
foundation completely. Then the historical evenV[the transforming Hew Being)
has become a matter of empirical verification. . . and 2) researchers for
the "historical Jesus" seek to measure Christ by history rather than allowing
history to be measured by Christ. Such attempts put Christ at the mercy of
historical investigation rather than recognize that there would be no history
in its fullest sense apart from Christ as its "center." ("The Problem of
Theological Method," Journal of Belialon. (January. I9U7), XXVII, 21.)
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In the of this analysis, it im ediately becomes clear what
Tillich means when he says that "The foundation of Christian belief is not
the historical Jesus {jjense 3} hut the biblical picture of Christ ^sense 2 -
the picture which is based on objective, factual events^" As Tillich
goes on co say, "Hie criterion of human thought and action is not the constant¬
ly changing and artificial product of historical research, but the picture cf
O
Christ as it is rooted in ecclesiastical belief and human experience." But
even though the "picture" of Christ is an interpretation rooted in "ecclesi¬
astical belief" and "human experience" it is more fundamentally based on a
real event that actually happened- Tillich says erarhatically that the -ofccture
of the Christ is not just an idea or a product of philosophical imagination.
"If this wore the case, it would be as distorted, tragic, and sinful as
existence itself, and would not be able to overcome existence."3 There is
a factual event, says Tillich, in Jesus of Nazareth.
This fact is called "Incarnation" and if there are only ideas, only
and ideal picture, then we have no Incarnation because we have no
fact.
^The Interpretation of History, p. 3U.
3"A Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation," Church Quarterly
Review. (January-March, 19*49), CXLVII, p. 1!45•
^"The Significance of the Historical Jesus," p. 5; See also The Inter¬
pretation of History, p. 262; Propositions, Part III, p. 13. A footnote in
Tillich's article "The Religious Symbol" (Journal of Liberal Religion.(Summer
I9U0, p. 29, first published in Reli^iBse Yerwirkllchung. p. SS ff. is worth
quoting here in its entirety. "The assertion of Kurt Leese, on the occastion of
a discussion of my whole position, that I have quite consistently transformed
Christ into a symbol is erroneous- If it is meant by this to say that the
empirical reality of Christ throu^x a mythical interpretation is of no sig¬
nificance at all, my view is wrongly interpreted- The symbolic character of
Christ involves also his empirical character. Only so much is correct, that
this empirical aspect cannot be understood apart from symbolic intuition. It
is not possible and it is also superfluous to probe into the empirical elejent
"in itself" that stands behind the symbolically interpreted, emu^'cal aspect
of Christ. This would be to seafch for something that would no longer be
symbolic, as liberal theology tried to do."
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W ith these distinctions in mind, let us look again at D. M.
1 n
Baillie'e criticise. W th all his deep interest in Christologywrites
Dr. .Baillie, "he regards it as quite independent of the question whether
Jesus ever existed as an historical t>ersoziality at all."^ It should he
clear hy now that Tillich does regard it as of decisive importance that
there was an historical personality called Jesus and that, without this
factual Incarnation, there could he no gospel of God's coming to man in
his existential situation.^ Baillie's error is in taking Tillich's " non¬
existence of the historical Jesus" to mean the non-existence of an historical
l©is discussion will center on Baillie's criticism because it is the
most widely-known and the most incisive. D.M. Baillfee is not to he criticized
personally, however, for Tillich did not make his view clear on this point
until some of his more recent writings which are not readily available in
Britain. .Actually, Tillich is closer to Baillie's position that Baillie real¬
ises*
j&La. Sli.., P • l&t •
^Since many of the sources on Tillich are not readily accessible, some
of the more important references dealing with the factualness of the Incarnat¬
ion will be listed here. (Italics mineh
"The doctrine of the Incarnation concerns an event which has hatroened.
and is ind pendent of any interpretation of it. . . . it is an event with all
the characteristics of an "event in time and space": namely, occurring "but
once", unrepeatable, possible only in a special situation and in a special,
incomparable, individual form, a subject cf report and not of analysis or
deduction." ("A Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Incamation," p. I33)
"The fact which is called 'The historic Jesus'. .. is an event which has
made pissible the Gospel. . . . A fact happened which gave the possibility
of sharing the picture of a man in whom God appears to us in a human life.
This is the first we have to affirm; An event has happened which gave rise
to the picture cf Christ in the gospels. . . ("I'he Significance of the
Historical Jesus," p. 5)
"The Logos became an immanent Son of Man, an earthly man, an "historical
man, fles£h." ("A reinterprstation of the doctrine of the Incarnation," p. I39)
"The Messiah, the mediator between God and man, is identical with a person¬
al human life the name of which is Jesus of Kazareth ."(Systematic Theology.
I, 229 f.)
"Christ is an historical event, God manifesting himself in tine as the
center of time, and by his appearance filling time with meaning. . . ."
("History as the Problem of Our Period," p. 26l).
"There is an historical event which in symbolic-mythological teiras is
described as the apperance of the Christ" ("Ikesent Theological Situation."
p. 306).
"The logos became history, a visible and touchable individuality, in t%
unique moment of time." (The Protestant ^a. p. 2^).
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personality,'" Baillie then goes on to interpret Tillioh as believing that
the "incarnation of God in a man is a purely 'mythical' idea, whioh could
2
not possibly be actualized in en historical person, • . Now the New
Being, for Tillich, may be a symbol or a myth, Iwt it is much more than
Just a 'mere' symbol or a "purely 'mythical' idea, which could not possibly
be actualized." It is a symbol rooted in historical reality* it is the
result of Christ's appearance as a transforming power within history, which
3Tillich believes oannot adequately be expressed apart from symbols and myths.
Although his statements are sometimes extreme, what D.M, Baillie
is really trying to say about Tillich (and other dialeotioal theologians)^-
does need to be said, l,e, that he does not give due attention to the events
in the life of Jesus, With the major reservation that Tillioh does believe
in a factual Incarnation, this writer agrees with Tillich's eritios in the
observation that Tillich does not show sufficient interest in the biograph-
ioal details of the Jesus of history. If the God-man really has appeared
in history in what Tillich calls a "paradoxical manifestation of the ultim¬
ate perfection"^ wo should make every effort to trace the details of that
manifestatiOn.
This should not be taken to mean, however, that Tillioh is skeptical
about the possibility of knowing Jesus as an historical personality (i.e., in
so far as we know him at the same time as the Christ of faith). What he is
skeptical of is the attempt of scholars of the past to find an "historical
T
The Interpretation of History, p. 33.
20p. cit., p. 79.
3~~
Here Tillioh disagrees with Bultmann who believes that a myth is Just
a primitive world-view that need not be taken seriously. For Tillich, a
myth is the "necessary and adequate expression of revelation." ("The Present
Theological Situation, etc.", p. 306),
^D.M. Baillie, op. cit., pp. 5I4 f.
^The Interpretation of History, p. 262.
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Jesus" tmo could, be 3%nown apart from interpret ticn or the witness of
faith. Tillich no longer follows the school of radical form critics who,
believing that what we really have in the Gospels is the preaching of the
Apostolic Age, are skeptical of the possibility of knowing ouch of anything
1
about «>esus as he actually was. Tillich is more confident that the New
p
Testament records axe substantially reliable as a true witness to Christ.
Although he is skeptical about the details of the records and does not
believe that we have the exact words of Christ, he does believe that we have
a reliable "picture" or a true interpretation of the facts.3 For this
reason, Tillich speaks of the "full New Testament picture" of Christ as
the criterion for faith.
I take the full content of the Gospels as much surer than the cutting
away of those things which are doubtful from a historical point of view.
I am rather critical. . . about the many singularities of the reports;
but when I wish to be dogmatic or when I preach, I think there should
be a difference in principle. Then I use all these words which I am
convinced are not historical but come from Paul's interpretation or
John's. . . . They cannot be taken as the historical man,Jesus - they
are interpretations; but nevertheless, for dogmatic purposes, for religious
purposes, for my own religion, for preaching, and so on, I use these
words without any differentiation. . . Therefore, I speak of the full
picture of the New Testament as comprising the content of the Incarnat¬
ion.
Baillie s sea* to include Tillich among the followers of this
school (on. cit., pp. 53 ^ ff.)« Tillich indicates that he has changed
his mind about the value of the more radical criticism ("The Significance
of the Historical Jesus," p. 6).
%einhold Niabuhr thinks that Tillich is too udck to accept the "biograph¬
er's estimate" without criticism and that the Gospel portrait can be accepted
"only if we have corroborative evidence that the r>ortrait is true." ("The
Contribution of Paul Tillich," Heligion in Life (Autumn, 1937). VI, 578).
Tillich would probably ask where Niebuhr would presume to find such "corrobor¬
ative evidence."
^There were facts about a man called Jesus, ait these facts were seen ind
interpreted by men of faith. Apart from the faith-interpretation, says Tillich,
the facts would have no religious significance. It is the faith-interpretation
that is the important thing; it is this interpretation which has proved to
have the power of overcoming reality.
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3. Religious Socialism
Any critical discussion of Tillich's interpretation of history
that seeks to be complete in any way cannot avoid taking cognizance of
the sociological views that occupy so much of Tillich's writings. Immedi¬
ately behind the vast panorama of Tillich's social views and concerns is his
basic phillsophy of Religious Socialism. This philosophy, in turn, is ad¬
mittedly guided and informed by many elements of Marxist thought. The
basic question we shall then need to ask is this; Is Marxism, purged of its
utopianism, un-scientific fanaticism, and metaphysical materialism1 a help¬
ful supplement to Christian thought? Or, in other words, is Tillich justi-
> 2
fled in cannonizing Marx as a Christian saint?
Tillich points out many elements of Marxism that need to be appropri¬
ated by the church. But most influential to Tillich's thinking is the Marxian
analysis of the contradictions within Capitalism that unavoidably drive it
beyond itself toward the establishment of a collectivist society. Tillich,
as we saw in the previous chapter, regards Capitalism as in its latter stages
of decline.
It is difficult for one living in a land where Capitalism is
flourishing to believe, with Tillich, that it is destined so to decline.
Much of American prosperity, admittedly, is due to historical contingencies
and is not all the product of the '•free enterprise" system. It is also to
be admitted that the self-contr/lictions of Capitalism are apparent to the
1JAist of these elements, Tillich believes, are accretions and are not
the thought of Karl Marx himself.
p
It is not within the scope of this critique (or, indeed, within the
ability of this writer) to discuss whether or not Tillich has adequately
interpreted Marxian. Sduard Heimann argues that Tillich has misconceived
Marx's view of man - a view entirely at odds with the Christian doctrine of
man ("Tillich's Doctrine of Religious Socialism," in The Theoloo-v of P«pl
Tillich. p. 323 f•)• Tillich replies that "Marx exegesis has in common with
the exegesis of the Bible. . . the fact that it is open to many contradictory
interpretations (The Theology of Paul Tillich. p. ^16).
lHO
discerning eye and that they will become more noticable should another
depression occur. Nevertheless, it seems to this writer that Tillich has
over-exaggerated the depth of these contradictions and has over emphasized
the necessity of collectivism as the solution to the problem. Tillich's
views, it must be remembered, took shape in Germany at a period when the
proletariat had reached the stage of utter despair. But in the United States
there has never been as sharply defined a proletarian class as in Germany
or even in Great Britain. In the United States, even in the worst days of
the I93O depression, the workers never knew despair comparable to that
experienced in the heart of Europe. Especially at present there is no con¬
certed criticism of the capitalistic structure as such; workers may demand
better hours and more security, but these demands are for changes within the
structure of capitalistic society. Siere is no general revolt against the
free enterprise system. Indeed, the average worker (perhaps due to a decade-
long advertising campaign on the part of management) seems more willing to
support, and even to fight for, the free enterprise system than a good many
of the intelligentsia. Now Tillich may be right in declaring that .America
rests in a hap ~y stage of backwardness and that structural changes are in
the making that are destined to change all of this. But can we believe
that these structural trends are as all-determining as Tlllieh imagines them
to be? Tillich is careful to say that he doss not mean to imply any sort
of metaphysical determinism when he speaks of "structural necessity." Than
is "necessity" quite the word to use? It is likely that there is a structural
"trend" moving, even with considerable momentum, toward the collectivist
society. But if it is a "trend," then is it not conceivably reversible?
mi
(Most advocates of the capitalistic system in .America are aware of such a
trend and are seeking to divert it.) In other words, is the movement toward
socialism a necessity according to the dialectics of history?
Further, if we do grant that the self-destructive trends within
capital!m ciX*© &rxvx-"Ut.3 *©o02!xortixo oi* society 3iidL
are, as Tillich puts it, "working themselves out to a finish1'1 will this
"finish™ necessarily he the planned society under State scuapiceu that Tillich
envisions? Is socialism the only alternative? Is it not possible that the
trend toward collectivism can and in something less thai socialism as we
know it? It seems to this writer that the Uhited States may he in the
process of evolving such an alternative solution. Through, the increased
strength of labor unions, from the one side and, from the other, the growing
awareness on the part of management of its social responsibilities (and a
desire to avoid more radical measures) labor and management seem to be moving
toward a more cooperative relationship. Is it not possible that this "mana¬
gerial revolution,™ as it is called, would, if successfully carried out,
preclude the more advanced stages of socialism that Tillich predicts? May
it not be that in the United States there is actually a trend toward a
truer "middle of the Way" position than is found even in Great Britain? -
a way that will safeguard personal initiative and creativity and that will
allow for the expansion of industry to a degree that is not possible when
industry is government-dominated?
It may not be out of order to call attention to one further weakness
in Tillich's approach. Que of the major structural elements in Tillich's
analysis of the decline of capitalism is his Marxist conception that the
JQ
^"Our Disintegrating World," p. iMt-.
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survival of capitalism depends upon ever-expanding world markets. The end
of the age of economic expansion and exploitation, the closing of world
marlcots, tho diminishing supply of rav7 materials, and the consequent imperial¬
istic competition involved have inevitably led to vi&tU wars and are thus,
for Tillich, one of the major reasons for Capitalism's decline. Does this
view take into full account the scientific advancement in the last quarter of
a century? Does not this view rest on the assumption that the full product¬
ion necessary for capitalist economy i3 based on an exhaustible supply
of raw materials? Tillich does not take cognizance of the f&et that the
dependency upon raw materials such as iron and rubber is being replaced,
to some extent at least, by synthetics - vegetable compounds that could be
produced in almost unlimited quantities through the scientific tilling
of the soil. Nor does he seem to be aware of the fact that new forms of
energy are being produced (including atomic power) that may in the future
replace industry's dependency upon static supplies of coal, gas, and oil.
Is Tillich, then, as realistic as he attempts to be? Is not his thought
at this point limited by a remnant of Jiarxian dialectics? Bius we return
to the question with which we began: Can Marxism be accepted as a hllpful
supplement to the Christian interpretation of history?
h. Roman Catholic Criticism
This chapter so far has not attempted to deal with a criticism of
Tillich's approach from a Roman Catholic viewpoint. Since Dawson will be
criticized from a Protestant standpoint in a succeeding chapter, it is only
fair to subject Tillich to the same treatment. We shall therefore briefly
consider Dawson's criticism of Protestantism (especially as concerns an
interpretation of history) to see to what extent, if any, it applies to
Tillich's thought.
1U3
Although Daw3cm nowhere attempt© to construct a systematic critique
of Protestant thought, his writings are full of illuminating sidelights in
which Protestantism is implicitly and explicitly judged and found wanting.
On® of Dawson's most forceful criticisms of Protestantism is its tendency to
abandon the cultural problem. Protestantism, he claims, has established
such a drastic dualism of fiaith and works "as to leave no room for any-
positive conception of Christian culture. . . . The "otherness" of the
divine has been declared with such rigor that there is a fear "lest the
transcendent divine values of Christianity be endangered by any identification
O
or association of them with the relative human values of culture." This
divorce of culture from religion has been so pronounced that Dawson claims
to see a direct line from Lutheran!am (the separation of the state from the
judgment of the church) through Hegel's exaltation of the Prussian State to
Hitler ?
Another aspect of the detachment of culture from religion is the
traditional Protestant de-valuation of the centuries of Christian history
prior to the Reformation. The Reformers imagined that they were able to
cancel out a thousand years of darkness, superstition, and bigotry and begin
afresh. This attempt to wipe nut the debt to the Middle Ages resulted in a
severing of religion from its cultural and historical roots and thus paved
the way, as we shall see in Dawson's analysis, for total secularism. The
failure to see Christendom as a continuity in time led to the failure to see
it as a continuity in space and this resulted in the self-assertion of indi¬
vidual nations against the reality of Christendom.
^Dhderstanding Jjurone. (London; Sheed and Ward, 1952), p. 10
2Idem.
3See the essay "Hegel and the German Ideology" in Understanding Bnrone.
pp. 137-203; The Judgment of the Nations (London: Sheed and Ward, 19^3),pp.
33• Dawson recognizes that this cultural divorce is more characteristic of t
Lutherifk wing of Protestantism. Calvinism, he comments, has always stressed
Christian!zation of society (The Judgment of the Nations, p. 26).
Again, the divorce of religion and culture led Protestantism to a
negative appraisal of non-Christian cultures and a narrov/ness that made it
impossible to see God at work in every religion in terras of "general revelat¬
ion" and also in terms of a quest for the Christ.
Tillich's reply to these criticisms is not difficult to constrcut,
for he is in entire agreement with Dawson in regard to the unhealthy sepa¬
ration of religion and culture. Although, he likes to think of himself as
standing within the Lutheran tradition, he is far more a son of John Calvin
in his views concerning the redemption of society. With Dawson, Tillich
believes that religion must avoid being strictly transcendent and must come
to grips with the problem of relating its message to the cultural situation.
He agrees with Dawson that there is a link between Lutheran quietism and the
rise of Hitler. He states, to this effect, that the Reformation was carried
on largely through the power of the Germanic princes with the result that
the princes took over many functions of the bishops, thus subjecting
the church to State administration and political power in a measure
which was never possible for Catholicism. Shis was the price the German
nation had to pay for being the motherland of the Reformation. Without
this heritage, Hitler's tyranny would never have been possible.
So overcome the false separation of religion and culture, Sillich believes
that the Church should construct a positive "theology of culture" which
2
would "attempt to analyze the theology behind all cultural expressions."
Again, because of his early environment, Sillich acquired a strong
appreciation of the Suropean historical tradition and is thus not open to
Dawson's criticism of the Protestant disposition to treat the Middle Ages
lightly. He is particularly conscious of the fact that Protestants have so
oft9n overlooked the value of these centuries and cautions that Protestantism
""War and She Christian Churches," Protestant Digest (Jpn-nn/rv. lPkO) ,1II ,15.
Yet, in another place, Sillich speaks of the theory of attributing Hitler's
evil to Lutheraniam as being grossly over-exaggerated ("Love's Strange Work,"
The Protestant (January. 19^2),IV,75.
^Systematic Theolo.yy. I, 39.
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still depends upon the "religious substance" and power of the Roman Catho¬
lic tradition.1 Tillich is aware, too, of the essential unity of Christendom
as a "social reality" which rises above national particularism. Censuring
Staanuel Hirsch's German nationalism, Tillich comments that "such a thing
would mean the break-up of the more than a thousand-year-old tradition that
O
the Christian western world constitutes a homogeneous family of nations."
-find finally, Tillieh is immune to the criticism of failing to see
the deeper religious levels in primitive and non-Christian cultures.-' As
we have seen, he makes a place in his system for "General Revelation" - not,
to be sure, in terms of a Natural Theology that can discover final answers,
but at least as a worthy quest for the answers that can be provided only
within the Christian framework.
In the Old as v?ell as in the Hew Testament we find in language, rites,
and ideas a large element of general revelation as it has occurred and
continuously Occurs within human religion generally. The universality
of the Christian claim implies that there is no religion, not even the
most primitive which has not contributed or will not contribute to the
preparation and reception of the new reality in history.^
Tillich seams to hold a vfew close to Roman Catholic syncretism when he states:
I am convinced that Christianity is able to take all possible elements
or religious truth into itself without ceasing to be Christian. . . .5
In his eagerness to overcome the false dualism of religion and culture,
Tillich finds himself in substantial agreement with Dawson on these points
and thus rises above the traditional Roman Catholic criticisms.
1,1The JVotestant Vision," pp. 10 f.
'""Die Theologie des Kairos und die gegenwartige geistige Lage: Gffener
Brief an ihianuel Hirsch," Theologiache Blatter (November, I93U) XIII, 322.
3see Tillich's remarks on the theological history of religions as a
s^ource for systematic theology (Systematic Theoloav. I, 39).
^"The Problem of Theological Method," p. 19•
Site-
ike
/mother area in which Dawson censures Protestantism is in its
individualism. Dawson realizes that Protestant individualism has made
some important contributions. It was, he realizes, a powerful force in
the achievement of the social and political reforms that lie behind the
modern developmentIt was responsible, too, for increased literacy
(through its stress on the Bible as theethical norm) and the modern spirit
of independent Judgnent. Yet these advancements, he believes, have not
compensated for losses in other directions such as the "growing impoverishment
of the communal life of society" and the consequent secularisation of life .3
Protestantism's stress on the individual « especially in terns of conversion-
has tended to make the redemption of humanity "an Isolated act which stands
outside history and which involves on the part of humanity only the bare act
of justifying faith.Protestantism, Dawson believes, has therefore failed
to see the salvation of mankind as a "vital process of regeneration which
manifests Itself in the corporate reality of a divine society."^
Tillich's continual emphasis upon the corporate aspects of society
makes documentation of his agreement -with Dawson on this point unnecessary.
Indeed, his preoccupation with salvation through, "participation" has made
him susceptible to attacks, by his Protestant colleagues, that he makes no
6
place for individual conversion I
Dawson's criticism of the Protestant failure to see the redemption
of humanity as taking place through the "coroor&te reality of a divine society"
leads us directly to his critique of the Protestant idea of the Church. The
^•"Christianity and the Western Tradition," The Listener (May 6, 19kS),p.7*42.
~"Tha Crisis of Christian Culture: Education," in Our Culture; Its Christian
Roots ..and Present. Crisis (London:Society for Rropagaticn of Christian Knowledge,
1947)77. 40 f.
3ldsn.
bteliiglon and the Modern State (London: Sheed and Ward, I936), p. 97.
^Idm.
^"Tillich's Vie*? of the Church," The Theology of Paul Tlllinh. p. 26k.
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Church, at least by sectarianism, has been nominalistically conceived as
a group of people who bind themselves together in terms of a common faith,
rather than realistically conceived as the historical continuity of the body
of Christ. Further, there is in much of Protestantism a fear of ascribing
authority to the Church or to ecclesiastical tradition. Authority, rather,
has been made to rest upon individual interpretation of the Scriptures.
Religion in Protestant countries, Dawson believes, ha3 therefore tended to
become arbitrary and subjective - only an impoverished vorsicn of CaPjolicism.
When this faith in individual interpretation of the Scriptures as an infal¬
lible norm was undercut by historical criticism, the attempt was made in
Liberal Protestantism not only to eliminate ecclesiastical tradition but even
to get behind the early church itself to the figure of the "historical Jesus."
Dawson believes that this rationalized explanation of Jesus* person and
2
teachings is fundamentally illogical and uhhi storical. The attempt to cut
off the supernatural elements of the gospel picture results only in a select¬
ion of "those elements of the Gospel which appeal to the modern liberal
mind. . • This, Dawson believes, is the final blunder of the Frotestant
failure to see the Church as an organic-historic reality.
Tillich, it need hardly be pointed out, has a doctrine of the Church
that is not susceptible to these criticisms. He stresses the concept of fche
Church as the organic continuation of the Incarnation and is thus hostile to
any noisinalistie view.
*
Hie church is the historical embodiment of the Dew Being created by the
Incarnation. The very term Dew Being therefore excludes any doctrine
of the Church which conceives it to be brought into existence by religious
decisions.*
■
y • ■ 1 ■ 1 11 — ——
Christianity and the Dew Aae (Sheed and Ward, 1931), PP- 6S f.
2W&-* P* 77-
%M&-, P- 73-
"A Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation," p. 1*4-7.
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And again,
She Qhurch is not a creation of religions individuals, but religious
individuals are the product of the Church. She Church antec8des in¬
dividual piety; it is not the result of it.
With Dawson, Tillich is aware of the evils of sectarianism and speaks of
2
the divisions within the "body of Christ" as "utterly tragic." She great¬
est expression of this tragedy, Tillich believes, is the fact that "even
the Hew Heality as it appears in time and space under continuous disruption,
estrangement, anxiety, and despair becomes itself disrupted.Likewise
Tillich sees the need for some commanding authority beyond the individual.
The sacramental (though, not the legal) side of Catholic authority needs to
be revived among Protestants. This Tillich conceives as tho task of repre¬
senting "the Hew Being in such a way - in symbols and personalities - that
it becomes a new authority for masses and individuals."4 Further, although
he would not go as far as Dawson in this regard, Tillich speaks of ecclesi¬
astical tradition as having same normative (or at least guiding) function
in theological construction. As he insists,
A way must be found which lies between the Soman Catholic practice
of making ecclesiastical decisions not only a source but also the
actual norm of systematic theology and the radical Protestant practice
of depriving church history not only of its normative character but
also of its function as a source.5
In general, Tillich beliaves that the church must recover its role as a
"sacramental reality." He agrees entirely with Dawson that "The gift of
freedom, including religious freedom, is paid for by a loss in living sub¬
stance. The loss of spiritual substance since the end of the Middle Ages,
1,1The Permanent Significance of the Catholic Church,etc.", p. 26.
^"The Ikotestant Vision," p. 11.
3lbid.. p.11.
k
"The Permanent Significance of the Catholic Church, etc." pp. 26 ff.
^Systeraatic Theology, I, 51; see also "The Problem of Theological Method,"
pp. 20 f.
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botli intellectual and religious, has bean tremendous. . . With Dawson
Tillich believes that this process resulted in a Protestantism that is
"empty of substance, impotent in its social realityjand secular because of
its surrender of all places, things, men, and actions supposedly holy in
themselves."2 Protestantism has thus tended to become an amorphous group
without sacramental quality - just one group beside others, delivered to
the relativities of history.^ To offset this tendency, Protestantism,
Tillich believes, must regain the note of the Church as a "gestalt of
Grace" - a sacramental reality, having organic relatedness and historical
continuity. Only then can it give men "courage to be" against the threaten¬
ing relativities and meaninglessness of modern life. To do this, Protestant¬
ism, Tillich believes, must proclaim the "holiness of being" (the sacramental
©lament) in addition to the "holiness of what ought to be" (the prophetic
element); it must stress once more the "mother element" (carrying, sustaining,
protecting, etc.) in combination with the "father element" (the theocratic
1;,
note of demand, judgment, criticism, etc.). Thus again Tillich accepts and
rises above the usual Catholic criticisms.
The final item ws shall consider is Dawson's censure of the Protestant
separation of reason from revelation, philosophy from theology. Dawson noints
out the well-known truth that the Reformation was not basically a reaction of
reason against faith but rather a revolt of faith against intellectualism.5
1The Protestant p. 191.
2m&-> p. 197.
^Propositions. Part IV, p. 23.
^"The Permanent Significance of the Catholic Church,etc.", pp. 25 f.
^inquiries into Religion and Culture (London: Shesd and Ward, 1933),p.1^7.
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He speaks of Lather (however profotind or genuine his religious experience
may have been) as disregarding the intellectual elements in religion and
turning had: to primitive motifs: God as fearful and terrible.^ This de-
intellectualizing of religion (the cutting off of dogaa from tradition and
philosophy) made the whole edifice of Protestant theology, according to
Dawson, rest upon an arbitrary and subjective basis, lacking internal eon-
p
sistency. Thus with the rise of rational criticism in the Enlightenment»
3
religion was left helpless before the onslaught. The stripping away of
non-Jewish, mystical, and philosophical elements led, in one great branch
of Protestantism, to a milleniari3t emphasis which was finally secularised
into a doctrine of Progress. The Protestant anti-netaphysical bias thus led
ultimately, Dawson believes, to an interpretation of history as the progressive
k
development of immanent principles. This moral utopianisia was accompanied
by a cultural activism, stemming from the same da-intellectual!sing process.
Calvinism, for instance, created "an immensely strong moral motive for action
without any corresponding intellectual ideal, a culture of the will rather
than of the understanding - a purely ethical discipline which neglects intel¬
lectual and aesthetic values-"^ This is especially true, Dawson believes, of
the .American civilization and comes from over-stressing the purely occidental
elements as over against the oriental elements of contemplation and asceticism.
And all of this is a result of the de-intellectualizing of religion that
began with the Reformation.
ighyistiflplty and the Her; Age, pp. 6S f.
^Enquiries, eta.., P- 3&7? Christianity and the Hew Abe, p. 6S.
^Christianity and the Hew Age, p. 6S.
Dawson's essay in ihe Kingdom of God and History (London: George .Allen and
Uhwin, Ltd., I93S) p. 211.
-^Christianity and the Mew Ase. p. 23.
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A corollary to this is Dawson^ criticism of H-otestant rationalism.
It seeing co tradictory at first si#it to call Protestantism both de-intellactu¬
alized. and rationalistic at the game time. But the type of reason that
Protestantism lost in the process mentioned above was the intellectua
of the Schoolmen - the eurhasis upn knowledge through mystical intuition
and union. The loss of this element coupled with the casting aside of
symbols aad authority led, Dawson believes, to Biblicism, rigid scholasticism,
and arid rationalism. Further, the cutting off of reason from the vital,
mystical elements and "confining Christianity to the inner world of conscious¬
ness"^ led to a repression of vital forces that were sooner or later to break
forth in terrifying demonic forms (as in Naziam).
Tillich, again, agrees with Dawson point by point in lamenting the
Protestant failure to make a place for the hitter type of reason ("ontological
reason" as he calls it). His whole systematic construction takes the form
of attempting to overcome the divorce between philosophy and theology, reason
and revelation through his'taethod of correlation." He emphatically does not
agree with the Roman Catholic solution of the relationship between philosophy
and theology, but he does given them credit for being aware of the -problem.
Tillich realizes that reason cut off from revelation has, in Protestant
orthodoxy, created an autonomous civilization and, in liberal Protestantism,
dissolved revelation into reason, thus creating idealism and humanism.^ He
admits as well that Protestantism has, through a de-intellectualizing process,
become moralistic, educational, scientific, vague, and popular and that it
^"Concordats or Catacombs?", 'Hie Tablet (June 26, 1937), p.910.
2
The Judgment of the nations (London: Sheed and Wand, 19^3), pp. 19, 153.
3"®ie Permanent Significance of the Catholic Church, etc.", p. 31-
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has a tendency to degenerate into a "shallow secularism trimmed by
religious ahra3eology."^ Tillich. is also aware, as we saw, that the over¬
burdening of the conscious center through obedience to Lather's "law of
Justification." has led to personality disintegration. The loss of spiritual
substance, supra-individual symbols, and sacramental grace, Tillich believes,
are all aspects of an overljo-ratioaalized faith. Having failed to find
depth in a religion sheared of mysticism, Tillich caustically observes,
many are now turning to psyehoanalyedsts to help then find a depth In their
souls.2 With .Ds,wson, Tillich believes that human personality thus severed
from its vital base is easy prey to demonic forces such as vibalistic national¬
ism.-^
Therefore, in this regard, as in the other areas we surveyed, Tillich
accepts the truth of the Roman Cstholic criticism and rises above the limitat¬
ions of his own tradition. It will be interesting to see, after first in¬
vestigating his general thought, how Dawson similarly rises above the tradit-
ional Protestant criticism of Roman Catholicism. This will lead us, in
the concluding chapter, to an analysis of the Catholic elements in Tillich's
thought and the Protestant elements in Dawson's thou^it, and finally to a
consideration of hew an acceptable interpretation of history must include
elements of both traditions.
lf!lTh9 Ifermansnt Significance of the Catholic Church, etc.", pp. 25 f.
2Ibid,.. p. 30.








A distinguished layman of the Roman Catholic Church, Mr. Christopher
Henry Damson has "been influencing the English-speaking world for several
decades. In an indirect way he is perhaps one of the greatest Roman
Catholic apologists of our time.
Born at Hay Castle in the Dye Valley on the Welsh border on the
twelfth of October, 12S9, he was the only son of lieutenant Colonel H.5*.
Da^SOR Harlington Hall, Skipton and Mary Lcruisa Bevan, eldest daughter
of Archdeacon Bevan of Hay. Christopher Dawson traces Ms descent on his
mother's side from a long line of professional soldiers. Prom both sides
he inherited the characteristics of the old rural aristocracy - what S.I.
Watkin calls "the preeminently gracious and cultured tradition of the
Anglican country gentleman. . . He speaks of Ms mother as thoroughly
Welsh and passionately devoted to Welsh traditions. A learned woman and
something of an antiquarian, she was an authority cn Welsh saints and had
marked literary tastes. It was these tastes that Dawson acquired at an
early age, for as he says, "she had a simple and child-like gift of cora-
p
rauaication."
Dawson's father, although a professional soldier, never shot,
fished, or hunted; he was more interested in the science of his profession
and was sometiling of a scholar in his own right. He was an ardent reader
with wide tastes in the sciences, history, uhilcscphy, novels, and poetry.
* " " ~ ~ '
"Christopher Dawson," in Commonweal (October 2J, 1933)> P* S07•
^"Tradition and Inheritance* Memoirs of a Victorian Childhood, Bart I,"
(Spring, 19^9). P* 213.
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Above all, he admired. Dante. Dawson gays of his father that "This love of
Dante no doubt stimulated his interests in Catholicism and helped to dispel
his Protestant prejudices and upbringing."1 Mother of his father's Catholic
sympathies D; v/son points out is the use of Daman Catholic devotional books
for the family prayers. Further, Dawson describes his father's decision to
move the family from the south (Alverstoke and Das ton) back to Craven,
Yorkshire, as "part of a deliberate reaction against the Protestant tradition
and an attempt to recover lost spiritual roots in a past which he felt to
be Catholic."^ Yet, says Dawson, all of this "never led him to become a
Roman Catholic for he had little of the via media Anglicanism of the High
Church party.Rather, "he had a kind of hereditary 'political' likyalty
to the Church of England, and I remember he once said to me that no man has
the right to legye the Church to which his fathers belonged. In that he was
k
more Roman than Catholic."
With such a background, it is easy to see how Dawson acquired the
keen interest in social tradition that characterises his writings, his broad
literary tastes, his appreciation of rural life and nature, and his deep
religious convictions. Each of these merits a more detailed consideration.
Concerning the source of his interest in social tradition and
history, Dawson says, "The house where I was born was a Tudor building con¬
structed in and out of a medieval castle originally built in the twelfth
5
century.'1"' His boyhood was quite naturally steeped in history and tradition.
^•"Tradition and Inheritance; Memoirs of a Victorian Childhood, Part II,"




^"Tradition and Inheritance, Etc.", Part I, p. 2I3.
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From his earliest years he was surrounded by "the feeling of antiquity -
the immense age of everything. . . the continuity of the present with the
remote past. . . .nl Shis feeling, as he says,
was reinforced by the fact that nothing had changed since ny mother
had been a child in the same house and that all the family relations
existed in duplicate, so that alongside ray parents, my nurse, and my
uncles and aunts I saw ray mother's parents and her nurse and her uncles
and aunts."2
His father's deliberate attempt to recapture some of the old family traditions
and ties, as we noted, by returning to the north from which his family had
come is another exam le of how the father's interest in social tradition
carried over to the son.
Concerning Dawson's acquisition of literary tastes, we have only
to imagine the spacious library at the center of his parent's home to realize
what an influence this aspect of his parent's life had on him. His parents
spent many hours sharing favorite passages of great books so that early in
life books became a second world to him - not, a3 he says, a dream world
but rather as an extension of the real world.^ From his parents he learned
the connection between story and history, and comments that he grew in an
understanding of the past not so much through studying outlines of history
as through becoming engrossed in historical stories, myths, and legends
and discovering that history is composed of a series of different worlds, each
with its own spirit, farm, and riches.
The rural atmosphere of his early years was another great influence
in Dawson's later thought. He speaks of the early impressions of tire elemental
forces of nature as he saw them in the transformation of the valley at Craven
* "Tradition and Inheritance, etc." Part I, p. 2lH.
2Xdem.
•^"Tradition and Inheritance, etc." Ihrt II, p. 16.
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and in the rising of the water. In his early childhood, running water always
had a particular fascination for him as being "more satisfying than the
artificial and restricted reality of the grown-up world-Ihis type of
life lived close to nature had bean a characteristic of his family for
generations.
Neither my parents nor their parents nor theirs - almost infinitum -
ever lived in a town, and I find it exceedingly difficult, not merely
uncongenial but unnatural, to do so myself
This background no doubt had a great deal to do with Dawson's insight into
the disintegrating effects of modern urbanization and his view that culture
has an essential relation to the soil.
And finally, the religious atmosphere of his early years entered
deeply into Dawson's thought. Growing up in a staunch Church of England
home steeped in the high Anglican religious culture, Dawson learned through
personal experience the need and value of a vital relationship between
religion and culture. She family devotions, the Bible reading, the encourage¬
ment of his father in the study of the writings of Roman Catholic saints
and mystics, and his father's own Catholic sympathies were all of great
influence in his later development and his final conversion to Roman Catholi¬
cism.
The religious training of his home was supplement by hi3 education
at Bolton Grange preparatory school near Rugby and by his training at Winchester
(which Watkin calls "the most religious and traditional of the great English
public schools^)- Later he had as a tutor the Reverend C.H. Moss of Bletsoe,
„ - - - .
"Tradition and Inheritance, etc." Part II, p. 8. Cf. Tillich's love of
nature and the influence this had on his thought (See Chapter One).
2
"Tradition and Inheritance,etc." Part I, p. 212.
^E.I WatfcLn, "Christopher Dawson, " p. 60S.
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Bedfordshire, and it was here, in 1905, that he began his life-long a;fiintance.
with Mr. E.I. Watkin.1 The following years were 3?ent at Trinity College,
Oxford, where for a tine Dawson shared lodgings with "atkin. Dawson also
spent a year as a private pupil of the eminent Swedish economist, Qustav
Casael.
It was in these years after he had left the university, the
years prior to World War I, that Dawson became more and mere interested
in Roman Catholicism. Many factors entered into his final conversion.
Aaong them were his dissatisfaction with traditional Anglicanism. The advance
of Biblical criticism had shaken the foundations of Anglican authority. I%r
the time Dawson had entered preparatory school, religious instruction had
become "more ethics than religion, and a haze of vagueness and uncertainty
hung around the more fundamental articles of Christian dogaa." Anglo-
Catholicism had attempted to compensate for this lack of external Biblical
authority by providing a new standard of authority of its own. These
attempts, however, were felt by most of Dawson's superiors (schoolmasters,
tutors, and pastors) as the innovations of an enterprising minority.
The result of this conflict of authority was that I lost faith in
religion altogether for the time being. The intellectual current was,
in fact, setting away from Christianity, and I felt the first influence
of that wave of paganism vzhich has since swept the country.3
Yet his early training could not easily be cast aside, Although he lacked at
that time the intellectual grounds for faith, he claims that he never really
doubted the validity of the spiritual side of life.
"^Watkin compiled the indexes for most of Dawson's books.
2»Vflay I am a Catholic," The Catholic Times (May 21, 1926), p. 4.
P. 3
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In addition to his dissatisfaction with Anglicanism there was
a growing suspicion of Anglo-Catholicism to which Dawson, like Hewman,
had turned for spiritual support. During this period of three or four years
preceding his reception into the Catholic Church he had tried to hold to
the Anglo-Catholic path and had even attended Anglican confession regularly
as he had not previously dons."^ Still his allegiance to Anglo-Catholicism was
p
"half-hearted and without intellectual conviction." He expresses it as an
attempt to live on Catholicism from the outside "in a kind of spritual
eclecticism, which subsists on Catholic ideals but lacks the foundation of
■x
intellectual conviction."^
Another factor in Dawson's conversion was a trip to Home he made
at the age of nineteen which gave him an acquaintance -with Roman Catholicism
as a living religion and opened for him a "new world of religion and culture
"I realized for the first time," he says,"that Catholic civilisation did not
stop with the Middle Ages, and that contemporary with our own national
Protestant development there was the wonderful flowering of the Baroque
culture."5 Dawson was struck with the atmosphere of the Catholic Churches
which was so different from anything he had Jmown in England and recounts
that for him "the art of the Counter Reformation -was a pure joy."
I loved the churches of Bernini and Barromini no less than the ancient
basilicas. And this in turn led me to the literature of the Counter
Reformation, and I came to know St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross,
compared to whom even the greatest of non-Catholic religious writers
seem pale and unreal."'
= T,
"Ihy I am a Catholic," p. U "fthy I am a Catholic," p. 3
*~Idem» ^l.bi.d •» P* 3*
31dam. Ibid., p. k
Idam.
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Farther, there was the influence of his personal friends who were
Roman Catholics, especially E.I1 Watkin with whom, as we noted, he shared
lodgings at Oxford. Watkin had himself become a convert to Catholicism
(in 190S) and knew what Dawson was going through in his spiritual struggle.
Perhaps just as influential was Dawson's personal reading in Von Htigel,
Pere Pratt, and the German theologian Matthias J. Scheeben, in addition to
his readings in the medieval and counter-Reformation mystics."''
But most i portant for Dawson in his conversion to Roman Catholicism
was his new und rstanding of the doctrines of the Church and of Sanctification.
His readings in the Hew Testament, especially in St. John and St. Paul, in
Pratt and in Scheeben made him realize "how the Paulina doctrine of the
Mystical Body was the key to the Catholic doctrine of the Church and of
Grace.The fact which seams to have impressed Dawson most is what he
calls the "fundamental unity of Catholic theology and the Catholic life"3-
an organic unity which stretches bade into the centuries of Christian history
and includes all aspects of the Church's life. What really tipped the
balance for Dawson, as with Hewman, was Ms realization that
the Anglo-Catholic conception of a Catholic Church made up of separated
•branches' was a modem innovation and that the Patristic conception of
Catholic unity was not merely a unity of faith but a unity of communion.1,
AAfter his conversion, Dawson was influenced by the seventeenth-century
French mystics "she are so profoundly Pauline." He calls attnetion to the
fact that "there is. . .a traditional link between Christian mysticism and
the Christian (and pest-Christian) philosophies of history which emerges at
every stage of Western thought and no doubt this is largely responsible for
the direction of my own thought" (Personal letter to the writer, January, 1952).
Other major influences in Dawson's thought apart from those leading to his
conversion to Catholicism have been St« Augustine (his conception of Mstory as
centering around the two cities), Edmund Burke (his idea of Europe as a "Conraon-
wealth of Christian nations") and, in sociology, Victor Bruraford and Patrick
Geddes (who were also the teachers of Lewis Mumford).
^Personal letter writer, January, 1952•
3"Why I ara a Catholic," p. 2.
Personal letter to writer, January, 1952*
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As he say3 elsewhere,
I realized that the Incarnation, the Sacraments, the external
order of the Church and the internal working of sanotifying grace
were all parts of the one organic unity, a living tree, whose roots
are in the Divine Nature ad^whose fruit is the perfection of the
saints.*
The dootrine of the Church and the doctrine of Sanctification were, then,
linked for Dawson, This is where Dawson's earlier study of the Catholic
saints and mystics plays a decisive part. The knowledge of these lives
kept reourring to him and he increasingly felt that any genuine and com¬
plete Christian faith must make some plaae for these higher types of Charac¬
ter and experience. The life of the saint, he came to believe, is not
the independent achievement of a few highly-gifted individuals, but
the per eot manifestation of the supernatural life whioh exists in
every individual Christian, the first fruits of that new humanity
which is the work of the Churoh to oreate.
This fundamental doctrine of Sanctifying Grace as revealed
in the lew Testament and explained by St, Augustine and St, Thomas
in all its connotations removed all my difficulties and uncertainties
and oarried complete conviction to my mind. It was no lnger pos¬
sible to hesitate, diffioult though it was to separate myself from
earlier associations and traditional ties.^
So on the Eve of Epiphany, January 6, 191^4, Dawson, at the age of twenty-
four, became a Roman Catholic at St, Al.ysious* Church, Oxford.
Two years later, in August 9, 1916, Dawson was married to
Miss Valery Mills at Chipping Camden. His wife, Watkin states, has been
a constant source of inspiration and help to him, especially in his
illness.^ They have three children* two daughters, Juliana and Christi¬
ana, and one son, Philip.
Dawson's academic career has been rather brief. Having inherited
his father's estate, he has not been under the compulsion of earning his
*"Why I am a Catholic," pp. i+ ff.
gIbid., p. 5«
^Personal letter from Watkin, January, 1952.
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suidstenoe and has boon abla to give himself wholly to scholarly pursuits.
His only real aoademio position was at the University of Exeter where he
was lecturer in the History of Culture at the University College from
1930-1936. He has also given a number of public lectures, among them the
Forwood lectures in the Philosophy of Religion at Liverpool in 1933-^4 (incor¬
porated in his book entitled Medieval Religion) and the Gifford lectures at
the University of Edinburgh in 19ll7 find 19i|8 (which later appeared as
Religion and Culture and Religion and the Rise of "Western Civilization).^
Most of his life, howver, has been spent not in classroom teaching or in
public lectures but in research and writing. His first book, The Age of
the Gods (1923), is an account of the prehistoric origins of European
culture and is almost a pure cultural anthropology. Bis subsequent books
have dealt with a wide variety of topics including history, sociology,
literature, art, comparative religions, architecture, archeology, metaphys¬
ics, and theology. He has contributed scores of articles to literary,
historical, sociological, and religious journals - many of which have been
included as chapters in his later books. In all of these fields he has
displayed a masterful ability to sift out the important facts and most
telling illustrations from a vast range of materials.
According to 3.1. Y'atkin, Dawson's original plan was to con¬
struct a history of Western civilization from a Christian and Catholic
point of view as a counterpart (and counterblast) to H.G. Vfell's secular
p
interpretation. The Age of the Gods and The Making of Europe (and to seme
———-f
*It might also be mentioned that Dawson took part, with Tillioh, in
the Oxford Conference on "Church, Community, and State" in 1937* His contri¬
bution to this conference is published in The Kingdom of God and History,
(H.G. Yidod,et.al), (London, Geo^rge Allen and Unwin, 1939). PP« 197-216.
^Personal letter from Watkin, January,1952. See also the article by
Michael Wade, "A Catholic Spengler," Commonweal (October 18, 1935) XXII, 605<
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extent Medieval Religion) were the first volumes in this projeoted
series. But somehow Dawson was deterred from this course, much to the
regret cf Mr. Watkin.^"
One major interruption in Dawson's literary career was his
affiliation with the movement called "The Sword of the Spirit," founded in
19ij0 by Cardinal Hinsley, with Dawson as Vice-Chairman. The orid. s of the
early war years deeply affected Dawson and he was eager to help organise
some sort of Christian action in Britain as a counterpart to the Catholic
Motion movement on the continent, keeping in mind the specific British
needs. Dawson speaks of the purpose of the movement in tl^e words*
VJe are not attempting to create a Catholic political party. ...
On the other hand, we are not simply an organization for teaching
Catholic sociil principles. The Sword of the Spirit is an attempt
to fill the gap between the Christian Church and the Secular State-
a gap, a yawning abyss, which threatens to swallow up everything.
It is an attenpt to create a new organ, an organ for spiritual
action in temporal affairs.5
Spiritual action in temporal affllArs demanded the devotion of dedicated
Christian laymen, consequently great stress was laid uppn the "Lay Apos-
tolate." Further, an attempt was made to get Protetant and Catholic
clergy and laymen to cooperate in this common program of spiritual regener¬
ation. The plan proved successful for a period inasmuch as a non-Roman
movement was developed (the "Religion and Life" movement) to work cooperat¬
ively with the "Sword of the Spirit" and such Protestant figures as the
Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop Of Chichester gave their support
to the cause.^ Nevertheless, the program finally came to grief over the
Personal letter from Watkin, January, 1952.
2
Cf. Tillioh*s interest in Religious Socialism as an attenpt to fill
the gap between Lutheranism and Socialism,
z
"Europe and Christendom," The Dublin Review (October, 19^1), p. 119*
^Henry Smith Leiper in Christendom (Chicago), (Autumn, 19^)p. 530*
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issue of joint Christian action.* Upon the death of Cardinal Hinsley,
the movement continued (and is still functioning) under the direction of
Cardinal Griffin, but Dawson no longer took an active part. The results
of Dawson's practical and politioal thinking durirv£the years of his
participation in this movement are best seen in his book The Judgment of
the Nations.
Among the other positions held by Dawen have been his editor¬
ship of the Dublin Review from 191+1-19U5 en<i his advisory capacity, as
one of the four directors, with The Tablet, a weekly Roman Catholic news¬
paper. On the whole, however, Dawson has led a life of scholarly retire¬
ment, especially in these later years. Being of a more introvertive tempera¬
ment, he prefers the inner life of thought to the life of social and
political aotion (although his thought is definitely not of the ivory-
tower variety). His persistent ill health has also made it impossible
for him to take a more active part in the social and politioal movements
whioh he knows so well. He now resides at Cope Side, Boars Hill, Oxford,
where, at the age of sixty-four, he continues to write, his latest pub¬
lication being The Understanding of Europe.
It is impossible to give any final evaluation of Dawson's
contributions at this point in his career. Through his concern for
Christian unity, his open-mindedness, his depth of insight, and his
appreciation for some of the Protestant contributions^ Dawson may
perhaps prove to be one of the leaders in the development of an eoumeniscal
interpretation of history.
*"The English Catholics," Dublin Review (Fourth Quarter, 1950),p.11.
2
Dawson is an authority on the Protestant "Spirituals" who flourished
under uliver Cromwell and is also expecially appreciative of the contribut¬
ions of the Non-conformists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
I6i+
But Dawson -will probably be most remembered for his
elucidation of the relationship between religion and culture. His one
major theme, constantly reiterated in a wide variety of contexts, has
been the necessity for a religious undergirding of culture. S.I. Watkin
expresses this so adequately when he tells us that
It is an entire fabric of historical sociology which Mr. Dawson
is building up, not in a continuous treatise logically constructed
and set out, but by turning the flash-light of his trained and
piercing vision on a host of different points in the history of
social mankind to display everywhere religion as the essential
social form, constructing a society whose value is conditioned by
the degree of its own purity and truth.*
"Christopher Dawson," p. 609.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE MEANING AND MAKING OF HISTORY
A glance at the index indicates thfet the chapters of this
dissertation are of disproportionate length. This is not accidental
and reveals a basic difference between the two authors. Tilllch's major
emphases are philosophical and theological. Therefore, the chapters
dealing with his theoretical formulations about history and the theological
problems involved were more lengthy than the chapters dealing with his
concrete analyses df the relationships between religion and culture
and of the source and solution of the world crisis. Dawson, on the other
hand, concentrates on the concrete investigation of culture and historical
trends. Therefore the initial chapters dealing with the theoretical
aspects of Dawson's interpretation of history will be less lengthy than
those dealing with his elaborate historical analyses.^" Dawson nowhere
deals specifically with the theory of history 3s does Tillich, nor does
p
he develop any systematic theological construction. Hence, the following
two chapters concerned with a discussion of Dawson's theoretical and theo¬
logical formulations will be comparatively brief and are included primaril,
in order to provide a basis for comparing and contrasting the views of the
^It is interesting to note that, paradoxically, Tillich, who talks mote
about the necessity for concrete analyses (and uses frequently such terms as
involvement, participation, and decision) produces the most abstract and
speculative conclusions, while Dawson, who takes more the position of an
ivory-towered spectator comes out with the more practical politcal observat
ions and conclusions.
p
This does not mean that Dawson is lacking in theological comprehensi
He is an able student of theological and philosophical problems. Except for
occasional chapters and articles, however, his own views on these subjects
remain in the background where, perhaps, thoy are oven more important becaui
of their nature as presuppositions.
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two authors.
1* The Definition of History
Dawson agrees with Tillich that history is not purely objective
but that it involves a preeminently subjective factor - a group*s self-
interpret tion, The essence of history, Dawson believes, is not to be
found in facts but rather in group traditions.
The pure fact is not as such historical. It only becomes historical
when it oan be brought into relation with a social tradition so that
it can be seen as part of an organic whole
The only history that we oan know anything about, therefore, is the history
p
of a sooial tradition. Thus, whereas for Tillich a group's self-
interpretation is dependent upon its meaningful "center," for Dawson, its
self-interpretation is dependent upon its tradition, Dawson therefore
lays a great deal of stress on the importance of social tradition as the
real essence of history. The emphasis on tradition is especially import¬
ant in reference to Dawson's conception of Christianity and the Church,
Dawson oontinually speaks of Christianity as a oonorete social reality.
For him the church is not just a group of individuals united by common
opinions or beliefs (as with a sect) but is an organic unity - a unity of
oommunion. As the successor to the Hebrew "people of God" it is a "theo-
phoric" community bearing the presenoe of God in history as a vehicle of
God's redenptive aotivity direoted toward the regeneration of humanity,^
^Dawson concurs with Tillich is seeing historical consciousness as
a relatively rare achievement so that the denial of the significance of
hisotry is ^the rule rather than the exception. He agrees with Tillich,
too, in not ing that in Christianity above all men first acquired a sense
of the unity and purpose of history, (See Dawson's essay in The Kingdom
of God and History, pp. 197 ff»)
gIbid., p. 201.
^Christianity and the Hew Age (Londonj Sheed and Ward, 1931), p. 79*
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This process of the formation of a divine society and the oreation of
a new humanity gives the historical process an absolute value and a tran¬
scendent end,* Dawson*s doctrine of the Church will be treated l§ter in
greater detail. The important thing to note here, however, is that the
Church is the best example of what Dawson means by a living tradition
around whioh history may be formed. As Dawson sees it,
tradition is an organ of the Spirit of God in the world and the
living witness to the supernatural action of God on humanity is
centeal to the Catholic understanding and interpretation of history,
2. The Center of History
Regardless of the fact that, for Dawson, tradition more or
less takes the place of the notion of a "center" as the fooal point for
historical consciousness, Dawson does have something to 3ay about centers
of history, especially in relation to Christ, Although Dawson does not
develop the idea, as Tillich does, that every civilization is a quest for
the Christ-center, ha does see various world cultures as differing quests
for God, each opening a new window to heaven.
Every way of life is therefore a potential way to God, since the
life that it seeks is not confined to material satisfaction and
animal activities but reaches out beyond itself toward eternal
life.
As might be expected of a Roman Catholic, Dawson believes that Christianity
fulfills the hidden quests of all religions and is the completion and ful¬
fillment of their groping toward the truth, "Catholicism," ho says, "stands
essentially for a universal order in which every good and every truth of
I " — —
Religion and the Modern State (London: Sheed and Ward, 1936), p. 97*
This notion parallels closely Tillich's idea of the Church as the "bearer of
history" - that group in which history finds its being and meaning,
^The Kingdom of God and History, p. 21)4,
^Religion and Culture (London: Sheed and Ward, I9I48), p.62j Cf. p, 211,
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the natural or the sooisl order can find a placeDawson thus oalls
Christ the "center of history" because he seeiS in him an "event of absolute
p
value and incomparable significance for all times and all people." As
he goes on to say.
Amid the diversity and discontinuity of human civilization and
tradition there appears One Who is the same for all men and all
agesi in Whom all the races and traditions of man find their
common center.3
This "center" keeps history from being a "mere unintallectual chaos ef
disconnected events" and gives history order and unity and significance.^
It is, however, not just a plain significance or meaning that Christ gives
history but a divine significance and an absolute meaning, for in Christ
5
eternity entered time and transformed history in a unique and final way.^
With Tillich, Dawson believes that this unique event divided history into
a period of preparation and reoaption so that, in Christ, history finds its
beginning, center, and end. As a result, says Dawson,
it is natural and appropriate that our traditional Christian history
is framed in a chronological system whioh takes the era of the In¬
carnation as its point of referenoe and reokons its annals backward
and forward from this fixed center.®
The Churoh and World History
Prom this Christ-center, according to Dawson, it becomes possible to
see the history of humanity as an organic unity. As yet, however, there
•^Dawson's preface to MaTitan* s Religion and Culture, p. ix f.j See
also Bnquiriesbto., P. 189j Christianity and the New Age, p. 35# hi f•#
"The Papacy and the New Order," The Dublin Review '(April, 19^)2) p» 111.
^The Kingdom of God and History, p. 203*
^Idem.
^Religion and the Modern State, p. 80j "The Christian View of History,
Blackfriars (July-August, 1951J P« 31^»
^"Th'e Christian View of History, p. 3li+
^Idem.
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is no suoh thing as -world history or the history of humanity as a whole.
Paralleling Tillich's argument that there is so far no common center for
the whole of mankind, Dawson says that there is as yet no common tradition
or unity of oulture which has been able to units humanityThere are,
he says, a number of historical cultures each with its own limited life,
but as yet no universil history. This observation has more than a theo¬
retical significance for Dawson. The failure to s ee this has lead to
repeated attempts to write a universal history each of which has been,
in reality, only the interpretation of one tradition in terms of another.
For Dawson, "history deals with civilizations and cultures rather than
Civilization,with the development of particular societies and not with
p
the progress of Humanity." Further, the failure to realize these limi¬
tations has led to a false internationalism based upon the assumption that
a cosmopolitan civilization already exists. According to Dawson,
There is no such world community md the attempt to by-pass all
existing communities in order to reach an ideal. . . oan only
land in super-totalitarianism.^
Most of these errors may be traced back to the philosophers of history
who attempted to construct a universal history on the basis of a false
rationalistic idealism.^ But regardless of these criticisms, the possibility
*The Age of the Gods (London! John Murray, 1928), p. xvi; The Kingdom
of God and lifstory, pp. ~2U0 f.
The Kingdom of God and History, pp. 200 f.
-'"The Two Currents in the Modern Democratic Tradition" in Demooracy
and Peace (pamphlet) (Lodon: National Peace Council, 19k5)» -----
Although Dawson frequently criticizes Collingwood as a representative
of this rationalistic, idealistic tradition, Collingwood seems auprisingly
to be in essential agreement here with Dawson. Acoording to Collingwood,
there is a "fundamental flaw in the very idea of a universal history - the
fact that it claims a kind of universality which by its very nature history
can never possess. All history is the history of something, something definite
and particular. ..." (The Philosophy of History, p.9l s®s also p.8)
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of b universal history remains for Dawson as a goal and an ideal. With
Tillich, Dawson believes that modorn technology is increasingly bringing
mankind into at least the physical unity of a scientific world civilizat-
ion. Although this has an important part to play in serving to remove
the traditional fixed orders of the old religion-cultures (which were
blocking the advent of a true world civilization), technology alone oen-
2
not create world unity. The only possible basis forworld historical
consciousness, says Dawson, is through cultural unity which involves a
3
unity of tradition and ultimately a unity of faith. "the great world
religions, through their incorporation of various cultural traditions,
have, Dawson believes, been moving in the direction of unity for increasing¬
ly larger sections of mankind.^ The great barrier to the functioning of
this means of world integration, however, is the fierce competition between
the various religions, each of which claims to be absolute and final. The
solution does not lie in religious syncretism (from above)-' but rather
in the coordination (from below) of a number of different oulturel tradit¬
ions in a common religious unity.^ As Dawson sees it, Christianity is
preeminently suited to fcrm the basis for such a unity, for it alone,
•^Religion and Culture, pp. 212 f.
2Ibid., p. 213.
_
Just as a national culture must proceed the creation of a national
State, so international culture must precede the creation of an international
State (Enquiries, eto., p. 575 The Modern Dilemma, p. 18).
^Cf. Tillich's similar comments "T e great world religions, in creat¬
ing world missions, have anticipated thejproblem of a spiritual world unity.
But none of them has been able to bring about this unity so far. It is not
impossible that, in oonneotion with the present religious and cultural cross-
fertilization, movements may develop. . . which would lead to a unity of
cooperation betw.enthe world religions, and later, on this basis to a unity
of symbols and existential truth." ("Approach to World Peace," p. 685.)
^This fails to see the fact that cultural differences, as Dawson
believes, are the real basis for religious differences,
^Religion and Culture, p. 211j Cf. Tillich's similar commenti "the
spiritual ur&ty of mankind is a matter of an existential union of the big
cultural groups on the basis of decisions thsy make for the one ultimate
existential truth." ("Approach to World Peace," p. 685).
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^ 1
amongt he great -world religions, is not tied to any specific civilization#
With Tillich, then, Dawson calls attention to the organic relationship
betwok Christianity and the creation of a world historical consciousness.^
Dawson believes that the advent of a world civilization is
within the divine plan and, in fact, that it can be shown that there has
been a progression toward this goal. The history of humanity (if we may
use this phrase prematurely) shows a progressive evolution toward a greater
and richer group consciousness, a continuous process of integration
moving (though certainly not in a straight line) toward the greater
unity and group consciousness of mankind# This process, he believes, is
not likely to stop until humanity as a whole finds social egression in
3
a common civilization.
Religion and the Modem State, p. xvi; Judgment of the Nations,
p. 152# Dawson recognizes th:.t Judaism is also super-cultural, and so
is speaking here of the common Judeo-Christian culture#
p
fcBoth authors agree that Protestant individualism has failed to
give sufficient attention to this correlation. See The Kingdom of God
and History, pp. 209-211. " .
3̂The Age of the Gods, p. xixj"0n the Development of Sociology in
Relation to the Theory of Progress, " Sociological Review, XIII, 82j




1. Historical Interpretation as a Pressing Neoessity
Although Dawson does not consider the interpretation of
history the supreme question of our age with quite the same urgency as
Tillich, he does believe that this task is an absolute necessity* Several
reasons may be given for this judgment. First, Dawson, with Tillioh,
is aware of the crisis through which our civilization is passing, with
itsdemand for a proper interpretation of its historical antecedents.
"The events of the last few years," he writes, "portend either the end of
human history or a turning point in it. They have warned us in letters
of fire that our civilization has been tried in the balance and found
wanting. • • The threat of total secularization of our culture and
the annihilation of all the great values that have sustained society in
the past make it imperative that we understand how we arrived where we
are in order to know what remedies to apply to our situation. This in
itself is enough to make the interpretation of history of paramount importance.
Again, the interpretation of history is being pressed upon us
through the increasing competition of materialistic and anti-Christian
interpretations of history.
Outside the academic world, new social forces have been at work
which have used history, or a particular version of history, for
social ends, as a means of changing men's lives and aotions. And
the rise of these new political ideologies and ideological theories
of history has shown that the development of scientific specialism
has in no way lessened man's need for an historical faith, an interpre¬
tation of contemporary culture in terms of social process and spiritual
ends. ...
Religion and Culture, p. 215.
2
Religion and the Rise of Wesern Culture (London, Sheed and 'Ward, 195)*
p. 5»
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Dawson has partioularly in mind, of course, the threat of the Communist
interpretation of history and its propagandists force. The clash
between Communism and Christianity is, he believes, the central problem
of our time,and the "point where their contact is closest and their
conflict moat acute" is in their respective philosophies of history,^"
Yet, the very term "philosophy of history" calls to mind
another reason why the interpretation of history is so central a task for
contemporary scholarship, Dawson believes that irreparable harm has been
2
done by the idealistic philosophies of history of the past. Philosophical
idealism (which has affected so much modern thinking about history) went
off the deep end, Dawson believes, in Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling,^ The
consequent disavowal of German idealism has, in tern, caused a reaction
against the philosophy of history in general, so much so that today many
question whether such a thing as a Christian philosophy of history is at
all possible,^ "if we approach the subject from a purely philosophical
point of view,,u4says Dawson, there is a good deal to jusuify such a
scepticism, Dawson therefore sets aside the philosophical approach and
seeks to treat the interpretation of history purely as a theological
problem - in a Jewish, apocalyptic framework rather then a rationalistic,
idealistic one. The Christian view of history, he believes, is a matter
for faith (based on a particular historical tradition) and is not a product
of philosophical refelction, "Hence there is no Christian 'philosophy of
^Religion and the Modern State, p, 72,
2
For this reason, Dawson says "The discontinuous conception of history
is nearer to our won than is the unitary ideal of the liberal philosophy
of history," ("Edward Gibbon: Annual lecture on a Master Mind," British
Adademy Lectures,XX, 19,)
5"On the Meaning of History," in Religion and Life, XIV,p. 32 f,
(Article by Karl Lowith); C.L, Lewis, "Bistorieism," in~The Mondfch (October
1950).
^"The Christian View of History," p, 312.
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history* in the strict sense of the word. There is, indeed, a Christian
history and a Christian theology of history, and it is not too much to
say that without theia there would be no such thing as Christianity."*
Now philosophical idealsm, the parent of the idealistio interpretation
of history, grew up on the soil of German protestantism, and so Protestant¬
ism, Dawson believes, is indirectly responsible for many false historical
interpretations of the past century or so. There is another false interpre¬
tation of history for which Protestantism is responsible, and that is the
view of extreme millenialism. One family of Protestant sects sought to
strip off all the non-Jewish, mystical, and philosophical elements of
Christianity in their emphasis upon the historical time element of apoca-
2
lyptic literature in all its crudity and simplicity. It was this view
that, as secularised, developed into the modern doctrine of progress whioh
"ended in emptying Christianity of all supernatural elements and interpret-
3
ing history as the progressive development of immanent principles."
On the one hand, then. Protestantism produced philosophical
idealism and Socinianism which attempted to separate religion from history
li
and to recover the "pure timeless essenoe of Christianity," On the other
hand, Protestantism gave birth to the millenarian tradition in which an
attempt was made to separate the historioel elements of Christianity from
their philosophical accretions. Both views, Dawson believes,represent
*"The Christian View of History," p. 313•
^The kingdom of God and History, p. 211.
^Ibid., pp. 211 f.
1*
Idem.
^Dawson sees both tendencies more or less combined in Joseph Priestly,
a Socinian who developed a secularized milleniarism (The Kingdom of God
and History, pp. 211 f.)
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extremes which Catholicism has always tried to avoid. The Catholic
interpretation of history sees the uniqueness and particularity of
historical events while at the same time avoiding an extreme millenarian
apooalyptioism. On tho othor hand, Catholicism appreciates the universal
aspects of Christianity (in contrast to anything national, provincial, or
fanatical) while at the same time avoiding the fale universalism of the
Socinians and Originists (who eliminate history in favor of metaphysics)
of
and the idealistic historians who attempt to force history into a rational
pattern. To express it in another way, Catholicism, according to Dawson,
makes allowance both for the discontinuity of history (as seen especially
in the Augustinian dualism between the two cities) and the divine order¬
ing of history into a unified pattern (which, however, is mysterious and
is not rationally discernible). Beoause of this balanced interpretation,
Dawson believes that Catholicism is particularly equipped to make a needed
contribution to the present searoh for a meaningful interpretation of
history.
Nevertheless, Dawson does not develop a philosophy (or theology)
of history in any syfcematic fashion. His judgments on this subjeot appear
only incidentally in the midst of his more conorete analyses of various
religions and cultures and political and sooiologioel problems. It is
impossible, therefore, to construct anything that might be called Dawson's
philosophy of history in a purely theoretical way. Since many of Dawson's
views, however, parallel those of Tillich, it may prove helpful to use
Tillich's structure as a slceleton framework upon which to hang some of
Dawson's ideas. Although it is admittedt hat this is an artificial pro-
ceedure, it will perhaps at least provide a basis for discussing a few of
Dawson's major philosophical and theological observations in reference to
the nature of history.
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The Interpretation of Man
A convenient starting poiAtfor Tillich's analysis, as we
noted,was in his dootrine of man. The proper understanding of history
drove him to the necessity of constructing a more adequate anthropology.
And, conversely, his understanding of the clefts within man's nature
served to throw light on his understanding of history.
Dawson, similarly, states that the interpretation of man
precedsthe interpretation of history, especially in regard to man's
eschatologioal destiny and the creation of a new humanity through
Christ, In regard to the eschatological goal, he says,
If this be the essenoe of the Christian dootrine of man's nature
and destiny, it is dear that it must determine the Christian
conception of history and social order.
Further, with Tillich, Dawson speaks of man's nature as a microcosm
of the universe. He quotes with approval from the Times Literary Supple¬
ment the comment that
The mind of man seems. . . to assimilate itself to the universe;
we belong to the world and the world is mirrored in us. Therefore
when we bend our thoughts on a limited objeot, we concentrate
facilities which are naturally endowed with infinite correspondences
With Tillioh, Dawson sees man's deeper level of consciousnes as a gateway
to an understanding of existence itself as basically spiritual. "Men of
religious experience," he says, "have always taught that the further man
penetrates into the depth of his oonsciousnss and of what lies below his
consciousness fehe nearer he approaches to spiritual reality."^
_
The Judgment of the Nations, p. 89.
2
The Age ofthe Gods, p. xixj also quoted in Enquiries,etc, p. 125.
. . . . . . . -
Religion and Culture, p. Jlj Cf. Tillich, "Two Types of Philosophy
of Religion," p. k and "!vhat is Wrong with the Dialeotioal Theology?", p.
lijO where he speaks of proceeding "through the self beyond the self."
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Dawson, however, has comparatively little of Tillich's
awareness of the clefts in man1® nature, his self-estrangement from the
good and the perfect,* his finite oreaturliness and his necessary in¬
volvement in anxiety, the awful responsibilities of human freedom and the
consequent threat of non-being and meaninglessness# In short, Dawson
has little of the existential motif in his thought. He does, however,
utilize the demonic category in a fashion somewhat comparable to Tillich.
Dawson speaks of spirituL forces (both good and evil) higher than reason
and of forces lmwer than reason (forces of nature) that play upon man
and make human life a "warfare against unknown powers. . . • Following
St. Paul's figure of the "Cosmocrats of the Dark Aeon," Dawson says that
>
man is beseiged by "powers which are more than rational and which make
use of lower things, things below reason, in order to conquer and rule
the world of man."'' With Tillich, Dawson sees the demonic as a neoessary
oategory for expressing the supra-individual power ofevil - the fact that
evil is not just material or "the abstraot generalization of the faults
and weaknesses of individuls" but rather an organized spiritual power.^
Dawson, however, speaks of the demonic primarily in terms of the blind,
sub-rational forces of destruction and the spirit of uncontrollable power 7
rather than in terms of demonic pretention and the claim to unconditional
significance on the part of contingent beings. Nevertheless, as with Tillich,
*Dawson does, however, comment that man's awareness of eternity is
based on the consciousness of his mortality ("The Christian View of History,"
p. 326.).
2Beyond Politios (Hew Yorki Sheed and Ward, 1939), PP* 121 f.
5Ibid., p. 122.
^I'he Judgment of the Nations, p. 102
5;
Religion and the Modern State, p. 11lj The Judgment of the Nations,
pp. 2,5,6.11,
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Dawson considers the demonic a perversion of the good, ft'hen the non-
rational forces of man's make-up are starved or refused legitimate
social expression in an acceptable way (as in mystical emotion), they
turn against society and assume destructive and violent forms (as in
nihilism, sensationalism, and eroticism),"'" Thus, although Dawson does
not go to the extent of Tillioh in analyzing the existential predicament
of man, he is certainly not unaware of the "uncovering of the abyss"
that has taken place in recent decades,
3. The Interpretation of Nature
Although Dawson does not carry out the microcosmic analogy
as a basis for disdosing how the cleft within man's nature is the key to
a deeper understanding both of the predicament and the redemption of
nature and history, he does elaborate dsn idea that leads to similar
dootrinal consequences - that of man as a bridge between the spiritual
2
and the material worlds, Man, he believes, oocupies a unique position
as the lowest of all spiritual natures ad the highest of ell animate
beings. This role places him in a special relationship both to nature
and supernature so that he becomes the point at which the spiritual world
comes into conscious contact with the world of sense,3 Men thus becomes
a potential ch nnel through which the whole material creation may be lifted
into self-oonsoiousness and divine-consciousness. In other words, through
^Progress and Religioni An Historical Bnquirey, (Londoni Sheed and
Ward, l93l)« PP» 228, 230j Christianity and the New Age, p, 1$! "The
Renewal of Civilization," (National Peace Council Pamphlet, London, 19U3),
p. "Sducationtaad ,he Crisis of Christian Culture," (Human Affiirs
Pan^hlet, Chicagoj Regnery, 19U9)» P» k7 •
2"'Ihe Revolt of the Bast and the Catholic Tradition," Dublin Review
(^uly, 1928), pp. 13 f.j Progress and Religion, p. l58j Bnqulries, etc.7511 f.
^Enquiries, etc., p. 319* There is no attempt to draw a parallel
with Tillioh at this particular point, for lillich's idea of the spiritual
world(the ultiiate) is vastlyd ifferent. Dawson here follows Thomistio
supernaturalism whereas Tillich rejects altogether the conoept of a second
realm of being paralleling this one.
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man, the whole material creation is destined to beoome spiritualized
and redeemed
Man W83 created to be the soul of the material world, the link
between the two creations* that through him, as St, Gregory of
Nyssa says, the divine might shine as through a glass into the
earthly world, and the earthly, elevated with the divine, might
be freed from corruptibility, and transfigured.
All of this assumes, of course, that nature now exists in a fallen state
and needs to be redeemed.Dawson does not attempt to analyze the cause
of this situation although, with Tillioh, he seems to think that the
fall of nature is cl sely tied up with the fall of man. He does have
quite a bit to say, however, about man's responsibility for the present
degraded state of nature in many parts of our world. For primitive man,
nature had a religious atmosphere. Primitive agrioulture therefore "was
not a sordid occupation* it was one ofthe supreme mysteries of life" -
a kind of divine liturgy, Man once lived in close contact with the
soil, realizing his interdependence with nature (as Tillioh would put it-
assuming an eros attitudetoward it. Even the scientists of not too distant
decades "sought knowledge for its own sake because knowledge is good. They
regarded nature not as a slave to be mastered, but as a mistress to be
„3
served in a spirit of almost religious reverence. Modern technology
and industrialism, however, have changed all of this. Nature no longer
possess a religious significance, but exists only to be exploited by man.
Nature, aocording to Dawson, has lost its "latent powers"^ and has been
^Enquiries, eto., p, 31+6* See also "Progress and Religion, p, 158 ff,
Roman Caholicism thus has a world-effirming as well as a world-denying
aspect, for it holds that the diviB purpose involves not the destruction
ortlie negation of nature but its completion and fulfillment. The Catholic
position is thus mid-way between oriental asoetism (in which the natural
world is negated) and occidental materialism (in which the spiritual world
is negated). See "The Revolt of the East, etc,", p, li* f,
p
Christianity and the New Age, p. 14)4,
^The Modern Dilemma (London* Sheed and Ward, 1932),p. 87,
Cf, Dawson's idea here with Tillioh's concept of the "power of being."
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made to serve human ends 30 that it "no 1 nger exists except as a part
of the life of raan,"^ But the real tragedy of this situation is that
p
the degradation of nature has led to the enslavement of man. Modern
industrialism has uprooted man from his natural relations to the soil
and herded him into unhealthy cities,3 Through time clocks, efficiency
experts, and conveyor belts man's temp has been accelerated so as to keep
time with the world of the machine rather than with the life of nature,
with its more leisurely cycles. With the upsetting of man's organic
and biological equilibrium, a whole new rhythm of life has been oreated
which, Dawson believes, must finally involve a biological change in
the character of the human raoe itself!^ Worst of all, the mechanization
of nature has resulted in the mechanization of man. The end result of
man's self-affirmation and control over nature is that man is now slip¬
ping back into nature and becoming a part of the great mechanical system
he has created, Dawson believes, therefore, that a profound truth is
expressed in St. haul's intuition that the whols material oreation is
groaning in travail, awaiting its deliverance from corruption and its
share in the liberty of the perfected supernatural order,^
^"Tradition and Inheritance, etc," Part II, p, 13, Dawson's
final appraisal of the role of scienoe and teonhology, however, is far
from negative. See page 8J4 f.
2
Cf. Tillich's view here. Chapter Three.
3 ,
Progress and Religion, p. 68.; "Progress and Decay in Ancient and
Modern Civilisations, Sociological Review (January, 192k) XVI, p. 10.
^Progress and Religion, p. 211.
inquiries, etc., p. 3h5»
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The Interpretation of History
Now this estrangement and quest for redemption that can be
seen in nature is even more apparent, Dawson believes, in thejrealm of
history. With Tillioh, Dawson says that it is "when we look at the
history of mankind in the mass that the evils of human existence are
most apparent,"^for history is full of tyranny and appression, and the
lust for power and pleasure. Dawson's view of history is far from
optimisitic liberalism in which sin and evil are neglected or at least
progressively and automatically overcome. He sees history as a profoundly
tragic process, with diaillus^uonmento, frustrationo, and irrationalities.
Although he does not use Tillich's concept of the "ambiguity of the good"
he notes that every human achievement carries with it the possibility of
2
evil as well as of good, and that evil itself is a progressive force.
As Dawson sees it, nearly every great historical achievement
has had negative consequences and results opposite, from what its designers
had imagined. The Industrial Revolution, for exam^e, has led to slums ,
unemployment, and the mechanization of lifej miracles of science have
only made wars more destructive! colonial expansion has produced hostil¬
ity and racial war; capitalism has led to exploitation and unrest; political
revolution and the quest for freedom have issued in the absolutism of the
modern State.^ There is thus a tragic contradiction between human aims
*inquiries, etc. p. 323*
2
The Judgment of the Nations, p. 2.
-"Dawson's Prefaoe to Maritain's Religion and Culture, xiv fl. j
Christianity and the New Age, p. 16; Beyond Politios, pp. 126 ff.j
"Religion and Mass Civilization* The Problem of the Future," Dublin Review
(January, 19W+) p. 1.
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and historical results# Dawson oould thus easily say with Tillich that
history, too, longs for deliverance and salvation.
But how are man, nature, and history to gain redemption/ We
have already noted that Dawson, with Tillich, believes that the turning
point is in man. The salvation of man, therefore, is the indispenable
prerequisite for the salvation of nature and history. Yet for both
Dawson and Tillich, man is unable through his own resources to redeem
nature and history, let alone himself. Although as a bridge between the
spiritual and material worlds he is endowed with a type of knowledge
that transcends the sensibleworld , he is too closely tied to nature to
1
be able to rise above it and reach the intuition of the divine. It
is impossible for him to free himself from the limitations of nature through
p
human intelligence. The divine Word must therefore come to man "in a form
appropriate to the limitations of his intellectual powers." This, for
Dawson, provides the background for the Incarnation#
5* Christ and the Redemption of Sxistenoe (Man, Nature, and History)
Although Dawson does not use Tillich's concept of the "New
Being," that term adequately expresses the key element in Dawson's
Christology. Dawson's stress, too, is on Christ as the new oreation;
Christ introduces into the world a "new spiritual principle which gradu¬
ally levens and transforms human nature into something new#"^ This
f—
"The Revolt of the Rast, etc.", p# ll*.
^Medieval Religion,(London.t Sheed and Ward, 193i+)» P» 77J "The
Dark Mirror,"JDubiin Review (October, 1930), p. 180 f. Dawson's observat-
ions here ont he limitations of human reason more or less parallel Tillich's.
^"The Christian View of History') p.
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includes for Dawson, as^for Tillich, the insistence that Christ i3 not
simply a moral ideal, a teaoher or prophet, or even simply a thsqphany
or a revelation of God to man out that he is God made man."'' As Dawson
puts it, "In Him God is not only manifested to man but vitally partici-
p
pated." Through Christ a new spiritual principle is introduced into
the world, a new order of life embracing man's total being (body, mind,
3 U
and spirit) in a vital synthesis. This in turn creates a new humanity.
Through Christ, humanity acquires a fresh beginning. Christ's work is
q
thus genatio and creative in an absolute sense.y
The redeit$>tion of humanity is, for Dawson, correlated with
the redemption of nature. For through Christ man's role as the bond between
the material and the spiritual worlds is restored and extended. The new
humanity c eated by Christ is brought into closer relationship with nature
(through realizing its interdependence with nature) and thus becomes a
ohannel for nature's spiritualization. Since this requires a proper
understanding of nature, man's scientific knowledge comes to have a
deoiaive part to play. Dawson's negative judgment upon industry and
technology should not therefore be taken as indioatig a denial of the
importance of the modern scientific achievement. According to Dawson,
the intelleotualization of the material world is a potential vehicle for
the spiritualization of nature. As Dawson sees it, "The organization of the
•''The Kingdom of God and History, p. 203. "The Christian View of History,"
p. 311+| enquiries, etc., p. 327*
Christianity and the New Age, p. 86.
^enquiries, etc.,p. 309*
^Cf. Tillioh's concept of the "oominu ity of the flew Being"
^Bnquiri.s, eto., p, 32?•
^"Revolt of the B»st" etc., p. 12j Christianity and the Hew Age,p. 105.
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material world by science and law which has been the characteristic task
of modern European culture is in no sense alien to the genius of Christi¬
anity. For the progressive intelleotualization of the material world
which is the work of European science is analogous and complementary to the
progressive spiritualization of human nature which is the function of
the Christian religion."*
The redemption of humanity leads on to, and is a constituent
factor in, the redemption of history. In spite of the fact that history
is a tragic process, redeemed man may know, through faith, that there is
a spiritual purpose being fulfilled through historical tragedy, failure,
and suffering, and that the true meaning of it all will someday be reveal¬
ed. Although God's viotory over the eviljforoes in history is not susoeptibl©
to scientific demonstration, the spiritual renewal of man, aocording to
Dawson, has consequences which are in some ways outwardly manifested in
the historical process.
Thus, although we oannot trace in society. . . the clear evidence
of the progressive development of the divine life in mankind, we can
still see in every age new manifestations of the charismatic aotivity
of the Spirit in the Catholic Church. Every age sees the Kingdom
of God conquering fresh territory - the supernatural order more
closely interpenetrating the natural world. Sometimes the conquests
of one age seem to be lost by the next, but this loss is superficial.
The achievement remains to be drawn in and represented as some future
period.
The Church, then, is moving forward ceaselessly and irresistably (though
not visibly or without interruption) toward the more perfect society.
The complete redemption of man, nature, and history, however,
must await the esohaton. Dawson differs from Tillioh at this point in
I 1 "
Progress and Religion, p. 21*75 "The Revolt of the East, Etc., p. ll*.
^Enquiries, etc., p. 3i|i* f.
t
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anticipating a real end to history. The eschaton for him is not just a
transcendent reference point or a symbol for the completed meaning of
history against all fragmentary actualizations.* Still, he does not
become involved in the self-contradiction, agifost which Tillich cautions,
of positing an end in a temporal sense. The end of history, hesays,
"is notf bund in history itself, but arises from the raising of history
2
to a superteanporal plane." In addition, he comments that the end of
history (as well as the beginning and center") transcends history and is
not an historical event in the ordinary sense of the word but rather an
act of "divine creation to which the whole process of history is subordin¬
ate ."3 But although Dawson is more realistic and objective in his
conception of the eschaton, he also makes place for a spiritualized
interpretation of the "end" and of the ooming Kingdom. "For the Christ¬
ian," he says, "the world is always ending, and every historical crisis
is, as itlw ere, a rehearsal for the real thing."^ Mth Newman, he believes
that history is "continually verging on eternity."^ The Kingdom of God,
consequently, must be seensTs both internal and spiritual as well as
6
external and cosmic. Tte awaitArt objective end while at the same time
7
living in that end as it is present, in germ, in history as we know it.'
Dawson thus has more of the apocalyptic note than has Tillich.
^Religion and the Modern State, p. 96.
% —
"The Christian View of History," p. 315*
^Beyond Politics, p. 136.
^Religion and the Modern State, p. 79•
Enquiries, etc., p. 333.
7
Cf. Tillich's "already" and not yet."
186
The ultimate transformation of man, natur§,and history may-
he expressed for Dawson, as with Tillioh, by the phrase "the restorat¬
ion of all things in Christ." Both Tillich and Dawson make a place for
the Neo-Platonic conception of the return of all things to their origin.
Dawson looks forward to the day when, a3 in the words of the Baster liturgy,
"the whole world may experience and see what was fallen raised up, what
had grown old made new, and all things returning to unity through Him from
whom they took their beginning."*
The Modern Dilemma, p. 113. See also The Judgment of the




1. A Definition of Term3
Tha term " culture" has been so bandied about that a definit¬
ion is essential.* For the common man, culture means a sophisticated
appreciation of the "higher things of life." It means going to the
opera, visiting the art galleries, holding a lorgnette to the eye-
the type of activity that produces from the common man a sneer of
contempt.^
By "culture" Dawson means something far different. He
undersfends culture in the anthropoligtcal and sociological sense as the
way of life of a particular people.^ Taken in this sense culture is quite
the opposite of sophistication and refers to the "grass roots" elements
of sooiety, such as family, region, and religion, and to common traditions
and customs which link a people into a living community having a real
continuity with the past.^ Culture in this sense is not an intellectual
T.S. Eliot gives a lucid description of t he misuse of this term
in his Notes Toward the Definition of Culture, p. 1J ff»
atthew Arnold is largely to blame for this state of things in
England, Daw on believes. In attempting to popularise culture he aotually
produced a Philistine reaction because he himself was a "highbrow." In
the past, however, the leaders of sooiety shared a common life with the
peasant. Both were united, says Dawson, in a common allegiance to the Bible
and the Christian tradition which was the oore of the whole culture. (Under¬
standing Europe, p. 250 f •).
awson would say that there is no such thing as culture in general,
but only particular cultures of individual human groups.
k
Dawson, following LePlace, gives full weight to the physical in¬
fluences behind culture such as Place (the geographical factor), Work
(the economic faotr)and People (the genetic factor). But he by no means
falls into materialistic determinism. Beyond theee three factors he empha¬
sizes the place of Thought (the psychological faotor) which includes religion
and the life of the spirit (Age of the Gods, pp. xiii,xxj Progress and
Religion, p. 75)* Culture, he says, has a material substrue&re but it also
"Has a spiritual superstructure which is the real mainspring behind culture
and m-.kas man superior to the animal. Although environment conditions
SUAiUfifoi'c dO0s not oause it I Culture, then, is iieither a purely physicalprocess as spengler would have it nor a purely subjective creation as in
Collingwood (Progress and Religion,pp. bh £•$ k6)»
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abstraction oarried on by the elite but is the way of life boras by
the conmon peopleIt is in the common people and he folk traditions,
says Dawson, that we see the essence of culture. And consequently it is
in the common people that we find the most sublime union of religion and
culture. Now it is this social unit along with its expressions in art,
literature, institutions, and social traditions that forms the spiritual
community whioh Dawson calls a culture. (The term "spiritual oommunity" does
not necessarily mean that the community has to be religious in the ordinary
sense of the word but points to the fact that the community owes its
unity to its common beliefs and ways of thought far more than to any
2
identity of racial type.) Defined in this manner, "oulture" is almost
interchangeable with what is usually meant by the term "civilisation."
"Civilization," however, usually indicates a more conscious and rational¬
ized manifestation as over against the natural, spontaneous, and common way
3
of life we have been describing. The tern "oulture" on the other hand
is a term having a wider connotation than "civilization." It can be
used to describe the way of life bothjof oivilized and uncivilized peoples,
whereas the term "civilization" could not be applied to the society of
uncivilized peoples.^ Further, the term "culture" usual^ includes a large
area incorporating a number of different societies. There are only four
great contemporary cultures in this senses Indian, Chinese, Islamic, and
c
European. It is in these cultural units as wholes that Dawson is particu-
-
Religion end the Rise of Western Culture, p. 268.
■ —•
Religion and Culture, p. I48.
3Ibid., p. Lfl.
^"Christianity and Culture," Dublin Review (April, I9I4I), p.137*
^Enquiries, etc., p. 67.
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larly interested, espeoially their relationship to religion and common
ways of thought around which they have been formed.
It will not be as necessary to give an extensive definition of
religion. 8y "religion" Dawson simply means, firstly, "the belief in
i§he existence of divine or supernatural powers whose nature is mysterious
but which control the world and the life of man" and, secondly, "the
association of these powers with particular men or things, or places,
,,1
or ceremonies. ... Yet, for a full discussion of the religious
aspects of culture, a broader definition is needed. Dawson, like Tillioh,
does not restrict religion to its institutional or objectivied forms but
sees religion as manifested in the whole Of life. Although he does not
use the term "theonomous analysis" he does at times disclose, in Tilliohian
fashion, the basic religious motives operating behind apparently non-
spiritual movements. He sees in the French Revolution, for instance,
2
an essentially religious movement in 3pite of its apparent rationalism,
in totalitarianism a religious attempt to subordinate the whole of life
to a higher, supra-personal end,^ and in modern social planning an un¬
conscious quest for salvation.^ (A variety of these movements will be
discussed in a later chapter.) Also, with Tillich, Dawson sees the style
of a period as a reflection of its true spiritual charaoter. Architecture,
literature, oustoms, and the plastic arts all manifest, to the discerning
eye, the spirit of the age.-' The study of styles provides for Dawson,
^Religion and Culture, p. 5k*
2
Snquiries, etc., p.303.
^Beyond Politics, p. 131.
^The Judgment of the Nations, p. 90•
5
Progress and Deoay in Ancietn and Modern Civilizations," pp. 3
Dawson, like Tillich, sees art as a sensitive barometer of spiritual change
and also comments on the significance of abstract painting ('i'he Modern
Dilemma, p. 101j Snquiries, eto., pp. 70, 83)•
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as with Tillich, an awareness of the spiritual significance of secular
movements and institutions and is part of what we have been describing
as Dawson's broad view of religion.
2. The Relationship Between Religion end Culture
Perhaps it will be necessary first to indioate that there
is a relationship between religion and culture as over against those
who, considering religion as a superficial oultural accretion, deny any
vital relationship between culture and religion, and, on the other hand,
those who believe that religion deals with a transcendent realm that
has nothing to do with culture. Or agei»» might be necessary to
defend the relationship between religion and culture against those who
think that the two are so identical that the term "relation" is inappropri-
. 1
ate.
The first error is perhaps not so popular now as it used to
be. The older sociologists stressed much too exclusively the material
aspects of culture and regarded religion as a late arrival on the soene
(as a oultural by-product). In order to counteract such views, Dawson
emphasizes the fact that religion a&iculture have always been closely
related and demonstrates thatt he further back into history we go the
more olosely w© find religion and culture joined. The two, then, are
organically,dnd not just superficially^ Related,
The second error - that of denying the relationship of religion
an& culture through a religious transcendence - has been dealt with in
1T.S. Sliot, Notes Toward the Definition of Culture, p. 33 •
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regard to the Roman Catholio critioisms of Tillich's views and will also
be discussed further on in this section.
The third error • that of denying the "relationship" of
elements so identical as religion and culture - is perhaps new becoming
more popular in certain circles. T.S, Eliot, for instance, speaks of
religion and culture as, after all, just "different aspects of the same
thingi the culture being, essentially, the incarnation (so to speak) of
the religion of a people."1 The dangers which Dawson sees resulting from
suoh views will be indicated later. This will suffice, however, to call
attention to another extreme equally rejeote.l by Dawson and to establish
the fact that, in his view, religion and culture are at least related.
Now this relationship may be expressed in several different
ways. It may be considered firstly as a relationship of mutual dependence.
Religion, for example, is dependent upon culture for the forms in which
it expresses it self, Dawson is close to Tillich at this point in his idea
2
that rligion canr.ot esoape embodiment in culture and is by nature a
cultural phenomenon. Butjif religion is dependent upon culture, culture is
even more dependent upon religion. It is through religion that culture
attains its foundation, its unity, and its dynamic, "in the last resort,"
3
Dawson says, "every civilization is built on a religious foundation. • • •
A civilization musijhave some vision of reality to give it meaning and
purpose. Without such a vision, a civilization soon perishes. So it is
true, Dawson believes, that
A civilization lives by its faith in its ideals no less than by
its wealth and its material organization.^
10p. cit., p. 31 ff,
^The Kingdom of God and History, p. 202.
^"Religion and Mass Civilization,etc.", p. 5»
^The Modern Dilemma, p. L\2.
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As lie says elsewhere, "the world religions have been the keystones of
the world cultures, so that when they are removed the arch falls and
the building is destroyed."1 By providing a vision of reality, a set
of ideals and purposes, a society's religion is at the very soul of its
culture and may be considered as its true foundation. Again, common
beliefs and attitudes supplied by a common faith make for cultural
unity. Such common ideals and principles are indispensable, for if a
society makes no moral or spiritual appeal to the loyalty of its mem-
O
bers, it must inevitably disintegrate. Besides providing a foundation
for culture and a center of unity, religion also serves as a great cultur¬
al dynamic.^ By virtue of its transcendence and Its judgment upon culture,
religion provides a fruitful tension in life between the ideal and its
realization which ever beckons culture onward and upward.
Throughout the history of humanity the religious impulse has been
always and everywhere present as one of the great permanent forces
that make and alter man's destiny.^
All of these observations serve to underscore the mutual dependency of
culture and religion.
The relationship of religion and culture can also be expressed
as one of mutual conditioning. Sociologists, it seems, never tire of
calling attention to the conditioning of religions by the cultures in
which they appear. Share is, as Dawson admits, the religion of the
peasant, the religion of the warrior, the religion of the city dweller -
^eli/don and Culture, p. 22.
2
The Mod8m Dilemma, p. 9^.
3Dawson recognizes that religion al30 has a conservative function,
but believes that the dynamic element is primary and has been far too much
neglected.
%he A~a of the Gods, p. 22.
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each, with its own characteristics reflecting an adaptation to its par¬
ticular environment."'" Dawson does not disparage the study of cultural
influences upon religion and in fact declares that no particular religion
can "be fully understood apart from these factors. Tet he insists that
this is not the isfoole truth. If religion is conditioned by culture,
culture is even more conditioned by religion. In fact, culture mi^it
be described as a deliberate effort to bring society into line with the
higher ways of life made known through religion. Ehus religion has a
profound influence upon the whole of life, and even an other-worldly
religion has its cultural manifestations.'' She impact of religion
upon culture is dramatically seen in those instances when a culture has
taken on a new faith and has had its most basic institutions thereby
transformed as in the case of the transformation of ancient civilizations
by Christianity or of the pagans of Arabia by Islam. The change in the
basic conception of reality carried with it a change in the whole charac¬
ter of the culture in question. She interaction of religion and culture,
then, is reciprocal: "the way of life influences the religion and the
religious attitude influences the way of life.#**
Dawson's primary interest, however, is in calling attention
to the effects of religion upon culture. He is particularly eager to
correct the views of those sociologists and anthropologists who regard
religion as an obstacle that has to be removed before culture can really
come into its own. Religion ia not, for Dawson, a leech that saps the
Religion and Culture, p. 57.
2Iblfl., p. U9.
"Villich makes the same observation (See Chanter Four).
U
Religion and Culture. p. 57.
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energy of culture but is actually its most dynam c force and increases
its creative energy. In Ms various books, Dawson shows in detail how
religion has been the motivating force behind nearly all of the basic
cultural achievements of the centuri -a. Agriculture, for instance,
probably began in the cult of natural fertility and was a result of the
ritual imitation of the processes of nature in devoition to the Great
Mother goddess The domestication of animals originated in the neces-
2
sity of keeping sacred animals for ritual sacrifices. In both cases,
the utilitarian development was a secondary consequence. Likewise the
rise of cities can be traced to religious origins, for as agriculture
grew up around the shrines to the Mother Goddesses, these shrines became
economic centers of Temple Cities, which lie at the roots of the develop¬
ment of all the early high civilizations."^ (Similarly, the monasteries
of the Middle Ages became centers around which cities grew and were the
mainsprings of the whole community life .^5 The calendar also arose as
a liturgical necessity, for the religious rite3 had to be ordered to
conform to the pattern of the seasons and the movements of heavenly
bodies.^ She careful observation of the movements of the planets by the
Babylonians led to the idea of a fixed cosmic order and, says Dawson,
became one of the foundations of modern science.^ Iriting, as the name
hieroglyphics implies, arose as sacred symbolism and the making of books
7
and the consequent compiling of libraries were sacred occupations. The
lThe Age of, the Go43,, p. 105> Progress and Religion, pp. 107 ff ,113 f.
p
She Age of the Gods, p. 107-
^Ibid., p• 112.
Beligjan and the Rise of "v; stern Culture, p. 57*
c
-'Progress and Religion, p. 113; Age of the Gods, pp. 112, 151.
The Age of the Gods. p. I35.
^Ibid.. pp. 112, I32.
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temple libraries and schools were the first centers of literary life and
education (as were the monastic schools of the Christian era) Without
the leisure provided by positions on these tennis staffs, the develop¬
ment of intellectual life and science might have been postponed for
P
centuries. Social institutions, too, such as the family, marriage,
and kinship all have a religious background, especially the instution
of Kingship and the codification of Law. In primitive societies, the
King was not so much the political ruler as he was the priest and religi¬
ous head of his people.^ In many societies, the city-temple was the "law
court and supreme source of jurisdiction, and men brought their wrongs
and their disputes before 'the throne of God.'Other miscellaneous
achievements such as art and handicrafts,^ music and the dance,^ poetry,^
the use of metals and engineering (necessary for the construction of temple
g
towers or for irrigation projects as in Babylon) might be mentioned in
passing as further examples of the way in which religion has been the
driving force behind nearly every major cultural development.
She creative power of religion is especially manifest in the
Q
effects of Christianity upon European life. Many of these influences
will be traced in detail in the next chapter- Some specific features not
treated there, however, may be briefly mentioned- She rise of modern trad©
"^The Ass of the Gods, p. I32.
2ibia.. p. 112.
^Eroareas and Bali-ion, pp. 110 f.
The A^e of the Gods, p. 128.
^Erogroas and Religion, p. 72; The Age of the Gods, p. 150.





vDawson .regards Christianity as -the chief source of the Suropean
dynamic (The Judgment of the Rations. p. 15? Christianity and the Hew Age.
P. 93*0
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and commerce, for instance, probably began with the pilgrimage routes
which, says Dawson, more or less preceded the trade routes.'1' -And per¬
haps the first awakening of world-consciousness was not in the secular
explorers, but in the ambassadorial journeys of Priars of the Middle
Ages to Egyvt and Mongolia.2 In fact, world exploration itself was
closely connected with religious motives, as is seen in Prince Henry the
Navigator whose exploration was devoted to religious ideals.-' ibid in
the imperialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, missionary
and monopolistic motives intermingled. Men even as late as David living-
stone felt that the expansion of European trade was one factor in the
k
extension of Christendom. The influence of Christianity can also be seen
in the origin of modern craft guilds which trace their line of decent
directly back to the religious confraternity - an association under the
5
protection of a saint. Illustrations such as these could be elaborated
ad infinitum from Dawson's writings, but these will serve to demonstrate
the way Dawson shows how religion has moulded culture through the ages.
ft.
The Ideal Relationship of Culture to Religion
Having traced the interactions between religion and culture we
may now turn to the more constructive question of Dawson's conception of
the ideal relationship between the two. There are, Dawson maintains, only
g
three possible relationships: the rejection of culture, the acceptance of
^Religion and the Rise of Western Culture, pp. 203, 260. Cf. lewis
Muraford, The Condition of Man (p. 160): "Just as trade in the nineteenth
century followed the flag, from the thirteenth century on it followed the
cross."
^Religion and the Rise of Western Culture, p. 260.
p. 267.
^Understanding Europe, p. 150.
^Religion and the Rise of Western Culture, p. 203.
^In contradistinction to Richard Neibuhr's five-fold classification
of the possible relationships in his book Christ and Culture (See Dawson's
review of this book in Religion and Life (Spring, 1952), p. 299)
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culture, and a qualified acceptance and rejection of culture. We shall
consider then in this order.
Firstly, as to the rejation of culture by religion, it is
obvious that Dawson disapproves. This he considers as a typical defect,
especially in the Lutheran tradition which stresses the extreme tran¬
scendence of God, leading to a denial of the world and a consequent
X
separation of religion and culture. This Lutheran dualism, Dawson
believes, has its counterpart in the separation of faith and works.
For Dawson, religion and culture, like faith and works, are organically
related. The transcendent spiritual claims of religion, then, must not
be taken to imply a denial of the limited and historically conditioned
2
values of culture.
The separation of religion and culture is, according to Dawson,
fatal to both elements. Culture separated from religion loses its
social significance and is in danger of becoming "highbrow." If culture
is only, as in popular usage, an intellectual abstraction, it possesses
absolutely no power of restoring or transforming the life of society.^
jfeut religion separated from culture is equally impoverished. It is, says
Dawson, like a soul without a body. For its very being, religion must
Tillich criticizes Lutheran!am on these same grounds, as we
saw. Dawson recognizes, however, that there is also world-affirmation
in Latheranlsn (See The Judgment of the Nations. pp. 28 ff.).
2
The emphasis upon extreme transcendence 1ms historically led to
sectarianism, Dawson notes. This may be an important reason for Dawson's
rejection of the separation of religion and culture.
^"The Crisis of Christian Culture: Education" in Our Culture (V.A.
Denant, ed.) (London: Socie^ty for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge,
19^7). P. 36.
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embody itself in vital and living cultural expressions.
Dawson's attitude toward the rejeotion of oulture by religion
was, as we pointed out, not very different from what we might expeot.
His position toward the full acceptance of culture by religion, how¬
ever, may surprise us. A superficial reading of his Gifford leotures
might give the impression that Dawson over-stresses the concordance of
religion and culture and fails to maintain a proper religious transcend¬
ence. Although he does put the emphasis upon the fusion of religion
and culture in these books, he also cautions about the necessity of
aohieving a proper balance between the acceptance and rejection of
culture by religion. And in both earlier and later writings, the ten-
2
sion between religion end culture is even more explicitly pronounced.
Dawson believes that the complete identification of religion
and culture is as fatal to both elements as is their complete separation.
When religion becomes at one with its oulture it becomes tied to a limited
social order, loses its spiritual character, ard becomes secularized. And
—
Dawson, however, is not entirely without sympanthy for the religious
rejeotion of culture and reoognizes that there are situations, as in the
early Church, when it is absolutely necessary for the living elements to
separate themselves from the decaying culture. Yet he maintains that our
situation today is different and that, sinoe our civilization is still
basically Christian, Christians cannot stand by and allow it to disinte¬
grate. They must continually seek to penetrate the oulture - even the
modern mass civilization that is coming into being - in order to give it
spiritual aims, Further, Dawson believes that the attitude of withdrawal
and hostitlity in our time can only lead to the complete extinction of
religion. For the modern mass State has at its disposal new techniques
of sujugating the will from within so that martyrdom is losing its prac¬
tical effectiveness (See "Concordats or Catacombs?", p. 909l nIt Shall
Not Happen Here," p. rj).
o
^See Dawson's reviews of books by Latourette and R.H. Niebuhr.
Dawson's analysis of the importance of the great Religion-Cultures of the
past in which religion and oulture were completely fused is misleading.
He does not propose such a complete identification as an ideal for our
time (See Religion and Culture, pp. 206-208).
^Religion and Culture, p. 206.
r
199
when culture "becones completely identified with religion it becomes
static, rigid, and lifeless. No longer judged by a religion which
stands above it, it loses the attraction of the ideal. Yflien all its
forms have become complete religious expressions, the free, experimntal
development of new cultural forms is discouraged and restricted.1 Time
and again Dawson draws attention to the Syzantine synthesis as an example
of the disintegration which results through a complete fusion of religion
2
with culture. For the sake of its own vitality, a culture must not
regard its achievements and values as possessing a universal or absolute
3
significance. This temptation applies not only to religion-cultures
but as well to secular cultures such as our own. Any culture which
attributes finality to its own way of life is in danger of falling
into the fixed mould of a Lgczantine civilization.
Religion, for its part, must maintain its transcendence above
culture and must, as Newman insisted, continually be at war with the
h
world. It must not acquiesce in some facile synthesis of religion with
the prevailing ideology. This would be paramount to a compromise of its
principles. Dawson seeks constantly to retain the dualism between the
city of God and the city of earth (or of man). The two are in unceasing
conflict and, although they mingle with one another in the institutions
of this world, they are separated from one another by an infinite spiritual
gulf and will ultimately be separated at the Last Judgaent.^ With Maritain
■'•See the discussion on the following pages of the place of autono¬
mous forms-
gThe Making of Buroue (An Introduction into the History of European
Unity) (London: Sheed and lard, 193^)> P* 18b- f; Progress and Religion. l60f.
•^Religion and Culture, p. 209♦ ^The Modern Dilemma, p. Ill•
•'"The Christian View of History," pp. 3^7 Enquiries, etc.. p. 2bl;
The Modem Dilemma, n. I09. The conflict between the two cities assumes
different forms through the centuries. The early Christian conflict between
Church and world, for instance, later became a conflict between Opposing
forces within the Christian society (Religion m-.n the Mao o-r Culture,
p• 146; The Kingdom of God and History, pp. 206 f.)
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and Lofccrurette, Dawson insists that Christianity must retain its tran-
1
scendence over culture as much as its transcendence over nationality.
Christianity must, in other words, he suparcultural as well as super-
national.
How ver completely a culture aay seem to he dominated by religion,
there remains a fundamental dualism between the order of culture
which is part of the order of nature and the principle of faith
which transcends the natural order and finds its center outside
the world of nan.^
As over against T.S. Eliot's too facile identification of religion and
culture, Dawson insists that the more religious a religion is, the more
it asserts its otherness.Nevertheless, Dawson maintains that this
element of distance or separation should not be taken to indicate that
a religion thus witholds its support and transforming power from a
culture. On the contrary, just as the judgaent of self-centeredness in
an individual is not opposed to the development of his personality, so
the judgment of a transcendent religion is not opposed to the develop¬
ment of a culture. It is, in fact, a major element in the healthy
survival of that culture. The ideal relationship between religion and
oulture, then, is neither the complete rejetion nor the complete accept¬
ance of culture by religion but rather a qualified acceptance and reject¬
ion in which both complete separation and complete fusion are equally
avoided.^ (Actually, says Dawson, it is difficult to find a culture
•*-The Modern Dilemma, p. 32.
2"Mr. T.S. Eliot on the Meaning of Culture," The Month (March, l$kS)
I. 155-
^Ideta.
It may be questioned, however, if Dawson always remembers this
principle himself, especially in relation to Catholic culture. He speaks
for instance of the "tradition of sacred culture which it has been the
mission of the Church tc nourish and preserve•" ("The Crisis of Christ¬
ian Culture: Education," p. U9, italics mine).
^Dawson's review of E.H. Niebuhr's Christ and Culture in Religion
and Idfe (Spring, 1952) p. 299-
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which does not fail at one extreme or the other. It is, of course, a
delicate balance and when it is achieved, as in the Middle Ages, it is
usually short-lived.)
She necessary tension between religion and culture that
Dawson recommends definitely should n*t be understood as an ontologieal
dualism. Bis contrast of Christianity and culture parallels, for Dawson,
the Hew Testament distinctions between flesh (as an evil principle) and
the spirit (that dwells in the bodily temple) or between the "world"
as a kingdom of darkness and the world as an object of redemption.*
Distinction between these spheres is essential whereas complete sepa¬
ration (as in ontological dualism) is heretical. The world, then, must
be "both renounced and remade."2 Christianity must seek to penetrate
its culture in the very act of standing apart from it in judgment.
The goal toward which we must work, then, is neither separation
of religion and culture nor their identification, but rather synthesis
Bat since the term synthesis tends to connote the idea of fusion, perhaps
the best teem (and one that Dawson frequently uses) is "vital collaboration" -
a collaboration in which the secular becomes consecrated to the sacred and
in which man's life in every direction becomes "guided and informed by the
spirit of religious faith.The mission of the Church, then, becomes that
of finding a social means of expressing this religious spirit so that the
world may be transformed through "bringing every side of human existence
^Dawson's review of B.H. Miebuhr's Christ and Culture, p. 300.
2Ibld-, p. 301
^V.A. Demant illustrates the ideal relationship of religion and
culture as that of marriage as over against hermaphrodism (fustion) and
separation, or divorce. (Personal conversation with Dsmant, December, 1951.)
''"Mr. T.S. Eliot on th.8 Meaning of Culture," p. I55.
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nwri every hawan activity into contact with the sources of supernatural
life.1
Whan this ideal is fulfilled and religion "becomes the very
center of things and the mainspring of the whole social life, it mast
not seel: to dominate every form of expression from without "but rather
to inspire from within, Any proper synthesis of religion and culture
must acknowledge the autonomous values of the given culture. This,
Dawson believes, is the true Biblical position. He uoints out that in
the Old Testament secular history and secular culture have a place in
God's plan as seen in the role of Gyrus and of the heathen nations as
2
instruments of God's purposes. And in the How Testament there is, he
believes, a still further recognition of a limited but intrinsic value
ascribed to the social order and social traditions that lie outside the
dispensation of grace? Augastine, he notes, rightly carries cn this
view in maintaining that the earthly city has a place in the universal
order and that the social virtues of the world have a real value of
their own. Dawson even seems to go so far as to approve of Dante's idea
that the temporal city should be regarded as "an autonomous order with
its own supreme end, which is not the service of the Church but the
4
realization of all the natural potentialities of human culture."7 On the
basis of this view, Dante speaks of the messianic role of the Italian
^•"Concordats or Catacombs?" p. 9^0
^"The Christian View of History," p. 3I6.
3ghe Kingdom of Ofld and History, p. 206.
h
"The Christian View of History," p. 321. Dante's radical difference
from St« Thomas at this point is apparent. Still, as Dawson points out,
his idea of the correlation between the secular tradtion of the Roman
Empire and the sacred tradition of the Church has its parallel in the
Thciaistic concordance of nature and grace. (See: The Kingdom of God and
History, p. 209.)
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people aa an instrument in the achievement of the goal of history, which
is a universal society made one throu^i the political unification of
humanity in a single world state. Ihis part of Dante's thought Dawson
rejects, for he comments that Dante's idea of the State as a secularized
imitation of ecclesiastical univsrsalism led directly to modern ideali¬
zations of the State and the consequent decline of the Church's prestige.
Nevertheless, Dawson does seen to approvo of Dante's appreciation of the
independent value and significance of secular culture. ItewsOtt's final
word, however, is that "while Catholicism recognizes the distinction and
the autonomy of the natural and supernatural orders, it can never ac-
2
quiesce in their segregation." Jill of life, he believes, is intended
to participate in the eternal and, as he says, "there is not the smallest
event in human life and social history but possesses an eternal and
spiritual significance. "3
H. Cultural Polarity
She relationship we have been examining between religion and
culture might be called "dialectical" even though Dawson does not use the
terra in this connection. He does, however, frequently speak of the
polarity between religion and culture. All of life, according to Dawson,
is a series of polar contrasts which form the very structure and dynamics
of culture. He speaks of the "polarity and duality of culture" as "an
example of that universal rhythm of life which finds its most striking
expression in the division of the sexes-Oils conflict of opposing
1»The Christian View of History," p. 323.
^Dawson's introduction to Mori tain's Religion and Culture, u.ix.
'Ihe Judgment of the Nations, p. 121
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historical poles naturally leads to abuses and all varieties of tragedy.
nevertheless, Dawson maintains that
If we condemn the principle of diversity or polarity in history,
and demand an abstract uniform civilization which will obviate the
risk of wars and religious schism, we are offending against life
in the same way as though we condemned, the division of the sexes
. . . because it leads to immorality.
Without the contrasts of oppositea, which are at the roots of historical
creativity, life would become a dead-level uniformity. The proper appre¬
hension of the polar structures of life, then, is important not only for
understanding the relationship between religion and culture but as well
for understanding the relationship between various polar elements within
culture, of which religion is but one.
The opposing forces in society usually cluster around the
O
poles of race, religion, or nationality - or sometimes a combination of
two or three of these forces. An example of the polarity of races within
the same culture is found in the case of the lonians against the Dorians
of ancient Greece. Conservative Anglicanism as over against Non-Conformity
in eighteenth century England illustrates the polarity of two religious
forces within the same culture The combination of both racial and
religious elements involving also the polarity of national sentiment is
seen in the opposition between the Celtic Catholics of Ireland and the
Anglo-Saxon Protestants of England. Social tensions such as these
frequently lead to destructive ends but, once restrained within a higher
synthesis, often become the most creative forces in history. The European
1Bie Juctment of the Nations, p. 121.
2It should be apparent that in this context we are thinking of
religion not in its transcendence as an element standing over against
culture, but in its sociological form as an element within culture.
^Religion and Culture, p. 202; The Judgement of the Nations, p. 121.
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achievement, for instance, "rests on the vital tension that exists
between a number of different racial elements that are held together by
the dynamic attraction of a common cultural aim.
At the very center of the process of cultural creativity,
however,stands the process of contrast, struggle, and fusion which
results from the influx of new elements into an established culture.
The pressure of foreign influences coming into a culture and demanding
incorporation into the old synthesis serves to destroy that synthesis
and press toward the creation of a new one. Such external influences,
says Dawson, are at the heart of the whole process of cultural change
and are the source of practically all of the sudden flowerings of culture
2
that history records.
These outside influences may be of many sorts: intellectual,
religious, or racial. The first type may be seen in the impact of
Sestern thought upon Russia during the past century issuing in a remark¬
able renaissance of literature (Tolstoy, Dostoevski, ejt.gl).^ The second
type - the creative force of a new religion coming into a culture from
without- may take two forms. A religion may come into a culture that
is already fully formed, as with Islam entering Persia. Or it may enter
a culture which is still in the process of formation, becoming a con¬
stituent element in the creation of that culture - a process seen at its
best in the effect of Christianity upon the formation of 5)urope.^ Usually,
—
j ——
"Interracial cooperation as a factor in Duropeaa Culture,"
(Rome: Reale Accadamia D'Italia Pamphlet, 1933). P« 3*
S£he Age of the Gods, p. xvi ffDawson makes his major criticism
of Spengler at this point. Spangler, failing to see the importance of
cultural interpsnetration, imagin s that culture is a physical organism
which, like a tree, blossoms and decays as a self-contained unit.
3understanding lurcme, p. 10$.
^The next chapter will deal more fully with this develoiTaent.
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however, the new influences come throu#i a third channels the invasion,
either bellicose or peaceful, of a new people. Such invasions make
necessary a radical process of racial fusion and social adaptation.
But whatever may be the method of cultural fertilization, the infiltrat¬
ion of foreign, elements is the key element in Dawson's analysis of the
process of cultural growth.
5• Cultural Cycles
Can any over-all pattern be discerned in these continuous
movements of cultural polarity and interaction? Dawson attempts to show
that there is such a design and that this pattern takes a cyclical funa.1
Every great civilization, he believes, tends to go through three succeed¬
ing periods which he labels as follows; 1) Growth, 2) Progress, and 3)
2
Maturity.
The first period (the period of Growth) is, we might say, the
period of childhood when the civilization is dominated by a synthesis
it has achieved from the previous (parent) civilisation. (One of Dawson's
main points here is the fact that the decline or death of a civilization
is not the end of its influence. Its great achievements of thought and
religion are passed on and become the fertilising principle of a new age.)
"^Dawson's perception of an historical pattern should not be con¬
fused with philosophical idealism's attempt to trace the pattern of the
"Idea mirroring itself in the history of the world" (Hegel). Dawson's
approach is sociological! he traces the general tendencies of the social
organism as a whole and arrives at his conclusions through the concrete
study of historical and social forces. (See Progress and Religion, p. h6.)
This survey is drawn largely from Dawson's chapter in Enquiries
entitled "Qycles of Civilization" written in 1922. Shis paper ewes its
interest chiefly to the fact that it was written before Dawson's acquaint¬
ance with Spongier's Per Pintergang des Abmidlands3.
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Daring this period of growth, the youthful culture is content to remain
under the sway of the older inherited synthesis, although it doco express
its unity of purpose in creative flowerings of culture from tine to time.
Eventually, however, new forces within the culture begin to break through
the barriers. The child, we might say, becomes an adolescent who is
no longer content to remain within parental bonds. He wants to assert
himself and discover the world* This brings us, then, to the second
period - the period of progress. As the old synthesis loses its hold,
the culture turns to external influences. It rejects the traditional
guidance from the past and strikes out on new paths. The heritage of the
parent culture is abandoned in favor of self-expression and individualism.
Occidental elements, such as activism, extroversion, and world-affirmation
prevail. 411 of this sudden progress coupled with the dissolution of the
old synthesis produces a state of chaos and spiritual anarchy. The living
elements of the culture, consequently, are driven toward the desire for
the maturity of a new synthesis. The third period, the period of Maturity,
takes place when the achievements and n w developments of the adolescent
period1 (the period of Progress) axe fully assimilated, coordinated, and
harmonized with the values and traditions of the past. This new synthesis,
Dawson remarks, is often attained only on the eve of the material decline
2
of the civilization. Yet even though the synthesis is often short-lived,
it is of tremendous importance. It marks the creation of a Beligion-
Culture, an age of social and internal unification. The period of Maturity,
Although Dawson does not use this term, it seems an appropriate
designation for the characteristics of this second period.
2Bnaulries, p. J2. There were only eighteen years, for instance,
between the closing of the pagan temples by Theodosius and the first
attack on Rome by the barbarians. (Religion and the Rise of Eastern
Culture. p. 28.)
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then, is more peaceful and serene than the adolescent period and is a
time in which oriental elements such as introversion and asceticism pre¬
dominate over the occidental onesShis period, however, should not be
misunderstood as a negative period - an era of petrifaction and death,
2
as Spenglsr would have it. It is rather a tine when the civilization is
most open to external influences and has the possibility of syncretizing
diverse elements. And the power of such a Religion-Culture is all out
of proportion to the prosperity or transience of the civilization that
produced it. When the latter declines and disappears, the synthesis
that has been achieved is, as we saw earlier, passed on to a new people
and becomes the seed of a new social order. Shis observation, then,
brings us back to the beginning of the cycle.
The complete cycle of Growth, Progress, and Maturity comprises
what Dawson calls a World AgeThere have been three such ages in the
history of the world, each lasting roughly a thousand to fifteen-hundred
U
years and we are now in the midst of a fourth. The first age was the
age of the early .Egyptian and Babylonian civilizations and the second, the
age of the late Egyptian and Minoan cultures. The third age was the age
of the Ancient World from the ri3e of the Assyrian Empire and the Homeric
period throu^i the rise and fall of the Roman Empire. Each of the socie¬
ties living during any one of these ages experienced parallel movements of
^Enquiries. etc., p• 77.
^Progress and Religion, pp. 41 f.
^Dawson calls attention to his dependency upon Vico at this point.
Vico distinguished between what he called The Age of the Gods (the source
of the title for one of Dawson's books), The Age of the Heroes, and fhe
Age of Men. Vico, however, failed to realize the important part played
by the Religion-Culture of the final period (.Enquiries, etc., p. 74).
^Dawson comments that the remarkable similarity in the duration of
cultural cycles may be due to the fact that the process of racial fusion
and cultural assimilation requires a "fixed number of generations in which
to work itself out" ("Progress and Decay,etc.",p7; Rrogress and Religion.-n.6o).
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Growth, Progress, and Maturity. Dawson traces the details of these
cycles in reference to the civilizations of India, China, Islam, etc.
1
as well as to Europe. The fourth age. in the midst of which we ars now
living, also evidences a similar cyclical tendency. It began with the
fertilisation of the daughter culture (the embryonic Christian Europe
of A.D. 500-750) by the parent culture (the Christian Empire of the
Patristic-zantine age ). It had its period of Growth and the accompany¬
ing flowerings of culture (based on the inherited synthesis) in the Caroling-
ian Bnpire and in the Middle Ages. The Henaissance, Reformation, En-
li^itenement» Industrial Revolution, and Era of World-Discovery comprise
its Adolescent period (or period of Progress). How our civilisation is
in an intermediate period, perhaps tending toward a new synthesis and
certainly in quest of it. Whether or not our age will culminate in a
great Religion-Culture, as did the three previous World Ages, remains
to be seen. If this does come about, it will not be the result of any
mechanically-determined historical "laws." For Dawson there are no
2
such deterministic structures. The periods of Growth, Progress, and
Maturity are not stages through which every civilization must necessarily
pass but are only tendencies (although, indeed, having remarkable consist¬
encies). China and Islam, for instance, have had no adolescent period
paralleling that of Western civilization.^ A new synthesis for our
civilization, then, remains an open possibility. She likelihood of such
a synthesis will be discussed more fully in the next chapter, following
an analysis of the historical background of the present world crisis
in terms of the principles discussed in this chapter.
^"See Dawson^ elaborate chart of the parallel movements in the
various vTorld civilizations in Enquiries, etc., facing page .
^Religion and the Modern State, pp. SI f.
^Enquiries, etc., p. 73*
210
CHAPTER EX, EVER
THE SOURCE AND SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT WORLD CRISIS
Dawson has much more than just an antiquarian interest in
the past. Like Tillich, he is keenly aware of living at a great turn¬
ing point in history. Our civilization, he believes, is going throxxgh
a period of great trial and testing, a veritable "Judgment of the Nations."
In order to meet the uresent crisis and know what remedies to apply, w®
must, he feels, properly understand it. And in order to understand any
situation, we must know something about its historical roots. "It is
only by understanding our past that we shall ever be able to recover
our inheritance in the future."*
This i3 especially true in reference to the complicated problems
of modern Europe. Dawson is particularly interested in the European
problem and, through his intensive study of the various periods of
European history, is particularly qualified to speak about Europe's
p
present needs. Europe, he feels is a microcosm of the world situation
and is thus the key to the whole problem of social reconstruction for
our time. It was in Europe that the world crisis originated and achieved
its most acute form, and it is Europe, he believes, that possesses the
greatest resources for dealing with the problems involved in this crisis-
Economic and political leadership may be passing from Europe to younger
lands; nevertheless, the European problem remains central and a solution
of the European problem would carry with it the solution to the world
Dawson's review of Ramsey and Harvey's Small Houses of the Late
Georgian Period (Sociological Review. January, 1924, XVI, p. J&.)
^Although primarily interested in Europe, Dawson shows a remark¬
able acquaintance with other civilizations. See esxxeifcally Enquiries.etc.
pp. 79-9^. 12S-I3S, 159 ff.
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problem. These problems, as already indicated, cannot be met and conquered
unless they are tharou^ily understood in the light of their antecedents.
Therefore, Dawson argues, the understanding of the European past is of
utmost importance for "it is only by understanding Europe that we can
understand what is happening to the world.
Dawson, as we have already noted, is somewhat of a dialectician
in his approach and discerns various polar processes at work in the
history of culture. Since this approach offers the closest parallel to
2
Tillich's construction, an attempt will be made to bring into relief
these particular elements of his thought. This chapter, then, will
center on the major polar forces which Dawson sees at work in the creation
and dissolution of the medieval synthesis.
A. She Creation of Europe
For our purposes we shall consider Europe as beginning with
the coming of Christianity to Greece. Dawson recognizes, of course,
the existence of cultures on European soil long before this event and
has a good deal to say about pre-Christian cultures of the Latin and
Greek worlds as well as about the pre-Mstorle cultures of Europe ?Still
he believes that Europe did not really become an entity until the Christian
era and that it is Christianity that has made Europe a cultural unity.
Europe, he argues, is not a geographical or physical unity. It is not a
^Dhderstanding Europe, p. 1SJ.
2Dawson, how ver, emphasizes a social rather than an ontological
polarity.
3Dawson sees the development even in the prehistoric period as a
polar process. The foundation of ancient Europe, he says, was created by
the interaction and combination of two elements! the neolithic peasant
culture of central Europe and the metal-using culture of the Mediterranean
in contact with the near East. (Age of the gods, pp. 60, I69 ff.)
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continent at all but rather a peninsular extension off the great land
mass of Asia. And its unity is not a racial one, for there have always
been diverse stocks populating it. She real force ^diich pulled Europe
together and made it a self-conscious unity was a religion coming in from
the outside and from the cultural fringes. It was Christianity and the
Church that made "Europe" possible and it was only by entering the
society of the Church that the various people comprising the European
synthesis came to acquire a common culture and tradition. Thus, if
we wish to point to one event which more than any other marks the foundation
of Europe, it would be the journey of St- Banl from Troy to Macedonia
in A.D > 49 • In this event Paul "brought to Europe the seed of a new
life which was ultimately destined to create a new world-
For thio reason, the understanding of Buropecn history demands
abofe all an understanding and appreciation of the Christian faith which
made Europe what it is.^ Vihat Dawson says of religion in general is
all the more true of Christianity in relation to Europe - that "Religion
is the k8y of hi story. "V7e cannot," he goes on to say, "understand the
inner form of a society unless we understand its religion."**
1. Three .basic Polarities
The penetration of Europe by Christianity is an example of that
process already noted of an outside religion coming into a growing
culture and becoming an important element in the development of that
•^Religion and the Rise of Western Culture, p. 2U.
^Roman Catholics, Dawson believes, have the best vantage point for
understanding Europe's past because of their living continuity with that
past. The Monastic movement, for instance, serves as a living bridge
by which the mind can travel back to the Middle Ages (The Making of
Europe, p. xviii).




culture. This process can best be seen as a three-fold one involving
1) Christianity coming into Hellenic civilisation* 2) Hellenic Christianity
mingling with the Roman civilisation, and 3) the transmission of latin
Christianity to the barbarians of northern Europe. Each of these facets
will now be discussed in detail.
The debt that Europe owes to Greece is immeasurable• From the
Greeks has been derived all that is distinctively Western (as opposed to
oriental) in the traditions of European science, art, philosophy, liter. -
ture, and political thought• "Apart from Hellenism, European civilization
and even the European idea of man would be inconceivable." But the debt
that Europe owes to the Christian Church for preserving and transmitting
this Hellenic tradition is equally as great. Apart from the Church,
these great achievements may never have become an inherent part of
European culture. The Christian Church came irfto Greece at a time
when Hellenic culture was in decline and was responsible for taking over
and preserving the best of its tradition. It was, in fact, through the
Church that Hellenism "saved its soul" and became transmitted to future
generations. Although the Church was for several centuries hostile to
the Classical tradition, it gradually assimilated it and used it in the
formation of a new Christian culture. This mutual penetration of Hellen¬
ism and Christianity "has left a profound mark on our culture, and their
mutual influence and interpanetration has enriched the Western mind in a
way that no single tradition, however great, could have done by itself."
^"The Making of Euroue. p. U.
?Ibid.. p. 60.
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Rome also had a great part to play in the preservation of
Hellenic ideals and it was perhaps more from Latin than from Greek
sources that Stiropean Christianity derived its Hellenic traditions.
Rome's great achievement was more thai :of transmission than of origi¬
nation. Its place in the maropeen development was to serve as a bridge
between the Hellenic last and the rising culture of the Korth and West.
The Roman roads, the Roman peace, and the Roman cities all played a
major part in the diffusion of Christianity to the barbarians. The Roman
walls at the outskirts of the 2apire, 3ays Dawson, "were the shields
which protected the west-ward advance of the classical Mediterranean
culture."* Dawson approvingly quotes Brudentius as saying,
Thi3 is the meaning of all the victories and triumphs of the
Roman Siapire: the Roman peace has prepared the way for the
coming of Christ.
The intermingling of Christian and Latin traditions produced a process
of creative interaction and interpenetration similar to that which occur¬
red in the meeting of Christianity and Hellenism. It was from the
Roman tradition that Latin Christianity got its organizational genius
and its specific forms of law and justice which so profoundly affected
the later canonical developments Further, the influence of the Roman
tradition was especially widespread through its heritage of the Latin
language which was to become the "sacred" language of the Church and the
foundation of the literatures and vernacular cultures of the North
If we were dealing, however, with the most conspicuous flowering
of Christian culture for the moment we would have to look to the Greek
^Understanding Europe, p. 29
gThe Making of iiuroue, p. 29
3phdgrstanding Durone, pp. 29 f.
^"Huxopean Literature and the Latin Middle Ages," The Dublin Review
(January, 1950). P« 3^*
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world. Latin Christianity was poor and barbaric as compared to the
simultaneous flourishing of culture in such centers of the Hellenic
world as Alexandria, Athens, and intioch. For the time being, the eastern
expansion of Christianity was far more rapid and impressive, but in its
importance for the succeeding centuries and the development of Western
civilization, Latin Christianity and its movement out into the barbarian
world proved ultimately of greater consequence. The expansion of this
tradition, therefore, will occupy our major attention.
Upon the collapse of the Roman Empire in the third and fourth
centuries, Christianity again served as a transmitter of the best of the
classical traditions. The Church, under Constantino, had already begun
to gain prestige and power. During the succeeding decades its status
grew until, upon the fall of the Empire, the Church stood unchallenged
as the only real basis for social unity. For the Church was not entangled
with the civic institutions of the Roman-Hellenic urban culture. It could
therefore survive the disintegration of that culture and a&ant itself
1
more readily to the new social conditions. As people began more and more
to look to the Church for leadership, the Church increasingly found it¬
self in the position of being the creator of the new organs of culture.
Just as Rome had been the intermediary between Hellenism and the West,
the Church now became the intermediary between the Latin West and the
2
barbaric Horth.
Rut as the Gospel v/as moving out on the Roman roods, barbarism
was moving in. The final victory, however, was not with the forces of
darkness. Rarbarianisn may have conquered the Smpir , but the religion
"Edward Gibbonpp. 22f.
^Understanding Euroioe. p. 30.
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of the Ikapire ultimately conquered the barbarians. This victory over
the barbarians, Dawson remarks, was no simple uniform process of advance
and conquest, but was interrupted by successive waves of barbarian advances
from the North and from the East, principally in the ninth century. The
clash between the Church and the barbarians took the form, in the early
centuries of the Dark Ages, of a crude conflict of opposing forces. The
Church was out to conver the barbarians and the barbarians were out to
destroy the Church and the Bapire. The conflict is perhaus seen in its
sharpest form in the ethical dualism between the ideals of the barbaric
warrior and those of the Christian monk. Each had his separate standard,
and the vices of the warrior were the virtues of the monk and the virtues
of the monk were the vices of the warrior. It was a conflict between
two spiritual worlds- Cm. the one side was the cult of war, violence,
heroism, and aggression; on the other side was the peace society of the
Church with its renunciation and asceticism. The resulting tension created
an atmosphere of eschatological dualism between the present world and the
world to coiae.^ The final victory of the monies over the barbarians was
not achieved, Dawson insists, through the success of any sort of civiliz¬
ing mission. The monks had no such intention. They came bearing a mes¬
sage of divine judgment and salvation, day civilizing results were defini-
k
tely by-products. In fact, the great impression of Christianity upon
the barbarians seems to have been made net through the teaching of any
new doctrines but through the manifestation of a new power. The saints
^•IJhderstanding; Europe, pp. 31 f.
^The Making of Burone. p. 287.
^Religion and the Rise of Western Culture, pp. 33 ff.
^Dawson does not, of course, minimize the important role the monks
played in keeping alive the torch of learning and the traditions of higher
culture during the Dark Ages. He does comment, however, that this role is
rather ironic, for monasticism really began as a withdrawal from culture.
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and. their miracles play a decisive part here. Although the atmosphere
of many of the miracle-legends seems utterly alien to Christianity as
we know it today, we must remember, Dawson cautions, that the Church was
confronting the barbarian mind and that
In such a world religion was able to maintain its power only by
the awe inspired by its supernatural prestige and the spiritual
violence it opposed to the physical violence of barbarism. 2
But as the barbarians became Christian, Christianity tended to take on
barbaric elements- Much that is unacceptable in medieval Catholicism
is due, Dawson believes, to these barbaric elements and is not necessar¬
ily a part of Catholicism or of Christianity as such.
Dawson speaks of the transformation from barbarism to Christianity
as a transform ticn, in Freudian terms, from the to the Super-Ego. In
pagan barbarism there was, he reasons, no individual consciousness of
guilt or personal responsibility. Guilt was associated with the cult and
religion centered in "an instinctive homage to the dark underground of
the Id." Christianity, however, brought a whole new mentality centering
in a conscious moral faith demanding conformity to the standards of
spiritual, perfection - an emphasis, in other words, on the Super-Ego.
This transition, Dawson says, is at the roots of the whole Western
development and is the real source of the moral activism of Western
society.
The victory of Christianity over babarism vhet^er it be described
in psychological or sociological terms, was of decisive influence for the
whole future of Europe. The young peoples of the North, through the
acceptance of Christianity, acquired a new culture and a new soul. The most
vital thing in the whole medieval development, Dawson believes "was not
^Reli.dcn and the Bise of Western Culture, p. 31
Understanding Europe, p. 15.
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the conversion of the Empire and the union of Church and State, but the
gradual penetration of culture by the Christian tradition*until that
tradition embraced the whole of the life of Western man in all its his¬
toric diversity and left no human aotivity and no sooial tradition un-
consecrated•
2, The Carolingian Synthesis
Perhaps the most momentous single step toward the establish¬
ment of suoh a tradition whieh would "embrace the whole of life" was the
Carolingian Synthesis. Prior to the time of Charlemagne, the two great
forces of medieval life (barbarian and Christian) had clustered about
separate poles. In proportion as the Papacy grew in power and prestige,
the Christian peoples of the West increasingly found their ptinoiple of
organisation in the Roman curia. The barbaric peoples, at the same time,
were finding their prinoiple of organization in the German monarchies.
As a result, the Dark Ages were characterized by a struggle between these
two powers - the Germanic Empire and the Papacy. But this dualism was
not permanent. Through the missionary activities of the Northumbrian
monks, especially Alcuin of York and St. Boniface, the barbarians of
northeastern France and northwestern Germany were converted to the Chris¬
tian faith and an alliance was formed between the Frankish Kingdoms and
the Papaoy. This achievement was dramatically symbolized by the crowning
of Pepin as the King of the Franks by St. Boniface in A.D. 752, and marks
the foundation of what was later to become the Carolingian Empire. This
alliance was later reinforced by the crowning of Charlemagne by the Pope
at Rome in A.D. 800.
•4lhe Kingdom of God and History, p. 206.
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■Sie aim of the Carolingian rulers was to establish a Christian
theocracy - a latin Christian erapirs - in which Christianity along with
the classical tradition could be diffused to the peoples of Western
Europe and serve as a bond of union between diverse peoples. Although
the experiment lasted for less than a century, it marked, according to
Dawson, a "true renaissance and the starting point of Western culture as
a conscious unity.Regardless of the fact that it collapsed later
under barbarian attacks, it marked the organic union of the Latin and
Germanic traditions and the cooperation of both elements in a common
social unity. And it succeeded in establishing a commonwealth of Christian
peoples which served as the basis of the whole medieval development.
throughout the Middle Ages, the Carolingian synthesis served
as an ideal which was repeatedly sought in various political oxperiements.
An attempt was made to revive it und-^r German hegemony by Otto I and his
successors in the tenth century, at a time when the H0rth was again brought
back into contact with the Mediterranean world. The guiding idea of the
German emperors was to establish a commonwealth of Christian peoples governed
by the independent authorities of King and Rope. Although thi3 was never
fully realized in practice, it preserved, like the Carolingian synthesis,
"a kind of ideal existence like that of a Platonic form, which was con¬
tinually seeking to attain material realization in the life of medieval
2
society." Tims, regardless of the external failure and instability of
P
these syntheses of Latin and Germanic elements in the political experi¬
ments of the Prankish, Caxolingian, and Germanic empires, two polar
elements were brou#it together whose interaction and fusion were, Dawson
believes, largely responsible for the great creativity of the Middle Ages.
Like flint and steel, they lighted a conflagration which spread from one
^Religion and the Rise of Bestern Culture. t>. 71-
p
The Making of Europe. p. 2S2.
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end of .Europe to the other. For in the eleventh century, Western
civilization began to eapand from its Carolingian nucleus in all directions
so that during the next three or four centuries "it transformed Europe from
a barbarian hinterland into a center of world culture which equalled the
older oriental civilizations in power and wealth and surpassed them in
creative energy."1
The results of this mutual interaction of barbaric and Latin
(Christian) elements is visible in nearly every cultural expression of
the age. Their meeting and blending produced an especially creative flower¬
ing of culture in northern France. Three social expressions of this
synthesis stand out conspicuously: Knighthood, the Crusades, and Ohri-stian
Christian Kingship. The medieval institution of Knighthood represents
in a dramatic way the fusion of barbaric and Christian elements, for the
knight was essentially a barbaric warrior inspired by Christian ideals.
Through. Christian chivalry, the aggressive instincts of the barbaric
peoples were sublimated and brought into the service of God and the
p
Church. The knight was a consecrated person and, when he died on the
field of battle, was not just a "hero" but also a "martyr" for the faith.
St. Louis provides us with the classical example of this type. The in¬
stitution of knighthood was closely connected with the crusades which
represent in even more striking manner how the war-lilce energies of
feudal culture were turned from civil war toward external enemies threat¬
ening the life of Christendom, such as the Moslems. The crusades, Dawson
believes, represent the most successful attempt of the Church to Christian¬
ize medieval society in its most vital but least Christian aspect.^ Through
•^Uhderstanding Europe, p. 33.
^Medieval Beliedon, pp. 105 ff«
^"Medieval Christianity" in Studies in Comparative Religion.
E.C. Messenger, ed. (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1935) 3.
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the idealism of the Church, wax took on a more honorable character and
warriors were sworn to the protection of non-combatants and to the
observation of the "Trace of God" and the "Pteace of God-" And finally,
the synthesis of the Christian and barbaric elements is seen in the
institution of Christian Kingship. Kingship as it has been known in
Western Civilisation is primarily based on the barbaric pattern of the
priest-king who was not so much a law-giver as he was the symbolic repre¬
sentation of his people - the hierophant of a sacred tradition.'1' In the
consecration of Pepin, for instance, the barbaric King had conferred upon
him a new sacred character which was to serve as a model for nearly all
2
the later doropean sovereigns. The earlier dualism represented by two
sharply contrasted types of rulers (the war-king and the peace-king) was
now overcome and henceforth the kings of the Western tradition were to
be more of a mixed type representing both elements of the Carolingian
synthesis. Perhaps the greatest literary expression of this whole social
transforraation is found in the chanson de geste. - the feudal epics origina-
3
ting in northern Prance,
As a result of the centuries of interaction and fusion of the
Christian and barbaric elements, the former sharp dualism between the two
k
poles was transformed into an internal, psychological tension. Both
elements came to be represented in the same class,or even in the same family,
5
producing at once both knights and monks. As we have indicated, Dawson
^•Religion and the Bise of Western Culture, pp. 78 ff.
p
For the inflp.ence of this development upon the British conception of
Kingship, see Dawson's essay "On the Coronation of an S&glish King," in
Beyond Bolitics, pp. 9frll5»
^Religion and the Rise of Western Culture, p . 1J2 ff.
^Ibid.. pp. 180 f.
^Ibia.. pp. 180 ff.
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that this tension underlying medieval culture was the source of most of
the creative heights it reached. As long as the barbaric impulses were
mastered and held in check by Christian ideals, they were a source of
great energy and vitality.
Sit the synthesis of Latin and Barbaric elements in medieval
chivalry may itself be regarded as one pole in still another polarity -
that between the Christian chivalry (of northern Prance) and the secular
chivalry (of sourthern Prance). The crusades had brought the Christian
knights into contact with the older oriental traditions of the Moslem
and Byzantine worlds. The Moslem civilization itself, having reached
the western mediterranean during the late Dark Ages, had produced in
Spain and southern Prance a new secular type of chivalry centered in
the cult of woman and romantic love and expressing itself in an extraor¬
dinary flowering of music and peetry. In its gay and exotic love of life,
its cult of hedonism, and itslstress on wealth and beauty, it served as
1
somewhat of an anti-crusade. It became, in fact, anti-clerical and
gave birth to the Albigensian heresy. Through the crusades and the drive
to stamp out the Albigensian heresy, the Christian chivalry of the North
came into contact with the secular chivalry (and courtly culture) of the
South, particularly in Brovence. But, as with the other polarities of
medieval culture, the initial conflict and opposition gradually gave way to
interpenetration and fusion. The feudal warrior class of the North gradu¬
ally took over the courtly manners of the South so that, in spite of its
secular character, Provencal culture had a civilizaing influence on a wide
2
area of European life. The attempt to bring both elements together in a
^Medieval Religion, pp. I07 f, 126 f.j Religion and the Rise of
stern Culture, up. 105 *"» IJO ff., 186 f.
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vital syntehsis is sesn in the cycle of Arthurian legends dealing with
the knight Lancelot and his quest for the holy grail. But most dramati¬
cally we see the two elements blending in the life of that greatest of
2
medieval heroes, St. Francis. Here, says Dawson, we see the best elements
of courtly culture de-secular!zed and spiritualized. In St. Francis the
gay troubadour of the courts becomes the joyful servant of the Lord -
"God's troubadour." Although Provencal culture was not strong enough
c
physically or morally to withstand the crusader's attacks, its influence
spread from one end of Europe to the other and left a lasting mark unon
3
European culture and literature.
The fusion of Christian and courtly (Islamic) cultures is one
aspect of the second great polarity underlying the medieval synthesis -
that between the oriental and occidental elements. One aspect of this is
the recovery of the Greek scientific tradition through contact with the
Moslem world of the western mediterranean. Hellenic science was the one
important element left out of the heritage of Greece taken over by
Christianity in the early centuries of the Christian era. Dawson tiies
to show lv»w this was really the fault of the Romans and not of the
Christians for, as he says, the Greek tradition which Christianity
received was largely that which had previously been assimilated by the
Romans.** During the Hellenic period of Roman culture, the Latin rhetor¬
icians, in their one-sided emphasis on the literary tradition, never
evidenced much interest in assimilating Greek scientific thought. Con¬
sequently, says Dawson, "the true responsibility for the failure of
^Religion and the Rise of Western Culture, pp. 1S6 f.; Medieval
Religion, pp. Ill f.
2
Religion and the Rise of Western Culture, up. 186 f.
^Dawson credits the art of the troubadours as being the starting
point of modern European literature (Medieval Religion, p. 128).
k „
The Making of Europe, p. 61.
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medieval eulture to preserve the inheritance of Greek science rests not
1
on the church, hut on the rhetoricians." Hellenic science, however, had
teaa preserved during these centuries by the Arabs and, through contact
with the Moslem world in its far western flank on the mediterranean basin,
this thought (colored ofCourse by the medium of its transmission) made
its way into medieval culture. The re-discovery of Aristotle was especi¬
ally of decisive importance for the medieval development. For Aristotelian-
ism with its antipathy to ths doctrines of creation, immortality, and
personal deity came as an intrusion into the balanced system that had
2
already been achieved. This clash of ideas consequently produced a ferment
of new thinking. In the ensuing conflict, Aristotelianism was banned from
the universities and its adherents excommunicated. Bat finally, in Aquinas,
an attempt was made to assimilate this new thought and bring it into corre¬
lation with the truths of Christian revelation. Thus the recovery of
Hellenic science (made possible through the interaction of Christian and
Moslem cultures) had an important part to play in the development of the
medieval synthesis.
The crusades also biought medieval culture into renewed contact
with the Byzantine woria. Baring the Bark Ages, the Papacy had under¬
gone a gradual process of reorientation from the Byzantine East to the
Germanic Nortk. The establishment of the Carolingian Empire ,for instance,
was one important event serving to turn the gaze of Western Christendom
away from its old ties with the East. Upon the decline of that Snpire,
the Soman pontiff stepped more and more into a position of authority and
leadership,^ and Byzantine spirituality gradually lost its appeal. Bat
^The Making of Europe, p. 60.
^Medieval Beljgioh. pp. 69 f-
^As might be expected, Dawson stresses the fact that "the new position
of social hegemony in Western Europe that the Papacy acquired at this period
was thrust upon it from without rather than assumed by its own initiative"
(The Making of Europe, p. 261+).
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through the opening of new channels of trade and communication and thought
(during the crusades) the Byzantine tradition vras agaii brought into relation
■with oooidental thought. Through such trading centers as Venice, Ravenna,
Salerno, and Naples, Byzantinism gained a new foothold in European life.
The assimilation of elements of Byzantine and oriental spirituality was,
Dawson believes, of basic importance for the medieval achievement. And
conversely the dissolution of this oriental-occidental polarity in the
later Middle -Ages led, as we shall see, to an impoverishment from which
Western civilization has never quite recovered.
Still another polarity which helps to round out the picture of
the social processes underlying the medieval synthesis is the interaction
between Eastern and Western Europe. During the greater part of the Middle
Ages, many of the "nations" of Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Lithuania,
and part3 of Russia and the Bulkans) shared in the common life of medieval
1
Christendom. These peoples, Dnwson believes, are therefore no less Euro¬
pean than those of Western Europe and the failure to realize this has led
to various false raoial theories of the past centuries (Pan-Germanism, Pan-
Slavism, Pan-Turanianism) which have contributed directly to the world wars
2
of our century end their chaotic aftermath. Eastern and western Europe,
Dawson insists, are "not rival representatives of conflicting traditions of
culture but members one of anotherDawson has little to say about the
specific results of this process of interaction between eastern and western
Europe during the Middle Ages. He does comment, however, that the mutual >
enrichment of each tradition through cultural interpenetration was tragically
lost through the Mongol and Turkish invasions of the Middle Ages, and, in our
time, through the ereetion of the Communist "wall of partition."^
^•"Christian Culture in Eastern Europe," Dublin Review, Spring, 1950»"p«18»
^Dawson's Preface to Haleoki's Limits and Divisions of European History,
p. ix. *
^Ibxd., p. x f.
^Understanding Europe, p. 81*.
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In summary, the great achievement of the Dark Ages consists
essentially in the transmission by the Church of the best of the Hellenic-
Latin tradition to the barbaric peoples of the North. The great achieve¬
ment of the Middle Ages, on the other hand, was the synthesis of these
various strands (along with Moslem and ifcrzantine elements) and the encorpo-
ration of the peoples of eastern and western Burope into one spiritual
community.
3. The Medieval Synthesis
The chief characteristic of the Middle Ages was its unity of
spirit. The Carolingian ideal of Christendom as a social unity was at
last in process of being realised, although now the primary expression
of the unity was not the Ikardre, as in the Carolingian system, but rather
the Church."*■ The underlying dualism of Christianity and barbarism and of t
the Church against the world which had characterized the previous centuries
had been transcended. The Church no longer took a hostile attitude toward
secular culture but had learned how to use the forms of secular culture
to the glory of God.
But this achievement of unity of spirit was not due just to the
conqu-st of the barbarians and the Christian!zation of life or to the
fact that Christianity had become the established and accepted religion.
2
It was due above all to the influence of Aristotelian philosophy.
Aristotle had taught that Reason is the cosmic principle that is active
in the symmetrical arrangement of the natural and social life as well as
in the ordering of the heavens. In this emphasis upon the basic harmony
of the universe, the conflict between nature and grace, reason and faith
was transcended. Reason cane to be seen as a spiritual principle not in-
^"Uaderstanding Bupope. p. 53.
2
Religion and the Rise of Western Culture. pp. 210 f.
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congruous with faith but rather an anticipation of it- Season, it was
now thought, could provide a type of knowledge which is confirmed and
developed by revelation.* Thus, although the medieval synthesis sought
to retain the distinctions between reason and faith, nature and grace,
the world and the Church, it stressed the essential harmony and concord¬
ance of these spheres. The whole medieval system, inspired by .Aristotelian
philosophical, ethical, and sociological principles, was based on the idea
of a systematically arranged hierarchy of spiritual substance from reason
up to divinity. Aristotelianism thus provided an idealogy for the
"complex corporative development of medieval society in which every rellgi-
2
ous and social function finds its autonomous organic expression. . . ."
The chief operating idea characterizing the age as a whole was the pro¬
gressive incorporation of the different levels of society into one great
divine order. As a result, says Dawson, "nowhere else in the history
of mankind can we see such a mighty stream of intellectual and moral
effort directed through so many channels to a single end."-^
This singleness of purpose manifested itself in a remarkable
flowering of culture which gives this age perhaps a greater claim for
k
the title Benaissance than that of the fourteenth century. Mankind was
one great society and the organic unity of religion and culture was
everywhere visible. Nearly every aspect of life was given a religious
significance from the trade guilds and the communes to the universities.
Philosophy and literature were dedicated to the medieval ideal. Above all,
the gothic cathedral symbolized the great spiritual achievement of the age.
Although a complete and final synthesis was not attained, there has never
Religion and the Bise of Western Culture, pp 210 f.; Medieval Be11gjon
PP- 77 f-
2Ibid.. p. 211.
^"The Crisis of Christian Culture; Siducation," p. 37.
k
"Medieval Christianity," p. .
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■been an age, Dawson says
in which Christianity attained so complete a cultural expression
as in the thirteenth century. Europe has seen nn greater Christian
hero than Sf Francis, no greater Christian philosopher than St.
Thomas, no greater poet than Dante, perhaps even no greater Chris¬
tian ruler than St. Louis.1
B. The Disintegration of Europe
Beneath this great unity and completeness of system achieved
in the Middle Ages was, as we have noted, a network of polar tensions.
The new covered these as in a palimpsest, but the new was never quite
able to efface the old. Now it was these very tensions between the old
and the new (particularly in the Latin-nordic polarity) which were the
source of medieval creativity. Nevertheless, the source of vitality
was at the same time a source of disruption - as a crater from which
destructive forces might at any moment erupt.
The two chief dangers which constantly threatened to disrupt
the medieval synthesis,were 1) the complete fusion of polar elements,and
2
2) their complete separation. If the first had ever been accomplished,
it would have amounted to an obliteration of the original creative forces.
The underlying diversities and polarities witli"the European culture were,
as we have seen, the very fountainhead of Europe's creativity. The over¬
coming of these dualisms through the complete fusion of diverse elements
would have meant the blocking of European creativity at its source. Now
medieval Christendom, especially in its quest for theocracy, strove for
this kind of complete unity. Fortunately for Europe, however, a complete
synthesis was never achieved. If it had been, medieval Christendom would
have become a closed system, static, lifeless, and non-progressive, such
as we see in the oriental and Byzantine worlds. And the next step after
the complete fusion of Religion and Culture, according to Dawson, is
Medieval Religion, p. 119•
p
■"•This discussion, it is apparent, is a concrete application of the
principles set forth in the previous chapter.
229
secularization. When no line is kept between the sacred and the secular,
the secular soon comes to control the sacred as we see so well in
^rzantine theocracy.
The other danger (which ultimately proved a more substantial
threat to the medieval synthesis) was the pulling apart of the elements
comprising the synthesis. This disintegration, as might be expected,
could take two different forms. In reference to the Christian-barbaric
polarity, for instance, the barbaric elements could pull auart from the
synthesis refusing any longer to be subservient to the social unity.*
The Christian elements, on the other hand, fearing too complete an
identification with the existing culture, could pull apart from the syn¬
thesis and become more transcendent. Both trends can be seen running all
through the Middle Ages.
The medieval synthesis depended, then, uuon a delicate balance
between complete identification and complete separation of the polar
elements. As long as the various elements could be held together in
tension, the society remained healthy. When the balance finally was
upset, it was through a combination of both threats, .
1. The Dissolution of the Medieval Synthesis
The danger of a complete identification of religion and culture
and the consequent secularization of life was the earliest temptation
medieval culture had to face. Dawson calls attention time and again to
the various reforming movements of the Middle Ages which attempted to
keep this from happening. "The real age of Reformation," he writes, "was
not the sixteenth century but the whole later medieval period from the
eleventh century onward." Dawson is, for a Roman Catholic, unusually
aware of the evils in the medieval Church and of the pressing need for
^"Dawson notes that there is a general tendency for the submerged
barbaric elements to reassert themselves. It happened in the case of
Rome and in modern Germany as well as in the Middle Ages.
^Medieval Religion, p. 191.
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reform. Although the scandals and abuses within the Church were not chrono¬
logically limited, there are two periods in medieval Christendom which
were particularly hazardous to its spiritual life: the first in the tenth
century and the second in the fifteenth century. Both periods, Dawson
1
comments, were characterized by a flourishing of secular culture. In
the earlier period, it was the crusades and the opening of n w trade
routes which brought with it a new influx of secularism. This spirit soon
permeated the whole of culture. Moral laxity, avarice, and unchastity
were widespread. Bishops and arch-bishops had their mistresses and wasted
2
their episcopal revenues on frivolous entertainments. Even the mon¬
asteries succumbed to these evils, and finally the Papacy itself became
so morally bankrupt that the French bishops were openly declaring that
the Papacy as the embodiment of the anti-Christ.^ As in the later period,
the reforms came from the Horth but they did not, as in the fifteenth
century, turn against the Papacy at this time. In fact, one of the
reforming French bishops himself became the Pope. Henceforward, for the
next two or three centuries, the Papacy itself became the champion of
reform and the natural leader of all those dissatisfied with the moral
decadence of the times. major reform, it should be understood, was
not so much directed against moral laxity as it was against the seculari¬
zation of the Church which had taken place through the seizure of ecclesi¬
astical authority, property, and offices by secular rulers. The wealth
of the churches and monasteries, it is to be admitted, provided a great
temptation for plunder and appropriation.41" Such activities led in many
cases to the secular control of ecclesiastical appointments and to all
^The Making of -Burot>e« t). 278.
2Ibld.. p. 272.
3ibia.. p. 27s.
^•'Medieval Christianity," p. 16.
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kinds of abuses, especially among the Germanic prince-bishons. It was
against these practices that the Reforming movements of the Middle Ages,
under the leadership of the Franciscans, primarily fought. The most
important single aspect of the whole period was the two-or three-century
long struggle between the fiapire and the Papacy over the rights of the State
in the appointment of ecclesiastical offices and the control of the
episcopacy (the "Investiture controversy"). Through the persistence of
its reformers, the Church finally won and grew in international nrestige
in proportion as the flapire declined in prestige. But the heightened
position and power of the Church was, ironically, a source of new tempta¬
tions in the abuses of power and wealth. As an international organization,
the Church increasingly made use of the temporal means At its disposal
to extend its ^ower through Papal taxes and revenues.Soon the Friars
themselves, who had been the spearhead of the reforming movement .became
"subordinate to the demands of ecclesiastical power politics. . . In
addition, the tremendous international power of the Church was a temptation
for the secular powers to try to conquer and dominate it. The success
of this attempt is seen in the Avignon captivity in which the Papacy,
according to Dawson, reached its lowest depths and lost its international
prestige.
The charismatic aspect of the Papacy fell into the background,
and Avignon came to be regarded simply as the center Gf a vast
bureaucratic and fiscal organization which was governed by finan¬
cial rather than spiritual motives.3
The spiritually sensitive, such as St. Bernard, attacked these abuses with
a feeling of an impending crisis and judgaent, and many, like Joachim of
Flora turned to apocalyptic speculations. Dante in his Divine Comedy
^Religion and the Rise of Western Culture, p. 256.
2Ibid.. p. 262.
^Medieval Religion. p. 191.
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classically expresses this revolutionary criticism of the Church in the
spirit of the Franciscans and Joachimites. The Franciscan movement it¬
self was split within over the question of lax as over against strict
1
observances and could no longer back the Papacy in its drive for reform-
Henceforward the reforming movements began to abandon the Papacy, looking
increasingly to the secular powers for aid in the fight against the evils
in the Church, sometimes allying themselves with definite national movements
(as did the .Hussites in Bohemia). Some of these movements became increas¬
ingly anti-Papal and were in danger of turning anti-Catholic. From this
time on, the line becomes increasingly difficult to draw between those
reforms inside and these outside the Church - between genuine reform and
heresy. It is, says Dawson, the delicate line between Wycliff and Langland,
p
between St. Francis and the Waldensians. The spiritual Franciscans
were sometimes on one side of the line and sometimes on the other. The
whole situation demanded the utmost skill cf the Papacy in order to know
when to auply techniques of repression and when to be discreet and
■?
tolerant.
The second wave of secularization, the Renaissance of the fif¬
teenth century, presented even greater temptations to the Church. The
rebirth of secular culture coincided with an even more complete loss of
opposition between the Church ana the world. The Church of Renaissance
Italy had entered into a whole-hearted acceptance of the new humanist
culture which, according to Dawson, "stretched the medieval synthesis
to its breaking point.Even the Papacy, now deserted by the reformers,
became inextricably absorbed in humanist culture. The Curia, says Dawson,
was thronged with "bright young men" who "regarded the whole medieval
^Medieval Religion, p. 53*
2Ibid.. p. 191.
3Religion and the Rise of Western Cultuee .-p. 25U ff.
The Modern Dilemma, p. IO9.
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development as an unfortunate episode that was best forgotten and who
looked back to pagan antiquity with romantic enthusiasm.Meanwhile,
the last great reforming activity, the Concilar movement, was proving
ineffective because "it based its action on a kind of ecclesiastical
constitutionalism which was inconsistent with the divine authority of
the Holy See."2 Through the combination of secularism, political "captiv¬
ity" of the Church, heresy, nationalistic movements, anti-Papal reforms,
and ecclesiastical power politics, the last two centuries of the Mid&4e
Ages saw the gradual disintegration of the unity that so laboriously had
been built up.
The sisteenth-eentury Protestant Reformation, then, is seen
by Dawson not as a sudden event bait as the culmination of a long process
in which the various elements of the medieval synthesis had been pulling
apart. One of Dawson's most interesting analyses is that in which he
describes the Renaissance and the Reformation as two aspects of a single
movement of disintegration: the breaking up of the old Carolingian synthesis
which had brought together Christian and barbaric (Latin and nordic)
elements - sourthern Europe and northern Europe.
The Renaissance represents the breaking of the synthesis in,
we might say, its southern hemisphere. It was the peculiar reaction of
the Latin peoples to the thrill of recovering their lost traditions and
th8 glory of their ancient past. Though in its origin it was not hostile
to Christianity (and was, in fact, a product of the desire for spiritual
renewal) it soon became a purely secular movement.3 It was also prompted
^"Medieval Christianity," p. 13
2Ibid-. pp. 12 f.
3christianit.v and the Hew Age, p. 95, Religion and the Rise of
Western Culture, p. 9* The Judgment of the Nations, p. JO. With Tillich,
Dawson belives that the Renaissance was much more than a discovery of
pagan antiquity. Both say that the author of the discovery was Christian
man.
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in uart by a nationalistic reaction to the barbaric, gothic culture of
the North. The Italians felt that their own native culture had been too
long sacrificed to the tuaiversalism of Christendom. They were becoming
aware again of their own higher traditions which could be tapped and
asserted once more against the encroadhments of the less civilized culture
of the rest of Christendom. The return to classical tradition, therefore,
was not just a scholarly interest in the dead past, but a truly national
awakening. The desire for new life for Italy thus expressed itself in a
mystical type of patriotism.
The Reformation, on the other hand, represents the splitting
off of the northern hemisphere from the medieval synthesis. It marks
the separation of the barbaric elements (just as the Renaissance marks
the splitting off of the Latin elements) from the old Carolingian syn¬
thesis. Dawson sees the Reformation primarily as a barbaric resurfgence3"
p
which "gave free scope to the centrifugal tendencies of the Western mind."
He sees it also as a nationalistic movement. The Germans, along with the
Italians, were beginning to react against the universalism of the Middle
Ages and to assert their cultural autonomy. The peoples of the North,
however, had no older cultural tradtions (as did the Latin peoples) to
which they could return. Therfore, Dawson reasons, they directed their
energies toward the transformation of the Christian tradition itself
Mixed with national sentiments, this reaction tended to become a revolt
"Interracial Cooperation as a Factor in European Culture," p. 7;
Progress and Religion, p. I78. Dawson is, of course, not using the term
barbarism in a crude sense but only as an expression of the essential
nature of that racial element (the gothic or nordic element) in the
Carolingian synthesis.
^Christianity and the New Age, p. 68.
^Progress and Religion, p-n. 17s ff.
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against the whole tradition of Latin-Christian culture.* This, Dawson
believes, explains the vernacular character of the Protestant Reformation,
the enthusiasm for translating the Bible into German, and the popularity
of the national hymns. The Reformation was, in fact, an attempt to create
a new and simpler form of Germanic Christianity based on the Bible and
individual conscience. This theory of the Reformation as a nordic
renaissance is confirmed, Dawson believes, by the fact that the Reformat¬
ion failed to advance outside the boundaries of northern Europe. He
calls attention to the fact that the religious divisions follow the lines
of the old frontier of the Roman Empire. The Latin peoples remained
solidly behind the Mother Church while the newer barbaric peoples to the
North were the ones who revolted against the Church and Latin culture.
Therefore, says Dawson, we find Lutheranism to the North and Catholicism
to the South, with Calvinism (which, of all the Protestant groups, stands
closest to Catholicism and has more appeal to the Latin mind^) along the
border territory at the Rhine, the Danube, and in Switzerland. The two
intermediate regions, Prance and England which were always mora national¬
istic, retained their traditional faiths while remaining at the same time
U
more national than either Protestant or Catholic.
Dawson believes that the Protestant schism was primarily a result
of these sociological forces and that the basic tension between the Latin
and nordic elements was far more important than any difference in faith,
dogma, or rite.
Underlying the theological issues that divide Catholicism and
Protestantism there is the great cultural schism between Northern
and Southern Europe which would still have existed if Christianity
never had existed, but which, when it exists, inevitably translates
itself into religious terms.5
■» — ■ 1
Dawson notes that even the French Protestants showed Germanophil
and anti-Latin tendencies ("Interracial Cooueration, etc." , p*7)«
O
Nationalism, Dawson believes, has always been a characteristic of
German Christianity - from the days f St* .Ambrose to the Nazi movement.
^Both Catholedsm and Calvinism stress the supremacy of the Church
above the State and the claim of the Church uuon the whole of life.
**Progress and Religion, p. 1/8 f. 5Judgment of the Nations, p.120.
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This is, Dawson believes, a general pattern with all schism. Hidden
sociological conflicts such as those between races, nationalities, or
economic entities in competition with one another are the real motive
1
pow r behind schism. Heresy, then, is just an excuse for schism (not
the cause of it) and doctrinal disputes are really a camouflage for the
deep-seated desire to revolt. Behind the Donatist movement, for instance,
was social discontent and national fanaticism. The primary impulse at
the roots of the great oriental heresies of the fifth century (e.a.
monophisitism) was the political conflict between the Greeks and the
Arminians.^ At the background of the Arianism of the Goths and Vandals
was the political and national desire for self-expression. Bohemian
nationalism was the driving force in the Hussite movement,5 and the
awakening of national consciousness in the assertion of the State against
c
the claims of the Church was the real cause of the English Reformation.
Behind the division of Son-conformists and Churchmen in the England of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the conflict of culture
between liberals and conservatives.7 The Pkotestant Reforma^tion, then,
is for Dawson just another example of how sociological conflicts masquer¬
ade in religious cloth-s. It was the passion for revolt of a whole people
g
that drove Martin Duther into schism and heresy. The motive here, Dawson
holds, was "not purely religious in origin but was the outcome of a
•^The Judgment of the Nations, pp. 118, 12U; Enquiries, etc., p.ix.
2iinouiri93. etc., p. 235.
3The Making of Europe, p. I3O} The Judgment of the Nations. p.118
^Medieval Religion, p. 8. Judgment of the Rations, p.12^.
P- 53- 7Ibld.. p. 122.
^Dawson's notion that cultured differences mask themselves in
religious forms seems to presuppose the psychologically doubtful category
of a "group mind" on the part of the societies in question which, through
the operation of unconscious forces .enables those societies to cover their
real differences (cultural, economic, political) with a religious facade.
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spiritual conflict in which religious motives were hopelessly confused."*
(Dawson recognizes that non-spiritual motives, such as avarice and the
protection of vested interests, were operating just as powerfully from the
Roman Catholic side causing the Church to oppose necessary reforms.2) If
these motives had been recognized for what they really were, the great
e 3
schism, Dawson beliyes, could have been avoided.
The Renaissance and the Reformation can also be seen as a
splitting off of the occidental and oriental elements from the medieval
synthesis. As we observed, the Middle Ages held together both elements
through its ties with the Moslem and Ryzantine cultures. The ultimate and
unfathomable gulf which had separated Greek and Roman as well as modern
Europe from the orient had temporarily disappeared. Bat since the
Renaissance and the Reformation, modern civilization has increasingly
emphasized the specifically occidental characteristics of activism, extro¬
version, and material organization which had previously characterised
Greeco-Roman civilization. Protestantism, says Dawson, "gave free scope
to the development of the occidental mentality"^ in its elimination of
asceticism and monasticism, its substitution of action for contemplation,
its divorce of intellect from dogna, and its Pragmatic morals.Rrotes-
tantism thus joined hands with the secularism of the Renaissance in
affirming the extroversion of life and denying the validity of absolute
6
metaphysical principles. This occidental enmhasis is seen especially,
Dawson believes, in Calvinism and its influence upon the Industrial
Revolution, which will be discussed later.
^The Judgment of the Nations, p. 124.
2Idem.
-hpor a criticism of Dawson's sociological determinism, see Chapter
Twelve.
^"The Revolt of the East," p. 11.
5«Ihe Revolt of the Sast," pp. 10-13; Christianity and the Hew
Age, pp. 89 ff.
"The Revolt of the East," pp. 11 f; Progress and Religion, p. 131
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2. The Aftermath of the Dissolution of the Medieval Synthesis
Dawson tends to attribute most of the present evils of
society (especially secularism) to the dissolution of the medieval
synthesis and the Protestant revolt. When the unifying factor of Catho¬
lic Christendom was broken, the whole edifice, he believes, began to
crumble. The completed effects of this process were not immediately
perceptible; nevertheless, the disintegrating process has proceeded
relentlessly until the present century in which it has reached its
fullest destructive force.
According to Dawson, there are t;.r8e major ways in which
Protestantism has contributed to the rise of mod-rn secularism. Firstly,
he attempts to show how the religious strife generated by the Protestant
schism was a major cause of secularism. The century of religious wars
following the Reformation, Dawson believes, discredited religion in the
sight of the masses and paved the way for religious indifference. While
the sides were at war, it was necessary for the world of affairs to carry
on as best it could- It was soon discovered that men could meet for
business and trade regardless of their religious affiliations. As the
wars dragged on men increasingly came to feel that the real world was the
world of business and social life in which they could meet one another in
the spirit of tolerance. Thus a neutral territory was created which,
serving as an opening wedge between religion and culture, gradually expanded
P
to include the whole of life. During the stalemates of the religious wars
it was further found that men of differing faiths could cooperate for
common political action. Religious wars, then, stimulated the rise of
*"It should be mentioned that Dawson nowhere launches into a whole¬
sale attack on Protestantism, as the above seems to indicate. These
criticisms of Protestantism are culled from a number of different infer¬
ences. A real attempt has been made, however, to keep from forcing a
pattern on his thought from the outside.
^The Judgment of the Rations, p. J2.
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new political parties championing national unity as over against religious
divisions. This in turn led to a new attitude toward government. The
duty of the government, so it came tc> be believed, was not to defend the
faith but to secure toleration, to keep peace, and to protect the rights
1
of private property. Eeligian, meanwhile, more and more came to be
considered a private affair which must not be allowed to become too major
a social r>heoncmenon lest it only generate further strife. All of these
tendencies served to strengthen the arm of the secular State which
increasingly displaced the Church as the center of life. The Protestant
Church, especially in its Lutheran form, only augmented this movement in
its reliance upon the secular powers. The religious strife of the seven-
teenth century was therefore detrimental, Dawson believes, to Protestantism
and Catnolicisra alike, for it drove society at large to the necessity of
constructing some working compromise upon which social life could continue
to function. It is apparent that any new ethos would have to avoid an
explicit doctrinal foundation, for that v/ould only accentuate social
strife. The result of this quest for a new basis for society was the
Liberal creed built u on Christian moral ideals divorced from Christian
2
doctrines - a sublimated Christianity. But such a make-shift foundation
could not support European society permanently. Although Liberalism did
succeed in holding society together for a considerable period, the great
European ideals could not perpetually survive apart from their doctrinal
foundations• The Liberal Compromise, then, was doomed to fall, The
^•Progress and Kellgion. p. 1S7.
2This must not be taken to indicate that Dawson has no appreciation
of Liberalism and its contribution to Western society. The importance
of the liberal Creed will be discussed later in this chapter-
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catastrophe of our century, Dawson believes, is basically tied up with
the collapse of that compromise resulting in an almost complete secular¬
ization of life. Much of the onus for this state of affairs, according
to Dawson's analysis, goes directly bach to the religious strife engen-
dreed by the Protestant Reformation.
Another way in which Protestantism paved the way for secularism
was through its puritanical reforms. Dawson believes that, as a rule,
puritanical reforms are self-destructive and that all radical attempts
to de-secularize religion culminate in the secularization of culture.
And this, in turn, leads directly on to a secularisation of religion I *
The attempt to purify religion and free it from its cultural accretions
necessarily involves an alienation of that movement from its culture.
Such separation of religion and culture leads, as we saw in the urevious
chapter, to the impoverish ment of both elements, for culture apart from
religion becomes secular and religion apart from culture ultimately
becomes ineffective. This was the error of Protestantism and especially
of Lutheran! sin. lather nosi ted an extreme dualism in which Hature and
Grace, Law and Gospel had nothing whatever to do with one another. His
extreme supern&turalism, in which the Gospel has no word for earthly,
political affairs, could not help but lead to secularism, according to
p
Dawson. This, of course, was far from the intention of the Reformers.
Nevertheless, as we saw earli r, Dawson believes that there is a straight
line from Luther to modern secularism and from the Lutheran idea of the
3
State as a God-given order to the Nazi regime. If we were to reply i?ith
"^Dawson, of course, does not believe that all reforms are futile.
We have noted that he heartily approved of the reforming movements of the
Middle Ages. These reforms he considers as constructive because they
remained within the Church which, in turn, kept in close touch with the
contemporary culture. Reforms become destructive, he believes, only as
they revolt against the Church and in doing so separate themselves from
culture.
2The Judgment of the Nations, pp. 9^ f•
•^Ibid-, pp. 28 f.
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John Baillie that the aim of the Reformers was "not the creation of a
sect that would achieve purity by separating itself from the life of the
community, but a thoroughgoing reform of the community itself,""'" Dawson
would reply that that attempt to reform the community as a whole
actually produces a reaction opposite from its intention. The attempt to
popularise asceticism by making it binding on everyone, he says, only
serves to render it more unattractive and repulsive. Thus it has been
historically thfct every fresh assertion of the Puritan claim was followed
p
by a reaction that only increased the secularization of society."
1Shere J\iritanism was defeated, as in eighteenth-century England and
Germany, the state-churches became more secularized than the
medieval Church at its worst, and where it was victorious, as in
Scotland and New England, it had a narrowing and cramping effect
on the life of culture.3
The mistake of the Riritans, then, was not in attempting to reform or to
transform life but in trying to make their high standards binding upon
k
everyone rather than making perfection a vocation of a minority. Since
the attempt to universalize asceticism could not permanently succeed,
ascetic practices unfortunately became the mark of a sect rather than a
vocational expression within the Church.^ Dawson, of course, does not
condone the easy acceptance of the world by the Church. He insists that
■'"John Baillie, What is Christian Civilisation?(London* Oxford
University Press, I9U5), p« IS.
^Enquiries, etc., p. 3O2.
3ldem.
^Dawson is supporting here the view of monastic asceticism.
^Dawson's attitude toward monastic asceticism seems equivocal. On
the one hand he lauds William Langland's "inner-worldly asceticism."
"for Langland," he says, "the other-world is always immediately present
in every human relationship, and every man's daily life is organically
Bound up with the life of the Church. Thus every state of life in Chiis-
tendom is a Christian life in the full sense - an extension of the life of
Christ on earth." (Religion the Rise of Western Culture, pp. 270 f., ital¬
ics mine). On the other hand, as in the discussion above, he speaks of
Christian perfection as the vocation of a minority and says, for examnle,
that it is "only in the saints that the Christian life is completely
realized." (Enquiries, p. 297)
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Christians must not compromise their Gospel or shut their eyes to the
evils of the world. But,as he goes on to say,
it is also easy, and it is a more insidious temptation, to adopt an
attitude of negative hostility to the spirit of the age and to
take refugs in a narrow and exclusive fanaticism which is essentially
the attitude of the heretic and the sectarian and which does more to
discredit Christianity and render it ineffective than even worldli-
ness and time-serving. For the latter are, so to speak, external
to the Church's life, whereas the former poisons the sources of its
spiritual action and causes it to appear hateful in the eyes of men
of good will.
Large sections of Protestantism, Daweon believes, succumbed to this
latter temptation and thus contributed directly to the disintegration of
past-Eeformation society.
A third way in which Protestantism has been responsible for the
secularism of our time is, indirectly, through the impetus it gave to
the rise of Capitalism and Industrialism. Dawson follows the theories
of Troeltsch and Wgber in refer o@ to the manifold social consequences
of the Protestant (especially Calvinistic) "innerweltlicher" asceticism.
The moral drive, the conscientiousness, the unremitting industry and
thrift so firmly implanted in the Puritan tradition have had, Dawson
believes, a great influence uosm the rise of capitalism and industrialism
and have been the moral power behind the technical achievements of the
p
past two or three centuries. The Industrial Revolution, Dawson believes,
"would have been impossible without the moral earnestness and sense of
duty that were generated by the Iforitan ideal. . . ."3 The Protestant
emphasis uuon the occidental elements, of which mention has already been
made, stressed moral activism as over against contemplation and served to
stimulate the more practical and utilitarian aspects of life. Closely
correlated with this was the Protestant interest in Biblical education
"^Beyond Politics, p. I33.
p
The Judgment of the Nations. p. 26; "The Crisis of Christian Culture;
Education," p. U2; Enquiries, etc., pp. 277 *"•; Progress and Religion.ti.TaU
"Ihe Crisis of the West," Dublin Review (October, I927).CLXXXI, 263.
•^Christianity and the Hew Age. p. 9U.
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which encouraged literacy and intellectual! sm and gave additional support
to the tendency toward the creation of a utilitarian culture.^" Sow all
of these forces, Dawson recognizes, have been productive of great good
and have contributed to the advancement of science and an amazinjr rise in
the material standards of life. Nevertheless, they have also been
responsible for most of the harsh and unattractive characteristics of
modern life. Industrialism led to the rise of the great factory towns
"huddled together at the mouths of the coal pits," and, worst of all,
to the creation of a techno-centric mass civilization which has had an
overwhelming secularizing influence. Thus Protestantism through its
contribution to the rise of industrialism, capitalism, and technology
has been indirectly responsible for much of modern secularism.
C. The Quest for European Reintegration
The centuries of modern history subsequent to the dissolution
of the medieval synthesis have been marked by repeated attempts to
recover the unity, direction, and sense of purpose which characterized
the Middle Ages. A civilization needs to have some unifying center, some
spiritual purpose to direct it and give it meaning. Without some common
ideals and principles which can appeal to the loyalty of its members,
a society falls to plsces. "Normally," Dawson says, "this dynamic is
supplied by a religion, but in exceptional circumstances the religious
impulse may disguise itself under philosophical or political forms."3
The whole post-Renaissance, post-Reformation era has been one of such
"exceptional circumstances" and has b en characterized, Dawson believes,
^"The Crisis of Christian Culture: Education," p. 1*2.
^Enquiries, etc.. p. 51* Dawson has a great deal to say about the
disintegrating effects of urbanization both in ancient and modern cultures.
Urbanization leads to the loss of the agrarian foundations and, as we saw
in the last chapter, once man's ties with the soil and the life of nature
are severed, his life becomes artificial.
•^IVogress and Religion, p. viii.
2^3
by a whole series of such extra-ecclesiastical movements toward inte¬
gration. We shall now turn to a discussion of these movements and
shall consider them in their double aspect as substitutes for the Chris-
tain faith and as quests for the social unity that had once been the
1
product of the Christian faith.
1. The Rost-Renaissanee Scene
+*
Vhat was it that held Europe togeher following the religious
disunity precipitated by the Reformation? Why was it that Europe
remained a cultural unity and was not divided into various compartments
according to religious lines of demarcation? The answer is that the
humanism and scientific culture of the Renaissance had Provided a new bond
of unity between the various nations, classes, and religions of Europe.^
For nearly two centauries following the dissolution of Catholic Christen¬
dom, Renaissance humanism served as a common unifying center so that in
spite of religious controversy and persecution, Europe could remain a
cultural whole. The splitting of Europe into two hostile religious
camps, then, did not succeed in dividing it into two mutually alien
cultural spheres (as it would have done had the Reformation occurred a
few centuries earlier.P To the contrary, Europe, following the Reformation,'
became even more conscious of its unity, its self-sufficiency, and its
h
destiny. This new bond of unity, however, was not entirely independent
•'"This aspect of Dawson's thought reminds us of Tillich's method
of theonomous analysis. Dawson goes a step farther, however, in his
attempt to show how even Protestant movements are a quest for the unity
and wholeness of the Catholic faith. Following Canon Lacey, Dawson holds
that "the sects in Protestantism correspond to the religious orders in
Catholicism." "But," as he goes on to say,"whereas the religious order was
part of a universal whole, and had its ralson d 'etre in the life of the
whol^, each sect set itself uu against its predecessor and existed as an
end in itself." (Enquiries, etc.. p. 302> Cf. "Religious Enthusiasm," in
The Month (January, 1951) V, 12 f.
%eliaion and Culture, pp. 3 f.
^The Mafcina of Europe, p. 289.
Idem.
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from Christianity - or as independent as^advocates believed. The Renais¬
sance itself, as we have seen, was not originally hostile to Christianity,
but actual drew much of its inwpiriation from Christian ideals. And the
unity achieved during the post-Reformation period was greatly dependent
upon the underlying "spiritual substance" (as Tillich would call it) which
was cariied over from the previous age. Dawson calls the classical education
of this period, for example,"an intellectual superstructure that was built
on a common spiritual tradition."1 nevertheless, the recognized basis of
2
cultural unity was no longer religious, but intellectual. A common
allegiance to classical traditions expecially in art, science, and
literature, took the place of the liturgy, holy days, and ecclesiastical
festivals as the center of interest. The Latin grammar replaced the
Latin liturgy, and the scholar and gentleman usurped the place of the
monk and the knight as the typical figures of the age .3 This second
European syntehsis, as it might be called, was a new type of international¬
ism based on Renaissance scholarship and art rath9r than on the religious
internationalism of the Middle Ages. Thus the Latin and Germanic traditions,
whose interaction and interpenetration had contributed so much to the
flowering of medieval culture, were still able, in this new Renaissance-
humanist synthesis, to meet in a common intellectual world.^ la this
humanist compromise, there was no complete break with the uast or with the
religious tradition. Giordano Bruno and Machiavelli, for instance, "gave
"Interracial Cooperation as a Factor, etc.", p. 8.
p
Thus Natural Theology which had previously existed as part of the
total Christian tradition came to have a new significance as a separate
discipline. It quickly came to acquire "a new value as the one certain
and universal foundation of religious truth in a world where everything
was disputed" and where society no longer possessed a religious unity.
(Religion and Culture, pp. 6 f.)
^The .'-taking of Euro-qe. p. 299*
ji
Understaudins Eurofe. p. 208
5"Interracial Cooperation as a Factor, etc.", p.8.
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their whole-hearted support to Haturalism, but for the most part both
statesmen and philosophers endeavored to serve two masters, like Descartes
or Richelittu. They remained fervent Christians, but at the same time
they separated the sphere of religion from the sphere of reason. . .
In was not until the eighteenth century (in the period known as the
Enlightenment) that this separation became complete and conscious.
The Enlightenment, according to Dawson, was the fulfillment of
the Renaissance, for in it the various rationalistic and humanistic ten-
2
dencies of the Renaissance finally reached their culmination. These
elements had been somewhat subdued during the age of intense religious
controversy, but in the age of the Enlightenement they finally came into
their kingdom. Certain aspects of the Enlighten' ment evidence a quest
for the unity and purpose of Christendom comparable to that found in
Renaissance humanism. Two of these may be considered here: Deism and
the doctrine of Progress.
The Enlighten ment had sprung from the courtly culture of
post-Renaissance Europe and was entirely lacking in religious foundations.
As the culture of the Church grew weaker, the culture of the courts
grew stronger. Movements attacking the truths of Christianity, the moral
values of humanism, and even the historic achievements of European culture
grew in popularity and, by degrees, the attack on religion was transmuted
into somewhat of a counter-religion.^ As we have noted, Dawson believes
that men must have some sort of a religion or an ultimate. Mien the
supernatural faith of Christianity seemed impossible to hold any longer,
the rationalists tried to manufacture a religion of their own. The Deism
^Enquiries. etc., p. 109-
"On the Development of Sociology" (Reprinted from Sociological Review)
(Manchester: Sharratt & Hughes, 1921) p. 75*
^XJhdsrstanding Europe. p. 38-
Dawson surveys other similar attempts to create an artifical
religion and declares that "every attempt to create a new religion on
purely rational and human foundations is inevitably doomec! to failure »
("The Dark Mirror," p. 178).
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that resulted was not as successful as its proponents had hoped in de-
supernaturalizing xeligion or in purging it of its supposedly obsolete
elements. Its utter dependence upon reason was in itself a type of
faith. Dav/son quotes Whitehead as saying thaff-hile the Middle Ages were
an age of faith based on reason, the eighteenth century was an age of
reason ;ased upon faith.Deism, then, was but a ghost or a shadow
of Christianity. Nevertheless, it retained many Christian doctrines
especially in reference ot its optimistic and teleological conception
of life. The doctrine of pnogress, for instance is a good example of
how a basic Christian ideal can be retained by a secular society through
a process of sublimation. The doctrine of progress also gave a unity of
purpose to the new age and thus helped fulfill the unconscious quest for
one of the important elements lost in the dissolution of the medieval
synthesis.
As the modern world gradually lost touch with the organized
Christianity which had been the governing spirit of Suropean
civiliaation in the past, it began to find a new inspiration
for itself in the ideal of Progress.2
Thus through the channel of the Enlightenment and its optimistic ration¬
alism, the doctrine of Progress entered the mainstream of Western thought
and became the new working religion of modern civilisation.
The barren intellectual! sm and rationalism of the Aufklarung,
however, produced a reaction in the movement known as Romanticism.
Romanticism is an elusive term which can mean a number of different things.
In this context we shall be concerned with the movement of the third
quarter of the eighteenth century centering in Rousseau and having the
worship of nature as its keynote. Rousseau's doctrines of the perfection
1aroaress and Religion, p. 220.
2,,0n the Development of Sociology, etc.", p. 75
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of nature and. the original goodness of man have had a profound influence
on the history of modern Europe. "This moody neurotic dreamer," Dawson
comments, "was one of the few men who have moved the world profoundly."^
Rousseau turned away from the rationalism of the Enlightenement (and the
attempt to transform the world by external organization) toward the laws
of nature written on the human heart and toward the emotional and the
subjective. Nevertheless he was very close to the rationalists of the
Enlightenment in his passion for social reform. His doctrine of the
perfection of nature in its original forms led to a radical criticism of
the corrupting influences of civilization. Particularly under attack as
an institution out of harmony with the essential laws of nature was the
State. So what appears at first si^it to have bean a reactionary move¬
ment turned out to be an unparalleled source of revolutionary dynamism.^
Rousseau's optimism and faith in the perfectibility of man and society
was another contributing factor. Thus through the impact of the emotional
forces generated by Rousseau, the rationalists found new power to carry
through their reforms and Romanticism thus joined forces with rationalism
and liberalism in a "new Reformation," as Dawson calls it, this time
directed against the Sfcate rather than against the Church.-^
Rousseau's doctrine of the Sovereignty of the General Will
as over against the autocratic ideals of the enlightened despots of his
age was truly a revolutionary doctrine. It aroused a wave of enthusiasm
and fanaticism which finally culminated in the French Revolution. Through
that revolution, Rousseau's doctrines became one of the great driving
I).
forces in the transformation of the modern world.
•^Enquiries. etc., p. 150.
2Ibid.. pp. 150 f.
3Proareas and Religion, pp. I93 f.
4
Enquiries. etc., p. 150*
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The French Revolution, according to Dawson, brought together
two currents of thought: 1) the gospel of Progress from the Enlighten¬
ment, aid 2.) the nature worship of Rousseau involving a radical criticism
of the State.3" The convergence of these two streams created what Dawson
calls an attempt "to restore the unity of European society on the foun-
dation of new ideas" and rational principles thus evidencing another
type of hidden longing for the spiritual community of the Middle Ages.
The aim was to found a perfect society on the basis of pure doctrine.
(The introduction of a new calendar is symbolic of the extreme to which
these designs were carried.3) This required, of course, a clean sweep
of the past and an unfavorable attitude to ecclesiastical as well as to
political traditionalism. As with the Enlightenment, however, the
hostility to Christian dogma could not disguise its dependence upon
Christian foundations. Although the Revolution was outwardly anti-
Christian, it passionately adopted much of the Christian moral teaching
and social intention.4 'The Revolutionary slogans of "Liberty, Equality,
and Fraternity" are, Dawson affirms, just secularizations of Christian
principles.
notwithstanding its high moral idealism and its efforts to
vindicate human rights and freedoms, the French Revolution ended in a
denial of these rights in the "Reign of Terror." In the midst of con¬
fusion, disorder, and disillusionment, totalitarian techniques were intro¬
duced and within a very few years the average man was more enslaved than
5
he had ever been under an enlightened despot. As a result, society
^■"Qn the Development of Sociology,etc." p. j6.
2
Progress and Religion, pp. 194 f.
P- 195.
Wd.. p. 196 .
^Dawson claims that nearly all the essential characteristics of
modern totalitarianism were anticipated by the first French Republic.
(Religion and the Modern State, p. 1*7; Beyond Politics. p. 71)
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turned with gratitude to the dictatorship of Napoleon Bonaparte and
hailed him as a Savior and second Caesar.
As a successor to the unfulfilled questjof the French Revolution
for a new spiritual community, the Napoleonic Sirpire itself, Dawson
believes, was another attempt to re-establish Europe's lost unity.* This
attempt, however, was foredoomed to failure, for Europe, with its long
tradition of freedom, could not ultimately succumb to a military dictator¬
ship no matter how beneficent it might be or how productive of peace
and unity. Further, it was too much at odds with the idealism of the
French Revolution to be able to endure.
The failure of both the French Revolution and the Napoleonic
Empire precipitated a liberal reaction which found its major expression
in the nineteenth-century Liberal State. The abuses of French totalitar¬
ianism and imperialism naturally led to a desire to lii*it the power of
the State to its minimal functions. But the reaction against liberal
ideals following the Reign of Terror was onlyftenrporary and the optimism
and belief in social progress, coupled with the liberal doctrines of
free trade and individualism came back into full force in the middle of
the nineteenth century. Especially in England, through the creative
friction of utilitarianism and non-conformity, moral idealism and the
2
passion for reform became great motivationg forces. Th3 result was
that Liberalism and Humanitarianism became thefpmactical substitutes for
religious orthodoxy and, for large sections of society, provided a
center of meaning and purpose for life.-^
^"Understanding Europe, p. UO.
p
"Devotion to Compromise" in series "Ideas and Beliefs of the
Victorians," The Listener (February 5» 1948) p. 214.
^Nineteenth-century Liberalism, however, was a half-way house to
secularism. Its ideals were based on a Christian foundation and could
not be preserved apart from that foundation (Religion and the Modern
State, p.
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The nineteenth century was also characterized by what we
might call a second romantic movement. This movement originally had no
ties with Bousseau but derived its impetus from the recovery of chivalric
1
poetry ana the consequent renewed appreciation of medieval literature.
It was only in its later stages that it mingled with Bousseauean nature-
worship and became a vague sentimental movement. In its origins it was
a purely literary movement and its attempt to recover the literature of
the Middle Ages forms a strict parallel to the return to classicism
during the Renaissance. Previously the scholars of the Enlightenanient
were so absorbed in the absolute value of their own civilization and in
their optimistic prospects for its future that they passed lightly over
the whole era of the Dark and Middle Ages as beneath their concern. The
Romantic movement, however, discovered the beauty, majesty, and riches
of ancient Christendom with something of the same enthusiasm Renaissance
scholars had shown in reference to the classics. Now for the first time
there was an interest in one's national heritage and in the origin and
2
diversity of national traditions. This deep interest in the past,
coupled with a genuine concern for social tradition marks the birth of
the full historical consciousness as we know it today.^ Although this
historical consciousness is a fruit of Christian culture, it also owes
a great debt to the humanist's interest in classical tradition and above
all to the romanticist's interest in medieval culture. Both traditions
•^Medieval Religion, pp. 12*+ ff.
-The Romantic movement also stimulated an extensive investigation
into oriental religions in their diversity and uniqueness. The research
was dominated by a willingness to see other cultures and religions according
to their own laws and principles. This led to the rise of a systematic
study of comparative religions which soon displaced the study of Natural
Theology in most seminaries.
3The Kjngdoa of God and History, p. 199-
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taught the European mind "to study the achievements of . . . civilization
and to value human nature for its own sake.""*"
She revival of interest in the Middle Ages naturally expressed
for many a nostalgia for the unity and wholeness of medieval culture.
This tendency was especially strongamong Soman Catholics and, as Dawson
realizes, often led to an idealization of the Middle Ages and its achieve-
2
ments. History, in other words, was made into a department of apologetics.
The recovery, through the Romantic movement, of the richness
and diversity of national traditions went hand in hand with the rise of
nationalism.^Originally nationalism was not hostile to the Christian
tradition or to the common cultural unity of Europe. In Ireland and
Poland, for instance, nationalism was closely tied up with the sense of
a Christian vocation and mission for the nation. And even in Italy where
nationalism was not so definitely Christian, it was far from being secular
and was inspired "by a thoroughly religious ideal of the nation as a
If
spiritual community." And even in later centuries vdien it became more
aggressive, nationalism was nearly always regarded as a Messianic vocation
which was exercized for the good of Europe as a whole. At one time or
another each of the major European powers - France, Italy, Spain, England,
Germany, Russia, Poland, and Ireland - regarded itself as the heir and
5
guardiaa of the universal ideal of Christendom. It was only when national¬
ism became detached from the romantic idealism that had nursed it and
•^The Kingdom of God and History, p. 199•
^While evidencing a great admiration for medieval culture, Dawson
nevertheless tiies to guard against this danger and believes that history
should be studied for its own sake and not for apologetic purposes.
(The Making of Europe, p. xvii; The Spirit of the Oxford Movement (London:
Sheed and Ward, I9U5) ,p. 8; Cf. Halecki, Limits and Divisions, etc.. p.
192 for a similar approach.)
^We are speaking here of the modern variety of rampant nationalism.
Dawson would probably say that nationalism has always been a European
social phenonomenon•
^Beyond Politics, p. 66.
-*The Judgment of the Rations. 0. 11+2.
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became reinterpreted in terms of popular Darwinian biology that it
1
acquired a definitely anti-European character. The result wa3 a series
of pan-racial theories which, especially in Eastern Europe, have been
so destructive. Nevertheless, in each case of its inception, nationalism
was a hidden quest for the social and suiritual unity Europe had once
known. Although Nationalism and racialism are atomistic and individual¬
istic in relation to the European society as a whole, within their own
national borders they represent movements toward social, solidarity and
2
spiritual integration. Thus nationalism may be added to our total list
along with humanism, rationalism, romanticism, and liberalism as one
further attempt to recover some of the lost elements of the medieval
%
synthesis.
How all of these movements we have been considering have
been largely spontaneous and sporadic. But the disintegration of
Western civilization in our century (accelerated by the shock of World
Wars, the collapse of the economic structure, and the failure of all
spontaneous movements of integration) has led to the need for more
deliberate and planned attempts to reintegrate our civilisation."' The
remainder of this chapter will be concerned with an assessment of the
major movements of this type within our century.
2. The Modern Scene
One valiant attempt to reintegrate our civilization and usher
in an era of international peace was the League of Nations. This attempt
failed, Dawson believes, primarily because it was foxinded on a basic
*The Judgment of the Nations, pp. lUh f.
2Totalitarianism will be discussed more fully later in this chapter.
^Cf. Tillich's analysis of the transformation our civilization is
witnessing from automatic harmony to planned unity.
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sociological misconception - the idea that naticm-States are the ul¬
timate social and political units.1 States, according to Dawson, are
only temporary and artificial political entities. Any peace which attempts
to preserve existing state boundaries as ultimate in the midst of a rapidly-
chstjging world is foredoomed to failure and is bound tc be considered by
tne defeated nations as an Injustice. Just why the boundaries of 1918
should be considered as final instead of those of ISHS, for instance, was
not asked by the makers of the Versailles treaty. Bu the question as to
why the clock should be stopped at a time unfavorable to them was asked
2
by the have-not nations, and with some justification. Such grievances
would not have arisen had the League paid sufficient attention to the
r
real cultural unit which is not the State but the nation.-' In reference
to Surope thi3 means Europe as a whole (as a cultural unit) in comparison
to other great cultural units such as India, China, and Russia. Such
large cultural units or confederations of states are what Dawson means
by "nations" - cultural areas with permanent, long-standing traditions.
A realistic international order, Dawson believes, would take account of
5
these five or six world cultures and build its system around them.
Failing to realize the basic significance of these national cultures,
the League of Nations, in s^ite of its name, was only a Leage of States.
It mistakenly regarded every de facto State as a ij[9 .jure Nation and thus
g
attempted to treat them all alike as having having equal abstract rights.
This juridicial standard of equality for all sovereign states naturally
*The Judanent of the Nations, pp. 5U ff.
2"Symposium on far and Peace," The Colosseum (March. 1937), III,pp. 33 f.
3'Ihe Judgment of the Nations, p. 5^*
^Enquiries. etc.. pp. 5^ f •; "Europe and the Smaller Peoples,"
Dublin Review (July. 19^3).PP« U f.
^Ttie Modern Dilemma, p. 19*
r
""Europe and the Smaller Peoples," pp. 4 f.
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does an injustice to the larger oriental civilizations which are much more
than "States." Dawson maintains that if it is to he realistic, the
structure of world organization must consider the cultural (national)
unit which acutally stands mid-way between the State and the world
society.* The most natural form of world organization, then, would be
2
a Confederation of confederations. China and India, for instance, are
such Confederations and Europe should also be treated as such a unit.
The major mistake of the League, according to Dawson, was the failure to
recognize Europe as a cultural unity. And since European disorder is at
the heart of international disorder, he argues, international organization
should not have been attempted until Europe had found political expression
for its basic unity? In putting first the organization of the world,
the League was premature and idealistic.
The L ague also failed because of its false cosmopolitan inter¬
nationalism. It made the mistake of asking people to transfer their
li
loyalties to a formless, nebulous world society that did not as yet exist.
The League, then, was too all-embracing in its superstructure and so
was no more than a "juridicial skeleton." The largest unit which as yet
possesses sufficient community of culture and historic tradition to arouse
a real sense of loyalty is the cultural unit- Cultural unification,
Dawson argues, must therefore come before international political uni¬
fication.
.Another defect of the League was its failure to reconcile its
cosmopolitan idealism with its political-military basis. In srdte of its
high idealism, the League was dependent in practice upon an alliance of
the victorious powers of World War I. In order to carry out its program,
^"The Judgment of the Kations. p. 148.
2im4«, pp. 1^9 t.
^Ibld.. p. 62.
^Dawson cautions that "there is no such world community and theattempt to by-pass all existing real communities in order to reaciifsuch
an ideal willl only land the world in some kind of super—totalitarianism
. . . . (»two Currents in the Modern Democratic Tradition," p.16)
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Dawson comments, it was necessary for it to preserve the status quo
and the military supremacy of those powers whose union was the only
real foundation of the system.* Changes in the political and economic
scene led to a decline in power of the victorious States and consequently
to an undermining of the foundation of the League. Bit apart from this
the original political-military basis had been too narrow,for the largest
power units, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. had not been included. To
summarise, in Dawson's words, "the failure of the L ague was due to its
real political-military basis being to narrow and one-sided and its ideal
2
superstructure too universal and all-embracing."
Are any of these defects overcome in the United Nations Organ¬
ization? What does Dawson think of this latest attempt at international
cooperation? Although ha has not yet written much about the United
Nations, he does comment in his latest book that the same structural
defects are repeated. The United Nations, he believes, is essentially
a cosmopolitan structure just like the old League and is "the organ of an
ideal world community which does not as yet exist.As with the League,
it has failed to take account of the organic cultural communities which are
the real sociological realities. And even more than the League, the
United Nations has failed to realize the basic importance of the European
cultural community. "The European peoples," he notes, "have a smaller
share in this organization than in any of its predecessors, and the
existence of Europe as an organic society of nations is completely ig-
k
nored." Out of a total membership of fifty-nine, Western Europe has
only eight members and can easily be outvoted by much smaller cultural
units as well as by separate States.^ Dawson therefore believes that
z n~—
A"Symposium on War and Peace," pp. 33 f. Ibid.. p. 57*
^The Judgment of the Nations, p. 62. ^bifl. ,p. US.
^Understanding Bucope, p. 57.
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the Christian principles of liberty and international justice must
find expression in an international order which is at once more real¬
istic than the League (and the United Nations) in its recognition of
the historic cultural complex and more spiritual, taking into account
man's deepest longings for a community of justice and love *hich can
only be fulfilled in reference to the transcendent spiritual order.
Another type of deliberate attempt to reintegrate modern
life in our century is evidenced in totalitarianism. Behind modem
totalitarianism lies a whole gamut of forces^" such as the decline of
Liberalism and Capitalism, the revolt against the nineteenth-century
State, the rise of militarism, the failure of the treaty of Versailles
and the League of Nations, the development of mass communication, and
the scientific control of public opinion. But most basically, the
appearance of totalitarianism on the modern scene marks a radical and
dramtic attempt to re-establish the spiritual community which has been
lost since the end of the Middle Ages. Tne vacuum caused by the dis¬
integration of the religous and humanistic unification of Europe had to
be filled and the various totalitarian movements set about this task in
wh t Dawson calls the most deliberate approach since the French Revolut-
ion. "Human nature," says Dawson, "needs a holy community," and when
this spiritual community is not provided by religion, men must turn to
^Dawson is not fully consistent in his various analyses of the
origins of totalitarianism. In one place he insists strongly that the
"totalitarian idea was not Fascist or Italian or German in origin" but
rather "a distinctively Russian reaction which could not have arisen with¬
out centuries of cultural segregation and politico-religious unity which
formed the Russian national consciousness" (The Judgment of the Nations,
p.25)« From Russian, he maintains, the totalitarian idea spread westward
into the very heart of Europe. But elsewhere he insists with equal vigor
that it was in Prussia that the totalitarian pattern of military and
economic effieientcy and scientific mass organization of a people was
first born and that Russia (and other nations) borrowed Prussian methods I
("Religion and Mass Civilization," p.3; "Christian Culture in Eastern
Europe," pp. 22-2U).
2
Beyond Bjlltics, I3I •
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political substitutes. Dawson sees Nazism, Fascism, and Communism as
as attempts to create secular substitutes for the broken unity of
Christendom. All were trying to find a substitute for it "in some
primary social element which is permanent and indestructible"^ such as
race or an economic group. All of these movements represent a reaction
to nineteenth-century Liberalism which, as we saw, attempted to set up
idealism and positivism as substitutes for the Christian faith. But the
ethos of liberalism was too artifical and failed to satisfy men's minds.
The reaction was particularly strong against the liberal State which,
according to Dawson, had been a broker, a policeman, and sometimes a
2
hangman but never a king or a priest. Men felt the need for a political
community which would be more than just the legal framework of an indi¬
vidualistic society and thus turned to the totalitarian State.
The revolt against the liberal State which had become separated
from the community had its counterpart in a revolt against the Church
which had likewise become isolated from social reality in its individual¬
istic sectarianism. The Church, too, was often regarded as a stronghold
of privilege and an ally of capitalism. It is no wonder, then, that the
trend tonard community left the Church as well as the (liberal) State to
one side. This does not mean, however, that the totalitarian movements
have been lacking in spiritual dynamic- As ah attempt to fulfill a basic
human need for a spiritual community, these movements have quite naturally
^The Judgment of the Nations, p. IU5.
p
As well as being a reaction against liberalism, totalitarianism
also represents the last stages of liberalism I Dawson shows how capital¬
ism (or economic liberalism) led to the mechanization cf life and how
mass society in turn necessitated a type of State which would assume
mass control. Through this process, the liberal State was gradually
transformed into an anti-liberal State. (B9.vond Politics, pp. 75 f.)
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been driven to religious forms of expression. Dawson thus refers to
Nazism and Communism as "Church-States. "'L Their "religious substance"
can be seen for instance in the fact that these movements have aimed at
the subordination of material and selfish interests to a higher end.
The try to see life as a whole and refuse to divide it - which is more
2
than can be said, Dawson believes, for the average brand of Christianity.
Totalitarianism, then, is not an evil to be condemned outrightly. Its
quest for a spiritual community, as we have seen, is an attempt to satisfy
a basic human longing.
If therefore Christians take up a negative attitude to this
movement. . . they may find that they are fighting against
God and standing in the path of the march of God through hi story. 3
Thus, as Dawson says in another place, totalitarianism
"is not irrelevant to the work of grace nor impenetrable to its
influence. If it do s not destroy itself, it may be transformed
and reconsecrated as the power of the barbarian warrior became
transfigured into the sacred office of a Christian King.^
Nevertheless, Dawson is far from blind to the evils of totalitarianism.
The fact that totalitarianism aims to fulfill a spiritual need does not
male® it any less the eneiay of Christianity. The distortions of its
spiritual aim classify it as a type of heresy or apostasy which must be
vigorously combattad by the Church. Thus, although Dawson may be sensitive
to the hidden spiritual qu st evidenced in totalitarianism, he declares
unequivocally that it must be denounced as the anti-Christ of our time.'5
One specific totalitarian attempt to create what Dawson calls
a "spiritual community" must be considered at greater length, and that
^Reli^lon and the Modern State, p. 57; Beyond Politics, pp. 9,S3;
2"Concordats or Catacombs?"p. 909* Beyond Politics, p. I3I. Arnold
Toynbee, in similar fashion, says that totalitarianism at least teaches us
that religion is indispensible to a culture. If the choice is between a
society based upon individualistic freedom (with no religious supn&rt) and
one based ut>on the claim of a corporate Juggernaut demanding, in religious
terms, the sacrifice of the individual to the whole, the latter is bound
to win. (Bjynbee's review of Dawson's Religion and the Rise of Western
Culture, p. 8 f.)
^Beyond Politics, p. I32. ^"Concordats or Catacombs?" p.9^9-
^Tne Judgment of the Nations, pp. 112 f.
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is Communism. As with the other movements we have "been considering,
Communism made its appeal to the Russian people largely because of its
disguised spiritual forces and its answer to the longing for a spiritual
community. Dawson therefore sees Communism primarily as a creed rather
than a political movement. He shows how the essential elements of Jewish
prohpeticism and eschatology coming out of Marx's Jewish background,
were transmuted into Communist forms. The gentiles of the Old Testament,
for instance, have become the bourgeoisie of the Marxist system and the
poor have become the proletariat? the Day of Jehovah has been transformed
into the Marxist dialectic and the Messianic Kingdom into the dictator-
ship of the proletariat. Marx's conception of abstract justice as well
as his sense of community, Dawson declares, has been taken directly from
the Jewish faith. But not only has Marxian theory a definitely religious
background but the major institutions of Communism as well evidence
strong religious affinities. The old theocratic traditions of ancient
Russian have been carried over in revised form, Dawson believes, so that
the Communist ideology corresponds directly to the old orthodoxy. In
similar fashion, the Communist Phrty corresponds to the Church and the
2
Communist State to the old empire under the orthodox Cgar. Communism,
then, has not succeeded in banning religion but only in erecting a sub¬
stitute one equipped with its own form of inquisition, excommunication,
^Religion and the Modern State, pp. 86-89.
2This quasi-religious character of Communism (its absolutism and
apocalyptic millenialism) is, of course, incongruous vdth Marxian material¬
ism, relativism, and determinism. This provides, according to Dawson, a
basic contradiction in Communist thought which no amount of rationalizing
has been able to bridge. ("The Christian View of History," p. 325).




and infallible scripture. As Dawson so adequately puts it,
$hat drives men to communism is not merely economic discontent
nor even dissatisfaction with the external social order. It is
something deeper than these - a discontent with human life it¬
self: a divine discontent £hat can only find full satisfaction
in the sphere of religion.
It is unnecessary to analyse the defects of Communism in order to show
why it is an unsatisfactory means of unifying kurcpe and restoring the
spiritual community for which Europe secretly yearns. Its despotic methods
conflict too greatly with the traditions of European freedom to allow
it to be considered seriously. Further, its claim as the necessary "next
stpp" in the development of Inuustrial civilization is, according to
Dawson, entirely without foundation. Contrary to Marxist theory, Commun¬
ism was accepted originally and fully only by a backward agrarian nation
and not by a highly industrialized one. Communism in Russia was a new
experiment that grew up with the advance of industrialism, science, and
technology and was not a panacea for a society already stiffering from
the diseases of industrialism, as Marx had predicted.^ therefore the
Russian experiment can be of little guidance for Europe as a whole,
for Russia has not had to face - and consequently has not had to solve-
the great problem of modeen society: haw a modern mechanized society can
become a closely-knit community without sacrificing its ideals of justice
k
and freedom. To this problem, Communism is unable to give an answer,
must therefore look elsewhere.
modern quest for the reintegration of culture and the establishment of
a true community. iVith communism, it marks a turn of the tide away from
In a less spectacular way, socialism also aspires to meet the
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liberal individualism and an effort toward social planning for the benefit
of the masses. Socialism, Dawson believes, is to be commended for its
attempt to translate the abstract ideals of liberal democracy into
social reality and to extend liberal ideals to the spheres of economics
and culture."^ Dawson fears, however, that socialism has acquired some
definitely anti-liberal elements such as its concern for the mass instead
of for the individual and its condoning of the use of power by the State
in order to smother opposition. And in a final analysis, Dawson believes,
socialism is just another form of secularism and materialism. This,
he feels, is the real basis for its appeal to the common man and the reason
why it is so difficult to check once it gets in power. It is easier,
Dawson says, to resist a totalitarian State that relies on concentration
camps than it is to resist a benevolent State that relies on free clinics
and free milk But the greatest threat of socialism, especially for
Great Britain, is that it tends to undermine the Parliamentary system
of government. This system rests, according to Dawson, ur>on a basic
conformity of interest among all the political parties and factions in
which there is room for an agreement to differ and a chance to effect
a balance of conflicting interests. Throu# the rise of the Labor
party, however, class conflict has entered into the picture and, as a
result, the opponents of the Laboring class are seen as sinister forces
which have no right to existSocialism, in this respect, is like a
religion which cannot sacrifice its principles in the interests of a
political compromise. For it to regard the constitutional order as a
sacred one to which it must conform "is like asking a religious fanatic
H
to postpone the millenium in the interests of the London Stock Exchange I"
"" *'-f- 1 "
The Judgment of the Nation^,, p. H5; The Modern Dilemma, p. IO3.
p
Religion and the Modern State, p. 27-
3"The Puture of national Government," Dublin Review (April,1935)p.237 ff.
^Ibid.. p. 2U0.
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Further, -under socialism, the political order becomes subordinated to an
organisation based on industry and governed by purely economic consider¬
ations •"*" And finally, when the government, through socialism, is given
power over large sections of the industrial system, elections are likely
to involve fundamental changes in economic policy. Such issues as these,
Dawson believes, cannot properly be solved by the ballot box and no nation,
on the basis of such decisions, can afford to vacillate from one economic
2
system to another every few years.
Dawson's hostility to socialism do s not mean that he favors
laissez-faire capitalism. He recognizes the need for large-scale social
planning for the modern mass society, but differs from the socialists in
that he prefers to see this planning less under the control of a central
government. Dawson seeks to maintain a position somewhere between
capitalism and socialism. He would like to see socialism purged of its
totalitarian tendencies and capitalism purged of its ties with narrow
economic individualism.^ He criticizes both capitalism and socialism
(and communism as well) for their bias toward materialism. 2hey are all,
he believes, typical products of nineteenth-century industrial society
with its secularism, fthat is needed instead is
a political philosophy that is more catholic and more humane -
one which does not exclude or depreciate the non-ecnomic functions
aid values, but which treats man as a free personality, the creature
of God and the maker of his own destiny. *
Of all the existing political and economic systems, Dawson gives
priority to fascism (not so much as materialized in Italian practice, but
rather as a theory). Fascism, too, is an attempt to re-establish the old
tradition of luropean unity and is even more conspicuously reminescent
Beyond Politics, p. 17•
^Religion and the Modern State, p. 27.
-%ia Judgment of the Nations, p. W>.
u
She Future of National Govsmeraent," pp. 250 f.
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of the medieval political system, particularly in the alliance it sought
■between the Church and the State, fascism, according to Dawson, is based
on the idea of a corporate or co-operative State comnosod of a federation
of a large number of local organisations and functional units.^ It in¬
volves the incorporation of both employers and employees in a series cf
great corporations and national syndicates. Although Mussolini took a
good many of his ideas from Georges Sorel (who had a great influence as
well on Lenin), he put aside Sorel's idea of class war and advocated
instead a policy of national unity. Dawson describes fascism as Sorel's
Syndicalism purged of its Marxist elements and reorganized on a national
0
and cooperative basis. Hather than liquidate whole classes as in
communism, fascism stresses the -onion of all the creative forces of the
nation. It thus arrives at a high degree of political efficiency and
economic control without sacrificing the existing social structure.^
Among the other advantages cited by Dawson are that it puts an end to
competition, subordinates private profits to the national interest, retains
a large margin of individual initiative, and allows for self-government
on the part of each industry. fascism thus meets most of the criticisms
levelled against both capitalism and communism. With the decline of
liberalism and parliamentary democracy, fascism, Dawson believes, may
5
increasingly become the pattern for the future.
ifivea through fascism may be good in theory and may actually
6
recover much that was good in the medieval corporate life, Dawson admits
that it has, in practice, become but another totalitarian instrument in¬
volving the ruthless suppression of opponats and the utilization of mass
^Inquiries, etc.., p* 55*
^SelLdLon and the Modern State, pp. 8 f.
3Bacruiries. etc.. pp. I3 f.
^RelirAon and the Modern State, p. 12.
ftrbld.. t>. lU.
^Visser T'Hooft levels a major criticism against Catholicism at this
point. He holds that Catholicism's apparent liberalism in reference to
2&\
propaganda. Dawson's writings daring the late war show a waning sym¬
pathy with the fascist stats (in its Italian form). At one time he called
p
it "a unitary mass driven by an aggressive will to power." Nonetheless,
Dawson believes that these defects were due Primarily to the nationalistic
form in which the fascist idea was expressed. He feels that if the fascist
concept of a corporate state could be internationalised into a society
extending, for example, over Europe as a whole, it would be close to the
Christian ideal and would be a real step toward peace.
Our survey to this point has considered a number of different
movements in modern Europe, each of which has, in its own way been a quest
for unity and an attempt to restore the foundations of the European com¬
munity. All cf them, however, have only served further to disrupt the few
remnants of that original unity. Thus the chaos and confusion of modern
Europe is, paradoxically, a result of the clash and life-and~death grapple
between the various competing revolutionary movements (communism, national¬
ism, socialism, liberalism, fascism) which were all equally inspired by
■x
a belief in social progress and the hope of a more ideal European order I
The result is that the achievement of a European order and spiritual commun¬
ity based on common ideals is actually more distant and more impossible of
fulfillment than it has been for centuries. Europe thus all the more
urgently cries out for a solution to its predicament.
the cause of labor is deceptive and that in reality it is acting on the
principle that whatever is reminiscent cf the pre-capitalistic order of the
Middle Ages is to be encouraged. Per this reason, he 3ays, Eoman Catholicism
opposes movements of the social and political left-wing and especially
anything challenging the rights of private property or the increasing
control of the State over life (The Church's Witness to God's Design.
Amsterdam World Council Series, II, 6l).
^Bparuiries, etc.. pp. lpf.
Peace Aims and Power Politics," Dublin Hsview (April, !$&)
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• Meeting the Crisis
The present crisis confronting Europe, Dawson believes, is of
world-shaking proportion and is equally as serious as that confronting the
1
Roman Empire in the years of its decline, Dawson frequently calls attention
to the close parallel between the forces at work in the decline of Rome end
2
those beseiging our civilization today. Among these are the vast develop¬
ment of material resources and luxuries, the physical unification of the
3
world, world-wide eeonomio expansion involving the exploitation of natural
resources and subjeot populationsi the opening of vast systems of communi¬
cation, extensive urbanization and the consequent loss of agrarian foundations
the collapse of the family and the failure of the citizen class to reproduee
5
itself, the increase of State control and governmental bounty, and the develop
6
ment of a standardized cosmopolitan civilization. Our civilization, of
course, is infinitely richer and more powerl\il} yet, like Rome, in conquering
and organizing the world it seems to have lost its own soul. If anything,
our civilization is even more threatened today than in the age of Rome, For
the fall of Rome, Dawson believes, was an external disaster which could be
oomplaoently accepted by Christians, whereas the civilization being threatened
today is a Christian civilization and the values under attack are Christian
7
values. The adversaries of higher civilization are not barbarians but
rather the totalitarian State "armed with modern scientific techniques and
Although Dawson constantly reverts to this analogy, he is careful to
point out that it is not a fatalistic one involving predictions according to
any cyclical "law," (The Judgment of the Nations, p, 23),
Dawson also points out that the decline of our civilization parallels
that of Greece in the loss of en agrarian fourdation end in the fact that a
high degree of intellectual and scientific achievement co-exists with a stage
of decline, (Progress and Religion,pp. 1+5, 65 ffj "Progress and Deoay,etc.w,p.
^"Crisis of the West," pp. 262-266.
^Enquiries, pp. i+5 ff.
5Ibid., p. 275.
^Beyond Politics, pp. 88 ff. There is a general tendency, Dawson notes,
for culture to decrease in quality as it increases in quantity.
^The Judgment of the Nations, p, 9*
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a religion of its own. Even worse, it is not just the outward structure
of sooiety which is at stake but also the soul of man.
1. Europe's Role and Responsibility
These threats to our civilization must be met and conquered.
And this victory, according to Dawson, must first of all be won in Europe,
for ^urope is at the very heart of the world problem. It therefore has both
a peouliar responsibility for and a distinctive role in this crisis. Its
responsibility is due to the fact that world civilization today (in so far
as there is such a thing) is a product of European culture. Moving out from
this cradle of modern civilization have been innumerable creative and
destructive forces. Although some of the revolutionary forces have become
even more revolutionary eotside of Europe, their oumulative effect has been
most drastic upon the parent civilization itself. If these destructive
forces can be oonquered in Europe, Dawson argues, there is hope for the
world. Europe, secondly, has a necessary role which no other cultural unit
can fulfill. The new world that is emerging, says Dawson, can realize itself
2
only in and through Europe. In spite of its material and eoonomic disinte¬
gration, Europe still leads the world in science and in thought and retains,
although in e lppled form, the moral and spiritual leadership of the world.
"Europe," Dawson believesstill remains the greatest center of world populat¬
ion and the riohest and most highly eultured area in the wo rid Whatever
the situation may be a century or two hence, there is no force outside Europe
today capable of taking her plaoe.
Even the United States, fb r all their wealth and prosperity are in a
very real sense dependent on the civilization of Western Europe, and
if the latter were to disappear it is at least highly doubtful whether
American civilization would be able to carry on.^
* ■
The Judffltent of the Nations, p. 9*
^The Modern Dilemma, p. 33*
London^i^SS6 p ^ Society of Free Peoples," Catholic Truth Society Pamphlet,
^"The New Decline and Fall," Commonweal,(June 20,1932), XV, 320.
267
The other greet world civilizations such as Chine, Russia, and India are
even more spiritual exhausted and open to the invasion of anti-spiritual
forces than either Eruope or the United States.^" The world therefore is still
greatly dependent upon Europe's leadership. If Europe fails in this responsi¬
bility and role, it may spell doom for the civilization of the world as a
whole,^
2, European Unityi Necessity and Actuality
Europe, however, cannot lead the world in its present divided
and disintegrated state. The moral, spiritual, and political unification of
Europe, then, is absolutely indispensible for the continuation of Western
civilization. The idee of European unity is no longer a vague Utopian
ideal, aocording to Dawson, It is a pressing political necessity,^
In the deepest sense, of course, Europe is already a unity. One
of the greatest disintegrating factors in modern times, as we have already
noted, has been the failure to take this basic unity into aocount. The
faot that Europe has never been a unified political State has led many to
believe that Europe is, after all, just a convenient abstraction. But,
Dawson argues, just as Germany and Italy were nations long before -the German
Empire and the Italian Kingdom existed, so Western Europe has been for
centuries a real social unit even though this fact has not yet attained
political expression, Europe is not an abstraction; the real abstractions
are the various national cultures vhich owe their very existence to their
1+
participation in a spiritual society common to all the Western peoples.
Germany, Franoe, and Italy, for instance, are nothing apart from Europe; they
draw their very life from their membership in the wider European sooiety. This
j
The Modern Dilemma, p, 31•
p
Progress and Religion, p. 215
^Dawson's preface to Haleoki's Limits and Divisions, eto, , p. viii,
^The Modern Dilemma, p. 15,
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is shown, Dawson believes, by the fact that those nations which try to
withdraw themselves from the common European culture in order to aocentuate
their own traditions end up by destroying the roots of their own higher cul¬
ture and become immeasurably impoverished.* The same thing is true physically
as well as culturally, for in the wars of the past the European States have
2
stood or fallen together. This is apparent in the case of the smaller
states which have been so quickly absorbed by the larger ones. But the
last war has shown that even the larger states such as France and Italy
could not stand alone. The essential unity of Europe is also seen in the
rapid diffusion of intellectual and revolutionary movements from one end
of Europe to the other. Even those movements most closely connected with
particular states such as the Renaissanoe, the Reformation, and the French
Revolution have had European-wide reperoussions. Dawson further points out
that the typioal representatives of European civilization, such as Erasmus,
Leibnitz, and Goethe were first of all citizens of Europe and not of any
particular state.^ The failure to recognize this unity has been the root
cause, Dawson maintains, for the disasters of the last fifty years which
threaten to destroy Western civilization. Now the essential unity of Europe
has not ceased to exist because it has been disregarded. On the contrary,
says Dawson, it has gone on developing and is actually more complex and
highly organized today than at any time in the past.^1 If further disasters
j
"European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages,"Dublin Review (January,
1950), p. 32. T.S. Eliot speaks of the deoline of British literature during
World War II whan contacts with continental movements of thought were restricted
and uses this as an example of how international cooperation and the process
of mutual fertilization is absolutely neoessary for the flourishing of national
cultures. (Notes Toward the Definition of Culture, pp. 116 f.)
^Understanding Europe, p. 55* Because of this close interdependency,
Dawson maintains that every European war is either a civil or a revolutionary
one.
^"Europe and the Smaller States," Dublin Review (July, 19^3) P* 10,
^The Modern Dilemma, p. 15.
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are to be avoided, Europe must become conscious of its organic unity
and create some form of political expression which will embody this common
European consciousness.
What political form shall this expression of European unity
take? At present there are three live alternatives* 1) European unity
under the hegemony of the United States, 2) European unity under the
hegemony of Russia, and 3) a United States of Europe. The first two
solutions must be ruled out at once, even though they may seem the most
likely. If Europe should come completely under the control of outside
powers, it would no longer be Europe. The notion of a United States of
Europe, however, immediately raises many problems. The term "United States"
is, first, a misleading one and suggests a tightly-knit federation such as
found in the U.S.A. This would be entirely out of line with the whole
1
European tradition of wide diversity within an underlying unity. The
term further seems to imply the abolition of nationality in the creation
of one giant super-State. But this, Dawson believes, would be no solution,
for nationality is at the very heart of the European tradition. All that
is strongest in European life has its souroe in the local traditions and
2
"to destroy nationality would be to cut the roots of our social vitality."
The only realistic solution is a loosly-knit federation which allows for
great diversity and which is especially mindful of the autonomous tradit¬
ions of the smeller states. Now what are the chances of arriving at suoh
a federation? A number of difficulties stand in the way. First there is
the possibility that if eaoh state retains its sovereignty, fresh struggles
of power among the member states of the federation might break out. Again,
*The Judgment of the Nations, pp. ll<9 f.
p
Enquiries, etc., p. 8.
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the union might beoome so big and powerful as to be a threat to the rest
of the world. There is, in addition, the extreme national sentiment in
each of the States whioh would block any proposed amalgamation.^ And
finally, there is the problem of the present diviaaonof Germany oreating a
great oleft right through the heart of central Europe. This tragic divis¬
ion would seem to make the unification of Europe completely out of the
question. Dawson believes, however, that this division has still not
destroyed the unity of Europe and that it will ultimately prove to have
2
been only temporary and artificial. Thus regardless of the fact that
this solution is difficult to aohieve, Dawson believes that we must press
toward some kind of European federation.
The development of a common European consciousness in a European
confederation is not incongruous with the need for international vision,
acoording to Dawson. For he insists that if a true world civilisation
is ever achieved it will not be by ignoring the existing historical units
3
of culture but only by an inc ease of mutual comprehension. If a European
confederation could be achieved, it would be a real step toward world
unity, for that confederation would be in a position to cooperate with
other great federations in the development of a world federation.^ It
is toward this goal that we must work, for, as Dawson puts it,
The world is faoed with the choice between world federation or
world empire.5
Spiritual Foundations for European Unity
Although Dawson insists upon the importance of political and
social planning, the analysis just given, if taken alone, would give a
^""Europe and Christendom," pp. 117
p
Understanding Europe, pp. l\3 f* The reconstruction of Europe cannot
be achieved without the unification of Germany, Dawson states. (Op.oit. 65 ff)«
^The Making of Europe, p. xxiii.
S?he Judgment of the nations, p. li+8.
^Understanding Europe, p. 85.
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distorted pioture of his thought. He believes that no eoonomic or political
system alone can solve our problems. For, as he says, "The foundations of
our world are 3haken and we shall not save it by replanning the superstruc¬
ture."* In other words, the basic diseases of our civilization must be
cured before it can become healthy again. Otherwise they will reappear in
new forms. The essential task, then, is to create not a new state maehine
but new men and a new spirit,
A purely praotical and opportunist system of international cooperation
Is insufficient. Economic and political aotion can do little without
oommon spiritual aims and a common intellectual culture.2
Spiritual renewal and social regeneration, aooording to Dawson, are not
just moralistio platitudes but have become a basic sociological neoessity,^
Some way must be found to restore oontaot between the life of the spirit and
the life of society. As it is, the spiritual foroes are existing separately
as a soul without a body while the outward life of society has become a
il
body without a soul. A culture oannot long survive with suoh a dichotomy;
5
it must become spiritually reintegrated or perish.
Now the need for spiritual reintegration has been vaguely felt
for a long time, according to Dawson. In fact, ever since the dissolution
of the medieval unity there have been innumerable movements, as we have
seen, searching for "the lost spiritual values of Christendom. Although this
quest has usually been a hidden one, sometimes it has been reoognized for
what it is and men, feeling the need for a spiritual basis for social life,
have tried to create an artificial religion. Thus we have the de-supernatural-
ized religion of the Deists, the sociological faith of Comte, and the various
attempts of men of our time such as Aldous Huxley, J. Middleton Murry, and
^•Understanding Europe, p. 227,
p '"inter-raoiel Cooperation as a Factor," p. 9*
^"Religion and Mass Civilization," p. 8.
l+Religion and Culture, pp. 216 f. Dawson also desoribes this as the
laok of balance between the inner and the outer worlds or as the dichotomy
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D.H. Lawrenoe to create a religion without revelation. But nothing
oould be more pathetic, Dawson believes, than the repeated failure of
all suoh attempts to manufacture a religion, Artifioially-produoed religion
naturally fails, says Dawson, because it lacks the essential element of
transcendence which alone makes faith both possible and necessary, Man
cannot permanently worship himself or something which is the creation of
2
his own mind. But most basioally, an artificially-constructed religion
will ultimately fail because it is out-of-touch with the long-standing
traditions of its culture.
All of these attempts to create a religion to meet our social
needs are absurd, says Dawson, for we already have at our finger-tips the
spiritual means of reintegration in the Christian faith which has organic
ties with the great traditions of the past and is in fact the very soul
of Western society, Beoause of this, Dawson believes that it is sociologi¬
cally realistic to advocate a return to Christianity as the basis for
European order.
The true foundation of European unity is to be found not in political
or economic agreements, but in the restoration of the spiritual
tradition on which that unity was originally based,*
Although the Christian basis of European culture has been obsoured and
weakened until it is almost invisible, Dawson believes that it is still
the only ultimate bond of social unity. The process of secularisation,
he says, has gone a long way, but it has not yet become complete. There is
therefore still a ohanoe of recovering our Christian foundations, for beoause
European civilisation "derives its life and u ity from a higher spiritual
between the religious and the scientific traditions (Enquiries, etc,, pp. 70,
96| The Modern Dilemma, pp. Ij2, Jl; Progress and Religion, pp. 2jj f,, 2i*7 f»)
^When the deeper spiritual impulses are not given an outlet, Dawson
cautions, they turn against life and become destructive. ("The Renewal of
Civilization," p. 9i "The CriBis of Christian Culturej Eduoation," p. Lfli
Progress and Religion, pp. 228 ff.j Christianity and the New Age, p. 1$
^"Christianity and the hew Age, pp. 50 ff.j "The Dark Mirror," p. 177*
2— '
The Modern Dilemma, pp. 105 f.
3Ibid., p. 27.
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prinoiple, it is not bound to the fatal cycle of birth and death. It has
in a sense an immortal soul - at least a possibility of spiritual renewal."'*'
If our civilization fails to choose this path, there is but one alternative.
The road that leads away from Christianity leads away from humanity alsoj
?
it leads to the anti-Christian order of the totalitarian mass state.
Dawson therefore pleads that
The time has come for us to retraoe our steps, to see what we have
lost in two centuries of economic progress and world conquest, and to
consider how we can recover oontaot with the essential realities ©n
which the existenoe of our civilization depends.5
The recovery of the Christian foundation for Europe, then, is
important not only for Europe but for the whole florid, for the spiritual
foundation of Europe, according to Dawson, is the only basis upon which a
world civilization can be erected. As we saw earlier, Dawson believes that
the unity (oo-existing with underlying diversity) which Europe achieved
at its height is a principle whioh can be broadened to form the basis for
a universal society of peoples. This unity was created by means of the
Christian faith. Dawson believes that the faith that brought together
Roman and barbarian in a common European society can also bring together
the nations and peoples of the world into one universal family. Christianity,
is not just a European religion - as if it were only the product of the
European past. It came into Europe, made it what it is, and has now passed
on through Europe to the rest of the world. Therefore European Christianity
is but one phase of the wider movement toward what Dawson believes will
be a world civilization based upon the Christian faith. If the faith of
Europe, therefore, is destined to be the basis for world order and if
^"The Judgment of the Nations, p. 98.
Svith similar emphasis, T.b, Eliot declaress "I do not believe that
the culture of Europe could survive the complete disappearance of the
Christian faith." (Notes Toward the Definition of Culture, p. 122)
^"fhe Crisis, of Christian Cultures Education," p. 37*
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Europe is to be the creative agent in this development, it is of crucial
importance that Europe regain that foundation for itself.
• The Roman Catholic Contribution
It is not, of course, just Christianity in general that Dawson
oonsiders as the fountainhead of European culture, but Roman Catholic
Christianity, We will want to ask then to what extent the spiritual
reintegration of which Dawson speaks implies a return to Roman Catholicism,
Does Dawson feel, for instance, that the only approach to European (and
world) reconstruction is through the Curia and the Papacy? Although Dawson
does not often disouss this issue specifically, he does say that
If Christianity is necessary to Europe, the Catholic Church is no
less neoessary to Christianity, for without it the latter would
become no more than a mass of divergent opinions dissolving under
the pressure of rationalist critioism and secularist culture.-"-
The Catholic Church is considered by Dawson as the one remaining center
of unity and spiritual order in Europe. For the type of Christianity that
is needed is a social Christianity in contrast to the individualism of
the sects in their preoccupation with personal salvation. Further, as he
goes on to say,
this society must not be merely a part of the existing social and
political order, like the established churches of the past; it must
be an independent and universal sooiety, not a national or local one.
The only society that fulfills these conditions is the Catholic
Church. • • .
Again, when Dawson speaks of the indispensibility of a doctrinal foundation
if our civilization is to survive, he is really thinking cf Roman Catholic
1The Modern Dilemma, p. 111.Cf, the statement of T.S. Eliot, "Every
culture is dependent upon that from which it is en offshoot. The life of
Protestantism depends upon the survival of that against which it protests
, , , ," (Notes Toward a Definition of Culture, pp. 7^+ £•) Tillich agrees
with both Dawson and Sliot end holds that the Catholio Churoh plays an im¬
portant part in the existence of Protestantism. Protestantism survives,
he claims, only through reference to what he oalls the "Catholic substanoe."
("The Permanent Significance of Roman Catholicism," pp. 26 ff.)
^Ibid., p. 110,
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doctrine. The only hope for a disintegrating civilization, he maintains,
is the reoovery of the dootrinal tradition upon which its intellectual and
social order was originally based. In the case of Europe, he writes,
this means a return to the tradition of medieval Christendom which,
however obscured by centuries of spirituel revolt and social disorder,
still survives in the Catholic Church, the only remaining representa¬
tive of the tradition and spiritual authority in the Y?est.
But above all, Bawson feels that Roman Catholicism alone has preserved
intact a real spiritual community having a living continuity with the
past. Catholicism, he believes, stresses the incarnational principle "in a
2
fuller, more concrete and more organio sense than does Protestantism.
As the Christian faith in Christ is faith in a real historical person,
not an abstract ideal, so the Catholic faith in the Church is faith in
a real historic society. . . .3
This, he believes, is as it should be, for Christianity in its origins
was not just an intellectual theory of salvation (such as found in Buddhism,
the Gnostic sects, or Liberal Protestantism) bujr was an heir to the Hebrew
tradition fou ded on the idea of a holy society.^ Christianity, then, was
not merely a set of dootrines or a moral ideal, but a conorete messianic
society living in expectation of a coming supernatural order. Again, the
Church of the Middle Ages, says Dawson, was not just a "pious ideal, but a
juridicial fact"^ - a Kingdom with its own constitution and laws. How in
the past, Europe found its cultural unity through entering this concrete
spiritual community. It was not just a common faith that welded the various
races and traditions into a unity, Dawson insists, but rather their joint
"The Revolt of the East and the Catholic Tradition," p. 7*
2
The Kingdom of God and History, p. 211*•
Idem.
^Christianity and the New Age, p. 79* Enquiries, etc.p. 297* "The Crisis
of Christian Cultures Education,"pp. 1$ f.; The Modern Dilemma, p. 107.
^Understanding Europe, p. 13j Medieval Religion, p. 2I4..
276
participation in en organic society. The Roman Catholic Church of today,
says Dawson, is the historical continuation of this seme society.*
Wherever Catholicism exists there survives some contact with the
spiritual roots from which European culture sprang.^
Thus the Catholicism which was so influential in the making of Europe
is potentially just as powerful a force for the re-making of Europe. The
return to Catholicism, therefore, would seem to be indispensible for the
3
survival of European culture.
The next question we would want to ask, then, is to whet extent
does all of this involve a return to the standards and ideals of the Middle
Ages? It must be said at once that Dawson is no "mere medievalist" who
believes that all our problems would be solved simply by a return to the
Middle Ages. For the whole idea of a "return to the Middle Ages" is, for
Dawson, self-contradiotory. As he says,
it is impossible today to return to the undifferentiated unity of
medieval culture. The rise of humanism and the modern scienoes has
created an autonomous sphere of culture which lies entirely outside
the eoolesiastical domain. . . .^
In another plaoe he asserts that it is a truism to say that we cannot
return to the past, but that it is "an entirely different thing to assort
This factor, it is interesting to note, was an i.portahfc element in
Dawson's conversion to Roman Catholicism. "I followed the usual Anglo-
Catholic path," he writes, "very much like Newman, since whet tipped the
balanoe was my realisation that the Anglo-C&tholio conception of a Catholic
Church made up of a number of separated "branches" was a modern innovation
and that the partristic conception of Catholic unity was not merely a unity
uf faith but a unity of communion." (Personal lottor to the writer, January
19, 1952).
^"Europe and Christendom," p. 118.
^Dawson seams hero to bo talcing a conservative Roman Catholic position
in his demand for a return to the Mother Church. His viewpoint, however,
is broader than this suggests. He also insists, as we shall see later, that
the crisis of our time calls for the union of all Christian and liberal
foroes in a conmon front against totalitarianism.
^Beyond politics, p. 20.
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that society cannot return to the spiritual tradition on which it was
based,*'^" The return to e former spiritual tradition does not mean, for
Dawson, a return to the medieval pattern of life but instead is closer to
what Tillieh means by a "theonomous direction of life,"^ Thus, says
Dawson,
We are not indeed, going back to the Middle Ages, but we ere going
forward to a n3W age which is no less different from the last age
than that was from the medieval period,3
In to even more explicit referenoe, Dawson declares that the Middle Ages
do not represent a final social expression of Christianity,
We cannot of course regard medieval civilization as the model of
what a Christian civilization should be - as m ideal to which modern
society should conform itself. It is admirable not so much for what
it achieved as for what it attempted - for its refusal to be content
with partial solutions, and for its attenpt to bring every side of
life into vital relation with religion,*-*
In one passage, Dawson comes strikingly close to the spirit of Tillieh
when ho writes.
No age has the right to call itself Christian in an absolute sense*
all stand under the same condemnation. The one merit of a relatively
Christian age or culture - and it is no small one - is that it recog¬
nizes its spiritual indigence and stands open to God and the spiritual
worldj while the age , . . that is thoroughly non-Christian ia closod
to God and prides itself on its own progress to perfection,-?
One final question in reference to Dawson's conception of the
role of Roman Catholicism is, "To what extent does he believe that the
Christian forces of our time whould be organically re-incorporated into
the 'Mother Church' ?' From time to time Dawson has had a good deal to say
about the necessity of the union of Christian forces in order to meet the
onslaught of secularism and totalitarianism. With Cardinal Kinsley, he was
one of the founders of the "Sword of the Spirit" movement which tried, as one
^The Modern Dilemma, p, 27•
^Dawson's theonomous direction, however, points more toward the
institutional churoh,
^The Modem Dilemma, p, 101,
^inquirles,(eto,), p. 301* '
^Religion and the Modern State, p. 120.
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of the features of its program, to promote the cooperation of Catholics
and Protestants in a spiritual orusade against the dark forces of our time.
But how far this movement aimed at the eventual consolidation of Christian
foroes within the'Mother Church'is not clear. We have already seen the
importance that Dawson attaches to the Reformation as one of the major
causes of the present disorder and secularization of modern life. The
logical conclusion of this analysis would seem to be that the re-union
of Christendom (under Roman Catholicism) is a necessary step toward the
re-integration of Suopre and the salvation of our civilization as a whole.
This is never stated explicitly as his position, although at times it seems
to be implied. The only thing that oan definitely be said, therefore, is
that Dawson advocates the oooperation of all Christian forces though not
neoessarily their organic union.
Of course, that in itself is no mean goal, and Dawson has much
to say about how Christian cooperation oan be furthered. This problem,
Dawson believes, has been consistently approaohed too intellectually, as if
a full understanding of one another's dootrinal positions would result in
mutual comprehension. But dootrinal and intelleotual differences are only
superficial, according to Dawson. The real differences are social and
reduce ultimately to differences between oultures, races, nationalities,
and economic groups. It is here that social conflicts arise which later
assume religious forms, as we saw earlier in this chapter. It is one of
Dawson's chief contentions that religious differenoes oan never be overcome
until these basic sooial confliots are resolved. The way to heal divisions
"The Sooial Faotor in the Problem of Christian Unity," The Colosseum
(April, 1938). IV, 1,1 The Judgment of -the Nations, pp. 118, 1^3, 1&5,
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caused by heresy end schism, therefore, is not to treat them as intellectual
problems but rather to see that all parties concerned understand the basic
social oauses for their animosity which, in most cases,have long since
disappeared or lost their disruptive power. Onoe these motivating foroes
are seen for what they really are, the religious issue is freed from all
extraneous motives and a new basis for cooperation is achieved. This
method, Dawson says, might be called "social-analysis"j it would serve the
1
same purpose Ibr society that psycho-analysis serves for the individual.
Because of the great possibilities through this approach, Dawson is quite
certain that significant strides toward Christian unity will be made in our
time. Whereas in the past national, class, and eoonomio motives had to
disguise themselves in the dress of religion, they have now come out into
2
1he open as the dominatit foroes of our time. This has increasingly freed
raligion from its entanglements and has helped to clear the religious issue.
Dawson is therefore of the opinion that "the present age is more favorable
3
to the cause of unity than any time since the Middle Ages." Another
indication that Christian forces may be moving oloser toward unity and co¬
operation is the pressing need for a common front against the new anti-Christ
tho totalitarian State. This iG ono enemy, Dawson believes, against which
all Christians can oooperate without compromising "Iheir principles. But
totalitarianism is not just a Christian enemyj it is the enemy of humanity
end threatens the basic human values* man's freedom, dignity, and rationality
This danger is so great and so real that it demands the cooperation of all
tho living foroes in our culture which recognize thoir mutual involvement
in the common spiritual tradition of Western civilization.^ Liberals,
On the Development of Sociology," p. 171.
The Judgment of the Nations, p. 125.
^Ibid.pp. 112 f. (see also p. 125)
Idem*
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humanitarians, and Christians alike have become brothers in the common
cause of preserving man's basic freedoms.'*" In the past, Liberalism and
Christianity have often been hostile to one another, especially on the
European oontinent. But since they are being attaoked by an enemy hostile
to both religion and humanism, they must join foroes and seek to understand
one another. Liberals, Dawson believes, must become increasingly conscious
of their rootage in Christianity; Christians, on the other hand, must take
seriously the present threat to the basic human liberties which liberals
seek to defend. Although Christians are justified in criticising liberal¬
ism's "cut-flower" humanitarianism (whioh often tended to become a rival
religion), the liberal ideals are not just empty abstractions but are the
very foundations of our oivilised life. If these values fall, our civili-
2
zation falls with them. Both Christians and liberals, therefore, need to
realize their deep kinship and understand that in the present crisis "the
cause of God and the cause of Humanity are one."^
5» Spiritual Regeneration* Sociological Signs end Esohatologioal ^ope
We have continually celled attention to Dawson's observation
that spiritual regeneration is ebsolutely indispensible if our civilization
is to survive. We have already noted some hopeful signs pointing to "the
possibility of greater Christian cooperation in the future. But ere there
any indications ihat our civilization will witness a general spiritual
awakening or a large-scale return to religion?
^Although these thoughts were written by Dawson during Y/orld War II,
with German totalitarianism particularly in mind, it is certain that Dawson
would apply them with equal force today in reference to the totalitarian
threat of Russia.
2
The Judgment of the Nations, p. 21.
^Ibid., pp. I) f.
281
Dawson's analysis of the social trends of the past four or
five centuries points to a number of hopeful signs. The general pattern
of action and reaotion which Dawson notes in relation to the major movements
of reoent centuries wculd seem to indioate that a new age for Christendom
lies ahead. All of the characteristic movements of the past four hundred
years suoh as capitalism, individualism, liberalism, rationalism and
scientific materialism are, aooording to Dawson, passing away. Now the
rejection of religion (or at least the relegation of it to a secondary
place or to a private sphere) was one of the ohlef characteristics of this
whole period.^" The last two hundred years in particular have witnessed
the completion of that prooess - so much so that Dawson calls them a
2
"post-Christian" age. Hostility to religion, then, is no new thing.
But the hopeful sign is that it seems to be tied up with that whole series
of movements vhioh have now nearly worked themselves out.
Everywhere we are witnessing a return to corporate ways of thought
and aotion, a now sonco of the roligious significance of the community,
and an increasing interest in the expression of collective conscious¬
ness in myth and ritual and art. This marks a great change from the
individualism of the nineteenth century.^
A comparable reaction is to be found in relation to all the other character¬
istic movements of the past few oenturies. Further, the various contemporary
movements of revolt, says Dawson, are not direoted primarily against the
old European culture and its Christian spiritual tradition, but against
those movements which themselves revolted against Christendom and the
European tradition.^ Capitalism, it must be remembered, was a revolt
T "
The Modern Dilemma, pp. 100-103#
^"Europe and Christendom," p. 113.
^Dawson's review of Latourette's Advance Through Storm, p. 363# With
Tillioh, Dawson finds in art a barometer of spiritual change. He notes, f»r
example, "the tendency of modern art to abandon the naturalistic principles
that governed its development from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century
in favor of new canons of style that have more in common with the art of
Byzantium and of the anoient east" (The Modern Dilemma, p. 101).
^The Modern Dilemma, p. 29»
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against feudalism. Although the socialist revolt against capitalism does
not automatically bring us back to the medieval tradition, it is not
necessarily hostile to it. It is the post-Christian othloal compromise
(the vaguo human!tarianism end faolla optimism) and not Christianity that
1
is the real target of +he revolutionary movements of our day. The new
age that is about to dawn, then, will be far different from the post-
Renaissance age and there are good reasons to believe that it will contradict
the dominant characteristics of that age. For history, as Dawson sees it,
2
doos seem to follow a course of alternate action and reaotion. Eaoh
generation, each century, and eaoh age to some extent oontradicts its
predecessor. We are living, Dawson believes, through one of the latter
types of transformations - when the ends of the ages meet. Such times as
these are "times when the whole spirit of civilization becomes transformed
and the stream of history seems to change its course and flow in a new
3
direction." Such movements of alternation, Dawson believes, are the
very stuff of history. Therefore, although secularism has become particu¬
larly rampant in our time,
there is no reason to boliovo that it will not ultimately be succeeded
by a movement in the other direction toward religious belief and spirit¬
ual integration as, has been the oase with all the more limited move¬
ments in the pastJ*
Thus there is the possibility - indeed the likelihood - that the old spirit¬
ual tradition of Europe will reassert itself. For this reason Dawson believes
that the Church whioh created Europe may yet save Europe and through Europe,
the whole world
, —




^Religion and Culture, p. 216.
^The Modern Dilemma, p. 113* Tillich, on the other hand, points out
that the Church cannot save society, but only Christ.
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Another hopeful indication provided by Dawson's sociological
analysis is what he calls an historical tendency toward "richer and fuller
1
group consciousness."
The history of mankind, and still more of civilised mankind, shows a
continuous prooess of integration, which, even though it seems to
work irregularly, never ceases.^
Although Dawson does not hold the old liberal view of progress, he does
believe that this movement of integration has preceded from the dawn of
civilization and that it is real and incontestable. It will continue to
operate, he believes, until mankind as a whole finds sooial expression in
3
a oommon civilization.
Another hopeful sign is found by Dawson even in the comparison
we have already diaou3sed between the decline of our civilization and the
decline of Rome I The grounds for hope lie in the fact that whereas the
cultural unity of the Roman Empire wa3 artificial and shallow, our spiritual
h
heritage and cultural unity has been far richer. The final decline of
Rome, he comments, was prededed by centuries of peaoej the disintegrating
forces of expansion, exploitation, and civil war did not work themselves
out for centuries. The Roman decline, in other words, was gradual whereas
the decline of our civilization has been swift and sudden. Therefore,
5
Dawson believes, our decline will probably not be permanent or final.
And the fall of Roman civilization was followed by spiritual resurreetion
and radical conversion. Perhaps, then, "the strife end discords of the
transitional period of modern Europe may also be the prelude to an age of
'■"On the Development of Sociology," p. 81.
2
Enquiries, p. 125j The Age of the Gods, p. xix.
^"On the Development of Sociology," p. 62.
^'Tho Crisis of the Tv'est," p. 275.
5
This argument seems weak in the light of Dawson's analysis of the
great disintegrating movements at work sinco tho Renaissance and the Refor¬
mation. Further, the fact that our decline has taken place at the "height
of our social and eduoational activity" (Understanding Europe, p. is of
little comfort, fur as Dawson says elaewhb 1 lli' T'yfSTtJITOe t'O" 'the decline of
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world civilization under Western leadership•"
And finally, there may be grounds for optimism in Dawson's
analysis of the great eultural cycles of Youth, Progress, and Maturity.
As we noted in Chapter Ten, the three proceeding ages of history have all
culminated in a great synthesis which incorporated tho aohiovomonta of the
period of Progress and reconciled them with the fundamental achievements
of the synthesis it inherited from the previous age. Whether or not our
present age will also culminate in suoh a synthesis remains to be seen.
Only one thing, aeoording to Dawson, is certain: no civilization can con¬
tinue indefinitely in a state of crisisj "it either achieves its synthesis
2
or it dies." If our civilization does achieve maturity, it will bring
together the various polar elements that have been pulled apart through
the disintegrating movements of reoent centuries. Both oriental and occi¬
dental elements will be incorpor ated, for true progress requires the oooper-
3
ation of both. If it is truly a European synthesis, it must also involve
a renewed collaboration of northern and southereEurope (as in the Carolingian
synthesis) as well as eastern and western Europe.^
Yet the calculations based upon an analysis of sociological
trends if taken by themselves would give a false impression of Dawson's
5
views. His thought also includes a strong apocalyptic element. Faith
■ 1 * 1 - ■ 1
Rome, "Here there was no question of senesoenoe. Sooiety came near to its
dissolution while at the height of its cultural activity. • • •" (Progress
and Religion, p. 213.)
^■"The Crisis of Christian Culture: Education," p. 1+6•
2
Enquiries (etc.) , p. 93#
?Ibid., p. 77.
Inter-raoial cooperation as a Factor in European Sooiety," p. 10.
^To the writer's knowledge Dawson has made no attempt to bring these
two levels of thought together. As a sociologist and historian he analyses
the great social movements and trends and claims to see general patterns such
as the progressive integration of society. Yet as a Christian thinker he holds
firmly to what he conceives to be the New Testament esohatology with its
antipathy to the calculable progressive achievement of the good.
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in the ultimate viotory of Christianity does not, for Dawson, depend upon
any visible grounds or humanly predictable trends. According to the
Christian view of history, the world is not getting progressively betterj
evil, in fact. Increases and grows stronger as the end of history approaches.
The Kingdom of God, Dawson maintains, do-s not come by the elimination of
2
conflict but by the inc-easing opposition of the Church and the world.
Christians, therefore, must not expect an easy victory for Christianity
but must be prepared for persecution. This does not mean, of course, that
evil has the last word. But it does mean that the time of darkness, failure,
and suffering is the time for the greatest hope, just as the time of the
3
Church's apparent success is actually the ti e of its decadence and decline.
Consequently it is in the dark ages of history when human failure and im¬
potence are most keenly felt that the power of eternity is manifest.
Thus, although Dawson does not believe in the nineteenth century
optimistic theory of progress, he does believe that there is spiritual
progress through a society's dying and rising again. There is no general
law of progress which can be objectively measured, as the nineteenth
century thought. Nevertheless, the Kingdom continues to maroh forward -
not through visible and tangible success but through failure, suffering,
and defeat. Dawson believes in spiritual progress, then, not as a natural
development but as an esohetologioal fulfillment.
—
The Kingdom of God and History, p. 216. Religion and the Modern
State, p. 77* TilliohTshares this view and comments that as a ebw kalros
approaches, the demonic forces tend to acquire increased power. ("Christ
the Center of History," Contemporary Thinking About Jesus? An Anthology,
Thomas S. Kepler, editor,"Tifew ^orkt Abingdon-Cokesbury,~X9l2T), p. 221.)
^The Kingdom of God and History, p. 215





The critique of Tillich's thought was largely on the basis of
his theology and philosophy because that is the area of his special work.
Since Dawson on the other hand devotes his major attention to sociological
and historical analyses, these will form the basis for the major critioism
of this author,
Dawson's analysis of the source and solution of the modern pre¬
dicament whioh we have been discussing in the previous chapter hinges around
his interpretation of the disruption of the medieval synthesis and this,
for Dawson is seen primarily in terms of the Protestant Reformation,
Beoause he sees the Reformation as the chief disrupting factor, he looks
hopefully to the reunion of Christians in the Mother Church as the solution
for the crisis of the post-Reformation era, Dawson's view of the Reformation,
then, is of central importance in an appraisal of his total social analysis
and greatly affects our judgment concerning the proposals he advocates for
the solution of "the modern dilemma," We shall therefore need to examine
his view of the Reformation in order to form a judgment about the validity
of his total thesis. First, we shall consider Dawson's analysis of the
causes of the Reformation,
Dawson sees the Reformation largely in terms of his sociological
determinism. Although he reoognizes the need for reform and does not use
his sociological analysis as a means of disguising the evils of the Church,
he does minimize the theological controversy and claims that something
similar to the Reformation would have occurred whatever the specific
theological differences may have been. The real root force behind the
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disruption of the medieval synthesis, Dawson believes, was the breaking
apart of the Latin and barbaric elements comprising that synthesis, the
Renaissance being a nationalistic resurgence in the southern hemisphere
and the Reformation the racial and national revolt in the northern hemi¬
sphere. To label this analysis a sociological determinism does not intend
to suggest that Dawson, by attributing the Reformation to underlying socio¬
logical factors thereby deflects blame from the Protestant Reformers. His
analysis is, in faot, an additional way of pointing the finger of oonoemnetion
for, as Dawson sees it, if the Protestant Reformers hod been truly spiritual
men they would have realized the sooial background to their revolt. They
would have sensed that the real motivating forces were racial and national
and not primarily religious. And, although the Church stood in the need
of drastic reform, they would have made that reform from within the Church,
thus preserving the medieval unity."*"
But oan the Reformation be so simply described as merely the
result of the interplay of sociological forces? Are the Renaissance and
the Reformation nothing more than just a separation of the Latin and
barbaric elements of the medieval synthesis? Dawson himself recognises the
danger of seeing a pheonomenon t oo exclusively from one standpoint. Theo¬
logians, he says, too often neglect the historical and cultural factors and
thus oome to see life In too abstract and idealistic a fashion. Sociologists,
2
on the other hand, too often see only the sooial forces at work. On the
whole, Dawson succeeds admirably well in combining the theological and
J
One defect of this view is that it assumes the Protestant Reformers
are guilty because they withdrew from Catholic Europe to found a separate
Church. But could not the case be madethat the Reformers did not wilfully
seoeed from the Church but were rather excommunicated?
^Progress and Religion, p. viiij Enquiries (etc.), p. x.
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sociological approaches. But is it not fair to ask whether through a
Roman Catholic bias he has not slipped into too one-sided a sociological
analysis in reference to the Reformation? Does he give sufficient attention
to the spiritual factors involved? As we saw, Dawson believes that heresy
and schism are the overt manifestations of hidden sociological conflicts
and that the Protestant Reformation is just one additional example in a
long history of such oonfliots. Could it not be said that Dawson is too
eager to see sociolpgioal motives as the driving force rather than spiritual
idealism? T.S, Eliot seems to have a more balanced view here. While
sharing Dawson's observation that religious divisions often become the
symbol around which a host of other interests cluster, he maintains never¬
theless that
There are, certainly, situations in history in which a religious
contest can be attributed to a purely religious motive. The life¬
long battle of St. Athanasiu6 against the Arians. . • need not be
regarded in any other light than the light of theology* the soholar
who endeavored to demonstrate that it represented a culture-clash
between Alexandria and Antiooh. » • would appear to U3 at best to
be talking about something else.
Thus may not Protestants maintain that, regardless of the sociological
forces Dawson points out, there were also spiritual issues at stake in
the Reformation end that these, indeed, were central? May we not rightly
hold that the Protestant Reformation was the only sufficiently radical way
thai'the reform, which Dawson himself recognizes as a pressing necessity,
could have been effected? Could not the Reformation then be regarded as
within the divine plan?
Another aspect of Dawson's sociological determinism is seen in
his appraisal of the value of diversity and oonfliot in the dialeotical
movement of history. Polarity, as we noted, is seen by Dawson as an
essential element in life and is not to be condemned. He insists that
^ Uotes Domrd the Definition of Culture, p. 76.
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to "demand an abstract uniform civilization which will obviate the risk
of wars and religious schisms* is an offence against life.^" Strife,
struggle, and oonfliot, he believes, ere far more healthy than complete
synthesis or dead-level conformity# But, we may ask, is not all of this
inconsistent with Dawson's tendency to orlticize the Reformers for disrupt¬
ing the medieval synthesis? If he believes, as in the quotation cited, that
the risk of schism is healthy for a sooiety, why should he be so critical of
the schism once it has taken place?
Still another aspeot of Dawson's sociological determinism is
his analysis of thecoultural cycles cf Growth, Progress, and Maturity#
Aocording to Dawson, one of the characteristics of the second period is
the bursting forth of new creative energy and critical experimentation
which ultimately breaks the hold of the old synthesis and moves toward
the creation of a new synthesis. Aocording to this, schism and heresy are
natural concomitants of the adolescent period and have their pleoe in a
healthy and growing sooiety# How,t hen, can Dawson fail to see the Protes¬
tant Reformation as an example of this prinoiple? Aooording to his own
analysis, such revolt is a neoessary part of the complete life cycle of
a civilization without which it would stagnate and die#
So imioh for Dawson's analysis of the causes of the Reformation.
Let us now oonsider his view of its results# Dawson attributes the modern
crisis to the dissolution of the medieval unity and implies that the
Reformation was the chief element in this disintegrating process. He
explicitly says that the Reformation (through the divisive sectarianism
2
it inaugurated) was the oLief force behind modern secularization# Is
^THe Judgment of the Hations, p. 120.
^Dawson also cells Capitalism the "main cause" of the secularization
of our culture (The Judgment of the Nations, p# 137)# but does not follow
through on this pronouncement as he does in reference to the secularizing
effects of the Reformation#
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this not another Roman Catholio bias - a disposition to place the blame
upon Protestant shoulders? Aocording to Dawson's own analysis of the
great social forces at work in the dissolution of the medieval synthesis,
did not the southern hemisphere (in the Renaissanoe) break away first from
that synthesis and result in a far earlier secularization of culture?
Why, then, should Dawson seek to place the blame for secularization on
Protestantism? In another context, Dawson recognizes that the Reformation
was in part a reaction against the secularism which had already set in
during the Renaissance, ^e speaks of Luther as coming to Rome and being
shocked at the extent of the secularization.* Dawson himself is not un¬
sympathetic to Luther's reaction, for he believes that it was "the coming
of the Renaissanoe and the whole-hearted acceptance by the Papaoy of the new
humanist culture that stretched the medieval synthesis to its breaking point
p
, , , ," Dawson at times admits that the Renaissance had a secularizing
x
influenoe and notes that with the Renaissance secular culture "emancipated
itself from the tutelage of the Church and created an independent order of
humanism and science,"^ Nevertheless, when dealing with the Reformation
he seems to forget these facts and inconsistently treats the Reformation as
if it were a new beginning toward secularization,
Dawson speaks of Capitalism and Industrialism as among some
of the other results of the Reformation (and also as factors contributing
to the rise of modern secularism). As we saw, Dawson follows Troeltsch
and Weber in tracing the Capitalistic, acquisitive spirit (industry, thrift,
prudence, ete.) back to the Protestant ethic. To what extent i3 this view¬
point justified?
"Medieval Christianity," p. li).
2Ibid.
'ibid., p. 22,
^Beyond Politios,, p, 16,
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Although Dawson may have the right to hold this view, he is
certainly behind the times, sociologically speaking. Contemporary sociol¬
ogists have largely abandoned Weber's thesis as an exaggeration, There
seems to be sufficient proof that Capitalism existed long before the
Protestant Reformation, Lewis Mumford, for instance, maintains that "it
existed as a mutation at least three centuries earlier and by the fourteenth
century it pervaded Italy: a country where Protestantism has never been able
to gain a foothold,"^ R.H, Tawney in his introduction to Welrer's The Protes-
2
tant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism comments that there was no lack of
"capitalistic spirit" in the Venioe or Florenoe of the fourteenth century
3
or the Antwerp of the fifteenth century. In fact, there are good grounds
for maintaining that Capitalism aotually grew out of Catholicism rather
h
than Protestantism. Lev/is Mumford, for one, successfully makes this case.
He shows how thrift, regularity, and prudence made their first appearanoe
5
not in Calvinism but in the Benedictine monasteries. Further, medieval
trade, he believes, was always moving in the direction of capitalism
and the Church itself fcnoouraged this development through the orusades which
combined spiritual and material motives with the latter increasingly making
a larger olaim.^ And with the growth in the financial power of the Churoh,
its interests became increasingly involved with business, investment, and
^The Condition of Man, p. 159* So© also John Baillie, What Is Christian
Civilisation, p. 2J,
pcNew Yorki Charles Soribner's and Son, 1930, p. 7»
^Dawson himself admits in another context that Capitalism had arisen
by the fourteenth century (Medieval Relgiftn, p. 159).
^hese conflicting analyses are all the more interesting beoause both
Dawson and Mimford studied under the same Sociology teachers: Patrick Geddes
and Victor Brumford (Letter from Dawson to the writer, January, 1952).




banking# Not only did the growing financial power and prestige provide
temptations to the Church to beoome engrossed in secular affairs, but as well,
according to Mumford,
the very offices of the Church served further to undermine its spirit¬
ual authority. Economically speaking the Catholic Church had become
a machine for manufacturing salvation. Its churches, its shrines, its
art, above all its relics, were so much capital goods devoted to the
production of its peouliar form of immaterial wealth. As the institu¬
tion grew in power, this whole apparatus of production rested more
and more upon an elaborate system of credits and debits, cleared
through its •musical banks••
Therefore, as Mumford goes on to say.
If economic historians were as versed in theology as in economics,
they would have realized long ago that credit finance has a close
affiliation with the system of ecolesiastical aocounteartoy for sins
end good works that preceded its establishment.*
Now it was against this whole system of ecolesiaatical accountancy that
the Reformers revolted. For this reason, Mumford holds that Protestantism
came into being "not as an ally of capitalism but as its chief enemy. • •
The original Protestants of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (the Walden-
sians, Fraticelli, and the Lollards) "were all in opposition to the over¬
heated desire for worldly gain. • • .M^ Thus at its source, "Protestantism
was an attempt to check the commercial spirit and prevent it from getting
hoM of the Church. • . ."^ Mumford admits, however, that by the sixteenth
century, Protestantism and Capitalism had groYm closer together so that the
Protestant emphasis upon moral duty and honest work did serve as a hand¬
maid to the rising mBroantilism end industrialism. The Protestant contri¬
bution to Capitalism and Industrialism, then, was not in respeot to its
origin but rather to its later development. By preaching the duty of the
Dawson admits that Avignon came to be regarded by its contemporaries
as nothing more than a vast bureaucratic fiscal organization.
^The Condition of Man , pp. 155 f.—*-
Ibid., p. 156.
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moral life end the holy significance of daily tasks. Protestantism served
to make industrialism more tolerable. Drudgery, in fact, "served the
Protestant as a valuable mortification of the flesh. . . Through
Protestantism, men developed a special faculty for deriving pleasure from
2
the industrial grind I
If Mumford is right, Catholicism thus shares -with Protestantism
any blame that may be deserved for the rise of Capitalism end Industrialism.
Although we may agree with Dawson that these have been disrupting forces in
modern civilization, we cannot follow him in attributing the major respon¬
sibility for this situation to Protestantism.
Let us now turn to another of Dawson's major arguments against
Protestantism, that concerning the disintegrating and secularizing effeots
of sectarianism. Although, as Protestants, we may deplore the endless
multiplication of sects and long for the reunion of Christendom, can we
agree with Dawson that schism is always wrong beoause it leads to oultural
disintegration? Dawson believes that if our civilization had retained its
religious unity it would be muoh more healthy today. But is there any
real basis for this contention? T.S• Eliot's view again seems a more sober
and sensible one. He doubts whether sectarianism is always a negative foroe
and points out that Methodist evangelicalism, for instanoe, prepared the way
for the Oxford movement with its positive, integrating effects.^ As Eliot
puts it.
The eotual choice, at times, has been between sectarianism and
indifferenoe end those who chose the former ware, in so doing,
keeping alive the culture of oertain social strata.**
Therefore, says Eliot, the loss of religious unity does not automatically
lead to cultural decline. Indeed, as he says elsewhere,
we must acknowledge that many of the most remarkable achievements of
culture have been made since the sixteenth century, in conditions of
^"The Condition of Man, p. 199* ^Motes Toward The Definition,(etc.).p
^Idem. ^idem.
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disunity* and that soma indeed, as in the nineteenth century France,
appear after the religious foundations for culture seem to have
crumbled away. We oannot affirm that if the religious unity of Europe
had continued, these or equally brilliant achievements would have been
realised. Either religious unity or religious division may coincide
with cultural efflorescence or cultural decay,-*-
This rather negative appraisal of Dawson's analysis of the oauses
of the modern crisis points to the necessity of raising some additional
questions about the validity of the solutions Dawson proposes for meeting
the present world crisis. As we have already noted, the analysis of the
caxsses of any crisis greatly conditions one's attitude toward the type of
2
remedy that is required. Since Dawson traces the disintegration of modern
times to the disruption of the medieval unity, ha naturally longs for a
recovery of that religious unity as a basis for the reintegration of our
oivilization. This, for Dawson, seems to involve a return to the Roman
Catholio Church, But, according to Dawson's more general analysis, what
is needed most is not an external, legal conformity, but inner, spiritual
change arid regeneration at the springs of personal and social life - at the
"deeper levels of human consciousness,"** Would not the return to Catholicism
that Dawson advooates be an example of the more external and legalistic
solution to the problem? May we not rightly claim that Protestantism is
much more oapable of effecting the type of spiritual change that Dawson
desires? In speaking of the popularity of political and economic panaoeas,
Dawson cautions that "a purely praotical and opportu ist system. • • is
insufficient, . . But does not Dawson's proposal for the return to
Catholicism smack too much of suoh praotical and opportu istic solutions?
'Sjotes Toward the Definition of Culture, p. 10
2
Tillich, for instance, sees modern disintegration largely as a consequence
of the capitalistic spirit and naturally, therefore, looks to Religious
Socialism as an answer to this situation,
5"The Renewal of Civlization," Peace Aims Pamphlet (London* National
Peace Counoil, 19k3» P*
^"Inter-racial Cooperation as a Factor, (etc.)", p. 9.
295
Dawson is critical of The united Nations and of present schemes for Yiorld
Government because of their external and abstract framework and their denial
of the oultural and religious foundations for unity, What is needed, he
believes, is "not a new state machine, but new men and a new spirit
Similarly, could we not say that what is neede- is not a new totalitarian
Church, but new men and e new spirit? Of course, w® would recognize with¬
out hesitation that the Church should be the agent for the omotion of new
men with a new spirit, but would insist, nevertheless, that a Church which
requires legal conformity and external obedience is not the best channel
for the invasion of the divine spirit, Protestants, too, long for the day
when there shall be "One Lord, One Faith, and One Church" but do not believe
that external obedienoe to a heteronomous institution is the way this shall
be achieved,
2. Protestant Criplticism of Roman Catholicism
On the whole, however, it is difficult to criticize Dawson's
Roman Catholic position - ©specially in the usual Protestant fashion, for
Dawson either admits the validity of these criticism*or rises above them,
Roman Catholicism is usually o itioized, for instance, as forsaking its
distinctive spiritual vocation in its quest for political power. As
Arnold Toyribee points out, the Papacy's downfall was deserved because "it
failea giWiously to live up to its own sublime ideals. It had betrayed
its principles, first in order to fight for power, and thon in order to
p
raise the funds that are in indispensible sinews of worldly warfare,
Paul Blanchard exhaustively documents ways in which the Roman Catholic
3
quest for power is a present reality as well as an historical fact,
"^Enquiries (etc.), p. 19•
2
Toynoee's review of Dawson's Religion end the Rise of Western Culture,
p. 5 f.
X
-'Communism, Democracy, and Catholie Power (Bostons The Beacon Press,
1951). "
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Similarly Tillich, speaking of the Roman hierarchy, says
It is an international power, playing the international power
game, fighting for the preservation of every stronghold and for
the conquest of new positions of power.
But whether or not these criticism*are justified, Dawson at least is
oarefiil to indicate that this is not his view of the proper funotion of
the Church. He severely oritioises the attempt of the Church to wield
worldly and political power. As he writes.
Whenever the Church has seemed to dominate the world politically and
achieves a victory within the secular sphere, she has had to pay forit in a double measure of temporal and spiritual misfortune. Thus
the triumph of the Orthodox ^hurch in. the Byzantine Empire was followed
first by the loss of the Cast to Islam and then by the schism with
the West. The medieval attempt to c -eate a Christian theocracy was
followed by the Renaissance and the destruction of the religious
unity of WTestorn Europe. ...
And again.
It is notorious that ecclesiastics often make the most unscrupulous
politicians, as we see in the case of Wolsey, Richelieu, Mazzarin,
and Alberoni, and in the same way the political parties which adopt
religious programs. . • have always distinguished themselves by their
fanaticism and violences in faot by a general lack of all the politi -
cal virtues. Political religion is an offence alike to religion and
to politics: it takes from Caesar what belongs to him of right and
fills the temple with the noise and dust of the market place.''
Dawson believes in putting the stress instead on religion as a spiritual
power operating from within and transforming social life "not by competing
with secular politics on their own ground but by altering the foous of
human thought. . . Although he believes that the Church is ultimately
the greatest power in the world and that it will ultimately be victorious,
its power and victory are not manifested openly and visibly, but rather
"The Christian Churches and Europe," p. 33h»
p
Religion and the Modern State, pp. 120 f.
5Ibid., pp. 122 f.
*+Ibid., p. 123.
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secretly and obscurely through apparent defeat and persecution.*®"
Again, it is thought by many Protestants that the Roman Catholic
quest for power is an attempt to construct a theocracy in which the Church
rules supreme over the State. Tillich, for instance, criticizes the
Roman Cathold demand
that the hierarchically constituted Church should direct the entire
religiously relevant life of the people. The ultimate consequence
of this demand is the medieval belief - and it has never yet been
given up - that every political hierarohy must subordinate itself to
the spiritual and priestly authority.2
Dawson admits thBt the ecclesiastics of the Middle Ages wrongly sought for
a theocratic society and that this quest in turn W83 a factor giving rise
x
to the Reformation. Although he does not renounce the idea that the
spiritual principle should reign supreme over the political principle,
Dawson does believe that Church and State should not be fused. F.&ch has,
aocording to Dawson,
its own formal principle without which it would not be itself. The
State exists for the people, and by the people, but the Church exists
for the Divine Word and the Spirit of which it is the Organ.^
The ideal arrangement, therefore, is an autonomous spiritual society
co-e dating with the national political units "without either absorbing
3
or being absorbed by them. In pl&oe of theocracy, the$, Dawson believes
in a dualism between Church ani State. The tension and friction between the
two is, he believes, a healthy one, for Church and State need to cross swords
in order to maintafii their vitality. Dawson believes that such a dualism was
■n '■ ■■■-— - 1 ——
Beyond °olitics, p. 130j The Kingdom of God and History, p. 216.
^"The Totalitarian State and the Claims of the Church, "p. l£2. As
Visser T*Eooft puts it, Roman Catholicism believes in a separation of the
Church from the State but not in a separation of the State from the Churoh
(The Church and the World Society, p. 6l). Theooracy is perhaps a misleading
d"esignation"T"or~ eocTesTasTioal domination since it can also indicate a Church-
State in which the State dominates (as in Byzantium). "Eoclesioorscy" is per¬
haps a better designation, as used by John Baillie in What is Christian
Civilization?, p. 2li.
"Progress and Religion, p. llfi,
^■Beyond Politics, p. 91
^Progress and Religion, p. 21*9 •
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the very foundation cf the medieval achievement. Beoause the Church in
the Yfest was an autonomous order it was able to survive the collapse of the
Western Empire. The Church of the Byzantine East, on the other hand, was
so olosely inter-twined with the Empire that "it formed a single social
organism which could not be divided without being destroyed."^
A correlative oriticism of Roman Catholicism is that it condones
the use of force and coercion in upholding what it conceives to be true
and that it discourages autonomous oreativity. This is probably Tillichts
major criticism of Roman Catholicism. Again, whether or not this oriticism
is justified, Dawson has no hesitation about upholding the rights of full
religious freedom and autonomous oreativity. H© admits that the late
medieval inquisition was a black spot in the history of the Church and
that the Church*s activity here was far less enlightened than anything in
2
the darkest period of the Dark Ages. But although Dawson recognizes that
Catholicism has been criticized for its failure to grant religious freedom,
he believes that suoh a oriticism of contemporary Roman Catholicism is un¬
fair.^ His own view of the polarity of life necessitates that he acknow¬
ledge that differing spiritual traditions make a definite contribution to
sooial vitality and progress. He believes, therefore, that it is unjust to
deprive any sect or religious body of free expression in education and sooial
life.^1 As he says, "only a bigot can demand that the mind of every man
should be forced into the same mould, irrespective of the spiritual tradition
to whioh he belongs."^ Dawson insists that the autonomous values of culture
must be recognized and protected.
—
The Making of Europe, pp. ij6, 185.
^"Medieval Christianity," p. 26.
^The Judgment of the Nations, p. 111*.
^Enquiries (eto»), p. 62j The Judgment of the Nations, p. lll».
^Idem. It might be noted that this viewpoint comes from an English
Roman Catholic living in a country where Catholicism has had to struggle for
its freedom. In countries where Reman Catholics dominate, they quite often
speak differently in reference to minority groups.
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Again, Roman Catholicism is frequently criticised as producing
too complete an identification of religion and culture. As Tillioh sees it,
Catholioism gives unconditional significance to certain limited and particu¬
lar cultural formsi it idealised a particular philosophy or a particular
political form as an absolute,* Such prooeedure necessarily involves, he
believes, the denial of the right of autonomous cultural forms to develop
according to their own laws. But Dawson is not guilty of thi3 error. He
reoognizes the value of autonomous forms, as we have seen, and realizes
that religion should not "lord it over" oulture. His view seems to be
that religion should inspire the cultural forms from within, and use these
forms without abusing them. And further, as we saw, Dawson does not believe
that any partioular oulture (such as that of the Middle Ages) is the complete
expression of Christianity,
And finally, Roman Catholicism is frequently criticized by
Protestants as mistakenly identifying the Church with the Kingdom of God
or at least considering the Church to be a visible manifestation of the
ultimate Kingdom, As a result, according to Karl Heim, the fruitful tension
is lost between the ultim te Kingdom and the limited and finite Church, This
in turn tends to obsoure the contrast and distinction between the Church
and the world. To put it in doctrinal terms, the contrast between Roman
Catholicism and Protestantism can best be seen, according to Heim, in the
2
differing evaluations given to the Resurreotion, Roman Catholioism sees
the Resurrection as a visible manifestation of power - a miraculous speotaole
designed to rehabilitate Christ in the eyes of the world. But for Protes¬
tantism, says Heim, the Resurreotion is not an infallible proof of Christ's
Systematic Theology, I, 28,
^Spirit and Truth (London: Lutterworth Press, 1935)# PP» 78 ff•
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claim for Lordship but is an added apologetic difficulty that only serves
to heighten the tension between the gospel and the world. The practical
consequences of this difference in doctrine ere that in the Roman Catholic
view, the victory of Christ*s resurrection is carried on and enforced by
the omnipotent, infallible Church as the agent of Christ*s victorious power
over the world. But in the Protestant view, «6 Heim sees it, Christ has
not yet won the final victoryj Re is still at work battling his foes. There¬
fore the historical tension between the Kingdom end the Church (and the Churoh
and the world) remains and, in fact, increases as the end of history draws
near.*' According to this view, the Catholic claim for worldly power and
dominion is the ultimate sinful pretention. Through its identification of
the Churoh with the ultimate Kingdom Catholicism thus, to quote Reinhold
Neibuhr, "consistently obscures the contradiction between the historical
2
and the divine. • • • The result is that the ultimate Kingdom of per¬
fection becomes domesticated into a Kingdom of this world, and the
transcendence end otherness of the divine in its judgment upon the -teorld
is hopelessly blurred.
But again, Dawson does not leave himself open to this criticism,
at least not in its fullest force. Following St, Augustine's tension
between the City of God and the City of Earth, Dawson consistently main¬
tains the transcendonce of the divine. Accordingly, the City of God, he
believes, can never be identified with the visible, hierarchical Churoh
3
nor v/ith the concrete millenial Kingdom of the old apocalyptic tradition.
It is difficult in all of this to say how closely Dawson follows the
^Karl Heim, Spirit and Truth, pp. 86 ff.
2Faith and History, p. 299.
Enquiries (etc.) p. Yet Dawson does seam to follow Augustine
in identifying the Church with the millenial Kingdom so that the prophecies
of this Kingdom are believed to have been fulfilled im the Church (The King¬
dom of God and History, p. 206| Enquiries, p. 255). And further, although
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traditional Roman Catholic view. But at least he does not dissolve the
tension between the conditional and the unconditional. Although he sees
the Church as in some ways the visible manifestation of the Kingdom, his
major emphasis is on the distinction and tension between the two. Bven
though he says that the society cf the Churoh "is the only Kingdom of God
on earth that we have any right to look for. • • .wl he insists with equal
p
vigor that it is not the Kingdom of Christ or the City of God#
These observations along with what we have already noted concern¬
ing Tillich's immunity to the usual Catholic criticisms of the Protestant-
position suggest that in Tillich and Dawson we are dealing with represent¬
atives of the two great Christian traditions who are large-minded enough to
transoend many of the limitations of their particular traditions and to
appreciate the unique contributions and dynamio elements in each other's
faiths. This in turn gives hope for the possibility of an ecumenioal
interpretation of history incorporating Catholic as well as Protestant
elements. Our survey will close, in the next chapter, with a discussion
of the possiblities and conditions of such a development#
the Church is not; £o' be idendfiea with the ultimte City of God it is, he
says, certainly not to be separated from it ('inquiries, p, 2I48)# The Church,
although not the City of God, is the visible, sacramental organ of it ("The
Christian View of History," p. 319)# and the Church and the Kingdan are
organically related since the Church is "the future Kingdom in embryo"
(Christianity and the Hew Age, p. 8i;)»




PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC ELEMENTS IN TILLICH AND DAWSON
Tillich and Dawson, as we have seen, are representatives of
two great branches of the Christian faith who, although steeped in their
own traditions and completely loyal to tJiem, have sufficient breadth and
olarity to transcend sane of their limitations. In the various levels
of social and historical analysis as well as in philosophical and theolog-
ioal doctrines we have noted many comparisons. Although the oontrasts at
times are sharp, t, he similarities ere far more prominant.
One basic reason for these similarities is the fact that in
Tillich we have a Protestant who is much more metaphysicially and lifcur-
gically-minded than most Protestants and in Dawson we have a Roman Catholic
who is less Thomistic and much more Augustinian than most Catholics. A
brief analysis of these factors will lead us to a discussion of how an
interpretation of history satisfactory to the modern mind must inolude
Catholic and Protestant elements mutually re-inforeing (and mutually
criticizing) one another.
1. Reason and Metaphysics
Tillioh^ concern with metaphysics has resulted in a recovery
of ideas and ooncepts which have usually been regarded as more typically
Catholic. It is not surprising, therefore, to find Tillich and Dawson
converging at a good many points in the philosophical basis for their
respective interpretations of history.
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An emphasis upon metaphysics carries with it the demand for a
higher evaluation of reason than is usually found in Protestant thought,
especially when reason is regarded, as in Tillich, as the very structure
of reality.
New products of the historical process are attempts which can succeed
only if they follow the demands of objective reason. Neither nature
nor history can create anything that contradicts reason. The new and
the old in history and nature are bound together in an overwhelming
rational unity, • . . The new does not break this unity; it cannot
because objective reason is the structural possibility, the logos of
being,1
Dawson's appraisal of reason is no leas lofty.
For reason is itself a creative power which is ever organising the
raw material of life and sensible experience into trie ordered cosmos
of an intelligible world - a world which is not a mere subjeotive
image but corresponds in a certain measure to objeotive reality.
And the type of human reason praised - the type that corresponds to this
basic reasonable structure of objective reality - is for both authors
not the discursive reason associated with rationalism and skepticism, but
something far deeper. It is not, as in Tillich's terminology, "technioel
reason" concerned with the discovery of means (the parent of "controlling
knowledge"), for this loses the depth and universality of being, "Reason¬
ing" thus separated from reason in its classical sense (concerned with ends)
becomes a tool for non-rational purposes such as the will to power. This
k
leads in turn to the de-humanization of man. The type of human reason
— 1 1
^Systematic Theology, I, 79*
^The Age of the Gods, p. xix.
•^Systematic Theology, I, 72-75* 82•
^Ibld., p, 73* Dawson similarly notes that "The abandonment of the
higher knowledge of the pure intellect for that of the discursive reason has
inevitably led on to t he descent from rationalism to mflterialism, and so to
that final stage of degradation, representated in different ways by pragma¬
tism, vitalism, and behaviourism, in which the mind abdicates its sovereignty,
and the obscure forces of unoonscious impulse reign supreme" ("The Revolt of
the East," p»6).
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praised is, to borrow Tillioh's terns again, "ontological (or subjective)
reason" -which has the possibility of transcending iself and confronting
the logos structure of reality; it is "the structure of the mind whioh
enables the mind to grasp and to transform reality."^ For both authors
this type of reason has more kinship with the intellectua of the schoolmen
and points to a deeper knowledge of reality through intuition, initiation,
vital communion, and immediate awareness - in short, through what Tillioh
2
calls an eros relationship# Both men therefore lament the current attack
on reason and the judgment that reason is an instrument of pride that only
widens the gulf between man and God. Tillich for instance believes in "the
elevation of reason as the principle of truth above all forms of authori¬
tarianism and obscurantism#"^ As he says.
This is a truly Christian issue even if it be fought out largely in
humanistic terms# Christian faith which proclaims Christ as "Logos"
cannot reject reason as the principle offtruth and justice."^
This high evaluation of reason in both authors naturally leads to
a tendenoy to give greater consideration to the place of Natural Theology#
Although Tillioh believes that "Natural Theology" itself is a misnomer
(since there is no "natural" knowledge of God apart from revelation), he
5
insists that reason is indispensible in the construction of theology#
While rejecting the Natural Theology of the Enlightenment, he believes that
6
its motive and intention were essentially sound# Reason, although not
able to disoovor theological truth or construct "proofs" of God's existence
^Systematic Theology, I, p« 72.
^Tillioht "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," p# 10f The Protes¬
tant Bra, p. 72| "Existential Philosophy," p. 67* Dawsont Religion and
(iuliure, pp. 33 f •» Progress and Religion, p# 26.
—-—r~ —
"The World Situation," in The Christian Answer, p. 70.
4Idem#i See also Systematic Theology, I, 155*
^Systematic Theology, I, 119 f•» "What is Wrong with the Dialectical
Theologyp. lijD.
^"Natural and Revealed Religion," pp. 166 fj "The World Situation,"
in The Christian Answer, p. 65•
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through arguments from analogy, is needed to analyze the human predicament
and to describe the undonditional elements in man, nature, and history.*
Its role is to provide existential questions and to show how human finitude
points beyond itself. Thus, although it oannot construct adequate theolog¬
ical answers, it does provide the needed questions without which the answers
2
given through revelation would be meaningless.
Although Dawson approaches the subject from a different angle and
speaks of Natural Theology as important for an understanding of the religious
aspects of -the world cultures, some of his conclusions abojt Natural Theology
are similar. With Tillich, Dawson rejeots the attempt of the philosophers
of the Enlightenment "to make Natural Theology the autonomous principle of
a purely rational religion."^ Whenever it has appeared, even outside of
Christianity, Natural Theology has always been preceded by a revealea theology
and has derived from a supernatural and historical faith. And within
Christian civilization, it has always existed, Dawson maintains, as a part
h
of the total Christian tradition. This dependency upon an historical faith,
however, does not negate its distinctive role. As we indicated, Dawson
sees its importance more in terms of its contribution to cultural analyses
than as a preparation for the reception of revelation (as with Tillich).
Natural Theology, he believes, is needed to aid in classifying fend inter-
5
preting the natural knowledge of God possessed by the human mind which
is experienced and expressed variously in different cultures. Seen in this
*"The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," p. 12
^"The Present Theological Situation," p. 305. Tillich comments, however,
that the ability to raise questions about the ultimate rests itself upon
prior revelation.
^Religion and Culture, p. 9*
IT —;
Ibid., pp. 3»k,U5 f.
^Here Dawson seems to be at odds with Tillich who believes that suoh
natural knowedge of God is impossible. Dawson's statement about the priority
of historical, revealed faith to Natural Theology, may, however, indicate
that the difference is not as great as it first appears.
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light, Natural Theology becomes a corrective to the study of Comparative
Religions so that the latter does not degenerate into a branch of anthro¬
pology. Its task is "to interpret the superoulturnl erri purely religious
elements that are contained in the hieroglyphs of ritual and myth" so that
religious pheonomena may be explained in purely religious terms end not just
anthropologically
Nevertheless both authors, although stressing the role of
human reason in opposition to current theological and philosophical tronds,
concur in placing certain limitations upon its possibilities. Tillich
indioates that reason, although aware of unconditional elements, is defin¬
itely finite. It has, he believes, inner contradictions which it cannot
2
overcome and therefore stands in need of salvation. According to Tillich,
human knowledge oannot attain the vantage point of "the absolute position
of the knowing subjeot" but is always existentially involved in history.-'
Tillioh agress with Schelling in the analysis that "Consciousness is not
oapable of turning freely to the eternal forms at all times" but is rather
a battlefield of demonic and divine fiorces.^
Similarly Dawson, following Aquinas, oeyo that "human intelligence
is not that of a pure spirit" and that "man cannot attain in this life to
the direct intuition of truth and spiritual reality,"-' "Man," as he
says elsewhere, "possesses a kind of knowledge whioh transcends the
,.6
sensible without reaching the intuition of the divine. Dawson is
therefore hostile to all arid, rationalistic approaches to God and
^"Religion and Culture, p. 61
2 J '
Systematic Theology, i, 81, 105, 155•
\ha Interpretation of History, pp. 63# 13^4# 150# 173 f.#191
^Ibid.# p. lip.
-'Progress and Religion, p. 173 *"•
^Christianity and the New Age, p. 33*
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frequently quotes Pascal's declaration of faith as his owni "Not the
God of philosophers and savants, but the God of Abraham, Isaac, and
Jaoob."1
One further way in vdiich a high appraisal of reason brings
both authors together is in their mutual desire to seo the gap bridged
between Theology and Philosophy, Tillioh, as we have seen, lays great
stress on the correlation of philosophical questions with theological answers,
Dawson, although not expressing it this way, believes with equal conviction
that the breach between theology (the world of hifcorioal religion) and
philosophy (the world of rational thought) is tragio. On the one hand he
sees the religious -world vdth all its richness deprived of means of cultural
expression and on the other hand the world of rational thought, laoking
meaningful consecration and direction, coming under the domination of
negative and destructive forces. The result is a oonfliot between "scienoe
without significance and the spirit which can only express itself in self-
3destruction," But this dualism is not necessarily final, Dawson believes
that it can be overcome through a oonstruotive union of the two areas on
h
the basis of a conmon intellects lism.
■Regardless of these observations it must bo noted that Dawson's em¬
phasis is more upon the continuity between reason and revelation (following
the Thomistio oonoeption of reason as the principle by which the intelligible
world oan be built up gradually through the senses). As finally supplemented
by graee and revelation, reason is not destroyed but completed (Progress and
Religion, pp. Yjh ff •)« Tillicb on the other hand, while agreeing that
reason is not destroyed by revelation and that revelation makes its appeal
to reason, puts more enphasis on the discontinuity between the two. The
best that reason con do is not to lead to the divine by climbing upward but
rather to lead to the abyss where one confronts the ontologicBl shock and the
stigma of non-being. The inner conflicts and contradictions of reason create
radioal questioning that drives one to the quest for revelation. Reason is
thus not so muoh supplemented and lifted to a highsr stage by revelation as
it is altogether 3aved and re-established,
^Religion and Culture, pp. 20 f., I4I4.
^Ibid,, p. 21; Progress and Religion, pp. 233 f»# %h7 fl# Enquiries,p. 70*
^Enquiries,frfcc,)p. 156; Religion and Culture, p. 217, Natural Theology,
Dawson believes, is an indispensible link between the two, although not
itself able to bridge the gap (Religion sod Culture, p, 1|I+).
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2, Ontology
The emphasis whioh Tillich places upon the ontological approach
results in the development of many concepts reminiscent of medieval or
early Catholicism so that again it is not surprising to find the two
authori agreeing on a wide variety of topics.
The emphasis upon God as Being which we noted in Tillich also
finds articulation in Dawson's t hought, Dawson even occasionally uses
the concept "Ground" which is so central in Tillich's thought, He speaks
for instance of "the ground of the soul" - that deeper psychological level
"to which sensible images and the activity of the discursive reason cannot
penetrate."* Elsewhere he comments that
all of the great traditions of the world religions. • • unite in
asserting the presence of God in the d pths of the soul as its
eternal transcendent 'ground.*2
Dawson, like Tillich, is eager to transcend the Cartesian split between
subject and objeot, spirit and matter. Both authors thus have affinities
with the mystical tradition (especially in its Germanic forms) based on
the obsoure knowledge of God in the depth of the human soul. Tillich
would conour with Dawson in the observation that this basic intuition of
God
provides a far more satisfactory basis for an explanation of the
faots of religious experience. . . than a theory which leaves no
place for any experience of spiritual reality, except a merely
inferential knowledge on the one hand and on the other a revelation
which is entirely derived from supernatural faith and has no natural
psychological basis.^
Nevertheless, both Tillich and Dawson are careful to indicate that any
mystical union with God is ultimately dependent upon God Himself and not
upon any inherent quality of the soul.^
""
1 — — —
Enquiries, p. 195• Cf. Tillich's doctrine of t>e Unvordenkliche.
2
Religion and Culture, p. 32#
x
•^Enquiries, p. 197.
^Dawsoni Enquirles, p. 19JU f| Tillichi Review of Meister Eckhart, p. 662.
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We have noted prviously Dawson's early interest in the mystics
and his recognition of the impact upon his -thought of suoh writers as
St. Bonaventura, St. John of the Cross, St. Theresa, arid the seventeenth-
century Frenoh mystics. Dawson, by the way, oalls attention to the fact
that there is a traditional link between mysticism and the Christian (and
post-Christian) philosophies of history and comments that this is no doubt
1
largely responsible for his own interest in the interpretation of history.
The link between mystioism and philosophy of history would seem to be
German Romanticism, according to Dawson*s analysis given elsewhere, through
which the mystical intuition and imaginative vision entered into the thought
O
of Fichte, Sohelling, and Hegel. If so, Tillieh's thought has similar roots.
Another aspect of the ontolcgical approach is the emphasis in both
authors upon love as an ontological power. Tillioh feels that Protestant¬
ism has too often oonsidered love as an emotional or moralistic foroe and
has failed to see it as a power that penetrates every moment of reality.
Love, according to Tillioh, is the movement of the life process itself in
its transition from original unity through self-estrangement to reconollia-
3
tion. Following the young Hegel, Tillich shows how "life duplicates itself
in love, creating the other and reuniting him with itself."^ In this
sense love constitutes being as such and is the essence of all life. Although
Tillich includes in his definition of love the element of separation through
which the new comes into being, he stresses love's uniting power and calls
love "the reality of reconciliation."
The richness of life is based on the possibility of infinite contra¬
diction and separations, but only if they are reconciled and do not
destroy the original unity. Love in this sense constitutes being.
Being is synthesis, namely the synthesis of love.5
T"——-— -
^Letter from Dawson to the writer, January, 1952
^Progress and Religion, pp. 25 f.
^Propositions, IV, p.7l Systematic Theology, i, 279 "The Protestant
Vision," pp. 9 fVThe Protestant Era, p. xli; Tfie Shaking of the Foundations
pp. 110 ff. This definition includes all the various types of love and trah-
scends the distinction between eros and agape.
^"Estrangement and Reconciliation in Modern Thought," p.9 Idem.
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Dawson similarly speaks of how love lost its numinous quality
and, especially by the Protestant seots, has been degraded into a sentimental
platitutde or a moralistic social benefioenoe "tainted with the suggestion
of social patronage and ethical self-satisfaction."^" As a counter to this,
Dawson speaks of love as a dynamic spiritual power that is able to unmake
and remake the human personality. Following what he believes to be St.
Paul's view on love, Dawson declares that
It is no human power or moral quality, but a supernatural energy
that transforms human nature end builds a new humanity.^
Thus, although Dawson does not see love es an integrating principle in
a whole system of various levels of estrangement and reoonoiliatfcn, he does
agree with Tillioh in seeing the need for a more comprehensive definition
of love whioh includes numinous elements of power oonneoted with the very
nature of being.
Another facet of the ontological approaoh is the basio unity of
life which both Tillich and Dawson stress. For Tillioh as well as for
Dawson, this involves almost a hierarchical ordering of being and value
in which everything has its plaoe in a vast system of inter-relationships.
Some of the implications of this are seen in such widely-divergent ideas
as» man as a microoosm of the universe, the mutual involvement of man,
nature,and history in tragedy and the quest for salvation, the perception of
spiritual elements in secular movements, the analysis of style as a reflection
of hidden spiritual insights and longings, and the dootrine of the return
of all things to their source. These have already been disoussed and need
not be elaborated here.
The centrality of being for both authors also involves, as we
saw, an ontologicsl conception of Christ's person and work. This is ex¬
pressed for Tillioh in his dootrine of the Hew Being and in Dawson involves
^•Enquiries, (etc.) , p. 298
^Idem.
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analogous formulae. It also no doubt aoeounts for the value both
authors place upon the Johannine identification of Christ and the
Logo s
3. Eoclesiology
Perhaps the area of Tillioh's thought which brings him into
closest approximation with Roman Catholicism is his stress on the im¬
portance of the Churoh and its liturgy and sacraments. Although having
a different oonoeption of the Church, especially as concerns its author¬
itarian and institutional form, Tillioh insists as strongly as any Roman
Catholic that the Church is the home of all true Christian theology.
The theologian who attempts to spin theology out of his own experience or
wisdom, Tillioh believes, will only produce subjective ideas and private
opinions. Christian theology, as well as the Christian interpretation
of his ory, is "the methodical self-interpretation of the Christian
2
Churoh. ..." The failure to see this has been, Tillioh believes,
one of the great errors of Protestant individualism and subjeetivism.
Tillioh, with Dawson, believes that we must recover the corporate aspeots
of Christianity and put greater weight on the Churoh as an objective
spiritual reality. Over against all nominalistio views of the Churoh as
an association created through the deoision of like-minded individuals,
Tillleh insists, as we have seen, that the Church antecedes individual
3
piety and is not the result of it.
Further parallels may be drawn between Tillich's conception
of the Churoh as the "bearer of history" and Dawson's idea of the Churoh
as a bearer of a living tradition which produces historical consciousness.
y "
*Dawsont Christianity and the Sew Age, pp. 85 f. j Tillichi Systematic
Theology, I, 1^-18.
—
"The Problem of Theological Method," The Journal of Religion (jan-
uaiy, 19b7)» XXVII, 19l See alsoi The Kingdom of God and History,'p. 129l
The Interpretation of History, p. iilj Systematic Theology, I, I48
2"A Re-Interpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation," p. li*7«
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The Church, according to Tillich, is ideally a "Gestalt of Grace" (a
medium through -which Grace is revealed) although it should never be
identified with that Graced As Tillioh sees it. Protestantism must have
this substantial base in order to make its protest effective and real.
Again, both men agree that the Church is the ultimately triumphant
prinoiple of society. Says Tillioh,
Although the Church can be distorted in existenoe it cannot be
destroyed in its being and meaning since it is based in the new
Being which has overcome existenoe.2
As a oorrolary to this doctrine of the Church, Tillich places
a high evaluation on the saeraments and has been one of the leaders in
the movement to rooover this negleotsd aspect of the Christian tradition.
Too muoh emphasis has been plaoed, Tillich believes, on the conscious and
rationalized aspects of Christianity. The continual demand for conscious
decisions in conformity with conscience has been, as we saw, one of the
3
factors leading to an ino ease of mental disorder in Protestant oountires.-
The lack of mystical emotion and concrete symbols that appeal to the deeper
levels of consciousness accounts, Tillich believes, for the failure of
Protestantism to reach and to hold the masses. Especially today, he
believes,
the masses that are disintegrated need symbols that are immediately
understandable v&thout the mediation of intellect. They need sacred
objectives beyond subjective quality of a preacher.*
Tillioh therefore goes even to the extent (which is remarkable for one
expelled from Nazi Germany for his political aotivism) of saying that
5
liturgy is more important today than any program of Christian aotion.
^The Protestant Bra, p. xxxvi.
^Propositions, Part V, p. 9* Dawson holds similarly that "the life
of the Church never fails, since it possesses an infinite capacity for
regeneration" (Christianity and the New Age, p. 111). But wheres Dawson
believes that "the Church that made Europe may yet be able to save Europe"
(The Modern Dilemma, p. 113), Tillich believes that it is not the Church
that is able to save society but only BeinS (The Interp. of Hist.p.225)
^Dawson, too, comments on the error of confining Christianity to
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Receiving from the eternal (and participating in the saoramental reality
of the New Being), says Tillioh, precedes action.^" It should be noted,
however, that Tillioh does not believe in a simple re-introduction of catholic
saoraments and symbols into Protestant worship (which would be nothing but
feeble imitation) but rather the creation of new forms of saoramental
expression growing out of the experience of the daily life. As Tillich
says.
It is not so important to produoe new liturgies as it is to pene¬
trate into the depths of what happens day by day, in labor and
industry, in marriage and friendship, in social relations and
recreation, in meditation end tranquility, in the unconsoious and
the consoious life. To elevate all this into the ligit of the eternal
is the great task of cultus and not to reshape a tradition tradition¬
ally,2
And further, it should be noted that Tillichfs concern for a recovery of
a strong sacramental element is conditioned by his emphasis upon the need
for prophetic oriticism as a corrective to -the abuses of magical sacra-
mentalism,
A convenient summary of the Catholic elements which Tillioh
feels must be recovered by Protestantism is given by Tillioh in his
conoept of the "Catholic substance,"^ This term includes most of the
elements we have been discussing! the emphasis upon the new reality (or
New Being), the sac aments, the need for tradition, authority, and symbols,
the Churoh as a "Gestalt of Grace," reason as a basio structure of reality,
and love as an ontological power overcoming existential separation,^ Tillioh
the inner world of conscience ("Concordats or~Thtac'ombs?H , p, 910). For a
good defense of the Protestant emphasis upon the necessity of conscious
moral decisions as the basis for faith over against Roman Catholic saera-
mentalism and mysticism, see Karl Heim, Spirit and Truth, pp. 113
**The Protestant Bra, p. 228,
^"Vertical end Horizontal Thinking," pp. 112 f•
2?he Protestant Bra, p. 219*
^Compare Dawson* s conoept cf Catholicism as a "living tradition."
^■"The Protestant Vision," pp. 8-12j The Protestant Bra, pp. 191, 197»
nIhe Present Thaologioal Situation," p. 308.
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believes that this "Catholic substance" has often been regarded as some¬
thing magical and that historically it has increasingly become "encased
■within an ever-hardening crust."* But, as Tillich goes on to say,
whenever 1he hardness and crust are broken through and the substanoe
becomes visible, it exeroises a peculiar fascinationj then we see what
w$s once the life-substance said inheritance of us all and what we have
now lost, end a dsep yearning awakens in us for the departed youth
of our culture.2
, Augustinianism
So far wo have been considering tho typically Catholic categories
behind the historical interpretations of our authors. We shall now survey
BOme of the aspeots of their thought more typically associated with
Protestant! sm.
It is not surprising to find a substantial amount of Augustin-
ianisra in Tillioh. The work of Augustine lies, of oourse, behind the whole
Lutheran tradition in which Tillioh stands. Tillioh is particularly in-
3
debted to August!ne*s ontology (being as good and evil as non-being),
his insight into the contradictions in existence and his conoept of love
as the power of overooming eiistential separation and re-uniting the whole
of disrupted existence,^ his correlation between empirical- freedom and
transcendent neoessity (which makes the fall both unavoidable and an act of
human freedom),^ and his doctrine of self-transcencfencein which there is an





The Protestant Bra, p. 191.
Idem.
?The Courage to Be, p. 115•
^"Estrangement and Reconciliation in Modern Thought," passimj "The
Courage to Be, p. 128.
^i'he Protestant Era, p. 250j The Theology of Paul Tillioh, p. 3ij2.
^Systematic Theology, ji, 207# "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion,
pp. 1, In "l*hat is Wrong with the Dialectical Theology?", p. lUO.
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The interesting thing to note is that Dawson, too, has been
considerably influenced by Augustinianism (in its apocalyptic, dualistic
form) and that this is no doubt one of the major reasons that his writings
are so acceptable to Protestant readers, Dawson lists St, Paul and St,
Augustine as among his two greatest spiritual teachers,
I oannot oall myself a Thomist in the strict sense, but rather
an Augustinian, and think my thought owes more to the theologians
than to the philosophersi above all to St, Paul,*
Although never direotly critical of ThQmism, Dawson does indicate some
of its shortcomings. He points out, for instanoe, that St. Thomas never
developed an adequate philosophy of history since he was too much under
the influence of Hellenic and Aristotelian traditions, Dawson himself
seeks to help remedy this situation through a stress upon the Biblical
2
and dualistic elements of the Augustininn tradition.
The one aspeot of Augustine's thought that ha3 most deeply
affected Dawson is his conception of the Two Cities which, as Dawson
points out, also had a great influence upai the Protestant Reformers,^
According to St, Augustine, two spiritual types of men (two wills or two
loves) produce two cities (or two types of society) - the city of man
built upon 89lf-love and self-will and the City of God built upon the
love and service of God, These two cities, says Augustine, have been
running their course through the ages behind the natural process of
social conflict and tension. As a substratum to the whole of history
there is therefore a deep spiritual dualism and conflict between the
two cities (primarily between the Church and the world) that gives history
^"Letter from Dawson to the writer, January, 1952,
p
"The Christian View of History," p, 5>13» The term Augustinianism
is used here with some hesitation. Augustine himself does not always
retain the "Augustiniax? dualism or tension, Tillioh criticizes his
doctrine of the millenium as being fulfilled in the Church as a tragic
failure to apply prophetic criticism widely enough (The Protestant Bra,
p. 26).
3fhe Kingdom of God and History, p. 209*
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its ultimate significance.1 Now this conflict, Dawson believes, is the
very essence of history and has assumed different forms throu^i the ages#
In the early history of the Church, for instance, It was a simple eonfliot
between the barbarians (as an external power) and the Church# Later in
the medieval sooiety it took -the form of a conflict between good and evil
2
within the Christian sooiety and within the Christian Church# Today the
confliot is as great as ever in relation to the spiritual forces of dark¬
ness against which the Church must struggle# But it would be a mistake
to see Augustine*s views solely in terms of this dualism and opposition#
An essential element in Auguatine*s thought Is, as Dawson points out, the
idea that history is a dynamic prooess in which the divine purpose
is progressively realised. Earthly history, then, is the City of God
in t he prooess of formation.'' Dawson's stress nevertheless, is on the
dualistio aspects of the Augustinian tradition. Although he believes
that the City of God is progressively realized in the course of the ages,
this prooess, as we saw in the last chapter, is secret and paradoxical,
not openly manifested or scientifically disoernible. The outward process
of history moves, in faot, toward a harvest of evil rather than the pro¬
gressive realization of the good#^ Evil, according to Dawson, flourishes
ri^ht up to the end of history when it will finally be separated at the
Last Judgment."* There is, further, no thought that man constructs this
City of God or that it is realizable within time, for, as Dawson says,
"The conflict between the two cities is as old as humanity and must endure
to the end of time."^ There is therefore in Dawson no rationalizing away
The Judgment of the Nations, p. 125» Enquiries, (etc.), pp. 2l+0 f.
"The Christian View of History," p. 317 •
'The kingdom of God and History, p. 205t Religion and the Rise of
Western Culture, p.
^"^he Christian View of History," p. 319; Enquiries (etc.), pp. 2i|6 f.
**Ibid., p. 315.
^Enquiries (etc.), p. 2I4I.
^Religion and the Modem State, p. 79*
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of the Augustinian oonflict as in th© medieval synthesisj Biblioal
eachatology is not eradicated in terms of Platonio idealism#
This Augustinian dualism is undoubtedly at the roots of a great
many more of the similarities "Thick we find between Dawson and Tillich#
It is probably responsible for Dawson's awareness of the discontinuity
of life and the place he makes in his thought for creative oonflict,
diversity, and polarity - the necessity for a healthy tension between
Church and State, religion and culture# It perhaps also accounts for
Dawson's perception of the demonic foroes and of the paradoxical action
of God in history, his retention of the prophetic and apocalyptic emphasis
upon the mystery and irrationality of historyIt would also seem to be
at the roots of Dawson's rejection, with Tillich, of the liberal view of
progress and his insistence, to the contrary, that history is a tragic
2
process with elements of uniqueness and spontaneity#
Further, Dawson's retention of the Augustinian dualism of
Church and world has consequences for the similarity between Tillich and
Dawson in their analyses of the relationship between religion and oulture.
Dawson eautions, as we have noted, that religion and culture should not
booomo identified# Thia means that every particular culture stands under
the divine judgment and that it must recognize its human limitations and
not attempt to "force its particular historical values into universal
3
divine truths." For religion on the other hand this means that the
element of transcendence is absolutely essential. Dawson notes, in fact,
Religion and the Modern S^ate, p. 80#
2
The apocalyptic element in the Augustinian tradition aocounts for
Dowoon'o rojootion of an optimistic view of history without becoming pessi¬
mistic or losing the element of eschatological hope,
3
Religion and Culture, p. 211.
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that as a general principle, the higher the religion the greater is its
"otherness." Christianity, even though the principle of life to civili¬
zation, must, as Newman warned, be "oontinuslly at issue vdth the world."^
Dawson stresses this because he believes that the Church has so often
failed at this point. Especially today in confronting the new Leviathans,
the Church must "once more take up her prophetio office and bear witness
to the Word even if it means the judgment of the nations and an open war
with the powers of the world
And finally, this Augustinian dualism seems to be the basis
for Dawson's rejection with Tillioh, of the idealistic interpretation
of history which, he believes, is at error beoause
it eliminates that sense of divine otherness and transcendence,
that sense of Divine Judgment and Divine Grace which are the very
essence of the Christian attitude to history.^
Dawson thus prefers, as we have seen, to oall his interpretation a
"theology of history" rather than a "philosophy of history" since the
latter too often indicates a rationalistic or idealistic construction.
Dawson's hostility to idealism, his preference for the theolog¬
ical and %blical approach, his awareness of the discontinuity of life and
the paradoxical aotion of God in history, and his stress upon the Jewish and
prophetio elements as over against the Greek metaphysical views brings him
perhaps into closer proximity than even Tillioh to some of the contemporary
Protestant emphases (as seen, for instance, in Barth and Brunner).-*
The Modern Dilemma, p. 111.
2
Dawson*s review, "Mr. T.S. Eliot on the Meaning of Culture," p. 155*
3
The Judgment of the Nations, p. 106.
^1'he Kingdom of God and History, p. 212.
Dawson nevertheless retains a large dose of Thomism in veiled form
as seen for instance in his conception of Grace as the agent for the
completion of nature, his view of the hierarchical ordering of the universe,
and his acceptance of the basic framework of the two orders of nature and
supemature.
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Th© prophetic strain in Dawson*s thought is so prominent,
V.A. Demant believes, that, upon surveying a number of figures in order
to form a comparison, he suggests that Dawson is most like Jeremiah.
Wot that there is anything gloomy about Mr. Dawson, as this
comparison might suggest to those who mislesdingly know the prophet
only as the sjcnbol of ruin; nor, of course, has Dawson's scholarly
urbanity any of the fierceness which struct terror into -the hearts
of those who heard the Old Testament seer. But there is a olose
affinity between the problem and the answer in their respective
messages. Both are speaking to a nation assured of its own good
standing with God and incredulous of any prediction of judgment.
Both insist upon the need to disentangle the hidden resources* of
religion from its external entanglements, especially its stifling
connection with the State. Both see the coming destruction of the
secular order, and teach that its only power of rejuvenation lies in
religious faith which has its roots elsewhere. What is probably
the most arresting coincidence is the confidence v&th which each
for his own generation knows what must be given up or helped to die,
because he knows what must be kept or recovered and built up into
a new structure.1
5. Towards An Ecumenical Interpretation of History
The crisis of our century has brought together some of the
keenest Roman Catholic and Protestant scholars in a mutual concern for
a meaningful interpretation of history. To date, there has been very
little collaboration, however, in the investigation of this problem.
Each communion has kept more or less to an elaboration of its traditional
approaches. The viewpoint of this writer is that both traditions have
indispensable elements to contribute to the construction of an interpre¬
tation of history. There is a pressing necessity for both "Catholio
substance" and the "Protestant prinoiple" - Catftolic substance inoluding
what we have referred to as the metaphysical, ontologies!, and ooclesiastioal
elements and the Protestant principle covering what we might call the more
Augustinian emphases on judgment, dualism, and prophetic criticism. These
two elements, as Tillioh points out, are not separate entities but rather
T
A Theolojgf of Society, p. 187.
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two faoets of the one greet Christian tradition.* "^here are not two
realities: here Catholicism and there Protestantism, but there is the
2
Catholic substance and the Protestant principle." And, as he says
elsewhere, "both of them represent historical forms of Christianity which
do not exhaust its full meaning."^ Perhaps Protestantism has over-emphasised
the Augustinian elements of discontinuity, dualism, and tension between
God and the world, nature and Grace, faith and reason, the Church and
culture, while Catholicism on the other hand has ever-emphasized the
concordance, basic unity, and continuity between these areas. The truth
perhaps lies between these extremes and requires some sort of dialectical
correlation.
In so important a realm a3 the relationship between religion
and culture there must, on the one hand, be such traditional catholio^
elements as the appreciation of culture end the desire to infuse it with
religious meaning. Culture must not be seen as an aspect of life alien¬
ated from God (as with the Barthians), but rather as having unlimited
potentiality for becoming transparent to the ultimate. Society and the
State need to be undergirded by spiritual power and brought into vital
relationship to the life of the Church. Yet, lest the Church succumb
to the temptation of taking society under its wing or wielding politioal
T
Putting it another way, Tillich states that Roman Catholicism has
emphasized the sacramental element - the holiness of what is given (i.e.
the holiness of being) whereas Protestantism has emphasized the eschato-
logioal, prophetic element - the holiness as demand (i.e. the holiness of
what ought to be). Neither type can live without the~~o"Eher, for both,
aooording to TTTlich,"represent historical forms of Christianity which
do not exhaust its full meaning" C*The Permanent Significance of the
Catholic Church," pp. 23-25.).
^"xhe Protestant Vision," p. 8.
^"The Permanent Significance of the Catholic Church," p. 25.
^he term "Catholic" instead of Roman Catholic is used deliberately
in this last section to convey the inclusion of Greek and Anglican forms
of thought and worship.
321
power heteronomoualy, thore is need for the Protestant protest.
Prophetic judgment is needed to keep the Church from becoming so closely
identified with sooiety ths-t it justifies and sanctions the "powers that
be" as final forms of the unconditional. Protestantism permits no pre¬
mature fusion of religion and culture into e stultifying heteronomy, nor
does it allow any final theocracy in which autonomous forms are brought
under the subjection of institutional religion. Religion must maintain
enough transcendence so aB to be able to challenge and change the soeial
order and bring judgment to bear upon every sooial achievement lest it
become idolatrous in its claim to perfection. In short, what is needed
(and this we have seen as central in both authors) is a view of the tran¬
scendent divine order as that whioh penetrates, but is not exhausted by,
the spatio-temporal order. This requires for the Church, then, in its
relationship with culture, both a radical attachement and a radical
detachement. This can be achieved only through a mutual reinforcement
of Protestant and Catholic elements.
The same principle applies to the understanding of Revelation
and its relation to the culture through which it is manifested. *We
again certain Catholic elements are required for a meaningful interpre¬
tation. Each culture, in its own way, must be seen as evidencing a
basio quest for Cod, v&th certain manifestations tht t may be appreciated as
anticipations of the Christ. This opens the way, if not for certain forms
of syncretism at least for seeing cultural history as a preparation for
final revelation. It makes possible the viewing of historical tradition
as embodying and expressing the New Being "before, in end after its final
manifestation in Jesus as the Christ."* Nevertheless, the obligation to
"The Present Theological Situation," p. 308•
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sae culture in this light must be coupled -with a reservation. The history
of revelation as taking place in and through cultural history must not be
misunderstood as indicating an equation of cultural history with revelation.
The Protestant principle alone can prevent tradition and the history of
revelation from beooming thus demonically distorted.
These considerations also have signifioanoe for the relation of
the Church to the historical process. The proper interpretation of history,
it would seem, requires an eocleseology in which the Church is seen as the
"bearer of history," having an historical continuity through the ages as
a social and sacramental reality. Only as a "Gestalt of grace" can the Church
meet the structural power of evil manifested in modern power-concentrations.
The Church, in brief, must be understood in its catholicity. Yet this high
eccleseology must be coupled with a radical judgment upon the existential
Church, lest history be regarded as "practically consummated in the existence
of the Churoh."^ The Protestant reservation requires that the "bearer of
history" designation be seen more as a demand than as a present reality.
The Churoh, in other words, is always striving toward - but never arriving
at - the embodiment of the grace of God in history.
Suoh a conception of the Church is rooted in the doctrine of the
"New Being" as the "center" of history. Catholicisim is right in rejecting
the Liberal Protestant attempt to construot a rationalized "historical Jesus"
as the center of history. This makes the Jesus of history subject to the
processes of historical criticism. The foundation of the Church must, in¬
stead, be Christ seen as the "New Being." This "New Being" as the center of
history is not at the mercy of the historical prooess or subject to the
j.
The Kingdom of God and History, p. 105.
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relativities of history but rather is One by whom history is constituted and
defined (in terms of meaningt beginning, center, and end). While appearing
within history. He oonquers the ambiguities of history and thus introduces
into history a new order of life embracing man's total being. This creates
in turn a new humanity which becomes the foundation of the Churoh.* Yet,
lest this New Being be regarded as possessed by the institutional Church and
contained within its sacraments so that it can be objectivated, controlled,
and dispensed as the Church sees fit, there is utmost need for the Prophetic
protest against all magioal saoramentalism. Here, supremely, the Protestant
principle guards against Catholic abuses.
And finally, both Protestant end Catholic elements are needed if
the consummation of history is to be seen realistically, avoiding both the
rationalization of history into a progressive approximation of the Kingdom
and the irrationalism which sees history as devoid of discernible meaning -
utterly paradoxical. A satisfactory view of the Kingdom demands a perspec¬
tive through which the present forms of society are seen as having some
organic relatedness to the coming Kingdom. The Kingdom of God must be
2
conceived as more than just an "abstract ethical ideal"j history must to
Some degree participate in the ultimate meaning disclosed at the end of
history. The Kingdom which lies beyond history must at the same time be
related to secular history - as its completion and fulfillment. The coming
Kingdom, in other words, must be interpreted as organioally related to the
existential, historical Church. All of this is more in keeping with a
Catholic approach. Yet the Protestant corrective is also essential. In
its stress upon the transcendence of the ultimate and the consequent
For Dawson's discussion of this see pages 183 f.
2
Dawson, Christianity and the New Age, pp. 68 f.
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refusal to allow the Kingdom to be identified (however correlated) with
the visible, hierarchical Church the Protestant principle guards against
the premature and prideful deification of the Church as we know it in
history. Only such a relationship betwen the relative and the absolute
in history can avoid, on the one hand, extreme apocalypticism (in which
meaning is forced abruptly upon history from the outside) and, on the other,
the simple identification of the Church and the Kingdom.
In all of these areas, as in the whole span of Christian doctrine
directly or indirectly connected with the interpretation of history there
is great need for mutual reinforoement (though not hollow ecleotic syn¬
thesis) of Protestant and Catholic thought. Elements of both traditions
brought into mutual interaction cannot help but produce an interpretation
of history superior to that found in either tradition. Brought into
proper focus, they would mutually supplement (and judge) one another, over¬
coming the half-truths and partial insights of each# Such en interpretation
of history would incorporate both philosophical and Biblical elements. It
would be at once saoramental and prophetic, stressing both the holiness
of present reality ("the holiness of being") as well as holiness as demand
("the holiness of what ought to be") - the "already" as well as the "not
yet." Neither tradition has sufficient resources (either philosophical,
historical, theological, or sociological) to do this alone. Both tradi¬
tions have tended to become hardened into pretentious systems each
claiming final validity# It is the opinion of this writer that Tillich
and Dawson oan show us the way out of this impaase and start us on the
road toward an interpretation of history that will be meaningful to the
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